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PREFACE 
Dr. Walter Henry Judd won the Republican nomination for 
the Fifth Congressional District in the Minnesota primaries 
of 1942. Winning the general election in November, he con-
tinued to occupy a seat in the United States House of 
Representatives for twenty years. In the House he soon 
emerged as the most vocal spokesman in Congress for Chiang 
Kai-shek and the importance of Asia in emerging world 9 £.:_, 
fairs. American foreign policy, particularly in Asia, served 
as the overriding interest of Judd's Congressional career. 
In 1947 Judd obtained a seat on the Foreign Affairs Committee 
and at the time of his defeat in 1962 he was the senior Re-
publican member of the ~ar East and the Pacific Subcommittee. 
Judd occupied a much more significant role in directing 
attention to East Asia and its many problems than any other 
single individual in Congress. 
Prior to entering politics in 1942, Judd had served as 
a Congregationalist medical missionary to China for ten 
years. In 1938, during the initial invasion of Northern 
China, the Japanese took over the large mission hospital 
which he had supervised but allowed him to leave the country. 
iii 
He returned to the United States, and that fall he began a 
two year lecture tour throughout the nation to warn Americans 
of the inherent danger of Japanese imperialism in Asia. 
Later Judd commented that there was no other way for him to 
help China except to return home and carry on the fight in 
the United States. Although he spoke eloquently, the results 
proved discouraging. In January, 1941, convinced that his 
mission had failed, Judd moved to Minneapolis and began to 
practice medicine again. He continued to speak locally on 
Asian problems, and had just finished a talk on December 7, 
1941, warning of imminent war with Japan when news came of 
the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. Suddenly the many 
addresses which he had made became tangible evidence to the 
people of Minnesota's Fifth District that indeed Judd was 
an expert on Asian affairs. Friends 'were convinced that Judd 
had the knowledge to be an effective war-time Congressman. 
The Cowles newspaper interest boomed him for Congress. 
Because of the unique role he played in dramatizing the 
urgency of reassessing· United States-Asian affairs, his 
significance is national rather than merely local. Irrespec-
tive of his prominence, historians of the most recent period 
in American history have either ignored Judd completely or 
have given him only brief mention even though he assumed a 
place of leadership within the Republican party for opposing 
iv 
the Truman-Marshall-Acheson diplomacy regarding East Asic1 .. 
This study is limited in scope to certain aspects of 
Judd's public life, particularly to the significant role he 
occupied in shaping attitudes and winning converts to his 
objectives regarding United States-China relations. The 
author has elected to deal with four general problems. The 
first seeks to explain how and why Judd gained the title of 
"expert" on matters Asiatic, and to test the validity of this 
title. The second attempts to ascertain the role Judd 
assumed in formulating a "revised" attitude in Congress 
regarding racial restrictions which resulted in the repeal 
of the Chinese Exclusion Act in 1943, and the passage of the 
Walter-McCarran Immigration and Naturalization Act of 1952. 
The third assesses Judd's role in formulating and disseminat-
ing the doctrines of the "new-isolationists" and "Asia-
Firsters" whose impact on foreign affairs during the late 
1940's and thereafter led to important modification in the 
Truman-Marshall-Acheson diplomacy. Fourthly, the author 
attempts to judge Judd's influence during the early months 
of the Republican Administration which came to power in 1953. 
This study has been based primarily upon a systematic 
examination of the Congressional Record, Senate and House 
hearings, reports, and miscellaneous documents, for the years 
( 
1939-1964. The speeches of Judd's appearing in Vital 
V 
Speeches of the Day, his addresses and writing reported and 
reproduced in the press, and references in general works 
were investigated in great detail. The Minneapolis press, 
especially the Tribune and Star, and the New York Times were 
most valuable sources of information. Due consideration was 
given to the nature and authors of articles, speeches, and 
comments which Judd read into the Cong~essional Record, and 
this consideration aided in evaluating Judd's position on 
contemporary affairs. 
The preparation of this thesis involved the help and 
encouragement of many people. Despite the advice, consulta-
tion, and material aid provided, the final presentation, 
idiosyncrasies, and conclusions are those of the author, and 
he takes full responsibility for any errors in factual or 
historical judgment that may appear in this study. The 
author cannot here acknowledge all indebtedness, but several 
individuals must be singled out. The writer wishes to ex-
press his sincere appreciation to the members of the doctoral 
advisory committee. Indebtedness is acknowledged to Dr. Sid-
ney D. Brown, who supervised the study from beginning to end, 
and whose interest, advice, guidance, and patience were in-
deed great. To Dr. Theodore Agnew special thanks are ex-
pressed for his having read the entire dissertation in rough 
draft form. Virtually all of his extremely valuable sugges-
tions were incorporated in the final draft. Sincere 
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appreciation is extended to Dr. Richard Jungers and Dr. John 
E. Susky for giving of their time whenever they were called 
upon. 
The author gratefully acknowledges the able assistance 
of the fourth floor staff of the Oklahoma State University 
Library, and especially the service of the Interlibrary Loan 
Department, for acquiring material vital for this study. 
Also particular appreciation is extended to Mr. Robert Lopez, 
Head Librarian of the Minneapolis~ and Tribune, who 
allowed the author free range of the library facilities, and 
for making available retired files. Special thanks are given 
to Mrs. Margarette Hanson, Library Researcher, and Mrs. Lola 
Anderson, Classifier, of the Minneapolis Star and Tribune 
library, for assisting in locating pertinent materials vital 
to the presentation of Judd's personal and public activities, 
and for answering an endless number of questions. 
To George R. and Erma M. Goodno, gratitude is extended 
for a unique challenge. Last, Judith Lynne is especially 
recognized, for reasons obvious to her and too personal to 
mention here. 
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CHAPTER I 
WALTER H. JUDD: A PROFILE 
On April 20, 1939, Dr. Walter Henry Judd, surgeon and 
recently returned medical missionary to China, testified 
before the United States House of Representatives Committee 
on Foreign Affairs on the inherent danger of the United 
1 States "appeasement" policy toward Japan. Five days later, 
on April 25, he appeared before the Senate Committee on 
Foreign Relations and gave similar testimony. 2 The testimony 
which he presented then and in succeeding days to various 
3 
congressional committees, plus the some fourteen hundred 
addresses which he delivered from 1939 to 1941 throughout 
1 U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, 
Hearings, American Neutrality Policy, 76th Cong., 1st Sess., 
1939, pp. 332-54. Hereafter cited as House Committee on 
Foreign Affairs, American Neutrality Policy Hearings, 1939. 
2 U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, 
Hearings, Neutrality, Peace Legislation, And Our Foreign 
Policy, 76th Cong., 1st Sess., 1939, pp. 295-320. Hereafter 
cited as: Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Neutrality, 
Peace Legislation, And Our Foreign Policy Hearings, 1939. 
3
congressional Quarterly, "GOP Keynoter Judd an Expert 
on Asian Policy," Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, 
XVIII, Part 2 (July 15, 1960), 1266. 
1 
2 
the country, landed Judd a congressional seat which he held 
for twenty years. His entry into the political arena result-
ed not so much from planned political strategy as from the 
December 7, 1941, tragedy of Pearl Harbor. This premeditated 
attack by Japan established Judd's reputation as prophet for 
all time. 
Judd was born in Rising City, Nebraska, on September 25, 
1898, the sixth of seven children of a retail lumberman, 
Horace Hunter Judd, and his wife, Mary Elizabeth Greenslit. 
Both parents were of English stock, and their ancestors had 
4 
come to America early to live in New England. Judd's grand-
parents migrated to the mid-west from New England about mid-
. h 5 n1neteent century. When the young Nebraskan manifested an 
interest in foreign missions, his actions were not unique in 
Judd family history, for the family had given Hawaii the man 
4Minneapolis Tribune, August 29, 1957; in 1692 a mater-
nal ancestor of Judd, Ann Pudeator of Salem Town, was hanged 
with eighteen other "witches" in Massachusetts. Another 
"witch", Giles Cory of Salem Village, at the same time was 
pressed to death. Fourteen of the reported "witches" were 
cleared of the crime by action of the General Court of 
Massachusetts Bay in 1711. Judd worked in 1957 with Repub-
lican leaders from Massachusetts "to clean a blot on the 
country," by lifting the remaining convictions. For further 
account see: Minneapolis Star, April 19, May 21, 1957; 
Minneapolis Tribune, August 29, 1957; Marion L. Starkey, The 
Devil in Massachusetts (Garden City, New York: Dolphin Books, 
Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1961), pp. 202-06. 
511 Biographical Information," Judd, Walter H., Vertical 
File, Minneapolis Star and Tribune Library, Minneapolis, 
Minnesota. 
who was probably its first medical missionary when Dr. 
Gerritt Parmalee Judd of Connecticut landed there in 1828. 6 
A fundamental religious faith appears to have been the 
center of the daily life of Horace and Mary Judd. The Con-
gregationalists of Rising City, where Judd attended grade 
school and high school, could not afford a full time or 
regular minister; but the church did not lack for volunteer 
leadership. Judd's mother, for one, regularly conducted 
3 
Sunday school classes. Years later, while speaking about his 
earlier days, Judd recalled the map of St. Paul's missionary 
journeys which hung on the wall of the Sunday school room. 
"Sunday after Sunday, year after year," he recalled, "there 
it was, the world staring me in the face. 117 
Judd has explained his decision to enter the foreign 
mission field in several ways; however, without doubt his 
mother's exhortation on Christian precepts and the map of 
St. Paul's sojourns influenced him, as did a YMCA conference, 
held in Lincoln during Judd's senior highschool year, which 
stressed the need of taking Christ to the benighted heathen 
61bid., AP Special Washington Service, "Minnesotans in 
Washington." 
7
stanley High, "Wanted~ More Men Like Judd," Readers 
Digest, L (May, 1947), 118: As condensed from The Missionary 
Herald, April, 1947. 
4 
of foreign lands. 8 Youthful reading was another factor. On 
one occasion Judd remarked that Ian Maclaren's book, Beside 
the Bonnie Brier Bush, a story of a selfless doctor, exerted 
the most influence on his selecting his life's work. 9 Wil-
bur Elston, a Minneapolis Star staff correspondent, reports 
that the life story of David Livingston exerted the influence 
on Judd which prompted him to prepare for the mission field: 0 
Other books which Judd felt influenced him greatly in decid-
ing his life's work included: The Virginian, by Owen Wister; 
and The Doctor and The Sky Pilot, both by Ralph Conner. Com-
menting on these books, he once said~ "I am so fond of these 
books that I still have them in my library. 1111 Despite the 
8This conference probably was the greatest single factor 
which led Judd to the China mission field. He cites this 
most frequently when asked about the subject. 
9Minneapolis Tribune, December 18, 1955; the volume is 
supposedly written in a Scottish dialect. A central figure 
of the story is a Dr. MacLure who "had mony virtues, an' did 
his wark well, but it wes a peety he didna mair profession o' 
releegion." The doctor's eternal judgment, however, "has 
been ready long ago; and it iss a good judgment, and you and 
I will be happy men if we get the like of it." Not expecting 
eternal salvation, the doctor, nevertheless received it. 
Why? "Come, ye blessed of my Father ... I was sick and ye 
visited Me." Ian Maclaren [John Watson], Beside the Bonnie 
Brier Bush (New York: Dobb, Mead and Company, 1895), pp. 326-
27. 
lOMinneapolis Star, February 12, 1952. 
llM. l' T 'b D b 18 1955 inneapo is ri une, ecem er , . 
5 
various tangible influences which might be cited, Judd often 
declared that he chose medical mission work deliberately be-
cause "the needs were the greatest and the workers the few-
t .. 12 es . This statement strongly suggests that his mother's 
admonition to Christian brotherhood and service was the de-
cisive influence. 
Committed to a career of service, Judd entered the 
University of Nebraska in 1916 to begin medical training. 
As a college freshman Judd suffered from an acute case of 
acne. A skin specialist, who had only recently bought a.n 
x-ray machine, informed Judd that "We've got a new way of 
clearing up acne like that--x-ray exposure." As a result of 
severe over-exposure Judd soon started developing precan-
h h . h h 1 d h' . 13 cerous growt w 1c asp ague 1m ever since. In early 
1961, when Judd was asked about the popularity of President 
John F. Kennedy, he replied that physical attributes were 
most important in winning high elective positions. 14 With-
out doubt Judd's bout with acne and x-ray treatment which 
resulted in the removal of hundreds of small growths from 
12H. h 1g I "Wanted: More Men Like Judd," 119. 
13
victor Cohn, "The Congressman's Scars of Courage, 11 
Coronet, XLVII (July, 1960), 31-32. 
14Minneapolis Star, March 16, 1961. 
6 
his face, which gives his face a severely scarred and burned 
appearance, has affected Judd's life and personality in no 
small way. It would be impossible to gauge exactly how ex-
tensively this unfortunate event modified his own career or 
served to identify him with certain causes; to intensify his 
drive for "the lost cause;" or to prove the correctness of 
his foresight or strategy which dominates his speaking. 
Judd remained in college another year after his treat-
ment before withdrawing to join the army in 1918, where he 
d . 15 rose to the rank of Secon Lieutenant. After he returned 
to the University, Judd began to practice the speaking 
skills which would serve him in later years; he spent some 
time on the Chautauqua platform during the summers. He sup_:-
ported himself on stage, also, during his undergraduate 
years--he played cornet in theatres, dance bands and Chau-
tauqua tours. (He once said: "That cornet practically put 
16 
me through college.") Despite these demands on his time, 
Judd earned a Phi Beta Kappa key and a Bachelor of Arts 
degree in pre-medical work from the University of Nebraska 
in 1920. 
1511 Biographical Information, 11 Judd, Walter H., Vertical 
File, Minneapolis Star and Tribune Library, Minneapolis, 
Minnesota. 
16Minneapolis Star, February 12, 1952; High, "Wanted: 
More Men-Like Judd," 119. 
7 
Judd taught zoology at the University of Omaha to sup-
port himself from 1920 to 1924. He received his M.D. in 
1923 and interned at the University Hospital in Omaha from 
1922 to 1924. 17 In spite of his busy schedule, however, he 
remained active in church and mission-oriented groups, and 
after his internship he served as traveling secretary for the 
Student Volunteer Movement, a recruiting society for various 
. . b d 18 . 11 d · · · 19 mission oars, in co eges an universities. During 
this travel he first visited the political district he was 
d . d 20 d f. h f 21 estine to represent an irst met t e uture Mrs. Judd. 
Mariam Louise Barber, the girl "told to meet him at the 
trolley and see that he got to the meeting on time," proved 
to have a great deal in common with the young doctor six 
17
charles Moritz (ed.), Current Biography 1949 (New 
York: The H. W. Wilson Company, 1949), p. 308; High, 
"Wanted: More Men Like Judd," 118. 
18 Student And The Modern Missionary Crusade (New York~ 
Student Volunteer Movement For Foreign Missions, 1906), p. 
40. 
19Who's Who In America, 1948-1949,XXV (Chicago: The 
A. N. Marquis Company, 1948), p. 1301; Moritz, Current Bio-
graphy 1949, p. 308; High, "Wanted: More Men Like Judd," 
118-19; Congressional Quarterly, "GOP Keynoter Judd an Ex-
pert on Asian Policy," 1266. 
20M.. 1' S F b 12 1952 inneapo is tar, e ruary , . 
21M· 1· D 'l H ld b 17 inneapo is ai y era , Septem er , 1962. 
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years her senior. Her own lifetime international interest 
began in India, where her father was superintendent of the 
Calcutta YMCA. Born in India, Mariam had first come to the 
United States at eight years of age, when she was sent to 
Montclair, New Jersey, for her public school education. 22 
At the time of their meeting at Mt. Holyoke College, 
in South Hadley, Massachusetts, however, Judd had committed 
himself to leave for China within a few months. In early 
1926, under the sponsorship of the Congregational Foreign 
Missionary Board, he began his ten-year career as a medical 
missionary in Shaowa, in northwestern Fukien province--a 
site twelve days' boat journey up the Min and Fu-t'un. 23 
Some thirty years later Judd was to recall that when he 
arrived at his hospital, Fukien province was a "hot spot" 
for early Chinese Communist activities. Judd, however, had 
moved from viewing the Communists as mere "land reformers," 
to a very militant anti-Communist position. Judd related 
in 1960 that a roving band of Chinese Communists captured 
his hospital and the surrounding area in December of 1926. 
Frequently thereafter similar occurrences took place, he 
charged, but he acknowledged that he received courteous 
22Ibid. 
23High, "Wanted: More Men Like Judd," 118-19; Minneapo-
lis Star, February 12, 1952. 
treatment from the Communist bands. In March, 1927, he 
continued to assert, a Communist guerilla band mistook him 
for one of the hated English 00 colonialists'8 and had taken 
him to the "river 11 for execution before he convinced the 
leader of his American birth. 24 For the remainder of his 
stay at Shaowa, he explained, he experienced few problems 
with these seemingly dedicated s, reformers 00 • 
Comparing Judd's re~ollection of 1926-1927 with the 
writing of Chinese historians, it appears quite probable 
that Judd's harassers were roving bandits, without a great 
deal of political philosophy, who were making the most of 
the warlordi-sm which characterized Fukien at this time. 
Communist '1hot spots n and bases of operation were located 
9 
several hundred miles to the West and South of Judd's hospi-
tal. Eight years later, however, the Communists were to 
control the general area in which Judd's hospital was 
24
congressional Quarterly, 81 GOP Keynoter Judd an Expert 
on Asian Policy, 0' 166. 
25 located. 
Life in the hot, humid climate presented problems at 
Shaowa more vexing than the Communists or roving bandits. 
10 
Judd contracted malaria, common in the Fukien area, and on 
26 
several occasions nearly died from the severe attacks. 
Thus the dreaded disease forced him to return to the United 
States, via Japan, in 1931. While in Japan Judd studied 
briefly at Tokyo University, taking courses in the English 
language. Meanwhile, his former hostess, Mariam Barber, 
had received her B. A. from Mt. Holyoke, and had enrolled 
in the teachers college of Columbia University. In 1929 
she returned to southern India to teach high school English 
for two years in the American school run by the non-
.
25Minneaoolis Star, of February 27, 1933, reported a 
talk delivered by Judd to the Minnesota State Student Vol-
unteer Missionary convention, and quoted Judd as describing 
Fukien "as probably the most Communistic and bandit infested 
district in China." The article continued: "For six months 
the brigands imprisoned him along with other citizens of the 
city until the Chinese government finally overthrew the ban-
dit regime." For additional information on Communist acti-
vities in Fukien see: John E. Rue, Mao Tse-tung in Opoosi-
tion 1927..:..1935 (Stanford California: Stanford University 
Press, 1966), pp. 252, 260-61, 345-46; Mao Tse-tung, Select-
ed Works: 1926-1936 (New York~ International Publishers, 
1954), pp. 71-104; Jerome Ch'en, Mao and the Chinese Revolu-
tion (London: Oxford University Press, 1965), pp. 180-81; 
Robert Payne, Mao Tse-tung: Ruler of Red China (New York~ 
Henry Schuman Inc., 1950), pp. 113, 142. 
26
congressional Quarterly, "GOP Keynoter Judd an Expert 
on Asian Policy," 1266. 
11 
denominational United Mission Board at Kodikanal. She 
arrived back in the United States about the same time as 
27 Judd. The following year, on March 13, 1932, they were 
married. During the same year Judd received a two year 
fellowship from the Mayo Foundation, University of Minnesota, 
28 
to study surgery. 
In 1934, after completing his fellowship, Judd returned 
to the China mission field, taking with him his wife and the 
first-born of three daughters. The family finally settled 
at Fenchow in the malaria-free hill area of Shansi province 
' h Ch' 29 1n nort western 1na. Mrs. Judd contributed to the local 
mission program by teaching music at the nurses' training 
30 
school and English at the local high school. Judd, how-
ever, had only a few quiet months when he could devote him-
self full time to the bodily ailments of the Chinese peas-
ants who came to his hospital. During the early months of 
27Minneapolis Daily Herald, September 17, 1962. 
28M· l' St F b 12 1952 1nneapo 1s ~' e ruary , . 
29Who's Who in America, XXV, p. 1301; Moritz, Current 
Biography 1949, p. 308; High, "Wanted: More Men Like Judd," 
119; Congressional Quarterly, "GOP Keynoter Judd an Expert 
on Asian Policy," 1266-67; Richard H. Rovere, "Eight Hope-
ful Congressmen," The Nation, CLVI (February 27, 1943), 295. 
30Minneapolis Daily Herald, September 17, 1962. 
12 
1936 the Corrununists began an advance on Shansi province. 
Only hours before the Corrununist occupation, Judd evacuated 
his family to the United States, but personally returned to 
his hospital post, where he remained during the Corrununist 
occupation. 31 The "rebel" Corrununist control lasted only 
about a year, to be replaced by Japanese seizure. 
After the Japanese invasion of northern China in 1937 
and during the period of coalition between Chiang Kai-shek 
and the Corrununists, Judd treated many Corrununist leaders, 
including Lin Piao, later to become Red China's Minister of 
Defense, who suffered from stomach ulcers. The alliance 
between the Nationalists and the Corrununists, an alliance of 
convenience to both parties, was of short duration. But 
regardless of internal strife, Judd felt that he could ren-
der medical service to the general Chinese populace, and 
this would warrant his staying on at the hospital. With the 
Japanese assault on Shansi province early in 1938, however, 
Judd began to realize the fallacy of his earlier thinking--
he would be forced to minister to the Japanese rather than 
the Chinese. The Japanese captured Fenchow in February of 
1938 and took over the large hospital which Judd super-
31
congressional Quarterly, "GOP Keynoter Judd an Expert 
on Asian Policy,"_ 1266. 
13 
vised, 32 but Judd remained at his post first out of dedica-
. . d 1 t . . · 33 t1on to service an a er as a sem1-pr1soner. After the 
Japanese occupied the city Judd's medical practice consisted 
mainly of treating Japanese soldiers for various diseases, 
as the Japanese would not allow the Chinese to come to the 
hospital when they could prevent it. 34 After five months 
under Japanese occupation Judd had the opportunity to leave 
China and returned to his family in the United States. 35 
Judd later stated that he resigned his position in 
China because he wanted to be free to speak out against the 
Japanese without embarrassing the organization for which he 
worked, and to secure those missionaries remaining in China 
32Ibid. 
33 House Conunittee on Foreign Affairs, American Neutral-
ity Policy Hearings, 1939, p. 339. 
34
senate Conunittee on Foreign Relations,,Neutrality, 
Peace Legislation, And Our Foreign Policy Hearings, 1939, 
p. 295. 
35
congressional Quarterly, "GOP Keynoter Judd an Expert 
on Asian Policy," 1266; Victor Cohn relates from an inter-
view with Judd that a 11 jittery Japanese general" was respon-
sible for his being able to leave China in 1938. The story 
goes that the "general had gonorrhea, and feared his own 
medical officers' edict that any soldier with a venereal 
disease must not return to Japan for two years." Judd, how-
ever treated and cured him. Thus the general did not want 
Judd around as a reminder of his own "shortcomings", so he 
offered Judd safe passage through the Japanese lines. Cohn, 
"The Congressman's Scars of Courage," 33. 
14 
. . l 36 
against Japanese reprisa . The decision, he declared, 
came only after treating numerous cases of Chinese men, 
women, and children torn by American scrap iron processed 
37 into Japanese shrapnel. Thus Judd became convinced that 
he could best serve the needs of the Chinese and the Ameri-
can people by appealing to the latter to stop aiding the 
Japanese war machine. Judd, after discussing his plan with 
his wife, decided that he could finance a speaking tour for 
a year out of their savings and a legacy of $1,000 which he 
had received from his grandfather. The tour, however, last-
ed for over two years despite the fact that more than half 
of his speeches brought him no financial reward and the 
many "honoraria" amounted to no more than ten to twenty-five 
38 dollars. Thus Judd, following the pattern established by 
missionaries, took his case directly to the American people. 
Perhaps few Americans fully understand or appreciate 
the influence which foreign missionaries and missionary or-
ganizations have exerted on the formation of American foreign 
36
senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Neutrality, 
Peace Legislation, and Our Foreign Policy Hearings, 1939, 
p. 295. 
37
congressional Quarterly, "GOP Keynoter Judd an Expert 
on Asian Policy," 1266. 
38H. h ig I "Wanted: More Men Like Judd," 120. 
15 
policy, particularly in the field of East Asian relations. 
Doubtless these individuals and organizations exerted great-
er influence in the nineteenth century; nevertheless, their 
influence still could be observed and felt well into the 
39 
twentieth century. Out of a small band of missionaries 
returned from China grew a strong and effective organization 
which forced re-examination of American commercial and dip-
lomatic relations with Japan in the years just prior to the 
attack on Pearl Harbor. This organization, the American 
Committee for Non-Participation in Japanese Aggression, 
served as the rallying point for many returning American 
missionaries from China, and for others who sympathized 
. h h . ' f ' 40 wit t eir point o view. 
The committee's founders, Harry B. and Frank W. Price, 
had returned to the United States from the China mission 
field after the outbreak of war between China and Japan. 
They brought with them an ardent desire to do something 
which would help bring an early conclusion to the Sino-
39John W. Masland, "Missionary Influence Upon American 
Far Eastern Policy, 11 The Pacific Historical Review, X {Sep-
tember, 1941), 279; also see: Tyler Dennett, Americans in 
Eastern Asia (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1922), chap-
ter XXIX; Kenneth S. Latourette, A History of Christian 
Missions in China (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1929), 
passim. 
40 New York Times, January 19, 1939, p. 3. 
16 
Japanese conflict. Both of the Price brothers, as had their 
father before them, had served in various education and 
. . . Ch' 41 mission posts in ina. Both men believed that hostili-
ties could be stopped by halting American exports to Japan. 
In the summer of 1938 the two brothers gathered together 
persons associated with the missionary, religious, and 
academic work in China and discussed plans for carrying this 
idea to the general public. Out of these discussions emerg-
ed the Non-Participation Committee, which became commonly 
known as the Price Committee. 42 The purpose of the commit-
tee, as outlined in one of its early publications, 
is to help in bringing the essential facts to the 
attention of the American people, cooperating with 
other individuals and organizations that are working 
to this end, and to investigate ways and means whereby 
the stoppage of war credits and essential war supplies 
to Japan can be made effective for the remainder of 
the present conflict in China. 43 
The founders contacted State Department officials and in-
formed them of their project. 
41H B p, " 
. ~rry . . rice, pri.or 
States, had served as Acting 
fairs, Yenching University. 
with the Nanking Theological 
Dr. Sun Yat-sen' s 00 The Three 
New XQll Times, December 12, 
The Department officials 
to his return to the United 
Dean of College Public Af- · 
Frank W. Price,. long associated 
Seminary, was the translator of 
Principles of the People." See 
1937, VIII, p. 12. 
42Masland, "Missionary Influence Upon American Far 
Eastern Policy, 00 293. 
43Ibid. 
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manifested pleasure upon learning of the committee's object 
of educating "the public toward a stronger stand against 
Japan's expansionist policy," and encouraged them to pro-
ceed. The committee kept in close contact with the State 
Department and congressional leaders at all times. 44 The 
group also achieved effective cooperation with American 
45 
officials in ~hina, whose actions they strongly supported. 
The committee appealed to Henry L. Stimson, who had 
been Secretary of War in the Taft cabinet and Secretary of 
State under Hoover, and was to be a Secretary of War to F. 
D. Roosevelt. Stimson had already made himself the out-
d ' ' h ' f h Ch ' 46 stan 1ng American c amp1on o t e 1nese cause. Harry 
B. Price, Roger S. Greene, former vice-counsul in the United 
States diplomatic service, and the Rockefeller Foundation 
representative in Peiping for many years, and other old 
China hands who had rallied to the cause, invited Stimson 
to serve as honorary chairman. Strengthened by the prestige 
of the Stimson name, the committee intensified their agita-
44
rbid., p. 294. 
45
william C. Johnstone, The United States and Japan's 
New Order (New York: Oxford University Press, 1941), p. 225. 
46Richard N. Current, Secretary Stimson: A Study in 
Statecraft (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers University 
Press, 1954), p. 135. 
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tion for both a voluntary boycott and for government embar-
47 goes against Japan. 
The Chinese National Government enthusiastically wel-
corned the formation of the American Committee for Non-
Participation in Japanese Aggression. Chinese officials 
viewed the organization as another indication of the growing 
anti-Japanese sentiment in the United States and the in-
creasing tendency to support China concretely. China's 
official Central Daily News applauded the formation of the 
committee and anticipated "far-reaching" results in awaken-
ing the American people to China's plight. The New York 
Times reported that "leading American Journalists" in China 
cabled their appreciation to Stimson for his role in the 
committee's activities. 48 Membership in the organization 
47Ibid. 
48 New York Times, January 22, 1939, p. 3. 
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increased rapidly and included men of diverse occupations. 49 
Judd affiliated himself with the American Committee for 
Non-Participation in Japanese Aggtession in the fall of 1938, 
and became foremost among the speakers who 0' took to the 
49New York Times, January 26, 1939, p. 6; Harry B. 
Price reported that the committee met with immediate re-
sponse in almost every section of the country, New York 
Times, January 26, 1939. The original group, however, car-
ried on most of the activities of the committee. National 
figures associated with the movement included not only Henry 
L. Stimson, but personalities such as William Allen White, 
the world-famous publisher and editor of the Emporia Gazette; 
A, Lawrence Lowell, President emeritus of Harvard University 
and a strong Republi~an supporter of Wilson's plan for the 
League of Nations; Rear Admiral Harry E. Yarnell, Retired, 
former commander of the American Asiatic Squadron, and Henry 
I. Harriman, a:p American utilities executive and former 
President of the Chamber of Commerce of the United States. 
Harriman served as an honorary vice chairman, Shall }1meric,A 
Stop Arming Japa11? (New York~ American Committee for Non-
Participation in Japanese Aggression, 1940), p. 40; Masland, 
"Missionary Influence Upon American Far Eastern Policy," 
293. Jonathan W. Daniels, son of Josephus Daniels, United 
States Ambassador to Mexico, accepted an honorary vice chair-
manship in late January 1939. Dr. Robert E. Speer, a re-
ligious author, also served on the honorary roster, New~ 
Times, January 26, 1939, p. 6. Rogers. Greene, of the 
Rockefeller Foundation, assumed the Chairmanship and served 
as chief contact man in Washington, D. C. Frank Price re-
turned to China soon after the committee's conception, but 
his brother Harry served as executive secretary, Masland, 
00 Missionary Influence Upon American Far Eastern Policy, 00 293. 
Miss Josephine Schain, head of the National Committee on the 
Cause and Cure of War, held the position of vice chairman, 
and Mrs. Sidney Gamble, a long-time supporter of the mission 
cause, served as treasurer. The organization maintained 
permanent headquarters in New York City, New York Times, 
January 19, 1939, p. 3. For a more complete history of the 
American Committee for Non-Participation in Japanese Aggres-
sion see Donald J. Friedman, ~ ~ F_rom ~,.ation g ~ 
Campaign Q.f .the. AmeriQm Collll!l.i.:t..:t..~ .f,QL ;Non.=l:a~d;.is::..l..PatiQD. j,n 
~ Aggrfill...sion, 1938-1,.9..4,l (Cambridge: East Asian Re-
search Center, Harvard University, 1968) , ~sim. 
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platform in behalf of the Price Co:rrunittee." He set out on 
his tour of some forty-six states, calling upon the American 
people to boycott Japanese articles and to demand an embargo 
on the sa~e and shipment of war materials to Japan. This, 
he declared, would have to be done i:rrunediately or Americans 
would have to give up their sons later in a war withJapan. 50 
Thus while Judd could report that he represented no one 
officially--this was a personal crusade--he often asserted 
that he represented the opinions and attitudes of a large 
number of Americans in China. He did, in fact, represent 
the views of the majority of American missionaries and lay-
. Ch' 51 men 1n 1na. 
Despite the fact that the missionary movement in China. 
stood for the maintenance of its own interests there, and 
that it resisted the demands of some groups that American 
interests be reduced to avoid trouble with Japan, their 
general demands, like Judd's, paralleled those of many po-
litically minded civilians, State Department officials, and 
government officials in general. Many missionaries in China 
and many of the officers of the various national mission 
50 Masland, "Missionary Influence Upon American Far 
Eastern Policy," 295. 
51 C . . 1 . Senate o:rrun1 ttee on Foreign Re at1ons, Neutra.li ty, 
Peace Legislation, And Our Foreign Policy Hearings, 1939, 
p. 295. 
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boards in the United States actively advocated the use of 
economic sanctions against Japan. Many missionaries, like-
wise, urged the adoption of effective measures to halt the 
shipment of various "war items" to Japan. Like Judd, they 
insisted that sale of certain materials to Japan violated a 
moral principle, and they could answer those individuals 
who feared that an embargo might bring on a war with Japan 
with seemingly sound logic: Japan would not and could not 
dare risk a war with the United States. The returned mis-
sionaries declared that an embargo would force Japan to 
abandon her invasion of China in short order. 52 
Information about Asia which was received in the United 
States from American missionaries in China, particularly 
after the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War, was decidedly 
partisan in favor of the Chinese. After the Japanese con-
quest of Manchuria in 1932, few, if any, American mission-
aries in Japan ,felt that they could justify the national 
policies of Japan. Furthermore, the missionaries from Japan 
did not have a history of attempting to secure opinion fa.v-
orable to Japan, as compared to the missionaries' attempts 
of arousing sympathy for the Chinese. Unofficial Japanese 
governmental policy was, indeed, quite hostile toward 
52 Masland, "Missionary Influence Upon American Far 
Eastern Policy," 295. 
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foreign mission activities in Japan. Not infrequently were 
missionaries openly harassed by the Japanese police, result-
ing often in violent anti-Japanese reaction by various mis-
sion groups. The drive. to heighten the sympathy for the 
Chinese intensified in the late 1930 1 s as the mission per-
sonnel returned from China and the mission boards labored 
to keep China's suffering before the American people. In 
this they were aided by the unique position the returned 
missionary has always occupied in the minds of the average 
church-going American. While under ordinary circumstances 
allegations of destruction and torture might be discounted 
as war propaganda by this sizable element of society, infor-
mation circulated by missionaries of wide reputation was 
53 
often accepted as fact. Likewise, information presented 
out of context, or an incomplete picture of existing situa-
tions within a culture, by the same missionaries, tended to 
emphasize the differences between East and West--rather than 
the similarities of the existing cultures. Thus the valid-
ity of the missionaries viewpoint could seldom be challenged 
by the average church-going American. The missionaries had 
long been looked upon by this American group to be experts 
on the culture, civilization, and history of the people to 
53Ibid., p. 290. 
23 
whom they ministered. 'I'hus, in innocence, the mission "ex-
pert" had on occasion been guilty of exploiting the ignor-
ance of the congregations to which he spoke. 
Assuming the role of just such an expert, Judd held 
and expounded the general theme that there existed in the 
Occidental World a general misunderstanding of, or an ab-
sence of appreciation for, the Oriental thought process and 
social and intellectual institutions. Even though Asian 
authorities of the West might take Judd to task at a later 
date over this point of view, his thesis met little, if any, 
opposition at the time. From the very beginning the people 
with whom Judd came into contact regarded him as a "top-
notch" authority on China. Judd, testifying before the 
House Committee on Foreign Affairs, and the Senate Committee 
. 1 . 54 . d h . 0 on Foreign Re ations, pointe out tote committees in 
dogmatic terms what he considered the United States needed 
most in dealing with Asians. This was an understanding of 
54
on August 2, 1939, Senator Lewis B. Schwellenbach, a 
member of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, stated 
on the Senate floor in response to recent testimony of Judd: 
"I wish to say that when the Committee ... had heard a number 
of witnesses we had an informal meeting of the Committee on 
the question of other witnesses being called, and it was the 
unanimous opinion of those present at that meeting that the 
testimony of Dr. Judd had been so outstanding, and had so 
clearly and exhaustively outlined the situation in the Far 
East, that there was no need to call any other witnesses 
upon the Chinese-Japanese problem." U. s., Congressional 
Record, 76th Cong., 1st Sess., 1939, XXCIV, Part 10, 10753. 
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the psychology of the Asian people. 
Judd's manner of speaking and presentation portrayed 
24 
the attitude that his were the only correct--the only logi-
cal--observations. His positive attitude, the seeming depth 
of conviction, left little room for questioning the validity 
of his arguments. He attempted to relate to the committee 
his interpretation of how the Oriental relegated economic 
affairs to a secondary position in his daily life. To the 
Oriental, final objectives were paramount in their lives, 
and the total cost in lives, time, and monies could not pre-
vent the realizing of these goals. To the West, the resour-
ces of China might appear relatively unimportant; however, 
to the Japanese with their scarcity of natural resources, 
Chinese resources were vital in the untimate objective of 
empire building. He pointed out how the information which 
the West could obtain from economic resources surveys could 
mean quite a different thing in the hands of the West as 
compared to the East--especially when this information was 
employed by Orientals in attempting to solve their own pro-
blems as they saw and interpreted them. The West could 
deduce that the price which Japan was paying was too great; 
55House Committee on Foreign Affairs, American Neutral-
ity Policy Hearings, 1939, p. 332; Senate Committee on For-
eign Relations, Neutrality, Peace Legislation, And Our For-
eign Policy Hearings, 1939, p. 296. 
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they would conclude that it "couldn't be." Thus Judd de-
clared that economic information alone as interpreted by 
Westerners cannot be employed in understanding the Oriental's 
reactions or his reasoning in situations such as the Sino-
fl . 56 Japanese con 1ct. Though Judd failed to make clear 
exactly how Japan's desire for expansion differed from 
previous conditions which prompted other countries to ex-
pand or desire expansion, he did attempt to explain his 
concepts of the kind of war which Japan was carrying out. 
To Judd the Sino-Japanese War constituted a conflict of a 
nature unknown in modern times. 
Whether Judd's presentation was intentional or not, it 
had the desired effect of stirring sympathy for the Chinese 
and portraying the Japanese as barbarians in China. Judd 
suggested that coequal in value with any factual information 
is the knowledge of the psychology of the people who employ 
the information. For instance, the United States, accord-
ing to Judd, has been prone to read Japanese diplomatic 
notes as if these notes had been written by other Americans, 
that is, to take them at face value. Apparently Judd had 
in mind here the traditional East Asian concept of "saving 
face." His argument followed that since the Oriental ab-
56House Committee on Foreign Affairs, American Neutral-
ity Policy Hearings, 1939, pp. 332-33. 
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horred head-on confrontation which would offend, the Japanese 
tailored their communications so that they would not be of-
fensive. Thus, to Judd, all dispatches between Japan and 
the United States had to be interpreted in light of this 
concept of "face saving." The Japanese employed this device 
in writing their communications and assumed that the United 
States did likewise. The United States, however, assumed 
that Japan read American diplomatic notes at face value. 
This, Judd declared, was seldom done. Thus, the two coun-
. l . . 57 tries were not tru y communicating. To Judd's thinking, 
the Japanese read into all official correspondence those 
ideas or concepts which would be included if they had 
written them, and as if they had been accustomed to "face 
saving" tactics. Judd suggested that perhaps the greatest 
contribution he and others who understood the Oriental 
thought process and language could make would be an explana-
58 
tion of the Eastern people. 
Despite Judd's elaborate explanation of oriental tac-
tics of composing diplomatic notes, it is doubtful that the 
Japanese avoided head-on confrontation any more than did 
57
senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Neutrality, 
Peace Legislation, And Our Foreign Poligy Hearings, 1939, 
p. 296. 
58House Committee on Foreign Affairs, American Neutral-
ity Policy Hearings, 1939, p. 333. 
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western nations. Henry W. Denison, a highly trusted and 
respected American adviser to the Japanese Foreign Office 
from 1881 until 1914, schooled many of Japan's leading dip-
lomats in the art of composing diplomatic exchanges. Deni-
son and other Americans ably assisted the Japanese in' bridg-
ing the gap between the days of seclusion and the days of 
modern international intercourse. 59 Judd seldom, if ever, 
suffered from modesty when asserting his own knowledge of 
the Asian people. Characteristic of his own self-assured 
understanding of events in Asia is this statement: "If we 
who have lived many years in the Orient, and are first-hand 
witnesses to what is happening there, have any contribution 
to make ... it is not so much in presenting statistical mater-
ial which can be assembled from various handbooks and re-
ports, as in trying to interpret from our intimate know-
ledge of the peoples living there what these facts mean to 
them, and what they are likely to do in given situations. 1160 
Interpreting events of East Asia, Judd expressed the 
belief that only a few of the problems which Japan felt 
59Payson J. Treat, Japan And The United States 1853-
1921: Revised and Continued to .1928 (Stanford, California: 
Stanford University Press, 1928), pp. 105, 192. 
60 C . F . l . . Senate ornrnittee on oreign Re ations, Neutrality, 
Peace Legislation, Artd Our Foreign Policy Hearings, 1939, 
p. 296. 
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confronted her were real--such as population pressure and 
lack of raw materials. Others which, according to Judd, 
had been real in the past but that ceased to be so included 
disorderliness in China, the white man's imperialism in 
China, and communism in China. Then, to Judd, there were 
other supposed problems which were nothing but the products 
of Japan's national fear psychosis, such as alleged politi-
1 d ' b Am . ' Ch' 61 ca esigns y erica in ina. Judd viewed American 
activities which led to Dollar Diplomacy in the Pacific, 
and the continuing attitude of Americans in China, which 
indeed could be interpreted as an attempt to control or 
manipulate political affairs by economic coercion, as 
America's humanitarian concern for the benighted brethren 
of the world. America, indeed, was rescuing the Chinese, 
whether they realized it or not, from a stagnant civiliza-
tion. Indeed, the future would hold China's eternal grati-
tude to the United States. 
For Judd, there existed three general but exclusive 
concepts which could describe American attitudes regarding 
China--three concepts which Judd viewed as most frightening. 
The first was that the United States knew the full extent of 
the Sino-Japanese situation in China; second, that the situ-
61
rbid. 
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ation in China did not fall within the realm of business, 
the concern, or the responsibility of the United States; and 
third, that nothing could be done about Asia without getting 
the United States into war. Erroneous and terrifying as 
these attitudes might be, he felt that he could easily un-
derstand why American people held them. To Judd, however, 
"the single greatest tragedy 11 in all the post-World War era 
was that the United States, as "one of the few nations in 
all the world that really believed in the brave new technique 
of peace--didn't just give lip service to them while really 
depending upon power politics behind the scenes--gambled 
her very existence on them, is being destroyed at this hour, 
for her faith. 1162 Judd felt compelled, therefore, as an 
"expert" and one with 11 first-hand 11 knowledge, to cast some 
light on these attitudes and perhaps clarify the distorted 
image which many Americans held of the Sino-Japanese con-
flict. The events in Chini;l., Judd argued, could not be 
passed off as a simple political conquest. In reality they 
involved a "deliberate, systematic, cold-blooded, calculated 
destruction, not just of ... [China's] ... political indepen-
dence, but of the nation's culture, a civilization that has 
62
rbid., p. 299. 
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stood for 5,000 years." 
30 
Attempts at subverting Chinese culture, however, could 
not be considered a unique goal of the Japanese. China had 
long known various forces which had attempted to defeat the 
Confucian system upon which traditional Chinese civilization 
is based. Even the American Christian missionary attempted 
to subvert the system. In direct contrast to Judd's por-
trayals of Japanese aims in China, the missionary almost 
without exception glorified the ideas of the founders of the 
Chinese Republic and of the National Government with its 
rejection of traditional ideas. The missionary in general, 
and Judd in particular, never failed to point with pride to 
the fact that a high percentage of the officials of the 
government o_f China had been educated in Christian ins ti tu-
tions and that many of them were themselves Christians. 64 
To Judd, however, the Japanese conquest involved a new kind 
of war, one which Judd argued could not be passed off as a 
struggle between armies--Chinese and Japanese. To Judd the 
war r 9ging in China involved "primary attack, and not the 
63House Committee on Foreign Affairs, American Neutral-
ity Policy Hearings, 1939, p. 333. 
64Masland, "Missionary Influence Upon American Far 
Eastern Policy," 288. 
31 
65 incident attack" upon unarmed groups. The Japanese did 
not define military objectives, Judd pointed out, "in the 
way that people used to in 'gentlemen's war,' such as rail-
road stations, barracks, air fields, arsenals, forts," and 
other conventional military goals. 
Judd's concept of the so-called "gentlemen's wars" 
showed his misunderstanding of the history of war. There 
has always been present a certain degree of abuse of civil-
ian population or non-combatants in the history of war. 
Judd, however, seems to have denied the presence of conven-
tional military objectives on the part of Japan as he stres-
sed the unorthodox tactics of the Japanese in China. In the 
Sino-Japanese War the attack was upon the wounded, both 
civilian and military, by preventing medical treatment; 
upon women "not primarily because of some peculiar beastli-
ness ... [in] ... the individual Japanese soldier ... [but] ... be-
cause the most vulnerable spot in all of the Chinese armor 
is the home. 1166 Likewise, the Japanese attacked the schools 
and the universities because scholars have traditionally 
provided leadership for the Chinese. China has not "made 
heroes out of the men with long swords, she made heroes out 
65House Committee on Foreign Affairs, American Neutral-
ity Policy Hearings, 1939, p. 333. 
66
rbid., p. 334. 
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of the scholars, men who had long fingernails, and gowns, 
to show that they would not touch anything with their hands 
67 
except the pen." China had been able "to overcome previ-
ous conquerors because she had a superior scholarship and 
civilization," Judd stated. 68 
Judd continued his argument by asserting that the pre-
sent threat to China came not only from a superior military 
nation, which was always the case, but from a nation that 
considered herself superior in all other ways. 69 Japan had 
in fewer than one hundred years made tremendous economic, 
social, and political gains which placed her far ahead of 
any other Asian country. Judd's argument, however, followed 
that the basic objective of the Japanese involved demoraliz-
ing the Chinese in order to prevent the rise of a literate 
leadership which might have the stamina to survive and 
eventually absorb the conquerors, as had taken place in the 
past. Japan, Judd asserted, manifested a knowledge of what 
previous thwarted conquerors failed to consider. To both 
the House and Senate committees of 1939 he cited the 
"forced" growing of opium-producing poppies and the use of 
67Ibid. 
68
rbid. 
69Ibid. 
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the drug in China as a Japanese tactic to demoralize the 
Ch ., 70 iense. No one challenged him on the point. But Judd 
was not ·alone in employing this topic to gain sympathy for 
his cause. Numerous accounts by missionary personnel re-
1 d h . ·1 h . 71 ate t e opium evi tote Japanese occupation. Like 
Judd, the group emphasized endless accounts of wholesale 
distribution of opium and other drugs--of how the drug habit 
was inflicted upon Chinese through hypodermics by leading 
the Chinese to believe that the inoculation was against 
72 
cholera. Judd often cited the closing of educational 
institutions in Manchuria as another tactic of the Japanese 
to break the Chinese spirit. 
Despite Judd's testimony, the internal situation of 
Manchuria or Manchukuo during the 1930 's was far better than 
the non-recognizing powers were willing or prepared to ac-
knowledge. There was a marked contrast between J'apanese 
action on the mainland before and after the establishment 
of the puppet government at Na~king in 1940. 7 :3 Under Japan-
7
oibid., pp. 334-35. 
71 For Example see g 11 0pium Supports Puppet Regime, au 
Christian Century, LVII (January 3, 1940), 29. 
72 
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(New York~ 
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ese control, some Asian historians have asserted, Manchuria 
possessed greater stability than at any time in modern his-
tory. It cannot be denied that the Chinese who resisted the 
Japanese occupation were disposed of; however, those who 
accepted the Japanese regime found increased security for 
life and property. The aribtrary and whimsical government 
of the warlord throughout China was nearly unbearable. The 
mercenary armies of the warlords had lived off opium produc-
tion and distr-d.bution long before Japan came on the scene in 
Ch ' 74 1na. The warlord's device of levying such high taxes on 
land suitable for poppy-growing that nothing but opium could 
meet the payment had been carried on since the end of World 
75 War I. The debased government of the "Old Marshal," Chang 
Tso-lin, and his son Chang Hsueh-liang, ceased to exist with 
Japanese occupation of Manchuria. 
The new regime established a uniform currency system, 
reduced taxes and collected them more honestly, and promoted 
industrialization. Opium production and consumption, long 
a severe plague in Manchuria, were not abolished; however, 
the Japanese regime did place the traffic under rigid gov-
ernment control and limitation. The new regime accomplished 
74John K. Fairbank, Edwin 0. Reischauer, and Albert M. 
Craig, East Asia: The Modern Transformation (Boston: Hough-
ton Mifflin Company, 1965), p. 674. 
75Ibid., p. 658. 
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to a greater extent what honest Chinese officials had failed 
to do since the early nineteenth century. Opium can be 
counted as a major factor in the fall of the Manchu dynas-
ty. Thus, the opium problem expounded by the American 
missionary was not unique in China under the Japanese. The 
political philosophy on which the Japanese sought to rest 
the new state was a revival of Confucian philosophy--"Wang 
Tao"--the "kingly way." This made a strong appeal to the 
traditional-minded Chinese population in Manchuria and in 
other areas where the Japanese employed the philosophy in 
76 
an honest manner. Judd, however, perhaps because he was 
never seriously challenged, stressed what he considered the 
"unnatural" activities of the Japanese in China. Their 
"demoralizing tactics," Judd declared, were unknown to 
America, thus preventing an overall understanding of the 
Chinese situation. These factors, he declared, needed to 
76Ibid., p. 708; Paul H. Clyde, The Far East: A His-
tory of the Impact of the West on Eastern Asia ( 2nd ed. ; New 
York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1948), pp. 646-47. Clyde further 
states that while in general this was true in Manchuria 
there was, however, some evidence that those who suffered 
from Japanese rule were not solely those who resisted the 
occupation. See in particular the picture presented by W. 
I. Ladejinsky, "Manchurian Agriculture under Japanese Con-
trol," Foreign Agriculture, V (1941), 309-40. Clyde notes 
that one must consider that there was a greater economic 
pressure on the Manchurian people as Japan's war program 
developed. A great many factors served to keep the Man-
churian resistance movement alive. 
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be explained and viewed from a proper perspective77 his 
perspective. 
Judd hit hard and strong at what he regarded as erron-
eous concepts held by Americans in viewing the Chinese sit-
uation. He reasoned that the Asian problem did involve the 
United States for three principal reasons: "partly because 
of America's past, partly because of her present, and partly 
78 because of her future." The United States' present posi-
tion with China and her future involved the past, because 
the United States had traditionally taken the lead in in-
suring China's integrity. The role which the United States 
had played in the past had built up China's confidence in 
the United States. Thus, Judd said, if "meddling" is invol-
ved it has been of the past and is not of the present. The 
United States would simply be carrying out its commitments 
of the past, as she had in the past led China step by step 
79 
to where she is today. 
In accordance with Judd's third observation he asked 
the question: "Should the United States go to war on China's 
77House Committee on Foreign Affairs, American Neutral-
ity Policy Hearings, 1939, pp. 334-35. 
78
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behalf?" His response was a flat "never!" The United 
States had no obligation to go to war for China, as the lat-
ter did not ask or expect this sort of aid from the United 
States. China's sovereignty was the Chinese alone to de-
fend, Judd declared; however, China could on the basis of 
past experience be appalled at finding the United States 
furnishing more than half of all the war supplies to the 
Middle Kingdom's enemy in its greatest hour of danger. How 
else could China feel, Judd seemed to ask, when the indis-
pensable materials necessary for Japan to execute its rape 
of China came from the United States, and in violation of 
the Nine-Power Treaty which the United States sponsored. 80 
Judd here demonstrated his lack of understanding of the 
Nine-Power Treaty. The treaty provided that the contract-
ing powers, with the exception of China, agreed to respect 
the sovereignty, the independence, and the territorial and 
administrative integrity of China. It contained no provi-
sions which prohibited commerce between the signatory pow-
ers. The treaty did, however, set forth the ~oncept that 
the violation by one signatory power of its obligations 
under the treaty constituted a violation of the rights of 
80
rbid., p. 337. 
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81 
the powers signing the treaty. Thus, Japan in 1937, as 
in 1932, violated not only China's sovereign right, but the 
treaty rights of the United States and of the other six 
signatory powers. The treaty made no provision for enforce-
ment of its provisions, and its value depended on the will-
ingness of the signatories to abide by those provisions, or 
on the willingness of a signatory to take effective diplo-
matic, economic, or even military steps to prevent or punish 
0 1 82 any v10 ators. 
Judd did, however, deplore the shipment to Japan of 
articles of war or materials which could be converted into 
armaments. Supplying Japan with armory or vital materials, 
Judd said, is what hurts the Americans who live in China or 
who have lived there. He asserted that, ii almost to a man, 00 
they believe that Japan could never have started her mili-
tary adventure in China without the indispensible assistance 
0 d f ~- . 83 of the Unite States o nu1er1ca. To dramatize his think-
ing on this point, Judd related the following personal ac-
81For test of treaty see~ Henry Steele Corri-!'tta.ger 
(ed.) , Documents of Americfill Histp~y ( 7th ed. ; New York~ 
Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1963), pp. 184-85. 
82 Johnstone, The United States and Japan's New Order, 
pp. 133, 137. 
83House Committee on Foreign Affairs, ,8meric;:m1 Neutral-
ity Poli£Y Heari~gs, 1939, p. 337. 
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count (although slightly_ exaggerated when compared with re-
ports of Chinese historians): 
I have been bombed myself over and over aga-in, 
with American airplanes, and it never helps to know 
where they came from, especially during that first 
disastrous year of war; or to know that all of the 
high-test antiknock gasoline comes from America 
because it isn't made anywhere else; and to know 
that all of the lubricating oil for airplane engines 
and American-made arsenal machinery are the absolutely 
essential high-grade Pennsylvania paraffin-base motor 
oils; and to know that one-third of all the stuff 
that the planes drop down to kill and destroy is 
still coming from the scrap iron yards and steel 
mills of our country ... I never could go to sleep 
without wondering if my people back in America 
knew what they were do-ing ... I am an American citi-
zen, too, and I feel, and we in China feel, that we 
have no right to allow our country to go on with 
this kind of policy, either by drift or deliberate 
choice, without having faced clearly the thing that 
we are doing. 84 
Judd scoffed at the idea assumed by many Americans that 
only two alternatives could be presented in discussing Uni-
ted States dealings with Japan. The United States neither 
had "to completely lie down or go to war." Judd asserted 
that peace and democracy cannot be served or saved by going 
to war for them, nor could they be served or saved by just 
84
rbid. There is ample evidence to indicate that Judd 
was not above resorting "to exaggerated statements" when it 
became necessary to do so to prove a point, Friedman, The 
Road From Isolation: The Campaign of the American Committee 
For Non-Participation in Japanese Aggression, 1938-1941, p. 
49. 
40 
d . h' 85 01ng not 1ng. In essence Judd was pleading for "aid-
short-of-war", which paralleled in large measure the phil-
osophy expounded by William Allen White's "Non-Partisan 
Committee for Peace through Revision of the Neutrality 
11 86 . d E Law 1n regar to urope. Judd, as did the White Commit-
tee, argued that aid to American allies was a substitute for 
war, not a step toward war. Judd employed this same basic 
idea in his defense of Chiang Kai-shek in the post-war per-
iod. He desired legislation making it impossible for the 
United States to sell and ship war materials to nations at 
war in violation of treaties which they had with the United 
87 States. Judd pleaded for modification of that legislation 
which had been passed after the mid-1930's as an effort to 
keep the United States out of war. The Neutrality Acts of 
1935-1937 had laid an embargo on the shipment of all muni-
tions, arms and implements of war to belligerents; however, 
the acts allowed the selling of all indirect war materials, 
and these had to be handled on a "cash and carry" basis. 
85House Committee on Foreign Affairs, American Neutral-
ity Hearings, 1939, p. 352. 
86 See: Robert E. Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins: An 
Intimate History (rev. ed.; New York: Harper and Brothers, 
Publishers, 1950), pp. 165-68. 
87House Committee on Foreign Affairs, American Neutral-
ity Policy Hearings, 1939, p. 337. 
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The President had previously used the acts whenever possible 
to punish attacking nations and to aid attacked nations, who 
could not buy from the United States. In the Sino-Japanese 
War, however, he refused to invoke the laws--to allow China 
to continue arms purchases. This policy also allowed the 
Japanese to continue to purchase articles of war or materi-
als regarded as indirect war materials, and she continued 
to have an edge over China in obtaining vital materials 
from the United States. Japan surpassed China in naval 
strength and ready cash, and took advantage of American 
neutrality legislation. The President did, however, take 
action against Japan by announcing in July, 1939, that the 
United States would in six months abrogate a 1911 treaty 
which guaranteed reciprocal trading rights. B
1
eginning on 
January 26, 1940, the United States was free to cut off 
shipments of oil, gasoline, scrap iron, and other raw mater-
ials to Japan. President Roosevelt was legally required to 
apply the arms embargo to all belligerents. This, however, 
would have cut off munitions shipments to France and Great 
Britain. He chose, therefore; to call Congress into special 
session in November, 1939, to amend the neutrality laws. 
Only after repeated prodding did Congress act, and this was 
only to repeal the arms embargo, to apply the "cash and 
carry" requirement to all commerce with belligerents, and to 
42 
prohibit American ships from carrying materials to warring 
countries. Congress was not willing to act in regard to 
Japan so as to name Japan as a menace to American overseas 
. 88 interests. 
Judd admitted to the House committee that there was a 
danger of reprisals from Japan if the United States shut off 
supplies to her. He felt that the United States had not 
done anything to stop Japan because of the fear that such an 
act might lead to war. Economic sanctions against Japan, he 
89 
continued, would be the way not to war, but away from war. 
Judd stated emphatically that he opposed a war.with Japan. 
His hope involved saving Japan from herself and not destroy-
ing her. Nothing that Japan could do or even threaten to do, 
Judd continued, would justify or require the United States 
90 to go to war. Japan, Judd felt, could not conceivably go 
to war with the United States at the present time, or for 
months ahead. Judd felt that Americans failed to view the 
Japanese in realistic terms. He pointed out that Ja.nan "is 
88For a more complete account of Neutrality Acts see 
Jules Davids, America and the World of Our Time: U . .§.. Di-
plomacy in the 20th Century (2nd ed.; New York: Random House, 
1967), pp. 153-85. 
89House committee on Foreign Affairs, American Neutral-
ity Policy Hearings, 1939, pp. 347, 352. 
90 b'd 347 I 1 ., p. . 
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having all she can do to defeat the Chinese" with the assis-
tance of the United States. He asked how could Japan then 
"defeat those same Chinese and the United States of America 
without our assistance? 1191 To Judd this demanded too much 
of one's credulity, and he remarked that the United States 
strained "at the gnat of very remotely possible trouble as a 
result of action we might take, while swallowing the camel 
of the ruthless and barbarous war now progressing as a result 
of action we fail to take." 92 
Fear of war with Japan at the present time he viewed as 
93 
an "unreason~ng and absurd bogey." But insofar as the Uni-
ted States refused non-military measures now, she could be 
deliberately choosing the military role later. War, Judd 
asserted, could be prevented with relative ease at the pre-
sent time before Japan got China any more under control. 
After China it would be the East Indies and the Phillipines~4 
He pointed to the Panay incident as a foretaste of things to 
91s C ' F . 1 ' . enate omm1ttee on ore1gn Re at1ons, Neutrality, 
Peace Legislation, And Our Foreign Policy Hearings, 1939, p. 
307. 
92
rbid., p. 310. 
93
rbid., p. 307. 
94Ibid., p. 310. 
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come "if and when Japan has victory within her grasp and does 
not need to coddle us along any more in order to get our 
money and materials. 1195 Judd pointed out that the United 
States did not have the "choice of getting out or not getting 
out," but only the "choice of being forced out gradually, 
which will be permanent, or of getting out voluntarily and 
rapidly now, shutting off war trade with Japan, and then re-
turning before long with enormous enhancement of position, 
prestige, and opportunity." He reported that he saw the 
Japanese "shiver" for three months after the Panay incident 
as some of the Japanese soldiers got a little too enthusias-
tic and made premature aggressive moves against the United 
States. The Japanese, Judd asserted, did not fear that the 
United States would use all-out military force against them, 
but only that the United States might cut off its "indispen-
sable trade with them. 1196 
Judd agreed with the objection that placing an embargo 
on Japan would be taking sides, but not between China and 
Japan. It would be "taking sides between law abiding and 
law breaking," and if Japan did not like the side she was on, 
all she had to do would be to get over "on the law-abiding 
95
rbid., p. 308. 
96
rbid. 
'd "97 Sl e. Judd continued this line of argument by stating 
that under provisions of "existing neutrality legislation 
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which lays down the same rule for both sides in a conflict," 
the United States is actually taking sides. But here the 
decision does not have a moral basis, nor is it the decision 
of the United States as to which side she is on. Thus the 
United States is an accessory to Japan's crime against not 
only China, but against international law, and against the 
United States itself, because the United States aided and 
abetted Japan in her crime against the "sovereignty, the 
independence, and the territorial and administrative integ-
rity" of a country which the United States by treaty is 
obligated to respect. Thus, Judd asserted, the United States 
98 is violating its own treaty. He did not wish to see Japan 
crushed, or to suffer the fate of the Central Powers at the 
conclusion of World War I; he wanted only to check Japan's 
military party and thereby allow her to free herself, China, 
and the United States from its threat. Then Japan could 
find ways of getting to the peace table to settle the China 
venture before she suffered economic collapse, especially if 
the United States offered some face-saving loopholes, as it 
97 Ibid., p. 305. 
98
rbid., p. 306. 
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could and should do. 
46 
The best interest of Japan could only be served, Judd 
argued, by certain economic sanctions. Likewise, Americans 
would benefit because many American activities worked 
against the nation's own best interest, as the action of the 
United States aided the process of building up a competitor 
that could put the United States out of business. The eco-
nomic results would be devastating to the United States, 
Judd felt, if Japan could succeed in getting hold of China's 
manpower and natural resources. By using Chinese raw mater-
ials which she would obtain by confiscation, and by using 
Chinese conscripted labor, which would be forced into a sta-
tus of economic serfdom, Japan could build in China, with 
the use of modern machines and human slavery, an industrial 
plant that could take over the whole world's markets in the 
100 products that she would manufacture. 
The economic sanctions which Judd desired in the late 
1930's had been suggested by Stimson, as Secretary of State, 
in 1932. President Hoover, however, blocked sanctions be-
cause he feared that the United States would be alone in 
levying a boycott and thus would bear the brunt of Japan's 
99
rbid., p. 309. 
lOO C · F . Aff . Am . 1 House ommittee on oreign airs, erican Neutra -
ity Policy Hearings, 1939, pp. 330-40. 
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101 ire alone. Stimson had to settle for non-recognition in 
regard to Japan's action in Manchuria. He did, however, con-
tinue to champion the cause of China. In early 1940 the 
former Secretary of State proposed in a letter written to 
the New York Times that Congress pass legislation to prohibit 
the export of arms, munitions or raw materials for arms to 
Japan. Stimson viewed the trade as 0 a dirty busineSS 88 car-
. d b 1 f Am ' 102 r1e on yon ya ew er1cans. Both Judd and Stimson 
demanded that the United States cite Japan in specific terms 
as an aggressor against the United States rights in China. 
Stimson expressed views which not only paralleled those 
which Judd gave to the House and Senate committees a year 
earlier, but which also smacked of the '8merchants of death'' 
theory which came out of the Nye Committee of the mid-1930's. 
Stimson's letter was.applauded, reprinted, and widely cir-
culatedby the American Committee for Non-participation in 
Japanese aggression~03 The man who had opposed Stimson most 
strenuously in 1932, William R. Castle, Hoover's Under Sec-
retary of State, opposed him also in regard to the undeclared 
101Armin Rappaport, Hena L. Stimson and Japan, ~-33 
(Chicago~ .The University of Chicago Press, 1963), p. 91. 
102 · New York Times, January 11, 1940, pp. 1, 4. 
103
rbid,p Johnstone, The. United States and Ja:pqn's New 
Order, p. 294. 
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Sino-Japanese War. Castle had in 1932 consistently and ada-
mently opposed sanctions against Japan. In the late 1930's 
his views echoed the isolationist-neutralist sentiment. 
Castle charged that the Roosevelt Administration was risking 
war by setting itself up as "prosecuting attorney and judge 
of the rest of the world." He acknowledged that Americans 
could and should feel sorrow and pity for the suffering of 
the Chinese, but he spoke the works and attitudes which per-
meated American thought at this time: "We have enough to do 
to keep our own house in order, to see to it that the mis-
eries brought upon innocent people of the world over do not 
also fall on our own citizens. 11104 
In contrast to the sentiments of these prominent Ameri-
cans, Joseph C. Grew, Ambassador to Japan, favored a more 
moderate policy. For Grew, the possibility of reconcilia-
tion between the United States and East Asia never entirely 
d . d 105 isappeare . Later he did, however, warn of the possibil-
ity that Japan might attack the United States with dramatic 
106 
suddenness; but at an earlier date he was greatly alarmed 
104 New York Times, January 11, 1939, p. 8. 
105
waldo H. Heinrichs, Jr., American Ambassador: Joseph 
C. Grew and the Development of~ United States Diplomatic 
Tradition (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1966), p. 307. 
106Fairbank, East Asia: 1'.fill Modern Transformation, p. 805. 
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by talks of embargo in the United States. Grew felt that 
Stimson and his "satellites" dangerously underestimated the 
107 
risk of war which might follow the embargo. He also be-
lieved Stimson's doctrine had been weak and had failed to 
accomplish its goal because it turned world opinion against 
Japan and broke down lines of communications. Grew likewise 
disapproved of Cordell Hull's lecturing Japan on the prin-
ciples of international conduct. Hull's objective was to 
mobilize world opinion against Japan, which in turn would 
force her to halt her lawless action. 108 Stanley Hornbeck, 
Adviser on Political Relations in the Department of State in 
1932, and Senior Adviser on Far Eastern Affairs in the late 
1930's, further complicated the course of action the United 
States should take in Asia. On both occasions Hornbeck was 
inclined toward a boycott as the only means of bridling 
109 Japan. Grew, in spite of differences with the State 
Department, believed that Rooseveltian foreign policy was 
107Heinrichs, American Ambassador: Joseph C. Grew and 
the Development of~ United States Diplomatic Tradition, 
p. 307. 
lOSibid. 
109 Herbert Feis, The Road to Pearl Harbor: The Coming 
of the War Between the United States and Japan (Princeton, 
New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1950), p. 102. 
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110 
"wise, sound, and beyond substantial reproach." Sumner 
Welles, Roosevelt's Under Secretary of State, tended to side 
closely with Grew; he felt that when the door of negotiation 
was closed, Japan was most likely to strike. He strongly 
supported Roosevelt's policy of giving neither provocation 
111 
nor concessions to the Japanese. 
When Roosevelt moved in early 1940 to prohibit sale of 
planes and aviation gasoline to Japan he acted wholly out-
side the framework of the Neutrality Acts and even in flat 
contradiction to the spirit of that legislation. For the 
Neutrality Acts, when invoked, provided that in the regula-
tion of exports there must be no discrimination between the 
nation which is bombed and the nation which does the bombing, 
between the victim of aggression and the nation which had 
deliberately set upon a war of conquest. It was because of 
this hard-and-fast rule against any and all discrimination, 
and the belief that it would work to the disadvantage of 
China, that Roosevelt failed to invoke the Neutrality Acts 
in East Asia. 112 Judd applauded Roosevelt's action at this 
llOHeinrichs, American Ambassador: Joseph C. Grew and 
the Development of the United States Diplomatic Tradition, 
p. 307. 
111
rbid. 
112 New York Times, January 11, 1940, p. 18. 
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time: he had specifically named Japan an aggressor in China. 
At this time Judd could lend his support to the President, 
because he realized that the Neutrality Laws did not give 
the President enough discretion in discriminating against 
aggressors. Later in 1944, however, Judd, more the partisan 
politician, asserted in a radio address that Roosevelt saw 
the danger of the Japa,nese situation in 1937 when he made 
his quarantine speech in Chicago, but that the President 
"would not risk his political career" to drive home to the 
113 American people the Japanese menace. 
Lending support to the President in 1939-1940, Judd had 
declared to the Congress and the American people that if they 
allowed Japan to continue her course of action in China, they 
would only be contributing to the eventual bankruptcy of the 
United States. By continuing the existing course, Judd de-
clared, the American people were allowing Japan to become a 
military and naval power--a potential military threat which 
they already mistrusted and which they would have to arm 
against. Thus, if the United States would stop its aid to 
Japan, then money would not have to be spent in building up 
American armament. In conclusion to this argument, Judd 
felt that "a decent instinct or self-preservation would 
dictate" that the United States stop its assistance to 
113 New York Times, November 6, 1944, p~ 16. 
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114 o 1 b . b f J d d d Japan. n y y economic oycott o apanese-pro uce commo -
ities and embargo of all war materials could the Japanese 
military party be defeated short of war. Judd asserted that 
Japan possessed in adequate·quantity only two of the twenty-
six materials necessary to execute modern warfare, coal and 
sulphur. More than fifty percent of her imported war mater-
ials were obtained from the United States. 115 Judd further 
emphasized that this astonishing recorded fact will in the 
future indicate that several democratic countries, including 
the United States, all by far stronger than Japan, "except 
in decisiveness and in spirit," destroy their own interests 
in Asia by aiding Japan to succeed in dominating the Pacif-
. 116 
lC. 
Assessing why the United States had not taken definite 
action in Asia, Judd related that perhaps many reasons could 
be found, but perhaps the most important were: 
lack of information as to what is going on and lack 
of foresight as to its significance for the future; 
... unconcern ... and ... the sense of isolation and sec-
urity that two wide oceans have given us for so many 
decades; preoccupation with our own internal diffi-
114
senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Neutrality, 
Peace Legislation, And Our Foreign Policy, 1939, p. 303. 
llSibid., p. 299. 
116Ibid., p. 304. 
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culties; an economic order ailing so seriously that 
we hesitate·to disturb it in the very least lest it 
have another relapse; widely believed so-called 'laws 
of business' that one must sell whatever he has to 
whoever will buy and pay for it ... ; plain greed and 
lust for profits from whatever source. 117 
But perhaps the strongest of all was the fear that if the 
United States stopped sales to Japan the action might lead 
to war. 
A recapitulation of what Judd stressed to the committees 
and his audiences throughout the country reveals that he 
believed: (1) that the United States did have, because of 
her past, her present, and her future, enormous stakes in 
East Asia, from legal, moral, humanitarian, and self-interest 
standpoints; (2) that substantial American support of Japan's 
lawless action, under present policies, would systematically 
destroy American interests in China, and thus threaten the 
security of the Philippines, and eventually of the United 
States; (3) that America's self-interest required extrica-
tion from the intolerable position the United States occu-
pied; (4) that Japan's "illegal" and "criminal" action 
against China would be thwarted by the nonmilitary means of 
ending the partial financing of the war by stopping the pur-
chase of her goods and placing an embargo on the sale and 
shipment of all war materials to her; (5) that the immediate 
117Ibid., p. 307. 
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employment of these tactics would be at minimum cost and at 
minimum risk to the United States, resulting in enormous 
benefits to the United States, and incidental benefits to 
China, to world peace, and eventually to the Japanese people; 
(6) and that if immediate action were not taken along these 
lines Japan presented an enormous danger to the United 
118 States, to all humanity, and all hopes for peace. The 
only sure way that the United States could keep out of war, 
Judd asserted, would be to prevent the eruption of this war 
h . h h U . d S ld ·1 t · 119 w ic t e nite tates cou easi y ge into. 
Judd saw four principal ways of approaching the problem 
of stopping United States assistance to the Japanese war ma-
chine. One would involve legislation for the cutting off of 
exported oil and iron and their derivatives, along with cop-
per, lumber, lead and other resources vital to the Japanese 
war effort. This policy could be justified, he felt, on the 
ground of self-preservation, for vital natural resources 
might be needed by the United States for its own defense in 
the future. Second, specific legislation would place an em-
barge on all loans and credits, along with prohibitive 
ll8 C · F ' Aff . Am . N 1 House ommittee on oreign airs, erican eutra -
ity Policy Hearings, 1939, pp. 353-54. 
119 C . F . R 1 . 1· Senate ommittee on oreign e ations, Neutra ity, 
Peace Legislation, And Our Foreign Policy, 1939, p. 297. 
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clauses governing sale and shipment of war materials to Ja-
pan. This could be enforced only so long as she continued 
her invasion of China or interfered with American trade in 
China in violation of the Nine-Power Treaty. This, Judd 
felt, was nothing short of justice as long as Japan continued 
her provocative, illegal and unfriendly acts toward the Uni-
ted States and its interests. Third, reprisals might take 
the form of high import duties on Japanese silk or the clos-
ing of American ports and harbors to Japanese vessels until 
that nation allowed American ships to enter Chinese harbors 
and waterways which Japan had prevented American vessels 
from using. Judd often mentioned that his wife refused to 
wear Japanese silk, and then suggested to the ladies of his 
audience that they do likewise. Finally, the United States 
could prohibit Japanese remittance of money or credits from 
the United States as long as Japan interfered with American 
citizens or firms in Asia desiring to remit, without exchange 
restrictions and discriminations, money to the United States. 
Judd had been informed by legal authorities that the Presi-
dent could under existing legislation shut off Japanese im-
ports to the United States as a result of Japan's discrimina-
. . Am . d . Ch' 120 b h · tion against erican tra e in ina, ut t e President, 
in Judd's opinion, did not have the popular support to carry 
120
rbid., p. 304. 
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this out. 
To follow any of Judd's suggestions would not indeed 
have been illegal under existing neutrality laws; however, 
such an action would have resulted in officially branding 
Japan as an aggressor. This would have been contrary to the 
spirit of the neutrality legislation and would have been an 
act which neither Congress nor the President was willing to 
do at that date. The New York Times charged that both the 
Congress and the President preferred instead to maintain the 
"elaborate fiction" that there existed in Asia no "war." 
In this "fantastic but essentially honorable position" the 
Government had the "over-whelming" endorsement of American 
opinion. 121 The President, however, most concerned with 
"bolstering the moral and material resources of the ... anti-
Axis groups," did not invoke neutrality legislation against 
Asian nations, because in so doing China would have been 
122 penalized more severely than Japan. 
The most desirable legislation, Judd believed, would be 
a combination of the extension of the "cash and carry" pro-
vision to all war materials, with executive and Congressional 
121 New York Times, January 11, 1939, p. 18. 
122Franklin D. Roosevelt, The Public Papers And Address-
§.§. of Franklin D. Roosevelt: War---And Aid To Democracies 
(New York: The Macmillan Company, 1941), pp. 589-95. 
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authority to prohibit the exporting of any basic materials 
useful in conducting war, to any nation at war in violation 
of a treaty with the United States. This, likewise, would 
have involved the naming of Japan as aggressor, and Congress 
was unwilling even in late 1939 to grant the President great-
er discriminatory power in neutrality legislation. The 
"cash-and-carry" provision, which could not in itself be a 
deterrent, eventually proved beneficial to Japan. Judd, 
however, asserted that no nation at war under any circum-
stances should trade with the United States except on "cash-
and-carry" basis. Executive and congressional prohibitive 
power, Judd pelieved, would serve as a powerful deterrent to 
11 b k . . 123 a treaty- rea ing nations. Only additional congression-
al legislation, Judd believed, held the answer to the Sino-
Japanese problem. On several occasions he asserted that the 
"administration has done all it could under existing legis-
lation to help China. 11124 He expressed belief that the 
people of this country "overwhelmingly" wanted such action 
taken by the Unitep States Government, by whatever legal 
machinery the Congress "in its wisdom and experience devises 
123
senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Neutrality, 
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as best calculated to accomplish such ends. 11125 
In conclusion, Judd would usually assure his audience 
that the United States could "temporize or postpone but not 
escape" the Asian problem. Thus, the "ultimate cost and dan-
ger will be infinitely greater," he feared, "than any possi-
, 
ble cost and danger now"; it "is already very late"; but he 
felt convinced "on the basis of long experience with and 
knowledge of the eastern people" tl:1.at the United States 
could stop the war "without firing a shot." But if the Uni-
ted States did not, and quickly, then ultimate war with 
Japan would be "almost inevitable. 11126 
Judd continued speaking against the Japanese menace for 
approximately two years. But often he felt that he had no 
greater impact than did President Roosevelt's "quarantine 
speech" of 1937. Although Judd spoke eloquently, the di-
sease of appeasement, which he saw permeating the 1930's 
often left him disheartened. Toward the end of 1940 he 
realized that Japan, at that late date, could not be stopped 
short of war. Thu$, feeling pangs of wasted energy and be-
ing short of funds, Judd limited his speaking activities 
and established hi~self in medical practice in Minneapolis. 
125Ibid., p. 312. 
126Ibid., p. 311. 
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On January 1, 1941, he took over the practice of a good 
friend, Dr. Y. T. Johnson, who was being called into the na-
127 
tional guard. Judd, however, continued to talk on the 
world situation. It has been reported that Judd's stirring 
appeal to audiences enabled members of Congress to trace his 
itinerary through their states by the mail which they re-
ceived demanding passage of embargo legislation. Several 
national radio broadcasts by Dr. Judd, "particularly those 
on the Town Meeting of the Air program, produced marked 
d . f . . ,,128 emonstrat1ons o op1n1on. 
By February, 1941, the directors of the American Com-
mittee for Non-Participation in Japanese Aggression con-
eluded that public opinion had come to support a more posi-
tive policy in regard to Japan, that their mission had been 
completed, and that they could close out active campaign-
ing.129 The Committee had during the eighteen months of its 
most intensive efforts "received almost $100,000.00 from 
contributions, speakers' fees and the sale of litera-
1 27 · 1 · F b 12 1952 M1nneapo 1s Star, e ruary , . 
128 Masland, "Missionary Influence Upon American Far 
Eastern Policy," 295; for an example of one of Judd's Town 
Meeting of the Air discussions see: Walter H. Judd, "Let's 
Stop Arming Japan!" Readers Digest, XXXVI (February, 1940), 
41-44. 
129 Masland, "Missionary Influence Upon American Far 
Eastern Policy," 294. 
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There is sufficient evidence to conclude that the Price 
Committee exerted considerable influence in swaying public 
opinion. As a result of the activities of this committee, 
"hundreds of women's clubs, church, youth, labor, and busi-
ness groups ... [went] ... on record in favor of an embargo on 
131 
shipments to Japan." Various Congressmen read into the 
Congressional Record statements, petitions, and resolutions 
from city and state groups which requested concrete action 
against Japan. The Price Committee in general and Judd in 
particular can be credited with the positive action of many 
of these organizations which resulted in a flood of letters 
and telegrams descending on Washington "demanding either 
legislation or executive action, or both. 11132 Members of 
the American Committee for Non-Participation in Japanese 
Aggression rejoiced over Roosevelt's selection of Stimson, 
on June 19, 1940, as Secretary of War, feeling assured that 
130
rbid., p. 293; Dr. Masland states in a footnote on 
page 293 that: "Original contributions were made by a group 
of individuals who had for some time been supporting organi-
zations promoting collective security. It might be noted 
that these same individuals appear to have furnished the 
funds which made possible the establishment of the William 
Allen White Committee to Defend America by Aiding the Allies." 
131Ibid., p. 294. 
132Ibid. 
61 
the latter would aid in formulating foreign policy. The 
committee lobbied to speed Stimson's confirmation because 
its members felt that he was sincerely interested in getting 
the embargo applied, and that he would influence the Presi-
133 dent away from compromising or temporizing with Japan. 
The committee served, without doubt, as "an important factor 
in Qvercoming the indifference and isolationism across the 
country and in Congress which held the administration in 
check during the first year or more of the Sino-Japanese 
W 11134 ar. William E. Daugherty, a member of the Special De-
fense Unit of the United States Department of Justice, as~ 
serted that the "hundreds of so-called 'China people' or 
Americans who have lived in China, who established and pro-
moted such organizations as the American Committee for Non-
Participation in Japanese Aggression, served as China's most 
135 important propaganda and pressure elements." When the 
President moved ahead with economic pressure against Japan, 
it was "perhaps safe to conclude that popular acceptance of 
133 Current, Secretary Stimson: A Study in Statecraft, 
p.139. 
134 Masland, "Missionary Influence Upon American Far 
Eastern Policy," 295. 
135
william E. Daugherty, "China's Official Publicity In 
the United States," Public Opinion Quarterly, VI (1942), pp. 
70-86. 
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Administration policy ... [resulted] ... in part ... [from] ... the 
constant compaigning of the [Price] Committee. 11136 
By the time of the attack on Pearl Harbor, Judd had 
b · 1 1 d . . M. 1 · 137 ui t up a arge an prosperous practice in inneapo is. 
Judd had felt that he must, however, continue his efforts on 
behalf of China, although convinced that the American people 
would remain unconcerned until too late to prevent wholesale 
1 d . 138 b oodshe of American men. Probably the peak of Judd's 
fame among church-goers came when, on the morning of December 
7, 1941, he told the assembled membership of Mayflower Con-
gregational Church, Minneapolis, that Japan would not hesi-
tate to attack the United States, and soon. After the news 
of Pearl Harbor came over the radio that afternoon, Judd was 
139 
regarded as a "minor prophet." The many speeches which 
Judd had delivered on imminent war with Japan took on new 
meaning and significance to the citizens of Minneapolis. His 
prophecy became tangible proof to many that indeed Judd un-
136 Masland, "Missionary Influence Upon American Far 
Eastern Policy," 295. 
137Rovere, ''Eight Hopeful Congressmen, 11 296. 
138
congressional Quarterly, "GOP Keynoter Judd an Expert 
on Asian Policy," 1266. 
139Minneapolis Tribune, March 17, 1943 
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derstood the Asian world. 140 
The Pearl Harbor attack convinced some of Judd's friends 
that his knowledge of Asia qualified him to be an effective 
wartime Congressman. In the summer of 1942, young Republi-
cans of the Minnesota Fifth Congressional District were 
racking their brains for a candidate to oppose isolationist 
incumbent Oscar Youngdahl in the primaries. Someone thought 
of Judd. After due consideration and several refusals, Judd 
consented; however, he felt that his chances for victory were 
slight. Even Governor Harold Stassen did not think Judd had 
a chance, but his supporters embarked on a bell-pushing cam-
141 paign that rev~rsed the odds in a few weeks. The Cowles 
newspaper interests, the Star and the Tribune, Minneapolis' 
largest dailies, gave Judd their full support. He also re-
142 
ceived strong labor union support. 
During the campaign Youngdahl often referred to "out-
siders" coming in to "take over" the Fifth District; then he 
would ask with ,sinister implication "what their motives were. 1114 3 
140Rovere, "Eight Hopeful Congressmen," 296; Congress-
ional Quarterly, "GOP Keynoter Judd an Expert on Asian Pol-
icy," 1266. 
141Minneapolis Tribune, March 17, 1943. 
142Rovere, "Eight Hopeful Congressmen," 296 
143Minneapolis Tribune, September 3, 1942. 
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Youngdahl compaigned on the principle that there had been an 
honest difference of opinion on foreign policy before Pearl 
Harbor and that he simply voted his convictions and what he 
considered to be the sentiment of his constituents. He con-
tended that the importance of personal service from Congress-
men had been minimized by his opponent. Judd's reply was 
that Youngdahl could not pass off his record with "there were 
a lot of people who didn't see the cloud or didn't believe 
the storm would descend on us." Judd reminded the constitu-
ents of the Fifth District that their own recollections, and 
the Gallup Poll,. revealed that a majority of the American 
people saw the ~anger of war long before Youngdahl was able 
to see it. It was his job, Judd declared, to "see what the 
people saw, and as their represen_tative, to seek a solution 
instead of feeding them soothing syrup. 11144 
Judd rested his candidacy in the primary election of 
1942 on the theory that the people wanted "fresh minds" in 
Washington to deal with the world crisis--men with a "new 
approach" to world affairs--"men who 'admit they don't know 
it can't be done. ' " He repeatedly emphasized that the Con-
gress of which Youngdahl was a member had "signally failed" 
~
4
~Ibid. 
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in its responsibility to the general public. 145 Judd hit 
hard throughout the campaign on the topic that he was the 
"prophet of war" with .;rapan and a foe of isolationism, while 
Youngdahl had voted against lend-lease and every other major 
piece of legislation which would have better prepared the 
Uni~ed States to fight an offensive war. 146 His campaign 
workers portrayed him as an "authority on the Japanese men-
ace" because of his "long years of residence" in the Orient, 
and as a man so well-versed in world affairs that hisser-
vices in Congress would be invaluable in the winning of the 
d . d' 147 war an 1n post-war a Justrnents. 
The Minneapolis daily papers were flooded with "letters 
to the editor" proclaiming Judd's vast knowledge of the Ori-
ental people, and damning Youngdahl for his isolationist 
position. 148 Judd had a huge committee of volunteer workers 
who put on a door-to-qoor compaign for him which literally 
overwhelmed the Fifth District. His wide personal acquaint-
anceship gained during his intensive series of lectures on 
145M· l' T 'b S t b 4 1942 1nneapo 1s r1 une, ep em er , . 
146M· l' T 'b S t b 10 1942 1nneapo 1s r1 une, ep em er , . 
147Minneapolis Sunday Tribune and Star Journal, August 
30, 1942, p. 7. 
148Minneapolis Tribune, September 10, 1942. 
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the East Asian situation before he became a candidate also 
contributed to making the primary election the most exciting 
in many decades, since Judd had spoken in Minneapolis alone 
t ' . t h' . 149 some seventy imes prior o is campaign. 
150 Judd defeated Youngdahl by some 10,000 votes, re-
ceiving approximately 56 percent of the votes; it was a sub-
stantial victory, particularly so in a year in which the tide 
of world events would seem to favor an incumbent. TheMinne-
apolis Star Journal summed up Judd's victory over Youngdahl 
by stating: "The rather decisive victory of Walter H. Judd 
... is another proof of the ability of the people to under-
stand issues and reject trivialities and make sound choices 
when they are confronted with clear alternatives ... Judd's 
victory ... resulted from a people's uprising which astonished 
orthodox politicians by its zeal and coherence. 11151 From 
the primary Judd went on to victory in the general election 
on November 3, winning over his Democratic opponent, Dr. 
Th P R b ' 't f 1 t 152 1 omas . yan, ya maJori yo near y wo to one, a -
149M· 1· S d T 'b d St J 1 A inneapo is un ay ri une .fill._____§_£ ourna, ugust 
30, 1942. 
150Minneapolis Tribune, March 17, 1943. 
151M· 1· S J 1 S b 9 1942 inneapo is tar ourna, eptem er , . 
152Minneapolis Tribune, March 17, 1943. 
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though the opponent's views on most questions differed only 
slightly from Judd I s. 153 The Christian Science Monitor ap:-
plauded Judd's victory. In electing Judd to high office, the 
Monitor said, "Minnesota has not only proved that she has 
abandoned isolationism for a broader international outlook; 
she has also made a real contribution to American statesman-
h ... 154 s 1.p. 
Richard Rovere, in describing collectively the election 
of eight new House members, including Judd, in the general 
election of 1942, wrote: "The truth seems to be, as so of-
ten it is in American politics, that they were elected less 
because of the stand on specific issues than because they 
appeared to the voters to be more honest and reasonable men 
155 
than their opponents." After Judd took office on January 
6, 1943, his popularity increased so rapidly that he became 
one of the most widely-known Congressmen outside his own 
Minneapolis district. He became one of the most sought-after 
speakers, not only for partisan Republican rallies, but for 
civic, religious and professio~al groups. During his Con-
gressional days Judd received an average of eight invitations 
153 Rovere, "Eight Hopeful Congressmen," 296. 
154M' l' T 'b 1.nneapo 1.s r1. une, March 17, 1943. 
155 Rovere, "Eight Hopeful Congressmen," 294. 
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a day to speak at some function. He turned down nearly 
twenty for every one he accepted, but still delivered well 
156 
over one hundred talks a year. Judd's platform style, 
his personality, his subject matter, whether on the House 
floor, filling the pulpit, or speaking with a convention of 
educators, seldom failed to arouse pungent reaction from 
both critic and admirer. 
156 
· 1 · S F b 12 1954 . M1nneapo 1s tar, e ruary , . During the 
month of February, 1952, Judd was booked for twenty-two 
speeches, well above his average; he was on a round of Lin-
coln day addresses for the Republican National Committee. 
Six of the twenty-two were in his district, and two others 
were elsewhere in Minnesota. At this time he earned several 
thousand dollars a year from his talks. He received from 
$100 to $250 for most speeches for which he was paid, but 
more than half of his addresses were without any fee, Minn-
eapolis Tribune, August 30, 1952. 
CHAPTER II 
WALTER Ho JUDD: REPEAL OF THE CHINESE EXCLUSION LAWS 
Judd officially became a member of the United States 
House of Representatives on January 6, 1943, and on February 
25 he delivered his maiden speech in the House on the need 
for better understanding of the Asian peoples. He emphasized 
America's grievous error of legalizing racial discrimination 
in dealing with the Orientals, for he saw in American legis-
lation--the exclusion laws--a chief deterrent to improved 
East-West relations. Judd believed that the major reason 
for the December 7 attack by Japan on Pearl Harbor could be 
found in these laws, while the Chinese still smarted from 
their sting. Judd felt strongly that immediate action 
should be taken to modify this American position. By remov-
ing this stigma placed on the Chinese, Judd believed, the United 
States would check one of Japan's most effective war propa-
ganda tools, and bolster China's morale, thereby giving that 
nation encouragement to continue in her fight against Japan-
ese aggression. Prior to taking his House seat Judd had de-
clared his intention to work for removal of the Asiatic ex-
clusion policy from American immigration pnd naturalization 
69 
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law. Thus repeal of the Chinese exclusion laws received 
priority in Judd's legislative goals. 
Judd addressed the House at length on American-Asian 
relations, associated problems, and possible solutions. Judd 
had been elected on a platform stressing international is-
sues; he sought to awaken Congress and the State Department 
to the expanding role Asia would·· play in future world af-
fairs. Minneapolis sent, and the House received, without 
apparent serious question, the former missionary as an auth~ 
ority on all Asian matters. Judd spoke with an air of com-
pulsion, as one familiar with the psychology of the people 
of East and Southeast Asia, in "hopes" of correcting some 
misconceptions about Asian culture and way of life. "It is 
apparent," he told his House colleagues, "that in the last 
20 years of diplomatic dealings with certain oriental na-
tions, and in our military relations thus far in the war, we 
have, with the best intention, made some grievous errors. 111 
These. errors, Judd felt,. sprang directly from Americans 
projecting their own ideas and their own reactions into the 
minds of the Orientals who "have not had our background and 
who, therefore, naturally do not have many of our ideas and 
1u. s., Congressional Record, 78th Cong., 1st Sess., 
1943, LXXXIX, Part 1, 1342. 
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reactions. 112 
Continuing his case for the Oriental mind, Judd express-
ed his belief that following the First World War, the United 
States went through a period of 11 disillusiorunent and debunk-
ing and cynicism." Many Americans, he asserted, "took over 
in their thinking" one of the communists' basic theses--
economic determinism--the "doctrine that no man or nation 
ever does anything except on the basis of what he or it ex-
pects to get in immediate material gains. 113 Here Judd found 
American thinking in error regarding the mind of the Orien-
tal. He told his colleagues that the things that a nation 
could "have". or "have not" could not always be "counted or 
measured or weighed." What Asians chiefly sought did not 
fall into these categories, but consisted of "certain intan-
gible things, certain things of the spirit" which they call 
4 
"face." To illustrate his point, Judd cited the Golden 
Rule. He asserted that when dealing with Asian people or 
with people of different cultures the Golden Rule should 
read: "Do unto others as you would have them do unto you, 
72 
if you were they. 115 To Judd, this constituted a great dif-
ference in practice from the connotation Americans tradition-
ally give to the Golden Rule. What seems right, just, an~ 
logical to the Western mind is often not that which seems 
right, just, and logical to the Eastern mind, he emphasized. 6 
In reference to the attack on Pearl Harbor, Judd assert-
ed that the United States State Department "knew everything 
about the Pacific--except the Japanese." The Japanese, Judd 
continued, learned from China the principles of unorthodox 
warfare--the sort of warfare which enabled China to fight 
Japan for five years without proper equipment, but with a 
"will." The attack upon Pearl Harbor and the reasoning be-
hind it Judd viewed as basic to this unorthodox concept of 
warfare. The attack by an inferior power against such great 
odds--the Japanese against the United States--can be traced 
to earlier Vnited States-Japanese relations, he felt. The 
United States and the Western world failed to take into con-
sideration the Japanese struggre for recognition during the 
early twentieth century. But just as Japan rose to the top 
in might following the Russo-Japanese War, which seems to 
have dispelled the island country's inferiority complex, 
5Ibid. 
6Ibid. 
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there occurred two events to which Japan could not adjust. 
One was the refusal of the Western powers to insert into the 
League of Nations covenant recognition of the principle of 
racial equality. The second blow, delivered by the Congress 
of the United States in 1924, was Oriental exclusion. 
Judd recalled for his House colleagues the labor trou-
bles on the Pacific coast in the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries. The problem, the white population con-
tended, resulted from Oriental immigration which had suppos-
7 
edly caused a reduction of wage levels. The Oriental popu-
lation thus received the brunt of cruel and often most bru-
tal discrimination. It was unjustly asserted that the Ori-
entals had caused the undercutting of native wage scales and 
living standards. Judd pointed out that the United States 
Congress explained Oriental exclusion as springing from_eco-
nomic sources, which was true only in part; had this alone 
been the real reason for exclusion, Judd continued, there 
would not have been a murmur of protest from any Oriental 
nation. The East recognized the United States as a sovereign 
country and realized that Congress had a right to regulate 
7For an extensive objective discussion see: Mary Coo-
lidge, Chinese Immigration (New York: Henry Holt and Company 
1909), passim; Carey McWilliams, Brothers Under the Skin 
(Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1951), .chapter II; Elmer 
Clarence Sandmeyer, The Anti-Chinese Movement in California 
(Urbana, Illinois: The University of Illinois Press, 1939), 
chapters II-IV. 
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immigration, but felt that the United States did not have 
the right to insult friendly people solely because of their 
race or the color of their skin. 8 Unfortunately, however, 
the basis on which the United States excluded Orientals was 
one of race--a desire to make non-Caucasians ineligible for 
American citizenship. 9 Judd continued: 
No matter what a man's or a woman's ability may be, 
or education or culture, or charm, or professional 
skill, if the pigment in his or her skin is differ-
ent from ours, he or she is because of that fact 
automatically and inescapably branded as inferior, 
forever condemned to a level below us--officially 
stignatized. Gentlemen, that day we made war be-
tween ourselves and Japan inevitable--if and when 
Japan could manage to get sufficient military 
strength to attack us. 10 
The United States, Judd proclaimed, is "reaping today [World 
War II] in bloodshed what we sowed then in arrogance and in 
the belief that somehow we were above the laws of human com-
. ,,11 
mun1ty. 
Judd suggested that perhaps a good case for American 
friendship might be made out of the United States selling 
war supplies to Japan. But this only resulted, he said, in 
8u. s., Congressional Record, 78th Cong., 1st Sess., 
1943, LXXXIX, Part 1, 1245. 
9Ibid. 
lOibid. 
11Ibid. 
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a buildup of military strength and in the attempted conquest 
of China--a selling down the river of an "old friend." Judd 
argued that 
no mind that can add up two and two and get four can 
ever make out a case for doing those two things at 
the same time. If you are going to insult Japan and 
make her hate you, then you had better not arm her. 
If you are going to arm her, then you had better not 
insult her. 12 
Judd emppasized to his House colleagues that the war· 
did not represent the sentiment of the Japanese populace, 
and that he did not bear any antagonism toward the Japanese 
people. The war to Judd constituted a conflict organized 
and executed by the Japanese military party, primarily to 
retaliate for exclusion laws. Without doubt this was an 
exaggerated point of view, but Judd expressed on many occa-
sions his conviction that, while the United States could 
win the Second World War without repealing the laws, another 
13 
war could not be prevented without their repeal. After 
their passage, Judd declared, Japan could only seek ven-
geance on the United States, to make the United States take 
back the racial insult and humiliation placed at the door of 
Asia. ·This desire to conquer·America for revenge led Japan 
12Ibid. 
13Richard Rovere, "Eight Hopeful Congressmen," The 
Nation, CLV~ (February 27, 1943), 296. 
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to attack China first, as she dared not leave a strong 
h . . dl h . d . h 14 Cina, frien y tote Unite States, at er back. Judd's 
thesis left little ground for the more conventional theory 
that Japan followed the road of imperialism for nationalistic 
reasons and to obtain strategic resources which she needed 
for industrial purposes. The revenge theory, along with 
Judd's disdain for racial discrimination, led him to take up 
the cause for repeal of the Chinese exclusion laws. 
Chinese exclusion, however, was but one example of il-
liberality which had permeated the immigration and naturali-
zation code for nearly two decades. The 1924 Immigration 
and Naturalization Act excluded all persons not eligible for 
citizenship, that is, all persons whose skins were not red, 
white, or black. Under the terms of this act, students, min-
isters, businessmen and persons within other named classifi-
cations could be admitted, but for temporary residence only. 
No Chinese, whatever his class or occ~pation, could be ad-
mitted legally for permanent residence on the same basis as 
persons of the three approved colors. The 1924 law set down 
the same stipulation for all Asiatics. When the 1924 law 
14u. S C H C 'tt I . t' d ., ongress, ouse, ommi ee on . mmigra ion an 
Naturalization, Hearings, Repeal of The Chinese Exclusion 
Acts, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. ,. 1943, p. 160. Hereafter cited 
as: House Committee on Immigration and Naturalization, 
Repeal of The Chinese Exclusion Acts Hearings, 1943. 
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was passed excluding all Orientals, however, the Chinese 
were not put on the same footing as other Orientals, for 
Congress did not repeal existing Chinese exclusion laws. 
The Chinese alone remained a race singled out by Congress 
as "unfit" for immigration and naturalization. The "great 
wall".of exclusion against the Chinese dates from 1882. 
Carey McWilliams declared that the exclusion of the Chinese 
by Federal legislation is a clear illustration of Congress 
yielding to the specific will of one of its individual states 
in the absence of any general demand. He noted the follow-
ing factors in explaining the exclusion laws: (1) All but 
one of the anti-Chinese laws were passed by Congress on the 
eve of a national election--thus they were passed for an 
avowed political purpose. (2) The interrelationship of the 
Southern attitude toward the Negro and the California atti-
tude toward the Oriental prompted Southern Congressmen to 
side with California on a~ pro quo basis. (3) White 
Americans throughout the United States had a general absence 
of real knowledge of the Chinese and failed to recognize the 
issue as related to national interest. 15 
Antagonism toward the Chinese had first expressed it-
15
charles F. Marden, Minorities in American Society 
(New York: American Book Company, 1952), p. 162; McWilliams, 
Brothers Under the Skin, pp. 91-104. 
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self in the form of lawless violence, then in discriminatory 
city ordinances and state legislation, and finally in Feder-
al legislation to exclude Chinese immigrants. 16 With the 
adoption of such legislation, the United States was formally 
committed to a policy of racial discrimination at variance 
with traditions, principles, and prior policies in East-West 
relations. Congress in 1882 had suspended all Chinese immi-
gration and had prohibited naturalization for ten years. A 
repeated suspension for another ten years came in 1892. At 
the end of this period, in 1902 and 1904, Congress extended 
the suspension of Chinese immigration indefinitely along 
with other humiliating gestures, which led to a major boy-
cott of American goods by the Chinese. Of some fifteen acts 
concerning the Chinese passed by Congress between 1882 and 
1913, perhaps one of the more provoking clauses had to do 
with Section Six Certificates which were not required of any 
other group. A Chinese wishing to visit the United States 
had to have, in addition to his Chinese passport, a special 
American document telling his occupational status. In the 
case of all other Asiatics the United States accepted pass-
ports of the alien's own government as evidence that the 
visitor was one of those favored classes who were permitted 
16 d M' . . . Am . S . 161 Mar en, 1nor1t1es.J:11 er1can oc1ety, p. . 
79 
. . h U . d S 17 to v1s1t t e n1te tates. The Chinese did not accept 
the discrimination without a struggle. However, the Supreme 
Court consistently lent support to the Government's position. 
In Chew Heong v. United States (1884) it held: 
A restriction upon their [Chinese] further immigra-
tion was felt to be necessary, to prevent the de-: 
gradation of white labor and to preserve to ourselves 
the inestimable benefits of our Christian civiliza-
tion. 18 
In the Chinese Exclusion case of 1889 the Supreme Court 
again unanimously upheld the power of Congress to pass exclu-
sion legislation even when it contravened formal treaties. 19 
Such notorious discrimination against the Chinese, in-
deed against all Asians, Judd asserted, would have to be dis-
carded before East and West could honestly try to give real 
expression to the ideal of "peace". Judd had concluded his 
maiden speech by expressing the heroic role of China and 
Russia in making Europe and America more secure in their war 
efforts. China he saw as a great buffer for Russia, and 
Russia the great buffer against possible Japanese entrance 
17Richard J. Walsh, "Our Great Wall Against the Chinese," 
The New Republic, (CVIINovember 23, 1942), 671-72. 
18112 U.S. 536; Milton R. Konvitz, Expanding Liberties: 
Freedom's Gains in Postwar America (New York: The Viking 
Press, 1966), p. 340. 
19130 UoSo 581; Konvitz, Expanding Hiberties, p. 340. 
·"\'. 
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into Europe. A fallen Russian, to Judd, would mean a disas-
ter for the United States in not only Europe but in Asia as 
well. China, he felt, neutralized a great amount of Japan-
ese manpower, not only in fighting men, but in the shipping 
and factory manpower needed to supply Japanese troops in 
Ch . 20 ina. America could and should, Judd asserted, show her 
appreciation for this Chinese achievement by repealing the 
Chinese exclusion laws. 
Judd's speech was hailed by some of his colleagues as 
"the greatest" and "the most informative" speech delivered 
on the House floor in years, with reference to the background 
situation in the South Pacific and the relation .of this area 
to the United States. 21 His rhetorical display of February 
25 was not the beginning, however, of a movement to allow 
Chinese to immigrate and obtain American citizenship, but it 
was the launching of the House phase of that movement. The 
movement itself had been underway since the summer of 1941. 
Soon after returning to the United States from China, Donald 
Dunham, a former member of the American consular service in 
Hong King, approached Richard J. Walsh, editor of Asia and 
the Americas and president of the John Day Company, on the 
20u.s., Congressional Record, 78th Cong., 1st Sess., 
1942, LXXXIX, Part 1, 1346. 
21Ibid., p. 1347. 
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need for repeal of the Chinese exclusion laws. 22 Their dis-
cussion resulted in the crystalization, in late May 1943, of 
the Citizens Committee to Repeal Chinese Exclusion. Judd's 
name and person was once again brought into close association 
with many notable friends of China. 23 The first formal meet-
ing of the committee did not take place until May 25, 1943, 
while its last session was held on October 12. Long before 
May, however, a tremendous amount of labor had been extended 
by what may be called a quasi-committee in arousing sympathy 
for and preparing Congress for repeal. 
Nearly all individuals who worked actively in the re-
peal compaign did so as volunteers or in connection with 
their activities for organizations with which they were re-
gularly employed and which desired repeal of the discrimina-
. l 24 t1on aws. The early activities of the quasi-committee 
22Fred W. Riggs, Pressure .Q.!l Congress (New York: King's 
Crown Press, 1950), p. 48. 
23The Citizens Committee brought together in 1942 such 
personalities as: Pearl S. Buck; H.J. Temperley, author of 
several volumes on China and Japan; W.W. Pettus, President 
of the'College of Chinese Studies, University of California; 
Read Lewis of the Common Council for American Unity; Monroe 
Sweetlgnd, c.r.o. official, labor adviser, civil rights work-
er, and newspaper publisher, Julean Arnold of the China Coun-
cil of Berkeley, California. Most of these persons, along 
with Judd, became active members during the committee's for-
mative period. 
24 · p C 47 Riggs, ressure on ongress, p. . 
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were carried out in small meetings and discussion groups 
throughout the country and by endless letters crossing and 
re-crossing the country. Interested individuals sounded out 
labor leaders, members of Congress (especially from the West 
coast), church officials, ministers, missionaries, patriotic 
organization leaders, and businessmen, to see whether or not 
they would support such Congressional legislation. The 
group, operating through Walsh's New York office, proceeded 
with all due caution to prevent any public opposition to 
their goal. The attitudes of all possible opposition groups 
were investigated,as were all supposedly friendly groups 
which included China and the Chinese in the United States. 
C. L. Hsia, director of the Chinese News Service, supported 
an immediate campaign, but declined to take an active role 
in the movement because he felt it would be unwise for a 
. . . l 25 Chinese to figure too conspicuous y. 
In order to prevent the repeal question from becoming 
a campaign issue in 1942, the committee delayed any general 
public action until after the general election in November. 
The period of quiescence ended on November 10, 1942, when 
Walsh ~poke on the subject before the Town Hall Round Table, 
a New York City league for political education. He urged 
that the United States repeal the Chinese exclusion acts, 
25 b'd 49 50 I i ., p. -
83 
place Chinese on an irrunigration quota basis, and make Chin-
1 . 'bl f 1 · ' 26 ese e 191 e or natura 1zat1on. Timing being of the es-
sence to the movement, Martin J. Kennedy, a Democratic Rep-
resentative from New York, seeking to sound out congression-
al sentiment, introduced his proposed Chinese Citizenship 
Act of 1943 only three weeks after Judd's initial plea in 
h f h Ch . 27 t e House or t e 1nese cause. With Kennedy's move "the 
die was cast, and the campaign for repeal was forced from 
the stage of private correspondence and consultation into 
28 
the open!' Kennedy's bill for outright revoking the Chin-
ese exclusion acts can be considered the first repeal bill 
introduced in the House since the original exclusion act had 
been passed in 1882. Several bills similar to Kennedy's 
followed in short order. The major one was submitted by 
f W h . 29 Warren G. Magnuson, a Democrat rom as 1ngton. 
The House Corrunittee on Irrunigration and Naturalization 
announced hearings on Kennedy's and Magnuson's bills for the 
26 b'd 52 I l • I p. - . 
27 . 1 d U.S., Conoress1ona Recor, 78th Cong., 1st Sess., 
1943, LXXXIX, Part 1, 1079. 
28 · C 52 Riggs, Pressure on ongress, p. . 
29 U.S., Congressional Record, 78th Cong., 1st Sess., 
LXXXIX, Part 2, 2571. 
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latter part of May, 1943, with the stipulation that testi-
mony would be confined to China and the Chinese. 30 Only 
after the House Committee limited hearings to the Chinese 
did the general lines on which the Citizens Committee should 
be formed emerge clearly. While Judd and the original ele:-
ment of the Citizens Committee argued for limiting legisla-
tion to China alone, other individuals and organizations 
were working for an "all or nothing" approach regarding re-
peal legislation. Bruno Lasker, a sociologist and publicist 
who chaired the National Council on Naturalization and Citi-
zenship, and Read Lewis of the Common Council for American 
Unity, favored bills affecting all Orientals. The course of 
events, however, favored those who were supporting action 
for the Chinese only, and these persons and groups accepted 
the position that China could serve as an entering wedge for 
more effective reform legislation for all Asiatics. 31 Judd 
favored by-passing legislation for the entire Asian area at 
this time apparently for expediency's sake. He skillfully 
dodged confrontation, whenever possible, on whether Japan 
should be granted a quota. When asked, his usual reply was 
30Hearings were held on May 19, 20, 26, 27, and June 2, 
3, 1943. It was at this time that the Citizens Committee 
held its first meeting. 
31 · p C 52 Riggs, ressure on ongress, p. . 
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that he felt the Japanese should be excluded, not because of 
their race, but because of their nation's conduct, which 
should be the only condition for exclusion. When quizzed as 
to whether the Japanese should be granted equality of treat-
ment with other Orientals, Judd replied: "If some future 
Congress should perhaps decide they have developed a govern-
ment which has proved itself a genuinely democratic and 
friendly nation for a long enough time to be trusted and 
worthy to be readmitted to the family of nations, it could 
extend them immigration privileges if it wished. 1132 
By mid-1943, only when it had become clearly hopeless 
to strive for reform legislation applying to all Asians, did 
the Citizens Committee objectives crystallize. Then and 
only then did they adopt three general goals. They pledged 
themselves to work for repeal of the Chinese exclusion laws, 
a quota for individuals of Chinese origin, and eligibility 
of Chinese for naturalization. Members likewise pledged 
themselves to three strategic decisions, which coincided 
with Judd's objectives: first, to concentrate on Chinese 
exclusion re~eal rather than attack the ban against all 
Asian itflIDigration; second, to reject bills previously intro-
' 
duced in the House and to stress the three objectives of the 
32H C ' I ' ' d N l' . ouse ommittee on mmigration an atura ization, 
Repeal of The Chinese Exclusion Acts Hearings, 1943, p. 148 ., 
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committee in every way possible and through every channel 
which might bear fruit; and third, to limit committee mem-
bership to American citizens--in order to impress "Congress 
with the fact that Americans were demanding the repeal of 
the antiquated Exclusion laws. 1133 
After studying the situation intimately, Judd realized 
that the most logical way to ensure passage of repeal legis-
lation was through the majority Democratic party. This was 
the reason why he never submitted his own comprehensive bill 
for repeal. Thus, working with a Democratic sponsor from 
the West or South, where opposition was likely to be the 
greatest, Judd believed his goal could be accomplished. The 
active support of Ed Gossett, a Texas Democrat, and the pre-
viously mentioned Warren G. Magnuson, a Democrat from Wash-
ington, fulfilled the desired qualification. In addition, 
both were men of 11 prestige 11 and 11 experience" in the House. 34 
The support also of Samuel Dickstein, a New York Democrat 
and chairman of the House Committee on Immigration and Nat-
uralization, and Noah M. Mason, an Illinois Republican and 
a member of Dickstein's Committee, proved of incalculable 
value for the repeal effort. Without doubt a major move in 
33R· P C 56 1ggs, ressure .QQ ongress, p. . 
34Ibid., p. 116. 
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arousing support for the repeal effort came in mid-May, just 
before Conunittee Hearings were held on the Chinese exclusion 
question. Mme. Chiang Kai-shek, on a country-wide tour, in-
vited a number of key Congressmen, chiefly certain crucial 
members of the House Inunigration and Naturalization Commit-
tee, to a dinner party. During the evening she discussed 
the possibilities of repealing the exclusion laws, "stressing 
the great importance of such action in boosting Chinese 
morale, and pointing out how much it would mean to China's 
35 part in the war effort." Mme. Chiang's dinner conunents 
only reinforced Judd's House speech of February 25. 
Judd occupied a unique position at conunittee hearings 
ten days later. He gave nearly thirty pages of testimony 
and was offered all the respect of a true authority on China. 
He asserted that if the United States wanted to make sure 
that China would hold out against the Japanese until Hitler 
could be defeated and the United States could concentrate 
fully on Japan, then the United States would have to do two 
things: first, get more material help to China; and second, 
"send more spiritual help, more to strengthen morale and 
faith. 1136 The less military assistance, Judd declared, 
35Ibid. 
36 House Committee on Immigration and Naturalization, 
Repeal of The Chinese Exclusion Acts Hearings, 1943, p. 146. 
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which the United States could deliver to China .immediately, 
then the more imperative it became that the United States 
give China the "intangible things." Likewise, the less the 
United States could assume the military offensive immediate-
ly, the more imperative it became for the United States to 
win the political offensive quickly. Judd then asserted 
that the "most dramatic and helpful thing. imaginable" would 
be a removal by Congress of the discrimination found in the 
. d . . ' 1 ' Ch· 37 Unite States immigration aws against inese. He ex-
plained in detail various alternatives which could be used 
to correct the discriminations. He insisted that the nation-
al origins concept, first applied in the 1924 legislation, 
should apply to all persons including the Orientals; that 
persons of all races should be on the same truly equitable 
basis as far as eligibility to enter the United States. The 
only exception would be those persons whose national origin 
by birth or ancestry was that of a country with which the 
38 United States was at war. A thorough study and application 
of this idea, Judd asserted, would end all discrimination, 
and the great stigma against Orientals would be removed from 
the country's immigration laws without increasing the total 
37Ibid., 147. 
38
rbid., pp. 149-50. 
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number of immigrants eligible to come to the United States 
b h 500 A . 39 y any more tan s1ans per year. The world waits, 
Judd proclaimed, "to hear what Congress says about the pur-
f h . . A . 11 40 poses o t 1s war 1n s1a. 
After the hearings Mason took up the Chinese cause with 
tremendous vigor. He echoed the sentiment of Judd's testi-
mony whenever the question came up for discussion, emphasiz-
ing the importance of the Chinese to the European war effort 
and declaring that something be done beyond financial aid 
for China to demonstrate American appreciation for her role 
in the entire war effort. Mason, however, viewed a general 
revision of the quota system with disdain. When quizzed 
about the Japanese he replied that without doubt neither he 
nor the Committee on Immigration and Naturalization would 
ever favor the admittance of the Japanese under the quota 
41 
system. 
Despite the differences in opinion about how extensive 
a refo~ program Congress should undertake in Asian immigra-
tion and naturalization law, a considerable common ground 
existed on which the supporters of repeal of Chinese exclu-
39Ibid. 
40
rbid., p. 14 7. 
41u.s., Congressional Record, 78th Cong., 1st Sess., 
1943, LXXXIX, Part 4, 5685. 
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sion could gather. The basic arguments presented by those 
who supported modification or repeal of the Chinese exclu-
sion laws and favored equality of treatment for the Chinese 
included: First., the repeal of the acts would be a friendly 
gesture toward China which would cement Sino-American rela-
tions in time of mutual peril. 42 Second, the morality of the 
discriminatory acts could be questioned because they violated 
the Burlingame Treaty, which had promised China most-favored-
nation treatment. 43 Third, repeal of the acts would give 
Chinese morale a psychological lift at a time when they suf-
fered both moral and physical stress and were in fact, near 
h b k . . 44 t e rea ing point. Fourth, the United States should pass 
this legislation for moral reasons. To Judd, one of the 
greatest questions facing the Unite~ States involved whether 
the American people practiced what they advocated regarding 
the concept that ,"all men are created equal in rights before 
the law, to be judged on the basis of what they are, or are 
or are not, as individual human beings, not by the race to 
42Ibid., 5739 
43House Committee on Immigration and Naturalization, 
Repeal of The Chinese Exclusion Acts Hearings, 1943, p. 152. 
44u.s., Congressional Record, 78th Cong., 1st Sess., 
1943, LXXXIX, Part 4, 5739. 
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45 
which they be,long." Fifth, congressional failure to re-
peal the exclusion laws could result in a Chinese military 
collapse and result in a separate peace treaty with Japan. 
Sixth, America's great new potential for expanded trade 
would be with China, and thus immediate action should be tak-
en to offer p~oof of sincere friendship in order to take ad-
vantage of trade opportunities following the war. Seventh, 
repeal of the exclusion laws would stop an all-important 
phase of Japanese propaganda, namely that the United States 
exhibited unfriendly attitudes toward China, otherwise she 
would grant t~e Chinese citizenship privileges. Eighth, 
continuing the exclusion barrier and forbidding China a 
quota would mqke the Chinese doubt American friendship and 
might even cause China to withdraw from the war. Ninth, 
putting China on a quota basis with other nations, besides 
being fair and equitable, would amount to a bagatelle, since 
current quota restrictions would permit only 107 Chinese to 
enter each year, and no one should quarrel with the admis-
sion of such a small number. Tenth, a combination of the 
above cited reasons would make the Chinese exclusion situa-
. . l 46 t1on a vita war measure. This legislation, it was argued, 
45 House Committee on Immigration and Naturalization, 
Repeal of The Chinese Exclusion Acts Hearings, 1943, p. 152. 
46u. s., Congressional Record, 78th Cong., 1st Sess., 
1943, LXXXIX, Part 4, 5739. 
92 
should be passed in the interest of security for the United 
States. Even aside from legal or moral or economic reasons, 
to Judd, the "decent instinct of self-preservation" required 
that the United States remove every possible sore spot in 
. 1 ' . h Ch' 47 its re ations wit ina. After the war, Judd declared, 
the United States would need as many friends as possible un-
less the nation would be willing to remain permanently mili-
. d 48 tarize . 
Despite the eloquent pleas of numerous Representatives 
! 
that Congress aLt.ow China to regain her "pride" and give her 
support to hold back the tide of fascism, several "die-hards" 
continued their crusade to keep America safe from the "yel-
low horde." John B. Bennett, a Michigan Republican and a 
member of the Committee on Immigration and Naturalization, 
was one of the most forceful opponents against any revision 
of the existing quota system. He rejected as "pure poppy-
cock" the propaganda angle and scoffed at the idea that it 
might affect Chinese morale one way or the other. 49 His 
basic argument throughout rested on the contention that any 
47House Committee on Immigration and Naturalization, 
Repeal of The Chinese Exclusion Acts Hearings, 1943, p. 153. 
48Ibid. , p. 154. 
49u.s., Congressional Record, 78th Cong., 1st Sess., 
1943, LXXXIX, Part 4, 5740. 
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legislation involving a quota for the Chinese contemplated a 
complete reversal of a "well-established immigration policy 
of a sixty-some years standing." Furthermore, Bennett as:"." 
serted, no matter what basic considerations .might be involv~ 
ed, the world ~ituation "being as it is this is not the time 
to change immi$ration policy either with respect to the Chi-
. II so dd d nese or any other people. Ju reacte to Bennett's argu-
ment by pointing out that unfortunately the propaganda em-
ployed by the Japanese could be traced to relations, actions, 
and attitudes of the United States toward China. 51 Lex 
Green, a Democrat from Florida and also a member of the im-
migration committee, supported Bennett in his strong opposi-
tion to ~ny revision of the quota laws. Green expressed the 
fear that the proposal would be only the first step in "open-
ing the gates". to Orientals. 
The basic arguments against repeal of the Chinese ex-
clusion laws can be summarized as follows: 
' 
(1) Basic immi-
gration policies should not be changed in time of war. Any 
bill which repealed the exclusion laws would change a policy 
of sixty years standing which thirty Congresses had not 
found it necessary to alter. Whether United States general 
50
rbid. I p. 5739. 
51Ibid. I p. 5741. 
52Ibid., p. 5746. 
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immigration policy would need revision would be one of the 
greatest post-war problems and Congress should not attempt 
to deal with it "piece-meal" while the war was still in pro-
gress. Furthermore, the opposition felt it desirable to a-
wait the return of American soldiers from the battle fronts 
before embarking on a "radical" change in immigration laws. 
(2) Under existing legislation all Asians are excluded, and 
repeal of the Chinese exclusion laws would place China in a 
favored position in Asia. Thus, to deny other Asian nations 
quotas, while granting one to the Chinese, would constitute 
a greater act of discrimination against other friendly Asian 
people. (3) To grant these privileges to the Chinese would 
be nothing more than "gesture legislation," since the Chi-
nese could not avail themselves of the legislation until the 
war ended. Furthermore, proposed legislation extended to 
the Chinese only a few "crumbs" as it did not place them on 
a base of equality with other nations. Other aliens could 
be admitted frqm certain countries as non-quota immigrants 
when born in nonquota countries or when coming to the United 
States as members of a family of a citizen parent; but any 
Chinese, no matter in what country he was born, would be 
charged to the Chinese quota. Perhaps this was the most 
valid of the arguments presented by the opposition since 
proposed legislation indeed stipulated that Chin.ese nation-
95 
ality would be determined by ancestry. rather than by nativi-
ty. (4) The minority group in their formal report expressed 
the feeling that Congress trod on most dangerous ground when 
it assumed the "task of legislating enemy propoganda out of 
. 1153 
existence. 
The merits and shortcomings of repeal commanded Con-
gressional attention for both brief and lengthy periods dur-
ing the spring and summer months, with Judd speaking period-
ically for positive action. Then, on June 29, 1943, Magnu-
son, author of an earlier repeal bill, introduced an immi-
gration and naturalization bill as H.R.3070, a bill destined 
54 for success. A few days later, July 2, Judd included in 
the Congressional Record a cablegram signed by Bishop W. Y. 
Chen, the Secretary of the National Christian Council with 
headquarters in Chungking. This was one of the very few 
times that a Chinese national spoke out in favor of repeal 
or mentioned the subrj.ect in public. The cablegram read: 
"Revised immigration laws would greatly enhance traditional 
53 U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Immigration and 
Naturalization, Minority Report, Repealing The Chinese Ex-
clusion Laws, Report No. 732, Part 2, 78th Cong., 1st Sess., 
1943; pp. 1-2. Her~after cited as: House Committee on Im-
migration and Naturalization, Minority Reoort, .Reoealing 
The Chinese Exclusion Laws, Rpt. 732. 
54 U.S., Congressional Record, 78th Cong., 1st Sess., 
1943, LXXXIX, Part 5, 6786. 
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friendshix:, China and America, have incalculable good effect 
international relations. 1155 In speaking about the message, 
Judd recalled that during the recent immigration committee 
hearings he had been asked whether the Chinese or only a f·ew 
Americans considered this problem of great importance, as 
nearly all of the requests had come from Americans rather 
than from the Chinese. Perhaps Judd's reply can be offered 
as one of the reasons for Chinese reluctance to speak out 
more d ' f. . 1 56 e 1n1te y. Judd said: 
The basic reasons for the Chinese reticence is their 
own sense of dignity and pride. Their record for 
5,000 years as well as for the last 6 years will 
stand without any need for them to advertise or ar-
gue tt. They realize that our discrimination against 
them, while pretending to be their best friend, is 
a reflection more on us than on them. 57 
The second reason for China's reluctance to participate act-
ively can be found in advice offered by the Citizens Commit-
tee. The committee accepted the general belief that Japan's 
Ambassador Hanihara's strong comments against the 1924 ex-
clusion provisions influenced Congress to accept the clause 
9 s perhaps_a gesture of defiance against· attempted "foreign 
55u. S., Congressional Record., 78th Cong., 1st Sess., 
1943, LXXXIX, Part 11, A3414. 
56 · p C 117 Riggs, ressure .Q!1 ongress, p. . 
57u.s., Congressional Record, 78th Cong., 1st Sess., 
1943, LXXXIX, Part 11, A3414. 
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. . "58 1ntervent1ons. 
The Chinese government did favor repeal; however, there 
was no official communication between governments on the 
topic. The precise role of the Chinese Embassy and nation-
als in the United States is uncertain, but without doubt 
both played a m,ajor "behind the scenes" role. Furthermore, 
the widespread sympathy for repeal both in Congress and. 
throughout the country did not make necessary extensive 
public activities by the Chinese. 
The Citizens Committee apparently did a thorough job in 
publicizing the "absolute" necessity of repealing the Chi-
nese exclusion acts, since influential Congressmen were 
flooded, as was Judd, with letters, editorials, petitions 
and pleas from religious leaders, religious and civic groups, 
and private citizens favoring repeal. In keeping with this 
general consensus, the House Committee on Immigration and 
Naturalization on October 7, 1943, reported out H.R.3070 
favorably without amendments and recommended that the bill 
59 be passed by the House. Four days later Bennett submitted 
to the House the committee's minority report on the bill. 
58Riggs, Pressure on Congress, p. 117; U.S. Foreign 
Relations, 1924, II, 369-73. 
59 U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Immigration and 
Naturalization, Report Repealing The Chinese Exclusion Laws, 
Report 732, Part l, 78th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 1. 
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The committee members signing the report, with the exception 
of William P. Elmer, a Democrat of Missouri, denied that 
they held any prejudice against the Chinese as a race. They 
asserted that all material aid possible should be afforded 
China in order that the Japanese might be crushed and the 
Pacific War ended. They apparently felt out of honest con-
victions, however, that this type of legislation could be of 
no material benefit to China, and thus amounted to nothing 
more than a "feeble gesture to do a futile thing at the ex-
pense of a sound and long-established rule of immigration. 1160 
The minority report adequately summarized the general atti-
tude and arguments of the opposition in the House during the 
nine months of debate on the subject. The report as such, 
however, presented little, if any, new evidence or arguments 
for the opposition which might strengthen their position. 61 
Despite the tenacious struggle of the opposition to im-
migration and naturalization reform, H.R.3070 passed the 
House by voice vote on October 21, 1943. 62 Victory for re-
peal came, however, only after lengthy and heated debate in 
6° C · I . . d N 1 · . House omm1ttee on mm1grat1on an atura 1zat1on, 
Minority Report, Repealing The Chinese Exclusion Laws, Rpt. 
732, p. 2. 
61Ibid., pp. 1-2. 
62u .S., Congressional Record, 78th Cong., 1st Sess., 
1943, LXXXIX, Part 7, 8635. 
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the House. President Franklin D. Roosevelt lent his support 
to the cause by forwarding to Congress an eloquent request 
for passage of the proposed legislation, saying in part: 
11 Nations like individuals make mistakes. We must be big 
enough to acknowledge our mistakes of the past and to cor-
63 
rect them. 11 The Senate Committee on Immigration favored 
the Magnuson bill over one of its own bills. Charles 0. 
Andrews, a Democrat of Florida, after a conference with Mag-
nuson, had introduced a companion bill to HoRo 3070 in the 
64 Senate on September 30. On November 12 the Senate Commit-
tee recommended that Magnuson's bill be passed without amend-
65 
ment. Fourteen days later the Senate took positive action. 
Only Presidential approval stood between failure or realiza-
tion of one of Judd's goals in Congress. The President sign-
ed the bill on December 17, whereupon repeal of Chinese ex-
63 U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Immigration, 
Report, Repealing The Chinese Exclusion Laws And To Estab-
lish Quotas, Report No~ 535, 78th Cong., 1st Sess., 1943, 
pp. 2-3. Hereafter cited as: Senate Committee on Immigra-
tion, Report, Repealing The Chinese Exclusion Laws And To 
Establish Quotas, Rpt. 535; U.S., Congress, House, Message 
From The President of The United States Favoring Repeal Q.f 
The Chinese Exclusion Laws, Document No. 333, 78th Cong., 
1st Sess., 1943, pp. 1-2. 
64
u.s., Congressional Record, 78th Cong., 1st Sess., 
1943, LXXXIX, Part 12, A4417. 
65
senate Committee on Immigration, Report, Repealing 
The Chinese Exclusion Laws And To Establish Quotas, Rpt. 
535 I p • 1. 
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clusion became Public La.w 199. 66 
The bill as enacted provided for the abolition of the 
Chinese exclusion acts, but this alone did not give the Chi-
nese equality of treatment. It did, however grant them a 
quota, later set at. 105 by Presidential Proclamation, compu-
ted under the provision of Section 11 (b) of the Immigration 
Act of 1924. 67 A quota of 100 per annum had been alloted to 
China by the 1924 legislationr but this quota could be used 
only by persons eligible for citizenship who were born in 
China; the repeal act did not alter this provision of the 
1924 law. The repeal law applied only to Chinese persons 
and persons of Chinese descent regardless of their place of 
birth. The quota regarding non-orientals born in China 
68 
continued to exist after the passage of the repeal act. 
6657 Stat. 600; U.S., Congressional Record, 78th Cong., 
1st Sess., 1943, LXXXIX, Part 8, 10010. 
67
section ll(b), 43 Stat. 159, states: "The annual 
quota of any nationality for the fiscal year beginning July 
l, 1927, and for each fiscal year thereafter, shall be a 
number which bears the same ratio to 150,000 as the number 
of inhabitants in continental United States in 1920 having 
that national origin (ascertained as hereinafter provided 
in this section) bears to the number of inhabitants in con-
tinental United States in 1920, but the minimum quota of any 
nationality shall be 100. 11 Also, see: U.S., Congressional 
Record, 78th Cong., 1st Sess., 1943, LXXXIX, Part 6, 8575, 
which states: The Chinese population of the United States 
in 1920 was 74,000 and the total population of the United 
States was 105,710,620. 
68H C . I . . d N 1 . . ouse omm1ttee on mm1grat1on an atura 1zat1on, 
Report, Repealing The Chinese Exclusion Laws, Rpt. 732, p. 3. 
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Public Law 199, furthermore, made the Chinese racially eli-
gible for citizenship, thus allowing them naturalization. 69 
The law also provided in connection with distribution of the 
quota that a preference of up to seventy-five percent be 
given to Chinese born and residing in the mother country at 
the time of application of the law. This provision resulted 
from the feeling that Chinese temporarily in the United 
States, or residing in or native to neighboring countries, 
should not be allowed to use up the entire quota without 
giving Chinese persons born and residing in China the oppor-
. k d f 't 70 tun1ty to ta ea vantage o 1 . 
Comparison of the bill of 1943 with the 1924 legisla"'."' ... 
tion and with later immigration laws shows that the 1943 
enactment did place the Chinese on a basis of technical 
equality. It did not, however, place the Chinese on a full-
quota parity base with other groups eligible for migration 
and citizenship. This particular piece of legislation in-
troduced a new principle into American immigration and quota 
laws by stipulating that nationality would be determined by 
69Ibid., p. 2; Fred W. Riggs, "U.S. Legislation Affect-
ing Asiatics-I," Far Eastern Survey, )..'VI (April 23, 1947), 
89. 
70House Committee on Immigration and Naturalization, 
Report, Repealing The Chinese Exclusion Laws, Rpt. 732,p. 2. 
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h h b . . 71 ancestry rat er tan y nativity. In contrast to the 
Chinese, white persons, persons of African nativity or des-
cent, and descendants of races indigenous to the Western 
Hemisphere could migrate under the existing law, employing 
the principle of nativity and not race as the determining 
72 factor for quota purposes. All Chinese persons coming to 
the United States as immigrants would be charged to the Chi-
nese quota regardless of place of birth. Thus true equality 
of treatment would have to come later for the Chinese. 
Regardless of the inequality to the Chinese, Public Law 
199 was still a major victory for Judd and the Citizens Com-
mittee. It provided the necessary "door-opener" for a much 
greater goal which Judd had come to desire and a point which 
the opposition had feared--complete revision of immigration 
and naturalization laws governing Asia. Opposition to re-
peal had come primarily from four sources~ labor, veterans' 
organizations, West Coast interests, and "patriotic" societ-
ies. This opposition, however, did not prove as effective 
as might be expected. Perhaps the strongest vocal opposi-
tion came from super-nationalistic and "patriotic" groups 
71Ibid.; Riggs, "U.S. Legislation Affecting Asia-
tics-I," 89. 
72 C · I . ' d N l' . House ommittee on mmigration an atura ization, 
Report, Repealing The Chinese Exclusion Laws, Rpt. 732, p. 
2. 
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such as: the National Blue Star Mothers; the American Coali-
tion; Mayflower Descendants; the Sons of the American Revo-
lution; Daughters of the American Revolution; and Native 
Sons of the Golden West. In general this segment of opposi-
tion was composed of individuals and groups which opposed 
all aliens who did not fall into the concept of a "white 
America." It is doubtful whether these groups carried much 
weight with the majority of Congressmen. Within other 
groups traditionally opposed to immigration revision .there 
were severe splits which tended to weaken any effective re-
peal opposition. While the Americanism and legislative 
committees of the American Legion opposed repeal, the na-
tional executive committee approved a resolution supporting 
repeal. The American Legion's Department of California not 
only called for repeal of the Exclusion Act, but recommended 
that the Oregon and Washington Departments take similar ac-
tion.73 A similar situation can be found within the Veter-
ans of Foreign Wars organization. Surprisingly, the C.I.O., 
generally expected to oppose repeal, urged the House Commit-
tee on Immigration and Naturalization to approve a repeal 
law. The AoF.L. failed to take the expected militant hard 
line against repeal; however, groups within the union such 
73 New York Times, October 31, 1943, IV, p. 18. 
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as the International Brotherhood of Teamsters kept up a run-
74 
nin9 attack on the repeal movement. Perhaps the effective-
ness of these groups was offset by a degree of indifference 
on the part of individuals who might be expected to side 
with them under ordinary circumstances. 
Public opinion polls revealed that the West Coast 
states favored repeal more strongly than the national aver-
75 
age. Newspaper accounts indicated that the visit of Mme. 
Chiang Kai-shek to the West Coast in the spring of 1943 
played no inconsiderable part in swinging sentiment in the 
direction of repeal. Supporting West Coast organizations 
employed Judd's major theme that repeal of the Exclusion Act 
was important in combating Japanese propaganda which accused 
America of discriminating against aliens, in giving concrete 
assurance of good-will toward China, and bolstering her mor-
76 
ale. Organized labor groups which supported repeal took 
the position that patriotism necessitated support. The 
International Ladies Garment Workers Union resolution declar-
ed that repeal was "not only economically sound but militar-
ily necessary to deal a crushing blow to Japanese and Nazi 
74 For a more complete account see: Riggs, Pressure on 
Congress, pp. 65-91. 
75 New York Times, November 21, 1943, p. 13. 
76 Nfili York Times, October 31, 1943, IV p. 18. 
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anti-American propaganda." 
The split in groups traditionally opposing revision 
doubtless enabled the supporters of repeal to accomplish 
105 
their goal in short order. Judd's role in obtaining this 
repeal legislation cannot be overemphasized, although he 
received vigorous assistance and support from Joseph R. Far-
rington, Republican Delegate from Hawaii, and Jerry Voorhis, 
Democrat from California. 78 Judd's accomplishment is indeed 
remarkable because at this time he held no key position in 
party, committee, or regional councils. His reputation, 
however, as an "expert" on the Chinese people, the accepted 
idea that he was an "authority" on Asian affairs, his deep 
conviction on the subject and his role as a returned mission-
ary, have to be considered in assessing Judd's influence on 
this legislation. He played the major strategic role in 
making Public Law 199 possible, although both Farrington and 
Voorhis were active in planning strategy and furthering per-
sonal contacts for the repeal, thus making Judd's activities 
more effective. Together these three men provided the nee-
essary liaison between the Citizens Committee, which carried 
out its task in a tactful and tireless manner, and Congress, 
77 New York Times, June 8, 1943, p. 35. 
78 . C 8 Riggs, Pressure on ongress, p. 1. 
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which until early 1943 had been the major obstacle to repeal 
legislation. Without this liaison and the energetic endeav-
ors of both the Citizens Committee and the Congressional 
group, the realization of a quota for the Chinese would have 
been much later in coming. 
CHAPTER III 
WALTER H. JUDD: THE QUEST FOR "EQUALITY" IN IMMIGRATION 
AND NATURALIZATION LAWS 
The repeal of the Chinese exclusion laws was but the 
first of several rebuffs which racial exclusionary princi-
ples in American immigration and naturalization legislation 
were to receive within a decade. A second rebuff came in 
1946 when persons belonging to races indigenous to India and 
the Philippines received quotas. The exclusionary principle 
was dealt a sweeping blow with the enactment of the Immigra-
tion and Nationality Act of 1952, which nominally repealed 
all racial exclusionary prov,isions in the United States im-
migration legislation, although strong characteristics of a 
racist policy remained. Despite the shortcomings of the 
1952 legislation it furthered the gradual process of remov-
ing racial discrimination from the immigration laws of the 
United States. Judd's contribution to the 1952 enactment 
surpassed his 1943 role, although, had Judd set his own 
pace, racial exclusion would have ended three years sooner. 
While Judd and the Citizens Committee labored for re-
peal of the anti-Chinese exclusion laws, Judd was also work-
107 
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ing in conjunction with the Immigration and Naturalization 
Service on a more comprehensive bill which would have struck 
down the "barred zone of Asia in the 1924 law and extended 
the quota system to all people of Asia. 11 No such measure, 
however, was introduced in 1943 because Judd felt that a 
1 
comprehensive bill of this sort could not pass Congress. 
Judd, howeve~ continued his work on the more comprehensive 
program in hopes of realizing more equitable treatment for 
the Orientals after the war ended. 
With the end of the war the entire immigration and 
naturalization structure as outlined in the Immigration Act 
of 1924 came under attack. In 1946, for the first time in 
nearly two decades, the annual number of permanent immigrants 
to the United States passed the 100,000 mark. The attempted 
resettlement of the horde of European refugees uprooted by 
the war and its aftermath posed a most grave problem for the 
United States. Both humanitarian and political interests 
argued for the admittance of a large number of these homeless 
souls who were fleeing from misery, hunger, persecution, and 
the general squalor of meager existence into which millions 
1Fred W. Riggs, Pressure on Congress: A Study of The 
Repeal of Chinese Exclusion (New York: King's Crown Press, 
1950), p. 39. 
2 had been thrown. 
109 
Judd expressed great empathy for this suffering segment 
of humanity. He seemingly viewed all refugees as examples 
of "the flight for freedom," and the United States as the 
"arsenal of freedom" had an obligation to assist in allevia-
ting their plight. But it was not humanitarianism alone 
that prompted him to support refugee programs in Europe and 
to speak in defense of allowing additional displaced persons 
3 
to enter the United States. Recognizing and assisting in 
this humanitarian endeavor would fortify the "free people" 
of the world against the spread of communism, and in this 
way it was "good business for America. 114 Just as Judd had 
argued that repeal of the Chinese exclusion laws would 
strengthen China against Japanese propaganda, he now argued 
that granting all Orientals a quota would weaken Communist 
propaganda. Judd would go so far as to assert that "ade-
quate" immigration and naturalization revision would be the 
~· strongest card we hold in Asia, even above our navy and air 
2Harvey Wish, Contemporary America: The National Scene 
Since 1900 (3rd ed.; New York: Harper and Brothers, Publish-
ers, 1961), pp. 270-73; Oscar T. Barck, Jr., and Nelson M. 
Blake, Since 1900: A History of the United States in Our 
Times (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1959), pp. 297-300. 
3Minneapolis Morning Tribune, January 25, 1946. 
4 
' 1· M ' T 'b M 31 1945 Minneapo is orning ri une, ay , . 
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5 force." Judd frequently declared that existing irrunigration 
and naturalization laws were totally inadequate to deal eq-
uitably and readily with the severe problems facing the Uni-
6 
ted States. Resulting irrunigration and naturalization legis-
lation tended, however, to define Judd's concept of "ade1-
quate" legislation as mere "token" legislation. 
Similar but perhaps less severe problems had impelled 
7 Congress to further "study" the irrunigration flow in the per-
iod following World War I. This study resulted in the Irruni-
gration Act of 19248 which, in conjunction with an act of 
1917 which codified nearly all previously enacted exclusion 
provision, governed American irrunigration policy until the 
SM. 1· M ' T 'b A 19 1943 1nneapo 1s orn1ng r1 une, ugust , . 
6M· l' M ' T 'b J 25 1946 dd' 1nneapo 1s orn1ng r1 une, une , . Ju s 
concept can be considered in accord with a pattern developed 
by the United States Congresses over the years. American 
citizenship, or eligibility to naturalization, has been ex-
tended over the years to include: 1790, free white persons; 
1870, persons of African nativity or descent; 1900, inhabi-
tants of Hawaii; 1917, inhabitants of Puerto Rico; 1924, 
American Indians; 1927, inhabitants of the Virgin Islands; 
1940, races indigenous to North or South America; 1943, 
Chinese; 1946, Filipinos and natives of India. 
7 The last general investigation of the United States 
irrunigration system was made by the Congress in 1907 and con-
tinued until 1911. 
8 43 Stat. 153. 
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Immigration and Nationality Act became effective in 1952. 9 
The act of 1924 strengthened and clarified a number of the 
earlier provisions of law and introduced new concepts of im-
migration policy which became the basis for similar provi-
sions of the 1952 act. The 1924 Act, as amended, contained 
two quota provisions. The first, effective until June 30, 
1929, set the annual quota for each allowable nationality at 
two percent of the number of foreign-born persons of such 
nationality resident in the United States in 1890. The to-
tal quota limit was set at 164,667. The second provision, 
which was effective from July 1, 1929, to December 31, 1952, 
introduced the most controversial national origins quota 
system--it provided that the quota for any country or nation-
ality had the same relation to 150,000 as the number of in-
habitants in the United States in 1920 having that national 
origin had to the total number of inhabitants in the United 
10 States of the year. Also, the 1924 Act introduced the pro-
9Frank L. Auerbach, Immigration Laws of the United 
States (2nd ed.; New York: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 
1961), p. 9. 
lOibid., p. 10; Barck, Since 1900, p. 299; U.S., Con-
gress, House, Subcommittee on Immigration and Naturalization 
of the Committee on the Judiciary, Hearings, Providing for 
Equality Under Naturalization and Immigration Laws, 80th 
Cong., 2nd Sess., 1948, p. 16. Hereafter cited as House Sub-
committee on Immigration and Naturalization, Providing for 
Equality Under Naturalization and Immigration Laws Hearings, 
1948. 
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vision that no alien ineligible for citizenship could be ad-
mitted to the United States as an immigrant. The Supreme 
Court had in 1922 ruled that Japanese were ineligib~e for 
. . h' 11 citizens ip. Thus, the "ineligible for citizenship" 
clause was aimed at the Japanese, particularly at those who 
had found their way into the United States despite the so-
called Gentlemen's Agreement of 1907. 12 
When the 1924 bill was pending in Congress, Secretary 
of State Charles Evans Hughes pleaded for the deletion of 
the provision which states that "No alien ineligible to cit-
13 izenship shall be admitted to the United States." Hughes 
felt that such legislative action "would largely undo the 
work of the Washington Conference on Limitation of Armament." 14 
The Japanese Ambassador, Hanihara, lodged with the State De-
partment a note of protest by declaring that "grave conse-
quences" were likely to ensue if the proposed 1924 law were 
enacted. In 1929 a Japanese leader said of the law: "It is 
11Milton R. Konvitz, The Alien and the Asiatic in Amer-
ican Law (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1946), 
p. 23. 
12 Auerback, Immigration Laws of the United States, p. 11. 
13Milton R. Konvitz, Civil Rights in Immigration (Itha-
ca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1953), p. 5. 
14Ibid. , p. 6. 
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not a closed incident. 1115 In 1930 Congressman Albert John-
son, author of the 1924 Act, announced that he favored an 
amendment to repeal the exclusion provision, but nothing 
16 
came of his remark, and the general racial exclusion 
clause was allowed to remain on the statute books for nearly 
three decades. 
When the preliminary quota statistics were announced, 
the interested American public obtained perhaps a truer in-
sight into the essence of the 1924 enactment. The new quota 
doubled the allotted British quota, while reducing the Ger-
man and Irish quotas by nearly one-half. It reduced the 
Scandinavian quota by nearly two-thirds. Thus a cry of pro-
test arose from the affected groups, and both Herbert Hoover 
and Alfred E. Smith advocated repeal of the national origins 
provision during their Presidential campaigns of 1928. 
Whether the law was well-worded (as argued by restriction-
ists) or not, the task of determining the national origin of 
the entire population of 1920 proved to be virtually an im-
possible undertaking; however, all efforts to change the de-
batabie formula met with most bitter opposition. Nativists 
and patriotic organizations cooperated through the "American 
15Ibid., p. 7. 
16Ibid. 
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Coalition II to advance the cause of 11 Keeping America Arneri-
can. 11 Organized labor resisted any change that might in.-
crease the total volume of immigration, and perhaps
0
threaten 
to lower wages·. The restrictionists won out and the new quotas, 
after several postponements, finally became effective on 
17 July 1, 1929. 
The n liberal II immigration policy sentiment, however, 
did not die out completely during the 1930's and early 
1940's. But not until after the entry of the United States 
into World War II did Congress begin to give serious atten-
tion to the immigration problem. The repealing of the Chi-
nese exclusion laws gave added emphasis to the need for ser-
ious study of the entire immigration. policy structure. Dur-
ing and after debate on the anti-Chinese laws a few Congress-
men pointed out that no serious or extensive study of the im-
migration problem had been made since passage of the 1924 
law. They argued that this lack constituted a grave problem 
which Congress must deal with, and to deal with it in an in-
telligent manner, they realized, would require a serious inves-
17Barck, Since 1900, p. 299 
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tigation. 18 The House took the lead in such a study. On 
January 4, 1945, Samuel Dickstein, a New York Democrat and 
chairman of the House Committee on Immigration and Naturali-
zation, introduced into the House a resolution to authorize 
his committee to study the basic problem affecting post-war 
. . . d l' . 19 1mm1grat1on an natura 1zat1on. The House passed the re-
20 
solution on March 21. The Senate did not act on the sub-
ject until July 26, 1947, when its resolution directed the 
Senate Committee on the Judiciary or any duly authorized sub-
committee thereof to make a full and complete investigation 
18 On January 4, 1945, Samuel Dickstein, a New York Dem-
ocrat, introduced in the Hou,se of Representatives Resolution 
52, to authorize the Committee on Immigration and Naturali-
zation to study the basic problem affecting post-war immi-
gration and naturalization. U.S., Congressional Record, 
79th Cong., 1st Sess., 1945, XCI, Part 1. 59. 
19Dickstein served as Chairman of the Select Committee 
to Investigate and Study Laws and Problems Relating to Post 
War Immigration and Naturalization, as authorized by House 
Resolution 52. U.S., Congressional Record, 79th Cong., 
1st Sess., 1945, XCI, Part 1, 59. 
20u. s., Congressional Record, 79th Cong., 1st Sess., 
XCI, Part 1, 59. 
21 
of the United States immigration system. 
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On the same day, July 26, 1947, that the Senate approv-
ed the immigration study resolution, Judd introduced the 
first of his several immigration and naturalization reform 
bills into the House . The essence of this bill provided 
that all persons permanently and legally residing in the 
United States could be naturalized . 22 This bill, like one 
which followed several months later, died in committee with-
out a hearing . 23 On January 20, 1948, Judd introduced a 
21u . s . , Congress, Senate, Investigation of Immigration 
and Naturalization, Document No. 3, 81st Cong . , 1st Sess., 
1949, pp. 1 - 2 . Pursuant to Senate Resolution 137, a special 
Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary was 
appointed, consisting of Senators Forrest C. Donnell, John 
Sherman Cooper, Pat McCarran, J . Howard McGrath, and Chapman 
Revercomb, chairman. Under the rules of the Senate Commit-
tee on the Judiciary, Senator Alexander Wiley, the chairman 
of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, served as ex offi-
cio member of the subcommittee . Also, pursuant to an invi-
tation extended by the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 
Senator H . Alexander Smith of the Senate Committee on For-
eign Relations and Senator Harry F. Byrd of the Senate Com-
mittee on Armed Services were designated to act in an advi -
sory capacity to the subcommittee with reference to the 
study of displaced persons. 
22u . s . , Congressional Record, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 
1947, XCIII, Part 8, 10523. 
23u. s., Congressional Record, 80th Cong . , 1st Sess., 
1947, XCII, Part 9, 11764. Judd introduced H . R. 4824 on 
December 19, 1947 . This would have provided the privilege 
of becoming a naturalized citizen of the United States to 
all immigrants having a legal right to permanent residence, 
and would have placed all Asiatic and Pacific peoples on 
the same basis in immigration law as Chinese persons and 
races indigenous to India. 
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third bill, H. R. 5004, on which hearings were held, and 
which was the foundation for the section on repeal of racial 
exclusion and the Oriental quota system of the 1952 McCarran-
24 Walter Act. 
Th S b . tt I . ' d N 1 ' ' 25 f e u comm1 ee on mm1grat1on an atura 1zat1on o 
the Committee on the Judiciary held hearings on H. R. 5004 
on April 19 and 21, 1948. 26 Judd was the first to testify 
before the subcommittee. He described the purpose of his 
bill as an attempt to obtain a comprehensive revision of the 
1924 immigration and naturalization law. It would, Judd 
24 U. S. Congressional Record, 80th Cong., 2nd Sess., 
1948, XCIV, Part 1, 331. 
25 The House Committee of Immigration and Naturalization 
was abolished by the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, 
and its functions were placed under the Judiciary Committee. 
26A partial list of those testifying who supported the 
bill included: Joseph R. Farrington, Delegate from Hawaii; 
W. Walton Butterworth, Director, Office of Far Eastern Af-
fairs, Department of State; Samuel W. Boggs, special advi-
sor on geography, Department of State; Joseph C. Grew, for-
mer United States Ambassador to Japan; Mike M. Masaoka, Na-
tional Legislative Director, Japanese American Citizens 
League; Sanford W. Bolz, Washington Representative, Ameri-
can Jewish Congress. A partial list of supporting documents 
included: Letter by John J. McCloy, President, Internation-
al Bank for Reconstruction and Development; letter by Gener-
al Mark W. Clark; letter by General Bonner Fellers; state-
ment by Richard J. Walsh, of John Day Book Company; letter 
by Walter W. VanKirk, Federal Council of Churches of Christ 
in America; editorial from the St. Paul Dispatch; editorial 
from the Washington Post. House Subcommittee on Immigration 
and Naturalization, Providing for Equality Under Naturaliza-
tion and Immigration Laws Hearings, 1948, p. 5. 
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assert~d, eliminate the necessity for constant piece-meal 
revision for particular groups or individuals, and at the 
same time preserve the fundamental principle of the quota 
b d . l . . 27 system ase on nat1ona or1g1ns. Judd accepted the na-
tional origins concept as good legislation and stated he had 
no desire to destroy the principle. To Judd's mind the bill 
removed with "one stroke" the remaining racial discrimina-
tions in United States nationality and immigration laws, 
which he felt had contributed greatly to ill feelings in 
~any quarters of the world. Yet his bill, Judd declared, 
would make no basic change in the quota principle of exist-
ing law. It would only extend existing law and thus admit 
]?er year a few hund.red more immigrants of Asian ancestry, 
28 
who r~ained ineligible under the 1924 law as amended. 
Judd pointed out to the subcommittee that several re-
maining areas of Asia had quotas which were available to 
non-orientals born in these Asian countries. Thus the ob-
jective sought by H. R. 5004, Judd explained, was simple in 
concept: "On the one hand, to end discrimination in nation-
ality and immigration laws in a manner which conforms to the 
idea behind the national origin quotas, and on the other 
hand to grant immigration quotas to certain, carefully de-
27 Ibid. 
28Ibid. 
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fined areas in the Far East whose immigration quotas are at 
present available only for those born there who are Caucasian 
or of African descent or of American aboriginal descent. 1129 
H. R. 5004 would have made eligible for naturalization 
the nearly 90,000 persons admitted legally for permanent 
residence prior to July 1, 1924, but who remained racially 
ineligible for naturalization. These persons, however, if 
they sought naturalization,would have to meet the same basic 
requir~ment as more recently arrived immigrants from other 
countries. Of the nearly 90,000 persons ineligible for nat-
uralization in the United States, according to the 1940 cen-
sus, about 85,000 were of Japanese or,igin, between 3,000 and 
4,000 Korean, and about 145 were of Polynesian origin or 
I I 
were native to minor islands of the Pacific. Judd pointed 
out tha,t the number who would seek naturalization would be 
less than 90,000 because many had died since 1940, and be-
cause some four to five thousand Japanese had returned to 
Japan as a result of relocation procedures which the United 
States carried out after its entrance into World War TI. 
Thus Judd estimated that the total number involved would be 
less than 85,000 persons even if all wanted to take out nat-
uralization papers, because many would fail to pass the nat-
uralization requirements placed upon all immigrants applying 
29Ibid. 
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1 . . 30 for natura ization. 
ro allow the naturalization of these people, Judd ar-
gued, would be justice pure and simple, since they resided 
in the country legally and had the right to stay in the Uni-
ted States the remaining years of their lives. Thus, to 
have this group, with an average age of fifty, fully incor-
porated as citizens rather than as alien residents would be 
advantageous to the body politic of the United States. 
"They pay taxes; they are good law-abiding members of their 
communities," Judd argued, and they "have proved through 
their conduct during the war, and especially through the 
conduct of their children who served with heroism, distinc-
tion, and valor" in the United States armed forces, "that 
they are loyal to the United States and fully worthy of , 
. . . h' ,,31 American citizens ip. Judd could imagine no substantial 
objection to allowing these people to become naturalized 
citizens if they desired to; to disallow them would consti-
tute discrimination and injustice. To dispose of this dis-
crimination, Judd continued, would surely ease the conscience 
of the American people, and it would increase the respect 
30
rbid., p. 6; according to the United States census 
of 1940, there were resident in the United States and its 
Territories 84,658 aliens of Japanese descent; 3,139 of Kor-
ean descent; and 145 who were listed as Polynesians and 
"other Asians." 
31Ibid. 
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for the United States abroad. 32 
The above discussed part of the bill involved a nonre-
curring situation as it would take care, for all time, of 
that group of persons who came legally to the United States 
prior to 1924. The other major element of the bill, immi-
gration, would establish formulas and procedures by which, 
Judd felt, racial discrimination would be eliminated in the 
United States immigration laws and by which the basic nation-
al orisins quota principle could be continued. It set up 
for th~ entire Asian world a so-called "Asia-Pacific Tri-
angle" devised for H. R. 5004 by a State Department geograph-
er, Samuel W. Boggs, and comprising all the nquota areas" of 
the Asian world, with the exception of the Philippines, and 
including all colonies and other dependent areas, situated 
wholly within the triangle bounded by the meridians 60° East 
and 165° West longitude and by the parallel 25° South lati-
tude. Any alien who immigrated to the United States and 
who was "attributable by as much as one-half of his ancestry 
to a people or peoples indigenous to the Asia-Pacific tri-
angle, regardless of his place of birth, would be charged 
either to the appropriated country quota within the triangle 
or to t.he separate Asia-Pacific triangle quota." The quota 
areas, however, and the colonies and other existing depend-
32Ibid. 
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ent areas would be subject to revision from time to time, 
the bill provided, because of development toward independent 
1 . . l 33 po 1t1ca status. 
Within this geographical area were located certain in-
dependent countries which had obtained immigration equality 
under the 1943 act, which established a quota for the Chi-
nese, and the 1946 act, which established quotas for natives 
of India and the Philippine Islands. Those areas already 
having quotas would remain the same, but other independent 
recognized countries would receive quotas. The bill, in 
addition, would have established a quota of 100 immigrants 
a year for the whole area, usable by all persons born in or 
indigenous to parts of the triangle other than the countries 
having individual and separate quotas. Thus the bill would 
have made it possible for every individual of Asian origin 
immigrating to the United States to have his ancestry traced 
34 back and assigned to the proper quota. 
Judd explained to the subcommittee that each of the 
naturalization and immigration bills which had become law in 
the past tended to be more complicated that the last because 
there are so many persons of mixed blood in Asia, amounting 
33Ibid. The term "quota area." replaced the ambiguous 
term "nationality" in immigration and naturalization law. 
34Ibid. 
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to halves, quarters, and eighths, and "to decide whether a 
person born in Indo-China of mixed ancestry belonged, for 
exam~le, to the Filipino quota, or the Chinese quota, or the 
Indian quota" constituted a most difficult procedure. 35 Un-
der H. R. 5004, however, there was a precise formula whereby 
on the basis of the ancestry of each person, the quota to 
which the individual would be attributable could be accur-
ately determined. An individual whose ancestry is attribu-
table by as much as a half or more to an Asia-Pacific tri-
angle recognized country would be charged to the quota of 
that country, and thus he could not come from a nonquota 
country as a nonquota immigrant. The bill in its entirety 
consisted of complicated terminology, as Judd explained to 
the subcommittee, but he assured the group that it had been 
gone over very carefully and that it would work to remove 
the stigma that attached itself to the complete prohibition 
of immigration of certain races, and yet it would make sure 
that there would not be a flooding of the United States with 
people of lower economic standards or other cultural pat-
36 
terns. 
The quotas established by his bill, Judd argued, would 
bring in fewer than a thousand persons a year of the groups 
35Ibid. 
36;rbid., p. 8. 
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falling under the new system. The fact stands that six of 
the countries receiving quotas had very small populations 
and their population was of a sort that never emigrated, and 
there appeared to be no reason why they would want to emi-
grate; and, if they wanted to, most of them could not come 
to the United States because they would not be able to meet 
the literacy or financial qualifications imposed on all im~ 
migrants. Apparently Judd did not regard the "literacy 
test" as a form of racial discrimination. Thus, Judd rea-
soned, the number of immigrants involved did not constitute 
a major problem, and thus he felt that no adequate justifi-
cation could be given for not taking action, while many rea-
37 
sons e;xisted as to why action should be taken. Judd be-
lieved that his bill was a powerful weapon against the 
spread of communism. To him the billion people of Asia 
would tip the balance of power away from Russia and toward 
the United States. Thus the enactment of H. R. 5004, to 
38 J4dd, would be a powerful weapon in that struggle. 
Juqd's bill sought to accomplish both the removal of 
racial ineligibility--whereby race as a cause for exclusion 
for nat~ralization purposes would be eliminated--and the re-
moval of the absolute bar against certain persons as immi-
37Ibid. 
38Ibid., pp. 8-9. 
125 
grants. In addition, Judd sought to advance the administra-
tive procedure of the existing immigration and naturaliza-
tion laws by revisions worked out with the Justice Depart-
ment and State Department. In total, Judd argued, only 
about 185 additional people could come in from the Pacific 
area under the revision; however, more of the existing quo-
tas could be used by persons indigenous to the Pacific area. 
As an example, Judd cited the quota of Japan, which stood at 
100, but which under existing law no Japanese could use. 
Under H. R. 5004 the quota for Japan would be increased to 
185. This is the figure worked out under the same formula 
as applied to everybody .else in the 1924 act. But that quo-
ta would be usable by persons of Japanese ancestry, as well 
as Caucasians or other Japanese-born groups eligible for 
. . h' 39 citizens ip. 
In his testimony, Judd pointed out that actually the 
total number of immigrants coming to the United States from 
all quota countries of the world would be about 635 fewer 
than were coming in or than could come in under existing 
40 law. Under the 1924 law it worked out that every time im-
migration officials determined a quota for a country they 
had to figure 0.00165854857 of the number of persons from 
39Ibid., p. 11. 
4
oibid., pp. 11, 16-17. 
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that country who lived in the United States according to the 
41 1920 census. This' is approximately one-sixth of one per-
42 
cent. Judd stated that one-sixth of one percent gives a 
figure of a half of one percent less than the 1924 law so 
that hereafter the immigration quota for every country would 
be fixed at one-sixth of one percent, thus reducing by 635 
the number of people who could immigrate to the United 
43 States under all the quotas of the world. This slight re-
duction, Judd emphasized, would apply to those countries 
which had a quota greater than the minimum quota of 100 for 
44 
any quota area. Furthermore, the number of immigrants 
from any colony or dependent area would be limited to 100 of 
45 
the quota chargeable to its "mother country." Thus, as 
such, no person would be excludable "per se" because of his 
race. 
Judd was able to gather an impressive list of personal-
ities who favored a general repeal of racial discrimination 
in American immigration law. Charles E. Bohlen, Counselor 
for the Secretary of State, in writing Frank Fellows, chair-
41Ibid., pp. 11, 16. 
4: 2rbid • t p. 11. 
43
rbid., p. 11, 16. 
44
rbid., p. 16. 
45
rbid., p. 12. 
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man of the subcommittee, favored H. R. 5004, and expressed 
the conviction that race discrimination in immigration leg-
islation "has complicated the conduct of foreign relations 
46 for many years." Peyton Ford, Assistant to the Attorney 
General, speaking for the Justice Department, favored pass-
age of the bill if certain changes in terminology weremade~7 
George P. Miller, Democratic Representative from California, 
presented an eloquent plea for passage of the bill by citing 
h 1 d 'd W ld W II d f th J Arn · 48 t esp en 1 or ar recor o e apanese- er1cans. 
Joseph R. Farrington, Republican Delegate from Hawaii, urged 
most earnestly that the bill be reported to the House for 
consideration. He had previously introduced in the House 
two bills similar in nature to H. R. 5004, but he felt that 
this bill was superior to his own bills. 49 
W. Walton Butterworth, Director of Far Eastern Affairs, 
Department of State, testified before the subcommittee to 
"vouchsafe" the support of the State Department for the bill .. 
He emphasized the fact that for years the maintenance of nor-
mal and friendly relations between the United States and Or-
iental countries had been impeded by the racial discrimina-
46Ibid., pp. 20-21. 
4 7 Ibid., p. 33. 
48Ibid., pp. 29-30. 
49Ibid., pp. 33-36. 
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tion which existed in American immigration laws. Butter-
worth stressed the offensiveness of the exclusion laws to 
the Asian and their usefulness in much foreign propaganda 
against the United States. He concluded by declaring that 
the State Department hoped very much that Congress would act 
promptly so that the bill might be passed by the Second Ses-
sion of the Eightieth Congress, because it was of key impor-
50 tance to United States relations with Oriental people. 
The former United States Ambassador to Japan, Joseph C. 
Grew, testified to the urgency of a bill such as H. R. 5004. 
Grew high-lighted his testimony by reading a statement made 
by Baron Sakatani during debate in the Japanese Diet, during 
February 1924, in regard to the 1924 exclusion legislation: 
If this bill is enacted by the United States it 
would lead to grave consequences. I do not mean to 
say by that the Empire will go to war with the Uni-
ted States over this question. But what I do mean 
to say is that if the Japanese people are to be 
classified by the United States as an inferior race, 
that action would seriously destroy the present de-
sire of the Japanese people to cooperate with other 
signatory nations in supporting the nine-power treaty 
and to observe the letter and spirit of that treaty 
in resolving our issues with China. If the bill be-51 
comes law, no one can foresee where that will end. 
Grew concluded his statement to the subcommittee by comment-
ing that "Congressman Judd's bill ... will have a very powerful 
50Ibid., pp. 36-38. 
51Ibid., p. 44. 
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effect in leading up to that most desirable objective ... [of 
strengthening] ... our bonds with nations whose friendships 
52 
can be ours.sn 
In departing from previously anti-Japanese sentiment, 
Bertrand W. Gearhart, a California Republican, added his 
voice to those who favored complete repeal of racial 
exclusion~ 
So, let us pass this legi.slationo Let us em-
brace these new principles, because they are en-
lightened principles. These people are here; a 
handful more will come. Let them become citizens, 
because they have demonstrated their trustworthiness, 
because Wfp know that they are worthy, because they53 
are the kind of people we like to live next to .... 
Other notables who favored the bill included~ John J. 
McCloy, head of the International Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development, and who was Under Secretary of War during 
the Second World War; General Mark Clark, who commanded most 
of the Japanese-American troops.in Italy and France during 
54 the war; Edward J. Ennis, chairman, Committee for Equali-
ty in Naturalization; Brigadier General Bonner Fellers, psy-
chological warfare officer and military secretary to General 
52
rbid., pp. 45-46. At the time the P'apanese Ambassa-
dor, Hanihara, warned the United States that 8'grave conse-
quences11 might follow the termination of the Gentlemen's Agree-
ment of 1907 which Japan had adhered to faith.fully. 
53Ibid., p. 49. 
54Ibid., pp. 51-52. 
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Douglas MacArthur; and Dillon S. Myer, former Director of 
55 
the War Relocation Authority for four years. Sanford H. 
Bolz, Washington Representative of the American Jewish Con-
gress, strongly recommended the passage of H. R. 5004; how-
eve~ he expressed the desire to abolish the national origins 
clause. He felt that if immigration quotas were dependent 
solely on place of birth and all racial barriers were remov-
ed then the process of elimination of racial discrimination 
would be nearly complete in American immigration and natur-
1 . . l 56 a 1zat1on aw. 
To refute the above testimony, Harry V. Hayden, Jr., 
National Legislative Representative of the American Legion, 
appeared in opposition to the bill. Hayden declared: "The 
American Legion ... has long been alert to the importance of 
guarding our country against improper immigration ,and impro-
per naturalization" legislation. He assured the subcommit-
·1 
tee that the action and attitude of the American Legion did 
not originate "from any narrow standpoint but from a stand-
point of the security and welfare of the country that our 
57 
members fought to preserve." Perhaps the essence of Hay-
den's remarks, speaking for the American Legion, can be sum-
5 5 Ibid . , pp . 5 2-5 3 . 
56Ibid., p. 53. 
57Ibid., p. 72. 
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med up as a belief that the immigration and naturalization 
laws should be 
... tightened up with reference to speaking of the 
English language, unequivocal obligation to bear 
arms, and now, in connection with this bill, that 
immigration should be made truly selective and con-
fined to the present quota or such reduced quotas as 
may hereafter be established and that: only such 
persons shall be admitted from any country who may 
be found to be assimilable and well-disposed to the 
basic principles of our American form of government 
and,way of life. 58 
Similarly, John B. Trevor, President of the American Coali-
tion, the national voice of various nativist groups, spoke 
in opposition to the bill. He asserted that the proposed 
legislation would "turn loose into the community a class of 
immigrants whose presence will not only aggravate the racial 
animosities which already exist ... but ... will render infinit-
ely more qifficult the efforts ... to promote amicable rela-
tions with the various races and states whose people are 
the peneficiaries of this bill. 1159 
Despite the overwhelming support of H. R. 5004, the Im-
migration and Naturalization Subcommittee took no further 
action on the bill. On June 4, 1948, therefore, Judd intro-
d d · · 1 b · 1160 . h f f . th b . tt uce a s1m1 ar 1 1n opes o orc1ng e su comm1 ee 
58
rbid. 
59
rbid., p. 77. 
60 H. R. 6809, 81st Cong., 2nd Sess., 1948. 
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61 to send a pill to the House floor for debate; this bill 
also died in committee. But a measure of success was forth-
coming for Judd, for during the First Session of the Eighty-
First Congress he again took up the cause of revision of im-
migration and naturalization procedure. On January 3, 1949, 
62 he introduced H. R. 199. The bill stated nothing new in 
terms of basic policy. It simply extended to the remaining 
twenty-five percent of the population of Asia, of which the 
Japanese constituted approximately one-third, the same pri-
vileges which Congress had granted to the Chinese, Indians, 
and Filipinos in 1943 and 1946. The maximum annual number 
of immigrants from Asia would be less than one percent of 
the tota·1 authorized immigration quota for the world. 63 
61u. s., Congressional Record, 80th Cong., 2nd Sess., 
1948, XCIV, Part 6, 7116. 
62u. s., Congressional Record, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., 
1949, XCV, Part l, 17; Legislation identical with H. R. 199 
was introd_uced in the 81st Congress by George P. Miller, a 
California Democrat as H. R. 90. In addition, identical 
legislation was introduced by Francis E. Walter, Democrat 
of Pennsylvania, as H. R. 308; Delegate Joseph R. Farrington, 
of Hawaii and Republican, as H. R. 1214; and Representative 
Sidney R. Yates, Illinois Democrat, as H. R. 14444. 
63u. s., Congress, House, Committee on the Judiciary, 
Report, Providing The Privilege of Becoming 2 Naturalized 
Citizen of The United States to all Immigrants Having~ 
Legal Right to Permanent Residence, To Make Immigration Quo-
tas Available to Asian And Pacific People, Report No. 65, 
81st Cong., 1st Sess., 1949, p. 2. Hereafter cited as House 
Commitee on the Judiciary, Providing The Privilege of Becom-
ing 2 Naturalized Citizen, Rpt. 65. 
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Five weeks later, on February 10, Ed Gossett, a Texas 
Democrat, for the Judiciary Committee, reported H. R. 199 
back to the House with a minor amendment, and recommended 
that the bill pass. 64 In its report, the committee cited 
the loyalty of the Nisei, 65 American-born children of Japan-
ese immigrants,who had been interned in relocation centers, 
and who had volunteered for military service in World War II. 
Furthermore, the committee expressed its satisfaction with 
the record of loyalty and dependability of all individuals 
of Japanese extraction residing in the United States, during 
the war: "All authorities are in agreement that there was 
no sabotage or espionage by a person of Japanese ancestry 
64 b'd 1 U S C . 1 R d 81 t C I .1 ., p. ; .. , ongress1ona ecor, s ong., 
1st Sess., 1949, XCV, Part 1. 1147. 
65General Mark W. Clark said of the Nisei: "Under my 
command in Italy the Four Hundredth and Forty~second Infan-
try Regiment and the One Hundred Infantry Battalion, compos-
ed of Nisei, fought the Nazi combat forces with the valor 
and skill characteristic of the young Americans that they 
are .... As I recall the outstanding feats of valor in com-
bat of the members of the Four Hundred and Forty-second In-
fantry and the One Hundredth Infantry Battalion, the number 
of Purple Hearts awarded to them because of wounds received 
in battle, and their extremely low hospital rate because of 
their eagerness to return to the line after having been 
wounded, .I can only urge that the rights of citizenship in 
our great America be given to the parents who furnished us 
with such qutstanding young manhood, men who willingly gave 
their all that America might live." House Subcommittee on 
Immigratioq and Naturalization, Providing for Equality Un-
der N,atura~ization and Immigration Laws Hearings, 1948, p. 
52 • I 
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resident in the United States or Hawaii, either before, dur-
ing or after Pearl Harbor. 1166 The committee accepted this 
sta t ement despite the questioning of it by Hayden of the 
American Legion. 67 The Judiciary Committee had reviewed the 
prior hearings on H. R. 5004, and affirmed its belief that 
the enactment of this bill, H . R . 119, would strongly bene-
fit the foreign relations of the United States. 68 
When the bill came to the floor for debate, on March 1, 
66House Committee on the Judiciary, Providing the Pri -
vilege of Becoming a Naturalized Citizen, Rpt. 65, p . 3 . 
67House Subcommittee on Immigration and Naturalization, 
Providing for Equality Under Naturalization and Immigration 
Laws Hearings, 1948, p. 72. 
68Ibid . , pp . 36-37; House Committee on the Judiciary, 
Providing The Privileg e of Becoming~ Naturalized Citizen, 
Rpt . 65, p. 6; The Committee Report stated that the purpose 
of H. R . 199 was: "(l) to provide without racial restriction 
the privilege of becoming a naturalized resident; (2) to 
make immigration quotas available to Asian peoples in ac-
cordance with the national origins provisions of the 1924 
Immigration Act, under specific provision that persons in-
digenous to an Asia-Pacific triangle descr~bed therin shall 
be charged to the quota for the quota area to which they are 
by ancestry indigenous, wherever born; (3) to place in quo-
ta status the alien husbands, wives, and unmarried children 
of the United States citizens who are chargeable to a quota 
a rea having a quota of less than 200 ; (4) to provide a pri -
ority of up to 75 percent for aliens immigrating to the Uni -
ted States chargeable to quota areas within the Asia- Pacific 
triangle who were born and are resident therein; (5) to sim-
plify the mechanics of computing quotas by providing that 
the annual quota for any quota area shall be one- sixth of 
1 percent of the number of inhabitants in the continental 
United States in 1920 attributable by national origin to 
that quota area; (6) to provide an annual limit of 100 im-
migrants from each colony, chargeable to the quota of the 
governing country." Ibid., pp. 1 - 2. 
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only Vi to Marcantonio, ~ New York American Labor Party mem-
ber, and Adam C. Powell, Jr., a New York Democrat, seriously 
questioned any aspect of the proposed legislation. They 
questioned the limitin9 of immigration from the British West 
Indies to one hundred annually whereas previously natives of 
this area could come into the United States under the Brit-
69 ish quota. Judd answered them simply by saying that such 
an arrange11}ent would only bring the whole pattern for colo-
nies into 4niformity. 70 Jacob K. Javits, Republican of New 
York, did not oppose, but saw in the bill, imperfection in 
dealing with colonies. He viewed this aspect of the bill 
as iO n t th b . f H R 199. 71 extraneous o e a sic purpose o . . . 
The House agreed to the minor Judiciary Committee 
amendment without question and proceeded to vote on the bill, 
despite Powell's and Marcanto:nio's attempts to block the 
72 
vote. H. R. 199 passed the House by an overwhelming vote 
73 
of 336 to 39, on March l, 1949. Judd's bill as forwarded 
to the Senate Judiciary Committee met with deferred action 
69u .S., Conqressiona_J,,. Recorg, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., 
1949, XCV, Part 2, 1678-82. 
7
oibid., pp. 1678-1682. 
71Ibid., p. 1684. 
72
rbid., pp. 1687-88, 1690-92. 
73Ibid., p. 1692. 
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pending the consideration of all-inclusive legislation on 
. . d 1· . 74 irrun1grat1on an natura 1zat1on. The New Ybrk Times first 
75 
expressed support for Judd's H. R. 199 on May 16, 1949. 
After several weeks of inactivity of the Senate Judiciary 
Corrunittee on the proposed legislation the Times chose to at-
tack the corrunittee directly and Pat McCarran, Nevada Demo-
crat and chairman of the Judiciary Corrunittee, indirectly. 
The paper acknowledged the great pressure from the American 
Legion; howeve~ it expressed the opinion that even if the 
Judiciary Corrunittee was unwilling to face facts on Oriental 
irrunigration. it could at "least do justice to the some 80, 000 
persons who are legally in the United States and whose loy-
alty and value are unquestioned, but who happen to be barred 
from citizenship by laws that are now an admitted anachro-
. ,,76 
n1sm. 
McCarran was working on a compromise bill of his own 
which he described as a complete rewriting of irrunigration 
and naturalization laws. It became quite apparent that any 
legislation in this area would have to bear the McCarran 
74 u. s., Congress, House, Corrunittee on the Judiciary, 
Report, Provides the Privilege of Becoming a Naturalized 
Citizen of the United States to all Aliens Having .s. Legal 
Right to Permanent Residence, Report No. 3140, 81st Cong., 
2nd Sess., 1950. pp. 1-2. 
75 New York Times, May 16, 1949, p. 20. 
76 New York Times, September 10, 1949, p. 16. 
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name if it were to get past the Senate Judiciary Committee. 
McCarran was very reluctant to give Judd any credit for the 
latter's services in working out a quota and naturalization 
syste~ for the Orientals. His sole public comment on the 
Judd measure was that his proposed legislation overcame the 
objectionable feature found in the Judd bill on the subject 
of admitting persons from the Asian Pacific area. McCarran 
viewed H. R. 199 as making it almost impossible to bring the 
Chinese wives and children of American citizens to the Uni-
. I' 
ted States. His own proposal, however, was nearly as re-
. . h' b. 77 str1ct1ve on t 1s su Ject. The three bills, Judd 1 s, Mc-
Carran's, and that of Francis E. Walter, a Democrat of Penn-
sylvania, who chaired the House Immigration and Naturaliza-
tion Subcorrurittee, were frankly discriminatory in their im-
migration provisions as affecting Asians. 
When it became apparent the Senate would not act upon 
Judd's H. R. 199 in the Eighty-First Congress, Francis Wal-
ter introduced as a separate resolution House Join!, Resolu-
tion 438, on May 9, 1949. The resolution incorporated 
Judd's basic quota and naturalization concept as presented 
77 New York Times, April 21, 1950, p. 16. 
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in H. R. 199, 78 but amended the Nationality Act of 1940. 79 
At this point the direction of congressional action started 
to veer to"the right from Judd's original intent and take 
on certain restrictive measures which w,re contrary to the 
spirit of H. R. 199. The House Joint Resolution passed the 
House on June 6, without debate, 80 and the following day was 
h S J d . . C . t 81 sent tote enate u iciary ommit ee. The Senate Com-
mittee reported the resolution out on October 13, 1949, with 
h d . h . 82 h h . t e recommen ation tat it pass; owever, wen it came up 
for consideration it was passed over at the request of Rich-
ard Russell, Georgia Democrat and member of the Judiciary 
78 U.S., Congress, House, Committee on the Judiciary, 
Report, Providing the Privilege of Becoming~ Naturalized 
Citizen of the United States to all Immigrants Having~ 
Legal Right to Permanent Residence, Report No. 634, 81st 
Cong., 1st ~ess., 1949, p. l; U.S. Congressional Record, 
81st qong., 1st Sess., 1949, XCV, Part 5, 6489. 
79u. s., Congressional Record, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., 
1949, XCV, ;!?art 5, 6489 
80u. s. Congressional Record, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., 
1949, XCV, Part 6, 7272. 
81Ibid., p. 7320. 
82 · U.S., Congressional Record, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., 
1949, XCV, )?art 11, 14388; U.S., Congress, Senate, Commit-
tee on the Judiciary, Report, Providing the Brivilege of 
Becoming.£ Naturalized Citizen of the United States to all 
Immigrants Having.£ Legal Right to Permanent Residence, 
Report No. 1167, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., 1949, p. 1. 
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. 83 Conun1ttee~ 
The Senate did not consider House Joint Resolution 238 
until June 8, 1950. Russell proposed an amendment which he 
state~ would limit the provisions of the measure strictly 
to the Japanese. He further decJ.ared·that "the bill as pre-
sented to the Senate was so broad that I felt it would per-
mit a great many aliens, including those who were here by 
virtue of treaties, to be included under its terms. 1184 McCar-
ren, chairm~n of the Judiciary Conunittee, supported Russell's 
amendment; he conunented that the amendment accomplished what 
the conunittee thought to be the intent of the measure. The 
Russell amendment sought to restrict the application of the 
resolution exclusively to Japanese persons and persons of 
Japanese descent who entered the United States, excluding 
Hawaii, prior to July 1, 1924. The Senate accepted the a-
mend.merit anq then passed the resolution by a voice vote. 85 
The House expressed its disapproval of the Senate amendment 
and agreed to ask for a conference on the Joint Resolution~6 
83u. ~-, Congressional Record, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., 
1949, XCV, Part 11, 14 769. 
84u C ' R d . S., on ress1ona ecor, 81st Cong., 2nd Sess., 
1950, XCVI, ;part 6, pp. 82.: 5-86. 
85lbid., p. 8286; Congressional Quarterly, "Naturaliza-
tion of Asians, 11 Congressional Quarterly Almana~ v:t (1950), 241. 
86u. s., Congressional Record, 81st Cong., 2nd Sess., 
1950, fCV~, Part 7, 8658. 
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On August 14, 1950, McCarran reported to the Senate 
that in the judgment of the conference the version of the 
Joint Resolution as initially passed by the House would be 
followed; however, the resolution as amended by the confer-
ence provided for a more thorough screening of applicants 
f . . h' 87 or c1 t12.ens 1p. On the same day the House agreed to the 
conference report. Judd declared,that the original version 
of the Joint Resolution had been ,the first section of his 
H. R. 199, which still awaited final Congressional action; 
however, he ~dded that the Joint Resolution would remove 
racial discrimination from both immigration and naturaliza-
tion laws and would establish quotas for the twelve remain~ 
ing excluded areas of the world. 88 Thus, on August 29, 
Congressional officials from both Houses affixed their sig-
natures to House Joint Resolution 238, and the House for-
d d · f P 'd · 1 'd · 89 ware it or res1 ent1a cons1 erat1on. President Tru-
man, however, vetoed the resolution on September 10, 1950, 
87u.s., Congressional Record, 81st Cong., 2nd Sess., 
1950, XCVI, Part 9, 12413; also see: U. s., Congress, House, 
Committee of Conference on H.J. Res. 238, Conference Re-
port, Amending the Nationality Act of 1940, Report No. 2914, 
81st Cong., 2nd Sess., 1950, pp. 1-7. 
88
congressional Quarterly, "Naturalization of Asians," 
241; U.S., Congressional Record, 81st Cong., 2nd Sess., 
1950, XCVI, Part 9, 12466. 
89u.s., Congressional Record, 81st Cong., 2nd Sess., 
1950, CXVI, Part 10, 12660. 
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with the request that Congress re-enact a section granting 
90 
naturalization privileges regardless of race. He contin-
ued: "When first introduced in the Congress this resolution 
provided that the right to become a naturalized citizen of 
the United States should not be denied or abridged because 
of race," whereas as amended it would be impossible to ad-
minister the act without "creating a twilight species of 
second-class citizens, persons who could be deprived of cit-
izenship on technical grounds, through their ignorance or 
lack of jud9Il}ent. 1191 The President urged Congress to recon-
sider the resolution at once, "reenacting in such form as 
to preserve section 1 and to remove those ill-advised pro-
visions in section 2, which seek to strengthen the Nation-
ality Act of 1940butwhichactualryweakenandconfuse it. 1192, 
The House took up President Truman's veto on September 
14.. Judd responded to the veto by stating: 
... I very much wish it (House Joint Resolution 238) 
had been accepted in the Senate as it was passed by 
the House ... I believe it would have been better as 
a simple bill saying as my bill did that 'the right 
to become a naturalized citizen of the United States 
90
congressional Quarterly, "Naturalization of Asians," 
241; U.S., House, Amending the Nationality Act of 1940 As 
Amended: Message from The President of The United States, 
81st Cong., 2nd Sess., Document No. 702, 81st Cong., 2nd 
Sess., 1950, p. 2. 
91Ibid., pp. 1-2. 
92Ibid., p. 2. 
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93 
should not be denied or abridged because of race.' 
Walter was not as charitable to the President as Judd in re-
questing that the House override the President's veto. 94 
Only Emanuel Celler, a New York Democrat and chairman of the 
Judiciary Committee, praised the President's action. He 
viewed the amended resolution as "suckled by fear and nursed 
by hysteria. 1195 The House, however, passed the resolution 
over the President's veto 307 to 14--a total of ninety-three 
96 
more than the two-thirds required to override a veto. The 
Senate did not take up House Joint Resolution 238 again, and 
thus allowed it to die from the Presidential veto. McCarran 
was formulating his own bill. It was two years later that 
Congress challenged and overrode President Truman's veto on 
a bill which incorporated the essence of Judd's H. R. 199, 
and Walter's House Joint Resolution 238. 
After President Truman's veto it was McCarran and Wal-
ter, chairmen of the immigration and naturalization subcom-
93
congressional Quarterly, 11 Naturalization of Asians," 
241; u. S., Congressional Record, 81st Cong., 2nd Cong., 
.1950, XCVI, Part 11, 14859. 
94u.s., Congressional Record, 81st Cong., 2nd Sess., 
1950, XCVI, Part 11, 14859; Congressional Quarterly, "Nat-
uralization of Asians," 241. 
i 
95 . U.S., Congressional Record, 81st Cong., 2nd Sess., 
1950, XCVI, Part 11, 14858-59. 
96Ibid., p. 14859; Congressional Quarterly, "Naturali-
zation of Asians," 241. 
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mittees in the respective houses, who dominated the scene 
in revision of existing immigration and naturalization law, 
replacing Judd. The latter, however, cooperated and worked 
with Walter for the principle of H. R. 199. After a number 
of bills were introduced in the House and Senate a Joint 
Subcommittee, consisting of seven members of the Committee 
97 
on the Judiciqry of the Senate, and the seven members of 
the Immigration and Naturalization Subcommittee of the Com-
98 
mittee on the Judiciary of the House, held extensive hear-
. . . 99 f d l . l . 100 ings on three pieces o propose egis ation. The 
hearings confirmed the domination by McCarran and Walter. 
On the second day of the hearings, March 7, Judd ap-
peared ~efore the Joint Subcommittee. He declared that 
97McCarran introduced S. 716 on January 29, 1951. U.S., 
Congressional Record, 82nd Cong., 1st Sess., 1951, XCVII, 
Part 1, 714. The Senate Subcommittee on S. 716 included: 
Pat McCarran, Nevada, Chairman; James 0. Eastland, Mississ-
ippi; Herbert R. O'Conor, Maryland; Willis Smith, North 
Carolina; Alexander Wiley, Wisconsin; Homer Ferguson, Mich-
igan; William E. Jenner, Indiana. 
98 Sb . N 1 I . . d N l' House u committee o. mmigration an atura i-
zation included: Francis E. Walter, .Pennsylvania, Chairman; 
Michael A. Feighan, Ohio; Frank L. Chelf, Kentucky; Ed Gos-
sett, Texas; Louis E. Graham, Pennsylvania; Frank Fellows, 
Maine; and Clifford P. Case, New Jersey. 
99The bills included: H. R. 2816, Celler; H. R. 2379, 
Walter; and S. 716, McCarran. 
100 S. 716 and H. R. 2379 were first filed with the sub-
committee; subsequently H. R. 2816 was filed with the Joint 
Subcommittee. 
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whether the provisions of H. R. 199 were enacted into law 
by themselves or were divided up and acted upon separately, 
or were incorporated in the so-called omnibus bills before 
the subcommittee, he did not care--so long as Congress 
101 
acted. The essential provisions of Judd's H. R. 199, he 
felt, had been incorporated in Walter's, McCarran's and 
Celler's omnibus bills on which the subcommittee was hold~ 
ing hearings. Judd felt that with such powerful support 
from three such "distinguished" Congressmen action would 
102 
soon be taken. Judd discussed his former bill at length 
and pointed out why the ideas and provisions should be pass-
ed. He employed the same basic arguments which he had used 
in the hearings on his own bills earlier. Judd asserted 
that such legislation would aid the Asians to move toward 
103 
"Christian democracy." Thus, if the United States could 
help any part of Asia toward representative government, it 
had the obligation to do so. This cause, to Judd 1 s mind, 
could be advanced by merely removing racial discrimination 
from American immigration barriers; this did not mean the 
101u. s., Congress, Joint Hearings, Subcommittees of 
the Committees on the Judiciary, Joint Hearings, Revision 
of Immigration, Naturalization, and Nationality Law, 82nd 
Cong., 1st Sess., 1951, p. 29. 
l0 2Ibid., p. 30. 
l0 3Ibid., p. 34. 
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removal of immigration barriers altogether, only granting 
all Asians a small quota. Such action would advance the 
104 
cause of the United States in East Asia, Judd asserted. 
In summary and conclusion Judd declared: 
Congress should pass the provisions of ... [his] 
... bill, in one form or another--first, for moral 
reasons. It is a matter of simple justice and a 
powerful demonstration by deeds that we believe in 
the dignity and decency of the individual human 
beings. 
Second, for security. It is imperative to 
our country that the opposite shore of the Pacific, 
as well as Of the Atlantic, be in the hands of peo-
ple friendly, not hostile, to the United States. 
Final repeal of the old exclusion laws will 
remove the single most powerful propaganda weapon 
our enemies have used and are using so skillfully 
against us .. .' :Third, economic reasons. America 
has grown great and powerful by the process of 
an expanding economy. The greatest undeYeloped 
resources in the world--material and human--are 
in the Asia-Pacific triangle. Assuming that we 
win the present military struggle in the world, 
America will need on her side in the years ahead 
the materials, the manpower, the markets of Asia. 
We do not win people as friends, allies or cus-
tomers by insulting them. 105 
During the hearings, March 6 to April 9, 1951, the 
statements and testimony of over one hundred individuals 
. d 106 
were receive . The general tone of the testimony resem-
bled that of previous hearings on immigration and naturali-
zation, although there was little denunciation of the McCar-
l04Ibid., pp. 34-35. 
105Ibid., p. 35. 
l06Ibid., pp. 1-787. 
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ran and Walter bills by groups which had previously fought 
change, because of the severe security precautions which 
were included. After the hearings were completed and con-
sideration had been given to the suggestions and comments 
presented at the hearings, along with various conferences 
with several governmental officials, McCarran introduced a 
11 refined" versd.!On of his former bills as S. 2055, 107 and 
Walter introduced the companion bill, H. R. 5678. 108 Both 
measures, often described by the authors as being identical, 
contained a few slight differences, but in general they both 
tended to tighten existing immigration and naturalization 
laws. Both bills contained the basic concepts incorporated 
in the Judd bill, H. R. 199; that is, they provided for the 
naturalization of those Asians legally residing in the Uni-
ted States, and provided for a quota for the remaining non-
quota Orientals, as worked out by Judd. 
McCarran's S. 2055 was modified in the Senate Judiciary 
Committee and emerged on January 29, 1952 with another nurn-
107u.s., Congressional Record, 82nd Cong., 1st Sess., 
1951, XCVII, Part 8, 10680-81. 
108u.s., Congressional Record, 82nd Cong., 1st Sess., 
1951, XCVII, Part 10, 12876. 
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109 ber, s. 2550, and the recommendation that the bill pass. 
On February 14, 1952, the House Committee on the Judiciary 
reported equally favorably on Walter's H. R. 5678, with a-
mendments. The greater part of the amendments which the 
subcommittee made to Walter's bill consisted o:f corrections 
of typographical errors or suggestions for perfecting the 
language of the bill. 110 Both McCarran and Walter sensed 
strong opposition to their bills in their respective Houses, 
the former from Herbert H. Lehman, Democrat from New York 
and Hubert H. Humphrey, Democrat from Minnesota; and the 
latter from Celler. 
McCarran's first opposition came in the Minority Views 
h d . . . h' 2550 111 oft e Ju 1c1ary Committee on 1s s. . The Minority 
109u.s., Congress, Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, 
Report, Revision of Immigration and Nationality Laws, Re-
port No. 1137, Part 2, 82nd Cong., 2nd Sess., 1952, p. 1. 
Hereafter cited as Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Revi-
sion of Immigration and Nationality Laws, Rpt. 1137, Part 2. 
110u.s., Congressional Record, 82nd Cong., 2nd Sess., 
1952, XCVII~, Part 1, 1053; U.S., Congress, House, Commit-
tee on the Judiqiary, Report, Revising the Laws Relating to 
Immigration, Naturalization, and Nationality, Report No. 
1365, 82nd Cong., 2nd Sess., 1952, pp. 1-3. Hereafter cited 
as House Committee on the Judiciary, Revising the Laws Rela-
ting to Irwnigration, Naturalization, and Nationality, Rpt. 
1365. 
111u.s., Congressional Record, 82nd Cong., 2nd Sess., 
1952, XCVIII, Part 2, 2229. Those signing the Minority Re-
port, Senate Report 1137, Part 2, included: Estes Kefauver, 
Tennessee Democrat; Warren G. Magnuson, Democrat of Washing-
ton; Harley M. Kilgore, West Virginia Democrat; and William 
Langer, North Dakota Republican. 
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Report described s. 2550 as 11 a bill which, under the guise 
of a codification of existing immigration statute, in fact 
incorporates ... hundreds of highly controversial provisions. 11 
The basic reasons why the minority group termed the bill 
"undesirable" and declared that it should be rejected in-
eluded the arguments that it did not correct many of the 
defects in existing United States immigration laws, and 
that many of its new provisions ran counter to American 
"d . d' . f . . d 1 · .. 112 emocratic tra itions o Justice an equa ity. The 
members who signed the Minority Report joined with Humphrey 
and Lehman to 08pose the McCarran bill and press for appro-
val of the so-called Humphrey-Lehman bill. On March 12, 
1952, Humphrey introduced a bill, S. 2842, entitled "The 
Immigration and Naturality Act of 1952," on behalf of him-
self and twelve other Senators. Lehman had introduced a 
similar bill at an earlier date which was never reported 
f . 113 out o committee. 
112 C . h J d. . R . . f . Senate ommittee on t e u iciary, evision .Q._ Immi-
gration and Nationality Laws, Rpt. 1137, Part 2, p. 1. 
113u.s., Congressional Record, 82nd Cong., 1st Sess~, 
1951, XCVII, Part 10, 13658. The twelve other Senators were: 
Herbert H. Lehman, NewYork Democrat; William Benton, Conn-
ecticutt Democrat; William Langer, North Dakota Republican; 
Harley M. Kilgore, West Virginia Democrat; Paul H. Douglas, 
Illinois Democrat; Brien McMahon, Connecticut Democrat, died 
July 28, 1952; Francis T. Green, Democrat of Rhode Island; John 
0. Pastore, Rhode Island Democrat; Blair Moody, Michigan 
Democrat; James E. Murray, DemocratofMontana, Estes Kefau-
ver, Tennessee Democrat; and Wayne Morse, Republican of Oregon. 
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The Humphrey-Lehman bill would have permitted the pro-
cessing and adrnissi9n, under the.existing quota system, of 
an increased number of aliens. The resolution would also 
have provided for meeting the emergency world situation in 
regard to the religious and political refugees from Eastern 
I 
and Southern Europe, as well as for helping alleviate the 
over-population in western Europe caused by the flight from 
tyranny in other parts of the continent. The bill further 
sought to elimin~te the stigmas of racial discrimination and 
discrimination based on sex. The Humphrey-Lehman bill would 
base the quota system on the 1950 census and wourd abolish 
the exclusion of Negroes from the census for quota determin-
ation purposes. It further provided for pooling of unused 
portions of the quotas so as to make the entire system more 
flexible and, in the opinion of President Truman, more real-
150 
istic. 114 The Humphrey-Lehman proposed legislation retained 
many concepts of existing legislation; however, it did pro-
vide for 'easier management of the immigration and naturali-
zation process. There were admittedly significant differ-
ences between the McCarran and the Humphrey-Lehman bills, 
but the latter would only mitigate, rather than destroy, 
the principle of the McCarran bill and of the 1924 Act. It 
has been, perhaps accurately, charged that it was not basic 
I 
conviction, "but political expedience, that led these sena-
tors to make this concession to a principle which they con-
114u.s., Congressional Record, 82nd Cong., 2nd Sess., 
1952, XCVII, Part 2, 2140-43. Some of the groups supporting 
the Humphrey-Lehman bill included: Administrative Law Divi-
sion of the American Bar Association; Amalgamated Clothing 
Workers (CIO); American Friends Service Committee; American 
Hellenic Veterans Association; American Jewish Committee; 
Ame~ican Veterans Committee; Americans for Democratic Ac-
tion; Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith; Association 
of Immigration and Nationality Lawyers; Catholic Committee 
for Refugees; Chinese American Citizens National Associa-
tion; Common Council for American Unity; Congress of Indus-
trial Organization; Czechoslovak National Council; Friends 
Comittee on National Legislation; Hebrew Immigrant Aid Soc-
iety; International Ladies Garment Workers Union (AFL); Jew-
ish Labor Committee; Jewish War Veterans of the U. S. ; Li th-
uanian American Congress; Lutheran Resettlement Service; 
National Association for the Advancement of Colored-People; 
National Council of Catholic Charities; National Council of 
Churches of Christ; National Council of Jewish Women; Na~ 
tional Lutheran Council; Order of the Sons of Italy in 
America; Polish Legion of American Veterans; Synagogue Coun-
cil of America; Union of American Hebrew Congregations; 
United Auto Workers (CIO); and the United Service for New 
Americans. 
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' d h h d d' ' ' I II 115 s1dere ' ars an 1scr1m1natory. It was Humphrey 
who pressed for allowing immigrants of one-half Asian ances-
try to be charged to the Asia-Pacific area only if they were 
b . h 116 orn 1n tat area. Judd might have been expected to sup-
port the Humphrey-Lehman bill as it smacked less of racial 
bigotry than the McCarran or Walter bills; however, perhaps 
political expediency and the fear of the "Communist conspir-
acy" led Judd to give seemingly full support to McCarran's 
and Walter's measures. 
McCarran used the "conspiracy" pitch continuously to 
gain support for his bill. The Nevada Senator charged that 
! 
"there has been an intensive letter-writing campaign to sab-
otage this bill under the auspices of the same groups which 
so vigorousty opposed" the McCarran Internal Security Act of 
1950. McCarran charged that there are "certain elements 
which are bent upon the destruction" of the American immi-
gration and naturalization systems, and "that every Senator 
who voted against the Internal Security Act and who is still 
a member of the Senate is listed as a sponsor of the so-called 
115Konvitz, Civil Rights in Immigration, pp. 15-16; 
Congressionq.l Quarterly, "Immigration and Nationality Act," 
Congressional Quarterly Almanac, (1952), 159; U.S., Congres-
sional Record, 82nd Cong., 2nd Sess., 1952, XCVII, Part 5, 
5604. 
116u.s., Congressional Record, 82nd Cong., 2nd Sess., 
1952, XCVIII, Part 5, 5758-59, 5766. 
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Humphrey-Lehman substitute bill."1117 McCarran proceeded to 
point out to his Senate colleagues the "'subversive 0' elements 
who opposed his bill, citing the Daily Worker along with 
other encommunist brandedn' newspapers, 18 front 0n organizations, 
and "pinku authors. 118 Lehman responded to McCarran by de-
claring that the Nevada Senator had not given any explana-
tion whatsoever regarding the merits of his resolution. 
McCarran seemed more concerned, Lehman asserted, with ques-
tioning "at least by implication, the loyalty and patriotism 
of the Senators who oppose the enactment of s. 255o.n 119 
William Benton, Democrat of Connecticut, replied to McCarran 
that the i>Daily Worker bogey has been used until it is 
db !0120 threa are. Brien McMahon, also a Connecticut Democrat, 
asserted ''that if this bill should be passed by both Houses, 
I certainly think that it would be returned to Congress, be-
cause, in my opinion, no self-respecting President could 
sign a bill embracing such outlandish provisions as are con-
tained in the bill. 00121 
117 U. s., Congressiona.l Record, 82nd Cong., 2nd Sess., 
1952, XCVIII, Part 4, 5093. 
llSibid., pp. 5093-97. 
119Ibid., p. 5100. 
120
rbid., pp. 5149-54. 
121
rbid., p. 5154. 
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The debate in the Senate was long and bitter; however, 
the opposition to McCarran's proposed legislation finally 
realized the futility of their continuing. Neither the 
House nor the Senate was in a mood to tamper with the nation-
al origins formula as set forth in 1924. 122 Thus Humphrey 
reported that, although a number of amendments remained on 
his desk, it appeared "perfectly obvious they will not be 
agreed to unless we have the concurrence of the Judiciary 
Committee, and there seems to be a difference of opinion.•~ 23 
Humphrey concluded: "we have tried to argue the question 
of immigration legislation with vigor, with knowledge of 
fact, and with intelligence." He then expressed a sincere 
124 hope that the McCarran bill would not become law. 
The temper of the opposition in the House was mild when 
contrasted with that in the Senate. The sole dissenting 
voice of the Judiciary Committee to Walter's immigration 
bill appears to have been that of Emanuel Celler, chairman 
of the Judiciary. Like the liberal force in the Senate, the 
New York Congressman regarded the quota system as too rigid 
and desired that the unused quotas be distributed among 
122Konvitz, Civil Rights in Immigration, p. 15. 
123u.s., Congressional Record, 82nd Cong., 2nd Sess., 
1952, XCVIII, Part 5, 5790. 
124
rbid.; U.S., Congressional Record, 82nd Cong., 2nd 
Sess., 1952, XC.VIII, Part 4, 4996-97. 
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countries having less than 7,000 quota allotments in the 
same proportion as they bore to the total "quota pie. 11125 
It was Celler, not Judd, who vocally objected on the House 
floor to the theory of nativity as the determining factor in 
the granting of immigration visas to all peoples with the 
exception of the Oriental people. Celler emphasized that 
H. R. 5678 placed a special stigma on people of Oriental or 
part Oriental ancestry. This he viewed as offensive and the 
basis for "tragic consequences ... in the development of our 
foreign policy vis-a-:vi.s Asia'. 11~26 Without a doubt Judd ac-
cepted this principle in the proposed law because of the 
"yellow horde" theory which still held sway in the minds of 
some of his colleagues. He was more concerned with obtain-
ing at least a "token" gesture toward racial equality in im-
migration law than in correcting all the discrepancies in 
legislation regarding the Orientals. Interestingly, Nattan 
E. Cowan, director of the legislative department of the CIO, 
distributed letters to all Congressmen in opposition to Wal-
ter's bill--the basic faults which the CIO representative 
cited paralleled those which Celler found objection-
125 House Committee on the Judiciary, Revising the Laws 
Relating to Immigration, Naturalization, and Nationality, 
Rpt. 1365, p. 326. 
126Ibid., pp. 327-28. 
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bl 127 a e. In the House, only Celler, Democrat Hugh J. Addo-
nizio of New Jersey, and Louis Heller, New York Democrat, 
seriously questioned the wisdom of Walter's bill early in 
128 the House debqte. 
The opponents of Walter's bill in the House were from 
the first clearly overridden. Thomas J. Jenkins, an Ohio 
Republican, the House 11 jester11 during debate, interpreted 
the defeat of each amendment as 01 a great compliment not ori.ly 
to the ability, but to the fairness of those in charge of 
'h bi' 11. 10129 t e Judd's first comments of significan'?e .during 
the House debate ori H. R. 5678 came near the close of dis-
cussions. He paid tribute to "1 the great Committee on the 
Judiciary and especially to its Subcommittee on Immigration 
and Naturalization for its hard and arduous work on this 
bill. 11130 He expressed gratitude for the nn long-suffering 
and understanding patience 00 which the subcommittee exhibited 
for those "who perhaps seemed at times to have ~xes to grind 
because of the importunity'0 with which some Congressmen 
pressed for certain changes i.n the United States immigration 
127 . U.S., Congressional Record, 82nd Cong., 2nd Sess., 
XCVIII, Part 4, 3201-06. 
128Ibid., pp. 4306-11. 
129Ibid., p. 4442. 
1301bid., p. 4439. 
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and naturalization law. Judd expressed appreciation for 
what he considered Walter's "unfailing courtesy, along with 
his thorough mastery" of the problem confronting the country 
on immigration and naturalization procedures, and for Wal-
ter's "high patriotismn in attempting to do those things 
131 
which he believed served the best interests of the country. 
Judd's comments at this time give insight into his thinking 
throughout his political career--that perhaps the intensity 
of a man's conviction is more important than the validity 
of his thinking. Judd acknowledged that he did not see Wal-
ter's bill as a final solution to American immigration and 
naturalization problems, nor did he feel that it gave per-
feet equity and justice in all situations. He did, neverthe-
less, feel that the bill, if enacted into law, represented 
an "enormous forward step and a great improvement over the 
hodge-podge of immigration legislation which has grown up 
. h 1 h ' . . ..132 since t e ast compre ensive revision. 
Judd's apparent motive in giving strong support to Wal-
ter's bill was to support the token gesture of abolishing 
racial discrimination, establishing quotas for all Asians, 
and preserving the basic national origins principle. He had 
spent nine and one-half years working to get this "long-
131Ibid. 
132Ibid. 
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overdue action taken." His concern about Asia sprang from 
his concern for the United States and for world order--his 
concern was to maintain the status quo of the United States 
in the hierarchy of nations. On the House floor Judd again 
expressed the contention that the "Racial Exclusion Act of 
1924" would be determined in the writings of future histor-
ians to have been the basic cause of World War II, as the 
act which 11 turned Japan over into the hands of the rabble-
rousers and the militarists who were trying to develop a 
race war of the colored peoples of the earth against the 
white people as a means of gaining world power for them-
133 . 
selves." In closing on an emotion-laden pitch forWalter's 
bill, he told his House colleagues that he was "deeply 
grateful" that the omnibus H. R. 5678 "contains in one place 
or another all the provisions" of his earlier H. R. 199--
provisions to remove racial discrimination from both immi-
. d 1 · . 1 134 grat1on an natura 1zat1on aws. Judd was convinced that 
Walter's bill did establish "equity" and "justice 11 in immi-
gration and nationality as far as "race is concerned, 11135 
even though the Asian immigrant quota was determined by an-
cestry rather than nativity. To Judd's mind the bill was a 
133
rb1'd., 4440 p. . 
134Ibid. 
135Ibid. 
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"monumental" piece of work when considered "in toto." He 
chided those who opposed the bill with holding to illogical 
reasoning because they did not believe the bill did every-
thing it should: "to give something less than wholly com-
plete equality to Orientals is certainly far better than to 
vote for total exclusion of them because of their race. 11136 
The opposition in both the House and Senate was aware 
that they were defeated; nevertheless, their last resort was 
to appeal for a Presidential veto. The conference committee 
which considered Walter's and McCarran's bill yielded to the 
House version of the legislation. The House approved the 
conference report by a standing vote of 203 to 52, 137 and 
d . b . 138 the Senate accepte it ya voice vote. On June 12,: 1952, 
after having received the Vice President's and the House 
Speaker's signatures, H. R. 5678 went forward for Presiden-
. l . d . 139 tia consi eration. President Truman vetoed the McCarran;..,. 
Walter bill on June 25. In his veto message to the House of 
Representatives, the President acknowledged the grave need 
for a general revision and modernization of the immigration 
136
u.s., Congressional Record, 82nd Cong., 2nd Sess., 
1952, XCVIII, Part 5, 6987. 
137Ibid., p. 6991. 
138
uoSo, Congressional Record, 82nd Cong., 2nd Sess., 
1952, XCVIII, Part 6, 7019. 
139
rbid., pp. 7128, 7167. 
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and naturalization laws, stating, however, his judgment that 
H. R. 5678 constituted a "step backward and not a step for-
ward .... 11140 The President described the bill as a 11 racist 11 
piece of legislation designed to discriminate against Asian 
and Southern and Eastern European people, and asserted that 
all "beneficial effects" of the legislation were offset by 
other severely unjust provisions. The President condemned 
the retention of the national origins quota system by stat-
ing that this "quota system--always based upon assumptions 
at variance with our American ideals--is long since out of 
date and more than ever unrealistic in the face of present 
world conditions," and is a "constant handicap 11 in the con-
d f Am . f . l . 141 uct o erican oreign re ations. 
In a message to Congress on March 24, 1952, the Presi-
dent had stated the need for an emergency program to deal 
with immigration from Europe: "Our present quota system is 
not only inadequate to meet present emergency needs, it is 
also an obstacle to the development of an enlightened and 
142 
satisfactory immigration policy for the long-run future." 
140
u.So, Congress, House, Immigration and Nationality 
Act, 82nd Cong., 2nd Sess., 1952, House Doc. 520, p. 1. 
Cited hereafter as Immigration and Nationality Act, House 
Doc . 5 2, 19 5 2 . 
141Ibid., pp. 2-3. 
142Ibid., p. 3. 
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Congress chose to ignore this Presidential plea. The Presi-
dent expressed his belief that the McCarran-Walter bill 
would compel Congress to resort again to "emergency legisla-
tion in order to admit any substantial portion of the refu-
gees from communism or the victims of over-crowding in Eur-
ope." He did, however, acknowledge the need for numerical 
limitation, but he argued that "the over-all limitation of 
numbers imposed by the national origins quota system" in the 
McCarran-Wal ter Act set the quotas tdo low for the need facing 
the United States. 143 . Referring to Asia, the President de-
clared that he wanted American residents of Japanese ances-
try and friends of the United States throughout Asia to un-
derstand his action: 
... I cannot take the step I would like to take, and 
strike down the bars that prejudice has erected 
against them, without, at the same time, establishing 
new discriminations against the people of Asia and 
approving harsh and repressive measures directed at 
all who seek a new life within our boundaries. I am 
sure that with a little more time and a little more 
discussion in this country, the public conscience 
and the good sense of the ~erican people will assert 
themselves, and we shall be in a position to enact an 
immigration and naturalization policy that will be 
fair to all. 144 
The President felt that it would be impossible to administer 
with fairness and justice the part of the act dealing with 
143Ibid. 
144
rbid., p. 2. 
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Asia and the Asian quota system. Mr. Truman suggested that 
while "good" legislation was being worked out that Congress 
remove from American statutes racial barriers against the 
Asians. 145 In conclusion, the President requested that Con-
gress create a representative corrunission to examine the ba.-
sic assmuptions of the United States irrunigration policy. He 
felt that it should study the quota system and examine the 
145Ibid., p. 8. Mr. Truman suggested a twelve man 
corrunission with sufficient funds, staff, and power to ob-
tain information so that a complete and accurate report 
might be completed within a year after its creation. Pend-
ing completion of the study and its serious consideration 
by Congress, the President felt, however, that certain steps 
should be taken within the year. First, he urged Congress 
to exact legislation which would remove from American stat-
utes racial barriers against Asians. Second~ he strongly 
requested that Congress enact temporary, but emergency, 
irrunigration legislation to authorize the admission of 
300,000 additional irrunigrants to the United States over a 
three-year period. Listed among these irrunigrants would be 
Greek and Dutch nationals, Italians from Italy and Trieste, 
Germans and persons of German ethnic origin, and religious 
and political refugees from corrununism in Eastern~ Europe. 
President Truman suggested that the corrunission be biparti-
san and be divided equally among persons from private life 
and persons from public life: "Perhaps four members be ap-
pointed by the President, four by the President of the Sen-
ate, and four by the speaker of the House." President Eis-
enhower, in his State-of-the~Union Message of February 2, 
1953, expressed the same sentiment held by President Truman. 
Mr. Eisenhower stressed the point that existing irrunigration 
legislation "contains injustices" and requested Congress, 
after review, to "enact a statute which will at one and the 
same time guard our legitimate national interests and be 
faithful to our basic ideas of freedom and fairness to all." 
Auerbach, Irrunigration Laws, p. 25; U.S., Congressional Re-
cord, 83rd Cong., 1st Sess., 1953, XCIX, Part 1, 752. Pres-
ident Eisenhower made several similar pleas during his Ad-
ministration. 
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effect of present immigration and nationality laws, and then 
ascertain the ways in which they could be brought into line 
with American national ideals and the foreign policy of the 
United States. 146 
Congress, however, had not yet reached President Tru-
man's "enlightened" stage regarding immigration and natural-
ization law. When the House considered the Pres·ident' s veto 
message the day following the veto, Walter rapidly regressed 
to petty tactics in defending his bill. He castigated the 
President by declaring his veto message to be an "elaborate 
opus" whose "fictional and amateurish character" could be 
but the work of "ghost writers" who had "neglected to do one 
thing--to read the bill. 11147 Walter continued his emotion-
laden defense of the bill for twenty minutes and declared 
that the bill's "authors, supported by every one of the ad-
ministrative agencies working in the field of immigration 
and naturalization, recommended the passage of this legisla-
tion and now they most sincerely recommended that it be 
passed again, the Presidential 'ill advisers' notwithstand-
. ..148 ing. 
146r · ' d N t' l't At H D 520 mm1grat1on .filL. a iona 1 y _£_, ouse oc. , 
1952, p. 4. 
147 U.S., Congressional Record, 82nd Cong., 2nd Sess., 
1952, XCVIII, Part 6, 8214. 
148Ibid., p. 8216. 
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Celler taunted Walter: "the gentleman from Pennsylvan-
ia, having given voice to his views where~y he took the Pre-
sident to task for, shall I say, having what might be deemed 
the temerity in vetoing this bill, I feel it incumbent upon 
myself to say a few words in support of the President. 11149 
The New York Congressman expressed his belief that President 
Truman had exercised "discretion," and that he had "acted 
with fortitude, integrity, and with wisdom, as he saw fit~~O 
He commented further that the "veto is the veto of the Pres-
ident" regardless of ghost writers which might have been em-
ployed. Celler then scoffed at Walter for perhaps being so 
naive as to find anything unusual in ghost writers for in-
151 dividuals in high places. Alfred D. Sieminski, a Demo-
crat of New Jersey, joined Celler and spoke briefly for sus-
. • h 'd I d 152 ta1n1ng t e Presi ent s stan . Massachusetts Democrat 
John W. McCormack also came to the President's defense, and 
reasoned that the veto message presented enough convincing 
reasons why the President had vetoed the bill, and why the 
House should sustain his veto. He cited remarks which he 
had made on the House floor as early as February 14, 
149Ibid. 
150
rbid. 
151Ibid. 
152
rbid., p. 8217. 
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1929, 153 denouncing the national origins clause. 154 McCor-
mack had viewed the clause as unrealistic when enacted into 
law in 1924, and when it became effective in 1929, as well 
153u.s., Congressional Record, 70th Cong., 2nd Sess., 
1927, LXX, Part 4, 3472-77. 
154Ibid., pp. 3472-77; U.S., Congressional Record, 82nd 
Cong., 2nd Sess., 1952, XCVIII, Part 6, 8218-19. Mr. McCor-
mack, commenting on the national origins clause, said that: 
"Nobody seems to know its real parenthood, although one John 
B. Trevor, of New York City, who was a captain in the In-
telligence Department of the Army, detailed in New York City 
during the war, [World War I] appears to claim the credit 
for it. I have heard that the Ku Klux Klan claims the cre-
dit for conceiving it and securing its adoption as an amend-
ment to the immigration law. I am satisfied, however, that 
their only knowledge of it was after its adoption in the 
Senate in 1924, as an amendment to the bill that passed the 
House, and that thereafter the Ku Klux Klan used it as a 
means of trying to carry out its purpose,s by attracting ad-
ditional members to its ranks. It seems rather hard for me 
to believe that anything that such an organization might 
sponsor would receive the favorable consideration of either 
or both branches of Congress. It appears from the records 
of the hearings of the House Committee on Immigration and 
Naturalization which reported the immigration law that the 
national-origins received little, if any consideration from 
the committee. It is quite probable--and so far as I can 
find it is a fact--that it was not presented to the commit-
tee for consideration. In any event, when the bill was re-
ported in the House it was not a part thereof, and during 
debate an amendment was offered in the house which included 
in substance the provisions of the present law. The amend-
ment was rejected. The House later passed the bill and 
while under consideration in the Senate, Senator Reed of 
Pennsylvania moved the amendment which inserted the present 
national-origins clause into the bill. Upon its return to 
the House it was sent to conference, and the House conferees 
recommended the adoption of the amendment, which action was 
taken. Whether or not it is correct, I am informed this 
amendment was reluctantly accepted by the House. in order 
that the whole bill might not fail of passage." 
165 
as being "equally unrealistic today." 155 Judd denounced 
more moderately the veto than did Walter: 
... surely nobody questions the right of the President 
to veto this bill. The thing which a great many of 
us do question is the wisdom of his vetoing it, es-
pecially at a time like the present ... ',;'/':'T,he President 
said the bill 'repudiates our basic religious con-
cepts, our belief in the brotherhood of man' ... I sub-
mit that it is the President's veto that repudiates 
our basic religious concepts, our belief in the bro-
therhood of man, because it keeps our statutes as 
they are, with hundreds of millions of people in 
those crucial areas still outlawed because of the 
color or the pigment of skin .. · ... Is it nbt better .. to 
accept the bill with its real gains, even though it 
does not correct all that many believe to be inequal-
ities, than to reject the great steps which it rep-
resents in the very areas where we are sustaining 
our most serious losses? Is it sensible to reject 
those forward steps just because the bill does not 
achieve the Kingdom of Heaven on earth? 156 
~'I") 
As the debate progressed, the proponents of the Presi-
dential veto felt disheartened over their chances for vie-
157 
tory. In a roll-call vote on the evening of June 26, the 
House voted 278 to 113 to override the President's veto. 
155u.s., Congressional Record, 82nd Cong., 2nd Sess., 
1952, XCVIII, Part 6, 8219. 
156Ibid., pp. a217-18. 
15 7 h C k . f . . h . Te ongressman spea ing or sustaining t e veto in-
cluded: Emanuel Celler, Democrat of New York; Isidore Dol-
linger, New York Democrat; Louis B. Heller, New York Demo-
crat; Arthur G. Klein, New York Democrat; Alfred D. Siemin-
ski, Democrat of New Jersey; and John W. McCormack, Massach-
usetts Democrat. Only Francis E. Walter and Walter H. Judd 
spoke for overriding the veto. 
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More than forty members either paired or did not vote. 158 
On the same day the Senate reached an unanimous-consent 
agreement, which provided that in the event the House of 
Representatives voted to override the President's veto it 
would vote at 2~30 p.m. Friday, June 27, on the matter. The 
time between noon and 2~30, the agreement provided, would be 
divided equally and controlled by Senators McCarran and Hurn-
h f d b h . 159 prey or e ate on t e issue. The McCarran forces fol-
lowed the same argument which they had previously used, 
while the proponents of the Presidential veto quoted from 
the New York Times, America, The Washington~' and other 
newspapers and magazines which supported the veto or which 
carried articles favoring the veto. Despite the strong pro-
test of the opponents of the bill, the final vote in the 
Senate tallied fifty-seven yeas to override and twenty-six 
nays. Thirteen members did not vote because of absences or 
. . 160 pairing. 
Thus the McCarran-Walter omnibus immigration bill, H. 
R. 5678, officially the Immigration and Nationality Act, be-
158u.s., Congressional Record, 82nd Cong., 2nd Sess., 
1952, XCVIII, Part 6, 8225-26. 
159Ibid., pp. 8142-43. 
160
rbid., p. 8267. 
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came Public Law 414161 on June 27, 1952, when the Senate 
completed its action. Because a two-thirds vote is needed 
in both Houses to override a Presidential veto, a switch of 
only two votes in the Senate or eighteen in the House would 
have sustained the Presidential action. 162 If durability 
is the test of good legislation, then the McCarran-Walter 
Act cannot be considered good legislation in totality, not 
even for its time. Thirteen years later, after strong sup-
port from President John F. Kennedy and general approval of 
President Lyndon B. Johnson, Congress struck down the racist 
national origins principle of 1924 and the general national-
istic sentiment whicn colored the McCarran-Walter Act, and 
enacted the basic concepts which President Truman requested 
in his 1952 veto message. It has been stated that "public 
sentiment clearly favored a more liberal policy" on immigra-
. ' 1952 163 t1on 1n . But, it was charged, an "anachronistic 
committee system and'factional divisions in the major par-
ties put a cluster of rural and isolationist Senators and 
16166 Stat. 163-281. 
162
congressional Quarterly Almanac, VIII; p. 154. 
163In his presidential campaign General Eisenhower 
said in Boston with regard to the McCarran-Walter Act: 11 0nly 
second-class Americanism tolerates second-class citizenship. 
It's time to get rid of both, and that includes rewriting 
the unfair provisions of the McCarran Immigration Act.n 
New York Times, October 22, 1952, p. 4; also see~ Konvitz, 
Civil Rights in Immigration, p. 27. 
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Congressmen into a strategic position from which they effec-
tively frustrated the will of the majority" on this issue~64 
In general, the revision and codification of immigration law 
in the McCarran-Walter Act followed much of the old line of 
policy without "significant deviation; indeed, it intensi~ 
fied the rigidities, discriminations, and injustices of the 
1 . l . l . ..165 ear 1er eg1s at1on. The act did, however, establish 
quotas for Japanese and other Oriental people--thus finally 
eliminating the racial discrimination features of American 
legislation. Furthermore, the elimination of race as a bar 
to naturalization and extending quotas to all Asiatic coun-
tries was generally regarded as highly commendable. 
For his role in drafting the McCarran-Walter Act, the 
Twin Cities chapter and the Midwest District Council of the 
Japanese-American Citizens League honored Judd on August 15, 
1952, at a testimonial dinner. At the same time Mike Masa-
oka, national legislative director of the Japanese-American 
Citizens League, was honored for his efforts since 1945 to 
-'..°~hieve?:6it££~nship for the some 85,000 persons (Issei) of 
· h u · d ·s 166 Japanese ancestry 1n t e n1te tates. The Japanese-
164
oscar Handlin, Race and Nationality in American Life 
(1st Ed.; Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1957), p. 225. 
165
rbid. 
166Minneapolis Tribune, August 15, 1952. 
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American Citizens League was probably the only nationality 
organization that urged Congress to enact the 1952 act over 
President Truman's veto. Later, commenting on the 1952 leg-
islation, Masaoka said that "token immigration is better than 
total exclusion.u 167 Masaoka continued to work for repeal 
of the National origins clause; Judd, however, appears to 
have been satisfied with the 1'token'' gesture of 1952. 
167u.s., Congress, Senate, Subcommittee on Immigration 
and Naturalization of the Committee on the Judiciary, Hear-
ings, To Amend The Immigration 9 nd Nationality: Act, and For 
Other Purposes, Part 2, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 1965, p. 622. 
CHAPTER IV 
WALTER Ho JUDD: IN DEFENSE OF CHIANG KAI-.SHEK 'S CHINA 
Following the November election of 1942, when Judd had 
arrived in Washington as a newly elected Congressman, he 
commented: "I want to get to the bottom of the State Depart-
ment business. 111 Judd was referring to State Department For-
eign Relations Papers which described American foreign pol-
icy in the 1930's and early 1940's, and the attack on Pearl 
Harbor. Judd, elected as an uexpert" on Asia, desired in 
1943 to investigate the conduct of the Pacific war; to keep 
China in the war; and to keep China in Nationalist hands--
and friendly to the United States. 
American foreign policy--particularly in Asia--was to 
become Judd's overriding interest. It was, however, several 
years before Judd became a strong voice in the arena of for-
eign affairs. He sought and obtained a seat on the House 
Foreign Affairs Committee in 1947; eventually he held the 
senior Republican post of the Far East and the Pacific Sub-
1Richard H. Rovere, "Eight Hopeful Congressmen," The 
Nation, CLVI (February 27, 1943), 295. 
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committee. Judd was to become in the post-war period one of 
the most vociferous critics of the Truman-Marshall-Acheson 
East Asian policy; yet, perhaps, he was to remain one of the 
2 
more 11 responsible 11 and "level-headed" members of the "China 
bloc 11 or "Asia-First" element which attracted national atten-
tion for nearly a decade in the late 1940's and early 1950's. 
Perhaps the dominating thesis during the first decade of 
Judd's congressional career was that adequate attention was 
not being paid to the "seriousness of the situation in the 
3 Far East. 11 Sufficient and effective American aid to the 
Chiang Kai-shek forces--to prevent a Chinese Communist take-
over--received top priority in the field of foreign affairs 
in Judd's activities during the post-war period. To be sure, 
Judd supported a general European aid program, but by giving 
full support to Europe, he felt that the Democratic Adminis-
tration could be forced to prevent the Nationalist regime 
from crumbling. 
The question of "truth" in Judd's assertion--that the 
Administration did not recognize the seriousness of the sit-
uation in Asia--was the basis of bitter controversy which 
raged throughout the Truman and into the early years of the 
2Tang Tsou, America's Failure In China 1941-1950 (Chi-
cago: The University of Chicago, 1963), p. 537. 
3u.s., Congressional Record, 78th Cong., 2nd Sess., 
1944, XC, Part 3, 3553. 
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Eisenhower Administrations; however, by the time of Eisenhow-
er's election mainland China had succumbed to communism. 
But, Judd believed, with a Republican Administration the 
China ailment could be cured, and China would be restored to 
the "rightful" and 11 democratic11 rule of Chiang Kai-shek. 
Judd, during the post-war period, expected the Truman Admin-
istration unwaveringly to follow commitments made under war-
time duress to Chiang Kai-shek, whether or not Chiang Kai-
shek carried out his responsibility under these commitments. 
The unique situation in China combined with the traditional 
attitude that the United States had special responsibility 
regarding China prevented the United States from immediately 
withdrawing from China at the conclusion of the war as she 
had done elsewhere in allied countries. A brief discussion 
of China's internal problems will show the unique position 
into which the Truman Administration was thrown. 
By the early twentieth century the United States felt 
confident that its action in China contrasted favorably with 
the predominantly economic centered drive of other foreign 
powers in China. American nationalism, regardless of ration-
alization, was never divorced from economic considerations. 
Perhaps because the American economic aspirations in China 
never developed as she desired, the United States assumed a 
position regarding China which was based on high idealism 
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and moral self-righteousness--this evolution of United 
States policy in China can be traced directly to missionary 
efforts. There was, however, a contradiction between Ameri-
can attitudes and actions in the Middle Kingdom. The United 
States during the second half of the nineteenth century fra-
med her policy in moral terms; nevertheless, she was unwill-
ing to enforce this idealism when it came in direct conflict 
with the high stakes of other powers in China--American vi-
tal interests at this time, it was felt, were not centered 
in Asia. Perhaps because of American missionary efforts in-
volving philanthropic and educational activities, coupled 
with the Open Door, the Boxer Rebellion, the Boxer indemnity, 
and the presence of Chinese studying in the United States, 
the United States assured herself that she was China's 
"greatest" friend in the Western world. 
But with the attack on Pearl Harbor and the realization 
that perhaps Chinese sovereignty was linked with American 
security or vital interest in the form of men, time, and 
money, the United States was forced to reassess her relation-
ship to China--a reassessment done under war-time duress. 
The American role in the Pacific, however, involved not only 
defeating the Japanese, but contending with China's internal 
political struggle. Original military strategy called for 
invasion of Japan through China; but, at the time of General 
Joseph W. Stilwell's recall in November 1944, as commander 
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of the China-Burma-India theater and chief-of-staff to 
Chiang Kai-shek, the strategy of 11 island-hopping11 had re-
placed original military intentions of invading Japan through 
China. China, therefore, did not assume the importance to 
the over-all war effort that had been previously planned. 
President Roosevelt had already fully committed the United 
States to China as one of the Big Four--unequal treaties were 
abolished in 1943, along with the Chinese exclusion--because 
the United States was duly impressed with the great sacri-
fices of China, notably as personified by Chiang Kai-shek 
and his beautiful, shrewd and persuasive wife, in their strug-
gle against Japanese aggression; however, such a position 
did not reflect the realities of the times. 
While becoming thus committed, the Nationalist Govern-
ment was becoming mo.re corrupt and dictatorial, and less ef-
fective in governing the populace. The possibility of full-
scale civil war erupting between the Nationalists and Com-
munists became more imminent, with hints that Chiang "might" 
have to withdraw from the war and make a separate peace with 
Japan sufficient to prompt additional American aid. China 
did tie up a sizeable number of Japanese forces, which might 
otherwise intensify the American struggle in the Pacifi~ and 
perhaps modify American involvement in Europe, the priority 
area. 
With these possible developments facing the country, 
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President Roosevelt dispatched Major General Patrick J. Hur-
ley in August 1944, as his personal representative to China. 
Soon after arriving and in approving of Chiang's demand that 
Stilwell be relieved of his command, Hurley announced Ameri-
can policy: 18 to keep China in the war, to support Chiang 
and the National Government, to persuade Chiang to undertake 
certain reforms, and to promote unity and democracy to which 
all Chinese proclaimed their dedication." 4 Judd--and the 
general American populace--agreed to such statements and ob-
jectives; realistically, however, as seen today, these ob-
jectives were clearly "irreconcilable." If the lever of 
withdrawing American support and aid was removed from Ameri-
can policy, then there was no way of inducing Chiang to make 
changes he chose not to make. 
The lever was withdrawn at the moment Chiang Kai-shek 
declined to execute President Roosevelt's request to which 
he had previously agreed in principle, that Stilwell, direct-
ly under Chiang, be given full command in early 1942, of all 
Chinese and American forces in China. Stilwell, who favored 
a tough 0' quid pro quo'8 policy toward Chiang, was finally re-
4The China White Paper August 1949, [Originally issued 
by Department of State in 1949 as United States Relations 
With China, With Special Reference to the Period 1944-1949] 
(Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1967), 
Introduction by Lyman P. Van Slyke. 
1.76 
placed by Major General Albert C. Wedemeyer. Soon after 
Stilwell's recall the President appointed Hurley as ambassa-
dor to China to fill the vacancy created by the resignation 
of Clarence E. Gauss on November 1, 1944, and in which ca-
pacity Hurley served until November 26, 1945. Hurley con-:-
tinued after the Chiang-Stilwell crisis to make gestures 
toward mediation between the Nationalists and the Communists; 
he fully supported the policy of supplying military material 
and financial support only to the recognized Chinese Nation-
al Government; and he encouraged reform in domestic affairs. 
The central government, however, became more and more inef-
' fective as the friction between the Nationalists and Commu-
nists grew more intense. 
With V-J Day (September 2, 1945) the basic question of 
power between the Nationalists and Communists remained un-
answered. China still faced the internal struggle for sup-
remacy of opposing ideologies and major factions. Thus the 
Truman Administration inherited a policy regarding China--a 
policy made under war-time duress--which had to be converted 
to a feasible post-war and cold war situation. Furthermore, 
the President was gravely concerned about future develop-
ments in Sino-Soviet relations. 
Judd, however, at this time had not formulated the 
theory that the Soviet Union was the "avowed" enemy of Na-
tionalist China or of the United States. He still viewed 
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the Moscow and Cairo conferences as a 0' 'magna charta' for 
China and the orient." Only months before he paid public 
tribute "to the statesmanship of Stalin in conceding China's 
sovereignty in Manchuria and Mongolia." Judd viewed Stalin's 
action as the preliminary step in the 11 restoration physically 
of China." 5 In like manner 1..Tudd could still "praise unstint-
edly" the Democratic presidency of Harry S. Truman. "I be-
lieve, 11 Judd declared, 1'a man like Truman is the best kind 
6 
of president we can have in times such as the present." In 
assessing the President's activities at the Potsdam Confer-
ence, Judd remarked~ nTruman is a very good American, a 
hard headed Missourian ... and did an excellent job. 11 He con-
tinued to assert that nPolitics is the 'art of the poss~ 
ible, 111 and that Truman "probably got everything possible 
7 
out of Potsdam. 11 In essence, Judd for months to come con-
sidered that Chiang Kai-shek's China was safe with Truman as 
President. On the domestic front there still prevailed a 
harmonious picture of bipartisanship in regard to Asia. 
What might be considered bitter partisanship on the 
China question did not burst forth until after the congres-
sional election of 1946 when the Republicans won a clear 
5 . 1' M1nnea:go is f.!_orni.ng: Tribune, January 6, 1944. 
6 . 1 · M1nnea20 is Mornin_g Tribune, May 31, 1945. 
7 . 1 · M1nnea20 is Morning Tribune, August 6, 1945. 
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majority in both the Senate and the House. But by 1948 
President Truman had regained enough popular support to win 
re-election. The 1948 election also saw a regaining of both 
8 Houses by the Democrats. Thus Marshall, on becoming Secre-
tary of State after returning from his 1947 mission to.China, 
could pursue more effectively his own policy in regard to 
China--a policy resulting in large measure from the 1947 
failure to arrange a peaceful settlement between the Nation-
alist and Conununist forces. Marshall, as Secretary of State, 
followed briefly a policy of disengagement in China,; however, 
he was forced to go along with the Republican majority in 
Congress and give lip-service to limited aid in order to 
8The Republican Party Platform which was adopted in 
June, 1948, was most vague in regard to foreign policy and 
made only a polite bow to China. A close reading will re-
veal that no severe criticism was leveled against the Demo-
cratic Administration's foreign policy. Without doubt the 
vagueness in the Republican Platform to a great degree 
sprang from the wide gulf within the Republican ranks on 
what should or could be done for China. The 1948 Platform 
declared~ "Within the prudent limits of our own economic 
welfare, we shall cooperate, on a basis of self-help and 
mutual aid ... We will foster and cherish our historical pol-
icy of friendship with China and assert our deep interest 
in the maintenance of its integrity and freedom. 18 U.S., 
Congressional Record, 80th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1948, XCIV, 
Part 12, A4662. The Democratic Platform barely mentioned 
China." Ibid., p. A4659. The Republican Presidential can-
didate of 1948, Governor Thomas Dewey, spoke only vaguely 
of "bringing an end to the tragic neglect!! of China. Brad-
ford H. Westerfield, Foreign Policy and Party Politics, 
Pearl Harbor to Korea (New Haven~ Yale University Press, 
1955), p. 121. See also the New York Times, June 23, Octo-
ber l, 16, and 28, 1948. 
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prevent 11 black-balling" of American European corrtmitments. 
By mid 1947, however, the Truman Administration had moved 
from the conclusion that Chiang Kai-shek could be saved to 
the viewpoint that the Chiang Government was doomed--that 
only an all-out military intervention could save the Nation-
alist regime. Because of a Republican Congress and the in-
fluence of individuals such as Judd in the House and William 
Knowland, a Republican of California, and Styles Bridges, a 
Republican of New Hampshire, in the Senate, consensus in 
Congress and throughout the country prevented Marshall from 
pursuing what he regarded as a realistic China policy during 
1947 and 1948. During these two years the Republicans used 
the threat of "torpedoing the Marshall Plan for recovery of 
Europe as a way of getting support for China. 119 After the 
Democratic victory in 1948 Marshall moved again from the 
policy of "limited-commitment" to that of disengagement. 
The Democratic victory of 1948, because of the most 
confident assurance of victory by the Republicans, produced 
a violent reaction among them. However, no longer did the 
Democratic Administration have to 11 buy 11 Republican support 
for its European program at the price of concessions on 
China. Thus, the Democratic victory of 1948 only heightened 
9The China White Paper August 1949, Introduction by 
Lyman P. Van Slyke. 
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partisanship on the China issue--and now "in the bitterness 
of defeat 11 the Republicans sought to "draw blood wherever 
10 
they could." 
Those individuals who sought "blood 11 chose to explain 
the gradual deterioration in China by postulating a "great 
conspiracy 11 in the United States State Department. They 
preferred to explain the disintegration of the Nationalist 
hold on China wholly in terms of external forces rather than 
in terms of neglect by Chiang and his cohorts. Before V-J 
Day the consensus of several Foreign Service men in China 
was that the chances of Nationalist surviving were minimal. 
As early as August 3, 1944, John S. Service, a Foreign Ser-
vice Officer in China, reported that the "Chinese Communists 
have become the most dynamic force in China and are challen-
11 ging the Kuomintang for control of the country." Similar 
sentiment was expressed by John P. Davies, Jr., who reported 
on November 7, 1944, that the ucommunist governments and 
armies are the first governments and armies in modern Chi-
nese history to have positive and widespread popular sup-
port." Davies explained this support for the communist move-
lOibid. 
11Department of State, United States Relations with 
China, With Special Reference to the Period 1944-1949 (Wash-
ington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1949), p. 566, 
(From Memoranda of John Stewart Service, October 9, 1944. 
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ment by asserting that "the governments and armies are gen-
12 
uinely of the people. 11 Another Foreign Service Officer 
in China, Raymond P. Ludden, likewise recognized the inef-
fectiveness of the Chiang forces in the war. Both Service 
and Davies believed that a coalition Chinese Government in 
which the Communists could find a satisfactory place was the 
best solution to the Middle Kingdom internal impasse. Like-
wise both individuals felt that to crush the Communist for-
ces would take a foreign intervention on a scale equal to 
the Japanese invasion of China. If the United States were 
to come to the Kuomintang's rescue on its own terms, Service 
wrote in June 1944, it "would be buttressing--but only tern-
porarily--adecadentregime which by its existing composition 
and program is incapable of solving China's problems;" 
this kind of aid would only be "gaining ... a brief respite 
from the ultimate day of reckoning. 1113 These and other in-
dividuals connected with the China foreign service believed 
that the Soviet Union desired to develop out of North China 
and Manchuria a separate Chinese state--perhaps even a Rus-
12Ibid., p. 567, 
7 I 1944) • 
13 b'd 573 I 1 ., p. , 
June 20, 1944). 
(Memoranda of John P. Davies, November 
(Memoranda of John Stewart Service, 
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sian satellite. 14 
In contrast to many State Department officials, Judd 
at this time felt that "Russia's official conduct with re-
gard to the Chinese Communists since they made a pact with 
Chiang in September 1937," had "been perfectly correct and 
circumspect. 1115 Judd took a 11 fact-finding".trip to China 
in late 1944, and addressed his House colleagues on March 
15, 1945: "one of the things I wanted to find out in China 
was how much, if any, is the Kremlin behind the Communists 
in China." He emphasized that when he spoke of Communism 
he did not mean 11 Russia," as 11 many Americans automatically 
did." He affirmed his belief to the House that the Soviet. 
Union was not aiding the Chinese Communist forces: "There 
was no evidence that I could find or hear about that Moscow 
has been backing or supplying with materials or with guid-
ance, the Communist government in China during the last 7 
16 years." 
Judd wanted it clearly understood at this time that he 
was not making charges against Russia. But he did charge 
14Ibid., p. 564, (Memoranda of John P. Davies, January 
15, 1944). 
15 Walter H. Judd, "What Is the Truth about China? The 
Great Moral Decision of Chiang Kai-shek And The Chinese 
People," Vital Speeches of the Day, XI {June 1, 1945), 565. 
16Ibid. 
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that the Communists in China, and thei: 11 communists and 
fellow-travelers" in the United States, were working primar-
ily in terms of what they believed would best serve the 
Soviet Union's future policies and interests. He was con-
vinced that the 11 Chinese Communists" were "first Communists 
and second Chinese," in their thinking, just as he "knew" 
that "American Communists" were "first Communists and second 
Americans." 17 Judd refuted Service's observation that: 
"The Chinese Communists have a background of subservience 
to the U.S.S.R., but new influences--principally national-
18 
ism--have come into play which are modifying their outlook." 
Judd, however, believed that the Chinese Communists were 
loyal to the Soviet Union, whether Russia wanted their loy-
alty or not. He contended that the purpose of the Chinese 
Communists was to make "Russia overwhelmingly the strongest 
power in Asia as well as in Europe. 11 This, Judd believed, 
would be just as bad in the long run for the Soviet Union 
as it would be for Asia and the United States, because a 
strong Russia in Europe and Asia would require enormous ar-
maments and constant tensions and suspicions which "he hoped 
profoundly" would not be the situation in the post-war 
17Ibid., p. 496. 
18
united State~ Relations~ China, p. 565, (Memoran-
da of John Stewart Service, April 7, 1944). 
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world. His apparent misunderstanding of Marxist philos-
ophy, that corrununism would take root in an industrialized 
state rather than an agrarian one, and of Russian corrununism 
led him to proclaim that true Marxism cannot win in China 
as it did in Russia. He reasoned that the corrununist appeal 
in Russia was "to the totally dispossessed, such as the 
serfs" and since China was not a natio? of serfs--being "pre-
dominantly a nation of lower middle-class people"--corrununism 
20 
would have no appeal to the vast Chinese population. Judd 
had originally held that the Chinese Corrununists were "just 
agrarian reformers, just Chinese patriots struggling only 
21 for the freedom of China and for democracy." As late as 
1942 he still believed this: 
You could persuade Herbert Hoover, J. P. Morgan, 
and Winston Churchill to be Corrununists as easily as 
you could persuade a landowning Chinese. peasant, 
whose ancestors have lived on one piece of land 
for centuries, to take the only tangible thing he 
has and dump it into a corrunon pot just on the pro- 22 
mise that around the corner will be something better. 
In early 1945 Judd felt that if the Chinese Corrununists 
could stall along until the war in Europe ended, "then they 
19 Judd, "What Is the Truth about China?" 496. 
20Ibid., p. 497. 
21Ibid., p. 496. 
22walter H. Judd, "Behind the Conflict in the Pacific, 11 
The Journal of the National Education Association 0 XXXI 
(September, 1942), 169. 
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could hope for powerful support from Russia," perhaps even 
try for an noctober revolution in the hope of getting con-
trol of all of China. 11 But if that failed, Judd felt, the 
Chinese Communists could at least rebel and try to split off 
north China, including Manchuria--in the name of freedom, 
of course--and then the new 11 independent democracy" could 
11 invite Russia in to protect it as she is protecting the 
new 'independent' governments in Eastern Europe." In the 
use of the terms "independent" and "democratic" Judd simply 
implied that the Soviet Union only moved into those areas 
where a political vacuum already existed. To Judd, however, 
the resulting new "North China" could, if it so desired, 
"voluntarily insist ... on being taken in as one of the United 
socialist soviet republics." He did, however, express the 
opinion that the Chinese Communists had real democracy with-
in their own party: 0'that is the source of much of their 
strength--but when it comes to extending democratic rights 
to those who disagree with them, their record is infinitely 
23 
worse than that of the Central Government." 
Judd strongly opposed Stilwell's proposal of arming the 
Communist forces and in so doing rejected the basic premise 
of American policy in Asia as set forth by Ludden and Ser-
vice: 
23
,Judd, 0"What Is the Truth about China? 11 497. 
American policy in the Far East can have but 
one immediate objectiveg the defeat of Japan in 
the shortest possible time with the least expendi-
ture of American lives. To the attainment of this 
objective all other considerations should be subor-
dinate. 24 
Judd's logic is quite apparent when he reports that the 
Chinese Communists tried to sell the West 1" a gold brick" 
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when they tried to disseminate the report that they had to 
"maintain their army or be destroyed." They maintained 
their separate army, Judd exhorted, "to seize power after 
Chiang ... armed them with American supplies under the pretext 
f . ,125 o unity. Judd asserted that the Japanese had made no 
serious efforts "'to destroy the bases of the Communists" who 
were "alleged to be the real anti-Japanese elements, 11 but 
the Japanese launched repeated campaigns to destroy Chiang 
Kai-shek's bases and his armies, who according to false 
rumors had not been fighting the Japanese. Judd's use of 
the term "false rurnorsn referred apparently to such dis-
patches as Ludden's and Service's: "'There is ample evidence 
to show that to the present Kuomintang Government the war 
against Japan is secondary in importance to its own pres-
24 
· d 1 " "h Ch" Unite States Re ations wit ina, 
anda of Raymond P. Ludden and John Stewart 
ruary 14, 1945). 
p. 575, (Memor-
Service, Feb-
25 Judd, "0What Is the Truth about China?"" 497. 
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26 
ervation in power. 11 To Judd, however, no 11 reasonable per-
son" could draw any conclusion other than that the Japanese 
were "shrewd enough to see that since it had proved most 
difficult to knock the Chinese [Nationalists] out by direct 
assault, then the best way ... [was] ... to weaken China ... [by 
allowing the] ... Communists to continue their work of disrup-
ting and disunifying and discrediting the government of 
China, [and thus] ... breaking it down from within. 1127 Judd 
found Japan's greatest and most real "secret weapon" against 
China, and therefore against the United States, was the Chi-
nese Communist bloc, which was "ably assisted" by some 
Americans, 11 sincere, but ... greviously misguided. 1128 These 
Americans, whom Judd felt were assisting the communists 
"willingly" or "unwillingly" in circulating "propaganda 
against the Government of China, 11 were individuals ih. the 
United States War and State Department. In contrast to 
later belief as manifested in Asia-First sentiment of the 
late 1940's and early 1950's Judd believed that the Japan-
ese must be "beaten on the mainland of Asia, 11 which meant 
"huge ground forces. 11 Late in World War II he asserted 
26
united States Relations with China, p. 575, (Memoranda 
of Raymonq. P. Ludden and John Stewart Service, February 14, 
1945). 
27Ju9d, "What Is the Truth about China?" 
28Ibid. 
498. 
188 
that the United States could not 18 beat a people just by air 
attack"; however, as an Asia-Firster in 1952 he argued that 
the Chinese Communists could be rapidly defeated solely by 
air-sea power and Chiang's invading forces from Formosa. 
This, however, is but one of the numerous contradictions 
which crept into the argument of those 18 friends of China" 
who are collectively known as the '0Asia-Firsters, 11 many of 
whom sought to explain Chiang's fall in terms of a "Great 
Conspiracy" within the United States State Department. 
The term "Asia-First" came into common use in 1949, 
perhaps as a reaction to the charges of China's friends that 
the Administration was continuing an "Europe First" policy. 
Opposition to the Administration policy of neglecting Asia 
in favor of Europe was perhaps the most concrete concept 
which they held in common. Despite the nebulous character 
of the group they accepted other hypotheses in common but 
with varying intensity. As friends of China they accepted 
the validity of American military strategy of World War II, 
which was to concentrate America's principal ef,fort on Eur-
ope while making the Pacific a secondary theater of opera-
tions. They accepted the tenet that during the Second World 
War the Nazi forces were unquestionably the strongest of the 
Axis combination. Thus the Pacific could be cared for after 
the defeat of the Axis in Europe. They felt, however, that 
the Truman-Marshall-Acheson Administration tactic of repeat-
189 
ing this priority in the diplomatic field was wrong. 
By 1949, the Asia-First element felt the United States 
had become the number one enemy of the Soviet Union. The 
United States, they reasoned, was the only barrier to the 
Asiatic expansion of Russia, whose empire at the time ex-
tended from Western Germany to the Pacific. They accepted 
the tenet that had it not been for direct American inter-
vention and American dollars much of Western and Southern 
Europe would have succumbed to Kremlin domination. But, 
because the United States was much closer intellectually to 
Europe than to Asia, they argued, American major strategic 
interests were being sacrificed by American diplomats. It 
was American ideological emotionalism which fostered Ameri-
can preoccupation with Europe. The Russians, however, who 
were not emotional in their policies as was the United 
States, realized that America would soon again neglect the 
Pacific. The Soviet Union, they reasoned, impelled the 
United States by means of the cold war and paramilitary 
activity to direct its efforts toward Europe at the very 
time when America's real interests lay in the Pacific. 
The Asia-Firsters charged that the rumors of an immin-
ent Russian attack, periodically coming out of Europe, for-
ced the United States to neglect the Pacific. While waging 
a cold war in Europe, the Soviet Union was helping to keep 
the shooting war going in China. This group believed that 
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the United States would be far more vulnerable to Soviet 
attack if the Soviets obtained possession of the great arc 
extending from the Kurile Islands to the Indian Ocean, than 
if she simply took over all Europe, their logic being that 
the Soviet Union would invade the United States through Al-
aska. Thus they charged that American diplomats in an ef-
fort to hold off the Russians in Europe overruled military 
leaders who wanted the opposite and were letting Asia sink 
by default to communism. 29 
Manchuria was a strategic area, the Asia-Firsters con-
tended, because it was the Soviet's gateway to Japan through 
Korea. Thus Korea was of strategic importance because of 
its proximity to the Japanese Islands. They declared that 
with the Russian advance on the mainland of Asia, America's 
position in Japan would deteriorate more rapidly. Japan 
would ultimately fall to Russian domination because of the 
importance of mainland Asia as an outlet for Japanese in~ 
dustrial goods, and because of the importance of the area 
to Japan as a source of raw materials. Japan's reliance on 
commercial intercourse with the Communistp would soon force 
29
see Constatine Brown's article, as read into the 
Congressional Record by Judd, 11 Europe-First Policy Has 
Weakened United States in Pacific, 11 reprinted from Washing-
ton Sunday Star, January 2, 1949, U.S., Congressional Re-
cord, 81st Cong .. , 1st Sess., 1949, XCV, Part 12, A23-24. 
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Japan to accept the Communist's form of government. 
By mid-1949 the Asia-Firsters felt that war was clearly 
being threatened in Asia--nothing less than a third world 
war. To avert this catastrophe the situation in Asia must 
immediately be "treated as a warlike situation," Judd fre-
quently asserted. The prevailing policy of the Democratic 
Administration, however, made war inevitable between the 
United States and the Soviet Union. The feeling that the 
Administration had written off not only China but all Asia 
continued to grow, to crystallize at a later time. First, 
however, Asia had to be convinced that the United States 
had no imperial ambitions, and second, that the United 
States would not allow Asia to succumb to Soviet imperial-
. 30 ism. 
30 U.S., Congressional Record, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., 
XCV, Part 15, A5522. Most prominently identified with the 
Asia-First movement and the China lobby were Senators ..P'a':t-
rick McCarran, Democrat of Nevada; and Joseph McCarthy, 
Republican of Wisconsin; Styles Bridges, Republican of New, 
Hampshire; William F. Knowland, Republican of California; 
and William E. Jenner, Rep~blican of Indiana. Military 
members of the lobby included General Albert C. Wedemeyer, 
Admiral Arthur W. Radford, General Patrick Hurley, and 
General Clair Chennault. Civilian officials of the move-
ment included Ambassador William C. Bullitt; Pennsylvania 
Governor George A. Earle; Walter Robertson, Secretary of 
State for Far Eastern Affairs; and Clare Boothe Luce. Pri-
vate citizens included Alfred Kohlberg, an importer of Chi-
nese lace handkerchiefs; Henry R. Luce, Publisher of Time, 
Inc.; William Loeb, publisher of the Manchester Union-
Leader; and author Freda Utley. The most influential mem-
ber of the Asia-First movement in the House of Representa-
tives was Walter H. Judd. 
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In contrast with Europe, the American approach when 
intervening in the Pacific in general, and in China in par-
ticular, had never been as complete. The Asia-Firsters 
demanded a whole-hearted pro-Nationalist intervention. 
They sought a top-priority American commitment to the sue-
cess of the Nationalist regime. The Administration, how~ 
ever, due to prevailing conditions in China, felt it could 
only continue the half-century-old sentimental verbalization 
about the "territorial and administrative integrity of 
China." Despite all its noble protestations, the United 
States had never committed itself to the unification of 
China under any particular regime to the point of running 
much risk of war on account of China; perhaps a possible 
exception could be found in the months just prior to Pearl 
Harbor. But this perhaps resulted more from the anxiety 
about the fate of the British Empire and the rubber and tin 
of Southeast Asia than from a pressing concern to save China 
h N . 1 · . 31 or t e at1ona 1st regime. 
In the years following Pearl Harbor, when China came 
more to the forefront in the American press, the decaying 
Nationalist regime began losing the admiration of many Amer-
icans, even some of its old friends. The United States, 
31 f · ld . P 1. d 1. . Wester 1e , Foreign o icy .filL Party Po 1t1cs, p. 
121. 
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devoted to winning the war in Europe first, was unable pro-
perly to assist Chiang in establishing control over all of 
China and Manchuria. The unexpectedly sudden end of the war 
further prevented the United States from doing incidentally 
for Chiang what was desired during the year prior to V-J Day. 
Not surprisingly, then, the United States was unwilling to 
do for Chiang Kai-shek after the war that which the Europe-
first priorities did for Europe. Indecisiveness about Asian 
strategy had characterized American policy throughout the 
war because of the complex situations which existed in Asia 
and whicp did not exist in Europe. As a direct result, 
American support for the Nationalists took on the same low-
priority status after the war, without turning into total 
32 
abandonment. By late 1948 and early 1949, with Western 
and Southern Europe relatively safe from Russian domination, 
and Chiang's surrendering the Presidency of the Republic of 
China, the Asia-First element became more vocal in their de-
mands for top priority for Asia in general and China in 
particular. 
The Asia-Firster was willing to accept Hurley's dictum 
that "America's failure in China ... [was] the result of Amer-
ic~'s surrender of principles in the Secret Yalta agree-
32Ibid. 
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ment." "Clearly and unmistakably," Hurley charged, "the 
fundamental principles that have made America the greatest 
unit on the face of the earth, and on which our policy in 
China was based--individual rights and self-government--were 
surrendered in secret agreements at Yalta. 1134 By 1949 Hur-
ley felt free to charge: "American diplomats and the im-
perialists and Communists who opposed self-government and 
liberty contended that the policy that I was making effective 
in China was my own policy and not that of the United States. 11 
Hurley's own failure and mistakes in China were far enough 
in the past to allow him to ask: "Why did the American pol-
icy in China fail? What is the cause underlying the Com-
munist conquest of China? What is the cause of the failure 
of the Government of the Republic in China? 35 Hurley pro-
claimed, despite his inability to explain it, that there was 
a "vast discrepancy between our announced foreign policy and 
our actual foreign policy. 1136 Judd saw in Hurley "the agent 
in China of President Roosevelt's successful policy of sup-
porting the Chinese Government, and who resigned rather than 
be the tool of those who were determined to change that pol-
33 C . 1 U.S., ongressiona Record, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., 
1949, XCV, Part 12, Al344. 
34Ibid. 
35Ibid. 
36Ibid., p. Al345. 
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icy to one of forcing peace and unity with the Corrununist re-
bellion in China. 1137 
On March 7, 1949, Judd declared that it was "popular 
nowadays for the architects and apologists of American for-
eign policy in China during the last few years to try to ex-
plain its catastrophic failure by laying all the blame on 
the inept, incompetent, inefficient, and corrupt Chinese 
Government and on the irrunoral Russians." It is not that 
simple, Judd asserted: "It is not enough to announce that 
the Chinese have lost the will to fight." The important 
questions to Judd were~ "First, Why have the [Chinese] lost 
it [morale to fight] after almost 20 years of valiant resis-
tance ag~inst Japan and more than 20 against Corrununists; and 
second, How can it be restored. 1138 Both Judd and Hurley 
were willing to accept their view that American "Corrununists 
and fellow travelers" alone were responsible for the condem-
nation of the Republic of China in our foreign affairs. 1139 
Likewise, Judd was willing to accept, as were many of the 
Asia-Firsters, Hurley's observation that the United States 
was "operating in a power bloc," and 81 There is but one thing 
certain about a power alliance, and that is historically 
37Ibid., p. Al344. 
38Ibid. 
39Ibid., p. Al345. 
196 
I 40 
speaking, power blocs have always led to war." Judd and 
the Asia-Firsters did hot condemn "power blocs" per se; they 
condemned only those which included Communist powers. This 
"power bloc" as described by the Asia-Firsters had its con-
ception in the supposedly "secret agreement" at Yalta, the 
conference which set in motion the forces which were ul ti-· 
mately to lead to China I s fall to II international Communism,1141 
40Ibid. 
41That part of the Yalta Agreement which Administration 
critics and Asia-Firsters delighted in referring to as the 
11 secret agreement" which pertained to China and Japan in-
cluded: 
1. The status quo in Outer Mongolia (The Mongolian Peo-
ple's Republic) shall be preserved: 
2. The former rights of Russia violated by the trea.cher-
ous attack of Japan in 1904 shall be restored, viz: 
(a) The southern part of Sakhalin, as well as all 
the islands adjacent to it, shall be returned to the Soviet 
Union, 
(b) The commercial port of Dairen shall be inter-
nationalized, the pre-eminent interests of the Soviet Union 
in this port being safeguarded and the lease of Port Arthur 
as a naval base of the u.s.s.R. restored, 
(c) The Chinese-Eastern Railroad and the South-
Manchurian Railroad, which provides an outlet to Dairen, 
shall be jointly operated by the establishment of a joint 
Soviet-Chinese company, it being understood that the pre-
eminent ipterests of the Soviet Union shall be safeguarded 
and that China shall retain full sovereignty in Manchuria; 
3. The Kurile Islands shall be handed over to the Sov-
iet Union. 
It is understood that the agreement concerning Outer 
Mongolia and the ports and railroads referred to above will 
require concurrence to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. The 
President will take measures in order to obtain this con-
currence on advice from Marshal Stalin. Henry Steele Comma-
ger, Documents of American History ( 7th ed.: New York: · 
Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1963), pp. 492-93. 
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a preliminary step in the eventual move to try for the con~ 
quest of the United States by the Communist bloc. 
What did this agreement do to China? 
"-, 
The Asia-First 
group charged that at Yalta the United States, in violation 
of the Atlantic Charter, agreed to the aggrandizement of 
Russian territory to include the Kurile Islands, half of 
Sakhalin, and the surrounding islands. Furthermore, it 
charged that in violation of both the Atlantic Charter and 
the territorial integrity of China, the United States agreed 
at Yalta to the internationalization of the port of Dairen. 
The United States also agreed to give Russia the "prer 
eminent interest" in Dairen which Russia immediately trans-
lated into exclusive right. In addition, the United States 
agreed to give Russia a half interest in the Chinese Eastern 
and South Manchurian Railways. This the Soviet Union immed-
iately construed to mean an exclusive right to the control 
of the railways. As if all these concessions to the Soviet 
Union, in violation of the Atlantic Charter, were not enough, 
the Asia-Firsters asserted, the United States further agreed 
that all these concessions to Russia by China would be con-
curred in by China and the American President would "take 
measures in order to obtain concurrence on advice from Stalin. 1142 
42u.s., Congressional Record, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., 
1949, XCV, Part 12, Al344; see also Commager, Documents of 
American History, p. 493. 
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Thus Judd and his cohorts charged that at Yalta the 
United States surrendered not only the principles of the 
Atlantic Charter, but also every element of the traditional 
American folicy in China, and greatly threatened America's 
security. President Roosevelt was a sick man at Yalta, they 
asserted; he was duped. Had he not supported Chiang loyally 
for five years? Had President Roosevelt not contributed 
greatly to the prestige and world influence of China by in-
sisting on granting China great-power status? Also, had he 
not insisted that China should be one of the five Permanent 
Members of the United Nations Security Council, with veto 
power? It then had to be someone near the President who was 
sabotaging the traditional spirit of the United States 
toward Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. The group, however, 
could not cite exactly the names of the individuals whom 
they considered responsible £or the so-called American dip-
lomatic debacle at Yalta. They completely rejected, perhaps 
with more logical reasoning, the view that a motive for the 
Yalta concession was a desire to hold Russian East Asian 
gains to the limits which the Czars had formerly held. They 
further rejected the idea that President Roosevelt and his 
advisers sought at Yalta Russian support for Chiang Kai-shek, 
or at least for a coalition between the Nationalists and 
Communists in which the Kuomintang would preponderate over 
the Chinese Communists. But to Judd, Yalta was only the 
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beginning for 11 those who were determined to change 11 ·Roose-
velt's original policy "to one of forcing peace and unity 
with the ~ommunist rebellion in China--a policy which led to 
conquest by the Communists." 43 
To the Asia-First element, the Yalta agreement was not 
the sole reason for the plight of Chiang's China. American 
Communists, both at home and abroad, they saw as the source 
of the propaganda which branded the Republic of China as a 
corrupt regime. Hurley could simplify the charges against 
the Kuomintang regime to: "Our Communists and fellow travel-
ers in the United States condemn the Republic of China be-
cause it is too weak after its years of vicissitudes to pun-
ish its malefactors. 1144 The Asia-Firsters believed that 
this was but part of the story. They would readily agree 
that the Republic of China was weak, inefficient, and cor-
rupt, but they were thoroughly convinced that Chiang was 
the choice of the populace, and without doubt he~ best· 
for American interests. Thus, they could continue to argue 
that Chiang's regime could be nothing but weak, inefficient, 
and corrupt, after nearly forty years of revolution and civ-
il war, illiteracy and poverty, oppression and exploitation, 
43u.s., Congressional Record, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., 
1949, XCV, Part 12, Al344. 
44Ibid., p. Al345. 
200 
and seven years of war against Japan. Chiang Kai-shek was 
viewed as the successor of Sun Yat-sen, and as such was or-
dained to lead that element in China whose purpose it was to 
establish in China "a government of the people, by the peo-
ple, and for the people." Chiang Kai-shek chose to sustain 
the ideals of individual liberty and self-government against 
imperialism and communism--but these could not be gained 
overnight, the Asia-Firsters argued. 
To the great dismay of Judd and many of the pro-Chiang 
element, Hurley resigned his post as Ambassador to China on 
November 27, 1945, amid growing criticism in the United 
States Foreign Service circles regarding the role that he 
. . Ch' 45 was assuming 1n 1na. Hurley's replacement, General 
45 It appeared at the time of Japan's surrender on Aug-
ust 14, 1945, that the Chinese Communists and the National-
ist forces were nearing a compromise. The following day, 
August 15, Chiang Kai-shek dispatched a memorandum to Mao 
Tse-tung in Yenan, requesting that he come to Chungking to 
discuss "many international and internal problems." Out of 
the ensuing six weeks conference among Chiang, Hurley, and 
Mao came the agreement that a Political Consultative Con-
ference, eventually set for January 10, 1946, should be 
called. When Mao returned to Yenan on October 11, it was 
reported that the two sides were in general agreement, ex-
cept on the government of areas libe~ated from Japanese 
control by the Chinese Communists. Mao, however, said 
"there are great difficulties, but they can be overcome." 
Fighting between the Chinese Communists and the National-
ists, aided by American forces, continued. United States 
Relations with China, p. 38. 
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George C. Marshall, held the title of Special Representative 
of the President in China, with the personal rank of Ambas-
sador. Immediately after release from his post, Hurley at-
tacked the State Department and professional Foreign Ser-
vice men in China by asserting that old hands of the Foreign 
Service in China were supporting the Chinese Communists and 
that the United States was permitting itself to be "sucked 
into a power bloc on the side of colonial imperialism 
. . . . 1 · ift46 against Communist imperia ism. Hurley, testifying before 
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on December 5, 1945, 
cited five career diplomats who he considered were undermin-
ing United States policy in China. He identified them as 
George A. Atcheson, Jr., John S. Service, John Davies, Ful-
d A h R . l 47 ton Freeman an rt ur ingwa t. 
Prior to Hurley's resignation there was already a grow-
ing demand that American forces still overseas be returned 
home immediately. Both Judd and Hurley opposed the removal 
of American forces from China, believing that they should 
be retained until the internal problem was settled by vie-
tory for Chiang. On October 11, 1945, Mike Mansfield, a 
Democfat from Montana, who had served in East Asia as a 
46Ibiq. 
47Ibid., p. 30. 
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48 Marine during the early 1920's, urged from the House 
floor~ "Now that the war with Japan is ended the best 
thing that we could do would be to withdraw all our forces 
from China just as soon as we possibly can and to allow the 
Chinese to settle their own internal affairs. 1149 The defeat 
of Japan did not terminate American responsibility in Asia, 
however, because to Judd the war in Asia was not yet over. 
He declared that the "first reason" why the United States 
must continue its "long-standing" policy of support of the 
Nationalist Government of China was "national honor." This 
included not only expelling the remaining Japanese from 
China, but the restoration of Manchuria to Nationalist con-
trol: "whether we win the war there so it will stay won 
will be determined by what pattern ultimately dominates in 
the development of China." He opposed the removal of Amer-
ican marines and supplies from China until Mao's forces 
were defeated and the country firmly back in the hands of 
Chiang Kai-shek. To Judd it was of "urgent necessity 11 to 
the future security of the United States to prevent a seri-
48Mansfield, speaking of Judd on the House floor in 
April 1944, said: "I have a high regard for the gentleman 
and conside~ him one of the outstanding authorities on the 
Far East in the entire country." U.S., Congressional Re-
cord, 78th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1944, Part 3, 3552. 
49u.s., Congressional Record, 79th Cong., 1st Sess., 
1945, XCI, Part 7, 9629. 
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. 'l . Ch' SO ous c1v1 war in ina. Thus he urged the United States 
to continue its support of the Chiang regime, 
... the same government our other allies have 
promised to support. Russia, for example, has 
pledged both moral and material assistance to 
that government, so she certainly cannot and 
will not object to our assisting it too. 51 
Judd apparently was willing to take seriously the Sino-
Soviet Agreement of November 27, 1945; however, he viewed 
all agitation or demands throughout the United States for 
withdrawal from China as part of the plot of American Com-
munists to aid the Chinese Communists. He rejected the 
argument of those Americans who opposed active intervention 
in China's internal affairs with his commonly stated analogy: 
If some should claim that to support the 
Chinese Government is intervening in China's 
internal affairs, surely they know that it is not 
possible for any nation with such power as ours 
to escape having enormous influence on one side 
or the other in any major issue in the world, 
whatever we do or don't do. If our influence 
is not on one side, then automatically it is on 
the other. If we refuse to assist our Chinese 
ally, we thereby assist the rebellion which is 
trying to overthrow that ally. 52 
Thus Judd argued that if the United States did not 
continue its present policy in China it would be an inter-
50u.s., Congressional Record, 79th Cong., 2nd Sess., 
1946, XCII, Part 9, Al07. 
51Ibid., p. Al08. 
52
rbid. 
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vention on the Corrununist side. He supported President Tru-
man's action when the Presid:ent reaffirmed American corrunit-
ments to the Chiang Kai-shek Government on December 15, 1945. 
Judd felt that this would "enable General Marshall and all 
of us to cut through the fog of claims and counterclaims and 
get the facts as to who in China really wants unity and who 
53 does not." At this time Judd stated that if the Chinese 
Corrununists agreed to becoming a political party without an 
autonomous army, and "Chiang refuses to establish a democrat-
ic government with legal and equal status for all parties, 
then he is exposed, and ought to be." Likewise, if Chiang 
was willing to establish such a government, and the Chinese 
Corrununists w~re unwilling to give up their separate army and 
government and become a II loyal opposition inst.ead of an 
54 
armed rebellion, then their pretenses are exposed." Later, 
however, Judd was to charge that this Presidential address 
was a 11 sello1;J.t. 11 Judd held the sincere belief that it was 
"Chiang's desire to achieve a unified democratic China with-
55 
out further warfare. 11 Judd apparently believed that Chiang 
was in complete control of the Nationalist forces and that 
he had a free hand in determining the decisions of the Na-
53Ibid. 
54Ibid. 
55Ibid. 
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tionalist Government. He repeatedly stressed the idea that 
unless there was clear evidence that the Nationalist Govern-
ment was not acting in good faith, then "every consideration 
of honor and of intelligent, legitimate self-interest re-
quires" that the United States continue, without wavering, 
the support of that Government in finishing the war. At the 
time, he asserted, the United States must insist that every 
effort be made to achieve 11 unity and democratic reform in a 
strong, independent, friendly China. 11 Throughout his Con-
gressional career Judd refused to sway from the conviction: 
"If there are risks in supporting Chiang Kai-shek, there are 
. k O • h' 1156 far greater ris sin not supporting .im. Judd maintained 
that Chiang Kai-:shek and most of the Kuomintang leaders la-
bored with steadfast determination to establish a real de-
. 1· . bl 57 mocracy in ~hina at the ear iest practica e moment. The 
Generalissimo was, in Judd's thinking, the best alternative 
for a pro-American China. Thus fully committed to Chiang 
Kai-shek, Judd was unwilling to sanction any move by the 
United States which would jeopardize the Nationalist regime. 
Despite the agreement to organize immediately a coali-
tion government as provided by the Political Consultative 
56
rbid. 
57 .o 
U.S., Congressional Record, 79th Cong., 1st Sess., 
1945, XCI, Part 11, A2282. 
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Conference which opened on January 10, 1946,at Chungking, 
fighting continued between the Nationalist and Communist 
forces. On February 15, while the Kuomintang's Central 
Executive Committee was meeting to consider the resolution 
adopted by the Political Consultative Conference of January, 
the Chinese Communist Party demanded joint control of Man-
churia along with the Nationalist Government. On the same 
day Marshall, returning to the United States from China, re-
ported that the situation in Manchuria was "extremely criti-
1 1158 ca . While in the United States Marshall appeared before 
the Senate Fo:reign Relations Committee to report on his 
. . . . Ch' 59 act1v1t1es 1n 1na. Senator Brien McMahon, Democrat of 
Connecticut, declared in 1951, in regard to Marshall's 
appearance and the Truman China policy as formulated in 
1945-1946: "there wasn't a single word of criticism, as 
far as I have been able to pursue ... from any member of the 
Foreign Relations Committee, Democrat or Republican, regard-
58
united States Relations with China, pp. 39-40. 
59Tsou, America's F.ailure In China, p. 447. This was 
Marshall's answer to Senator McMahon's question in U.S., 
Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Service and Committee 
on Foreign Relations, Hearings, Military Situation in the 
Far East, 82nd Cong., 1st Sess., 1951, pp. 569-70. Here-
after cited as Senate Committee on Armed Service and Commit-
tee on Foreign Relations, Military Situation in the Far East 
Hearings. Tsou declares that the veracity of Marshall's 
statement has never been challenged by anyone." Tsou, 
America's Failure in China, p. 477. 
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ing the policy that was followed in China, nor a single 
suggestion of a change of policy that is contained in the 
hearings of this committee over the years that I have been 
able to examine. a, Later on the same day McMahon declared: 
11 I make it without fear of contradiction, that in the years 
between '47 and '49 there was not a single, solitary sugges-
tion made for the formation of policy, change of policy, or 
disagreement with policy [on China] by any member of this 
[Senate Foreign Relations] Committee. 1160 Even though neither 
Democrat nor Republican in the Senate Foreign Relations Com-
mittee condemned the existing China policy, Judd was voicing 
opposition to the 11 American policy enunciated by Secretary 
of State Marshall in regard to China. 11 The crux of Mar-
shall's activities, as Judd viewed it, was the withholding 
of real assistance to China until internal difficulties with 
the Communists were settled. Judd had reached the conclu-
sion by 1947 that the "Communist aim is not to compromise 
with the Chinese Nationalist government but to take over 
control of China." Judd thus argued that the Marshall plan 
for long-range aid to Europe is 11 doomed to fail if the Com-
munist threat in China is not eliminated. 1161 
60
senate Committee on Armed Service and Committee on 
Foreign Relations, Military Situation in the Far East Hear-
ings, pp. 1905-06. 
61Minneapolis Star, November 28, 1947. 
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Bitter critic ism and dissent by Judd on the 'fruman pol-
icy came later--much later--when it became clear that the 
Nationalists could not withstand the Chinese Communists' on-
slaught. On May 17, 1946, .Judd read into the Congressional 
Record a statement entitled ''Manchurian Manifesto" which was 
signed by himself and fifty-nine other Americans. Although 
the statement made no direct attacks on Marshall's policies 
and activities in the Pacific, Judd did declare that some 
individuals interested in Asia were having difficulties in 
keeping silent with respect to recent developments in China. 
They were, however, uhoping against hope General Marshall 
could somehow achieve unity in China without sacrifice of 
the principles" for which the United States and China fought 
the war. Judd expressed the sentiment that neither he nor 
the individuals signing the ''Manifesto" wanted to embarrass 
Marshall or to give 81 any possible ground for any group of 
Chinese or for Russia to claim provocation from America as 
an alibi for refusal to cooperate loyally toward genuine 
. f. . . Ch' " 62 uni ication in ina. The "Manifesto 11 declared that al-
though the ominous crisis which was unfolding in Manchuria 
had not reached the diplomatic showdown stage, it promised 
the signers' support of '"the demand of the Chinese people 
62u.s., Congressional Record, 79th Cong., 2nd Sess., 
1946, XCII, Part 11, A2763; Tsou, America'sFailure in 
China, p. 447. 
209 
63 for a complete revision of the Yalta Agreement." The 
"Manifesto" did, however, sharply criticize Russian action 
in Manchuria as a "flagrant violation of the Sino-Soviet 
64 Treaty and the Yalta Agreement."' This was one of the 
first indications that Judd was growing suspicious of the 
Russians. 
The first real sign of open opposition to the Truman 
policy from the Republican camp in the House did not come 
from Judd but from Clare Booth Luce, of Connecticut, who on 
July 26, 1946, inserted in the Record a letter sent to Sec-
retary of State James F. Byrnes. The letter was prompted 
by rumors of an alleged statement of Dean Acheson, Under 
Secretary of State, supposedly made before the House Foreign 
Affairs Committee on June 19, "promising American training 
and supplies to Chinese Communist armies prior to their in-
65 
corporation" into the Nationalist army. The group urged 
that no aid or support be given to the Chinese Communists 
because such a move they felt was unwise and contrary to 
America's best interest. Mrs. Luce, speaking for the thirty-
eight signatories, stated that the recent appointment of Dr. 
63u.s., Congressional Record, 79th Cong., 2nd Sess., 
1946, XCII, Part 11, A2764. 
64 Tsou, America's~ In China, p. 447. 
65u.s., Congressional ~scord, 79th Cong., 2nd Sess., 
1946, XCII, Part 12, A4495. 
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John Leighton Stuart, President of Yenching University in 
Peiping, as United States Ambassador to China, had inspired 
hope among many .American friends of the Chinese people. She 
further commented that "Dr. Stuart's task will not be made 
any easier and may be rendered impossible ... if our policy 
toward our Chinese ally continues to blow hot and cold, 
varying with every different whim of Washington bureau-
66 
cracy." 
The letter also criticized President Truman's statement 
of December 15, 1945, the statement which Judd had hailed 
as a noble gesture, as "0 an invitation for the Communists to 
blackmail the Central Government, 11 for it appeared to give 
the Chinese Communists a virtual veto power by which they 
could prevent any American aid to Chiang unless the Chinese 
Communists were accepted. The communication, however, de-
clared that the criticism of President Truman's policy im-
plied "no reflection on General M.arshall. 1167 
In contrast to Republican sentiment in the House, the 
attitude of the Republicans in the Senate was still favor-
able to the Democratic China policy. On July 8, the New 
York Times quoted Owen Brewster, Main Republican and a mem-
ber of the Special Committee to Investigate the National 
66Ibi'd-, A4494 q5 pp. . -~ . 
67 b'd I. l • I p. A4495. 
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Defense Program,as saying: "the Repub;Lican Party will go 
along with General Marshall in the Chinese situation. 1168 
Ohly a few isolated complaints about Truman's Asian policy 
came from the Republican camp, but the President was having 
difficulties in other quarters. Labor troubles, rising cost 
of living, and a hostile Congress on domestic issues were 
all causing the President's prestige to sink even lower. 
This discontent resulted in a resounding Republican victory 
in the election of 1946 and in a Republican controlled Con-
gress. 
To complicate matters further for the President, on 
November 19 the Chinese Communists broke off further nego-
tiations with the Kuomintang and rejected all American medi-
ation. By the end of the month fighting had resumed and 
China was braced for full-scale war. On December 4 the 
Chinese Communists notified General Marshall that they would 
not negotiate until, as they charged, the 11 illegaln National 
Assembly, which had convened on November 15, and which had 
been boycotted by the Communists and a majority of third-
party representatives, was dissolved. They also demanded 
that the Nationalist troops be withdrawn to positions they 
68
~ York Times, July 8, 1946, p. 10; Tsou, America's 
Failure In China, p. 447. 
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held on January 13, 1946. 69 Marshall, realizing the Chinese 
Communist strength, met with Chiang on December 1, and'warn-
ed him that the Communist forces were too strong to defeat 
militarily. He further suggested that negotiations offered 
the only sensible way to avert a complete collapse of the 
country's economy. On December 18, however, President Tru-
man reaffirmed American belief in a "united and democratic 
China, 11 but was unwilling to commit himself or the United 
States beyond asserting that the United States would con-
tinue avoiding involvement in Chinese civil strife while 
"helping the Chinese people to bring about peace and econo-
• , , RI 70 
m1c recovery in the1.r country. 
The proclamation of the Truman Doctrine and President 
Truman's request for $400,000,000 in military and economic 
aid to Greece and Turkey, on March 12, 1947, 71 was a most 
opportune time for "friends of China" in Congress to chal-
lenge the President's policy toward China. 72 During House 
debate on the President's message on March 12, Judd took 
the occasion to criticize Mar~hall: "'Whatever our inten-
69
united States Relations with China, p. 41. 
70
rbid. 
71 U.S., Congressional Record, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 
1947, XCIII, Part 3, 1980-81. 
72 Tsou, America's Failure In China, p. 449. 
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tions were, has not our policy resulted in weakening our 
ally, the Government of China and strengthening the Commun-
. ' ' ? "
7 3 J dd k d M h 1st minority. u as e assac usetts Democrat John 
McCormack: 
Does not the gentleman feel also that as we 
stand today at this crossroad we should add to our 
sense of grave responsibility a sense of regret 
that in some degree we have been assisting a Com-
munist minority in China in its efforts to overthrow 
the Chinese Government, which with all its weaknesses 
has steadfastly refused to yield to such internal 
and external pressures as today threaten Greece and 
Turkey? 74 
McCormack, former majority leader, had by this time modified 
his stand of full support for Chiang Kai-shek, and was urg-
ing immediate aid to Greece and Turkey. The Democratic 
leader answered Judd with~ "I can assure the gentleman 
there is no assistance being given to the Communists in 
China. I believe that when there is more representative 
government established there, that affirmative action along 
the lines that the gentleman and I would agree upon should 
75 be extended over there." 
Judd, who had received a seat on the Foreign Affairs 
Committee with the opening of the Eightieth Congress in 
1947, had the opportunity to question Acting Secretary of 
73 U.S., Congressional Record, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 
1947, XCIII, Part 3, 1984. 
74Ibid. 
75Ibid. 
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State Dean Acheson on Americ.an China policy , 76 during hear-
ings on the assistance to Greece and Turkey, on April 18, 
1947. He asked Acheson how he could explain nwhat seems to 
be a contradiction in foreign policy.n "If," Judd asked, 
11 it is a wise policy for us to urge, for example, the Govern-
ment of China to unite with organized Communist minorities 
there, why is it a wise policy to assist the Greek Government 
to fight against the same sort of armed Communist minorities 
77 in Greece?" Acheson replied (surely, with all due causti-
city) that he did not think it was as Judd stated~ "In 
China, as you know far better than I because you are an ex-
pert on that matter, [sting! ] the area controlled by the Com-
munists is an area which the Communists have controlled for 
many years, perhaps up to 20 years .... In that area they have 
a government, for years, which has defied the authority of 
the Central Government and maintained its own authority. 1178 
76Marshall had been recalled from China on January 6, 
1947, to report in person on the China situation. The fol-
lowing day President Truman announced nomination of Marshall 
as Secretary of State, replacing James F. Byrnes. He took of-
f ice on January 21, 194 7. During March and April he was rep-
resenting the United States at the Moscow meeting of the 
Council of Foreign Ministers. 
77
u .S., Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, 
Hearings, Assistance to Greece and Turkey, 80th Cong., 1st 
Sess., 1947, p. 16. Hereafter cited as House Committee on 
Foreign Affairs, Assistance to Greece and Turkey Hearings. 
78Ibid. 
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The following day, however, Acheson corrected this mistake 
by pointing out that the Communists forces did not move into 
Shensi Province until 1935 or 1936, 79 and further declared 
that "those people who lightly describe our attitude toward 
China as a hands-off policy do not accurately describe it.u 80 
The Acting Secretary of State described to Judd the essence 
of lend-lease aid, surplus property, services, and loans, 
which the United States had provided to the Nationalist Gov-
ernment since September 2, 1945, which amounted to 
$2 ~69 000 000 J dd d'd t t' Ah 1 • • 81 , ..) , , . u i no ques ion c eson s statistics. 
Acheson concluded his remarks to Judd by explaining that the 
position of the Chinese Nationalist Government was not the 
same as that of the Greek Government. The former was not 
approaching collapse, Acheson asserted, nor was it threaten-
ed by defeat by the Communists at the present time, because 
the war in China was progressing much as it had for the last 
twenty years. On March 21, during the hearings, Judd again 
attempted to make the China question the center of the issue 
until Acheson retorted: 
You talk as though the Chinese did us a great favor 
to bend their efforts to defeat the Japanese. That 
is not the case at all. Any nation that is worthy 
79
rbid., p. 48. 
80
rbid. , p. 1 7 . 
81 b'd I i • , pp. 16-17. 
of the name will spend all its efforts in defeating 
its foreign enemy. We did not have to go to China 
and urge them not to dissipate their efforts in in-
ternal warfare when they had an enemy occupying 
three-quarters of their territory or half of their 
territory. 82 
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Later in the year, on November 12, 1947, during House 
hearings on Emergency Foreign Aid, Judd asked Marshall's 
opinion on Acheson's testimony of April 17. 83 Marshall sim-
ply responded to Judd's question whether this description 
was still accurate with~ "No: I do not think it is. 'rhere 
h b . d . . .. 84 as een a grea~ eter1orat1on. Marshall did not comment 
further on Acheson's statement; however, Acheson's conclu-
sions did seem a reasonable appraisal of the China and the 
Greek situation in early 1947. Throughout these hearings 
Judd was most concerned that three elements which he deemed 
necessary for success in the Greek-Turkish program be pro-
vided: money, correct planning, and the right kind of per-
1 dm . . h 85 sonne to a 1n1ster t e program. He maintained that 
82
rbid., p. 49. 
83 U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, 
Hearings, Emergency Foreign Aid, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 194 7, 
p. 24. Hereafter cited as House Committee on Foregin Affairs, 
Emergency Foreign Aid Hearingq. 
84 Tsou charges in his volume, America's Failure in Chi-
na, p. 499, that Marshall severely criticized Acheson's des-
cription of the Chinese situation as not being serious in 
comparison to the Greek situation. This charge cannot be sup-
ported by evidence in the Hearings. 
85House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Emergency Foreign 
Aid Hearings, p. 101. 
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technical experts from private business or professions 
should be used extensively to carry out the objectives; 
though he felt that both Government and private personnel 
had a role in administering the program, 11 it ought not to be 
dominated by regular Government employees, who have become 
conditioned to a certain pattern of thinking, as all of us 
86 know." Judd was charging here that Government employees 
deliberately prolonged any job that they undertook to insure 
their employment. Judd supported the proposed aid because 
he felt that the need was obvious, but emphasized that he 
considered that the appropriation of the money should give 
more than some npsychological stimulus." 
Judd viewed the aid, however, as a "stop-gap" measure, 
whereby the United States would have time to 11 correce187 or 
redirect its efforts to deal with such situations in the 
88 future. It appears that Judd felt that President Truman's 
proposals for Greece amounted to a. function of the United 
Nations or the International Bank, while aid to China was an 
obligation of the United States to insure American security, 
86Ibid., p. 155. 
87Judd's concept of the United Nations appears on the 
surface to be in contradiction of his other political con-
cepts. This will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 6. 
88 House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Emergency Foreign 
Aid Hearings, p. 82. 
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and a response to the "law of history." This law of history 
developed over a period of decades from the endless stories 
related by returned missionaries of their success and the 
task yet to be carried out, which fostered the sentiment 
that salvation of the Chinese was the special mission of the 
United States. 89 This emotion made its way into endless 
speeches by politicians of the modern era of which Judd was 
a pioneer. America found it easy to see behind the voice of 
Judd a selfless, altogether dedicated man who had seen China 
suffer and who had suffered with it. 90 The impact not only 
in religious but in political circles was tremendous. Was 
not the religious faith of the Generalissimo a product of 
the American missionary? Judd spoke frequently of Chiang's 
Christian faith and his prayer habit. Thus within such a 
sphere Judd could rationalize: 
In a sense, if one wants to be cynical, Chiang 
Kai-shek has made only two mistakes. One was that 
he did not give up at the end of the first three 
months of the war ... The second mistake ... is that 
89Eric F. Goldman, writing on this subject, states: 
"Over the years the attitude was spoken from a thousand pul-
pits by missionaries returning from China with fervid reports 
of how many more Chinese had chopped of their pigtails, 
learned to wear pants, or marched to the baptismal font." 
Eric F. Goldman, The Crucial Decade: America, 1945-1955 
(New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1956), p. 116. 
90
rbid.; Charles Wertenbaker, 11 The China Lobby; III---
Voices In the Wilderness," The Reporter, VI (April 15, 1952), 
13. 
he did not completely clean out the Communists in 
1938 and 1939, when some of his generals wanted 
him to.91 
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This was a theme which Judd never tired of and which colored 
his thinking and speaking for years to come. Under such 
circumstances Judd collected and read into the Congressional 
Record articles of anyone whose views on China remotely ap-
preached his own. 
On May 23, 1947, for example, Judd inserted in the Con-
gressional Record an article written by Frank W. Price, of 
the Price Committee with which Judd had associated himself 
during 1938-1941. 92 On inserting the article Judd commented: 
"So much of what has come out of China in the last few years 
has been superficial, primarily journalistic, or inspired 
propaganda with a purpose, that it is a pleasure to read 
something from one who knows what he is talking about. 1193 
Price declared that nchina's liberals are moving into a key 
position," and 11 are working for a unified, democratic, mod-
ernized, and prosperous China, independent in its foreign 
91Judd, "What Is the Truth about China?"' 500. 
92Frank Wilson Price, "China's Liberals Get Their 
Chance," The Christian Century, LXIV (May 14, 1947), 622-24. 
See also Frank Wilson Price, "How Strong are China's 
Liberals?" The Christian CentuJ;Y, LXIV (June 18, 1947), 
764-66. 
93 U.S., Congressional Record, 80th Cong., 2nd Sess., 
1948, XCIII, Part 11, A3438. 
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policy but cooperating fully with the United Nations." 94 
It was this liberal element, Price asserted, that Marshall 
strengthened, but which he has not been properly honored 
for. He felt that the 11 liberals are the men and women who 
will ultimately bring about a Chinese solution of China's 
95 problem." Dr. Price, who saw Chiang as a sincere and 
honest friend of this force, had great hope that this liber-
al element would gain control of the government with Chiang 
at its helm. He, however, cautioned that the narrow-minded 
conservatives who had opposed coalition government were once 
again moving into the inner councils of the Kuomintang par-
ty. But he felt that the progressive wing of the Kuomintang 
was ready to fight as hard as ever for its principles, "even 
96 if it has to break away and form a new party." Price ex-
pressed his belief that the Generalissimo was an individual 
sincerely dedicated to constitutional and democratic govern-
ment. 
In contrast, Carsun Chang, one of the "liberals" of 
whom Price spoke, wrote in the early 1950's, that John S. 
Service's report to the State Department dated June 29, 1944, 
accurately and fairly well summarized the situation in 
94Ibid. 
95Ibid., pp. A2438-39. 
96Ibid., p. A2439. 
Ch . 97 ina. Service reported that the "Generalissimo shows 
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a ... loss of realistic flexibility and a hardening of narrow-
ly conservative views." He further declared that Chiang's 
"growing megalomania and his unfortunate attempts to be sage 
as well as leader ... have forfeited the respect of many in-
tellectuals who enjoy in China a position of unique in-
98 fluence. 11 Chang points out that because the "Generalis-
99 
simo is emotional, his policy changes with his temper." 
Furthermore, to Chang the attitudes of Chiang Kai-shek had 
always been "strange" in regard to coalition government~ 
"When he [Chiang Kai-shek] did not care for the idea of 
democracy or constitutional government, he dealt with the 
'outside parties' as if they were enemies or criminals, and 
would not even allow them to enjoy freedom of press, asso-
ciation, or assembly. 11 But, Chang continued, when Chiang 
"felt he needed a coalition, he would suddenly ask them 
[outside parties] to join his government and take up this 
or that portfolio."lOO Any minister, Chang charged, who was 
in "Chiang's favor ... could go to his office and get a large 
97
carsun Chang, The Third Force in China (New York~ 
Bookman Associates, 1952) p. 98. 
98
rbid., pp. 99-100. 
99
rbid., p. 235. 
lOOibid., p. 233. 
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sum approved for expenditure, 11 but those 11 ministers who were 
101 
not close to him had to suffer. 11 Chang viewed Chiang 
Kai-shek as an individual who had 11 confidence only in his 
relatives, in his brothers-in-law, H. H. Kung and T. V. 
Soong, and their subordinates,n and a few other select per-
sonalities. Tutelage under Chiang, Chang asserted, "was not 
even rule by the party as a whole but [had] degenerated to 
1 b 1 'h. ,.102 rue y persona w im. 
Judd refuted all Chang's charges. By thus accepting 
the tenet that Chiang Kai-shek was basically honest and de-
sired a truly democratic government for China, he had to 
find an explanation for Chiang's lack of success outside 
China. Thus with true conviction Judd could assert that one 
"prolific source of misinformation" about China 11 has been 
those American military and civilian officials who failed 
in China, but who are not willing to admit frankly their own 
miscalculations and mistakes, and instead seek to justify 
themselves by placing all the blame on the Chinese." To 
Judd any "sensible person u would give '8more credence to the 
reports and views of those who succeeded [in China] than 
those who failed and quite understandably are deeply hurt 
lOlibid., p. 100. 
l0 2Ibid. 
223 
. 'd 103 1ns1 e. Was not the State Department and the Democratic 
Administration the most logical scape-goat? 
The Democratic Adm,inistration in Judd's thinking failed 
in projecting the United States into a position of world 
leadership; "if you cannot escape the world and you cannot 
run the world, cannot buy it, what alternative is there left 
except to join the world, yes, lead the world. 11 This was 
the "great job pressed upon America," because to Judd the 
world was "in economic, moral, and political chaos and ruin," 
and the United States was the "only area that is still rea-
sonably sound." The United States was the "sanctuary of 
the uni verse, '0 the only country with the "moral character," 
or "moral reputation 11 to lead the 104 world. By mid-1947, 
when Judd was making these assertions he felt that even 
though it was too late to save Eastern Europe short of war, 
"which the United States wouldn't use,n it was not too late 
to save Asia, though the United States had already turned 
Manchuria over to the Soviet Union nin a secret conference" 
105 . d 
at Yalta. Judd had not yet arrive, but was moving rap-
idly on his own initiative toward the "Great Conspiracy" 
103u.s., Congressional Record, 80th Cong., 2nd Sess., 
1948, XCIV, Part 12, A4490. 
104National Education Association, Proceedings of the 
Eighty-Fifth Annual Meeting (Cincinnati, Ohio, 1947), 46. 
lOSibid., p. 39. 
224 
camp as an explanation for current United States relations 
with China. Nor had he yet accepted the 88 pro-Communist" 
theory which declared that the sympathies of many adminis-
trators were with the Communist forces in Asia, but not 
necessarily in sympathy with the Communist cause in Europe. 
Judd failed or refused to comprehend the Administration's 
fear that the civil war in China had all the potential of 
a giant abyss from which the United States could not re-
treat once it further involved itself, and which could im-
peril American efforts at resisting communism in Europe, 
which did not have the suicidal implications of the Chinese 
situation. 
Judd could not accept the possibility that major dif-
ferences existed between Europe and China. George F. Kennan 
charges that nothing that could be pointed to nin the way 
of differences between the problems and situations of the 
two areas--neither the primitiveness of the existing indus-
trial base in China, nor the unpromising nature of the po-
litical background, nor any of the other gaps that existed 
in China's ability to absorb and use effectively outside 
financial capital--could shake his [Judd's] belief, and that 
of many other people, that the principles invoked to govern our 
relationship to Europe ought to have universalized valid-
225 
't nl.06 l y. Mar$hall attempted to impre.ss Judd with this con-
cept during hearings on European Emergency Foreign Aid dur-
ing November 194 7; however,. Judd replied to Marshall that 
Ch ' I b 1 ' ii • • 1 • 1 • II 10 7 1na s pro em 1s pr1mar1 y mi 1tary. To Judd's 
questioning whether military assistance would be given to 
the Chinese Nq.tionalist Government similar to that given to 
the,Greek Government, Marshall replied: "We sent 40 offi-
cers to Greece with a few men to help with the ordinary ad-
ministrative procedure ... also [the United States] sent cer-
tain material to Greecen; however, the United States had in 
"China ... hundreds of officers with the Chinese Army, to 
assist the Chinese Government in their military organiza-
tion." 108 The number "approaches 1,000, 11 Marshall declared. 
Judd, who had just returned from China the week before 
the hearings, related to Marshall that the Chinese were 
"going through a process of reevaluation of their position." 
He asserted that he had been asked by "a good many thought-
ful and eminent Chinese people, 11 if the United States took 
such a position with respect to European nations which are 
threatened by Communist minorities and "does not take such 
106 George F. Kennan, Memoirs 1925-1950 (Boston: Little, 
Brown and Company, 1967), p. 353. 
l07 C ' F . Aff ' E F House omm1ttee on ore1gn airs, mergency or-
eign Aid Hearings, p. 23. 
108
rbid. , p. 24. 
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a position with respect to China when it is threatened by a 
Communist minority," if the reason is ''because the Chinese 
are of a different color than the Europeans?"' 109 Marshall 
scoffed at Judd's request to give the Chinese leaders 11 flat 
reassurance 1' that 11 racial reasons" were not the reason why 
the United States did not give China the full, unlimited, 
and no-strings-attached aid which they apparently desired. 
The Secretary retorted ;chat "the people of China have been 
very critical of their own government, 11 and that a great 
deal had to be done first by the Nationalist leaders in 
correcting given situations befo;re it would be possible for 
the United States to do much for China. Judd's reply was: 
It is very difficult for the responsible 
leaders in that country to throw away the support 
they have unless they are sure they will get our 
support in its place. It is very important that 
we make it clear that if they do meet certain 110 
conditions we will certainly come in and help. 
Judd spoke as if the absolute domination of China was one 
of Chiang's irrevocable rights. Judd's clarion call ration-
alized and accepted the partially corrupt Chiang regime be-
cause he saw only two alternatives possible for China--
Chiang or Mao. It is most difficult to ascertain exactly 
what Judd wanted or expected the United States to do for 
l09Ibid., pp. 25-26. 
llOibid., p. 26. 
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China. No rational, logical or constructive program was 
advanced by the Minnesota Representative. It appears that 
he expected miracles from State Department officials while 
he spoke only in generalities of how these miracles might 
be executed. With credulous acceptance Judd viewed Chiang 
as genuinely desirous of reform. 
On the second day of the hearings, Judd told Marshall: 
"We have repeatedly told the Chinese Government that unless 
they do so and so we will not help them. Have we told them 
that if they do so and so we will help them, with coopera-
t . ?attlll ion .. On this occasion, as was so frequently the case, 
Judd was over dramatizing the procedures which the Democrat-
ic Administration employed in working with Chiang Kai-shek. 
The State Department, to Judd's thinking, continuously fail-
ed to afford Chiang the prestige due the head of a sovereign 
state. Judd continuously chose when there were differences 
of opinion between the State Department and Chiang Kai-shek 
to believe Chiang rather than State Department. officials, 
and in this sense he deserves the title ''apologist" for 
Chiang. Neither Judd nor Chiang would support or accept 
any American policy that might thwart, limit, or endanger 
the Generalissimo's position in China. There is much basis 
for the charge against Judd that he would 11 strain the hypo-
111
rbid. 
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thetical gnat--while swallowing the camel 'k in his belief in 
Chiang Kai-shek. Judd refused to accept the possibility 
that the very thing for which Chiang stood--arbitrary gov-
ernment--was the very basis of discontent among the Chinese 
populace. To J·udd, however, Chiang had served the best in-
terest of the Chinese masses, whether they realized it or 
not, since he rose to power. Thus, it was ingratitude and 
misunderstanding that led to the discontent, because Chiang 
had overcome major obstacles in the past, and would in the 
future, and would provide for the Chinese a democratic gov-
ernment. Furthermore, to Judd, the best interest and secur-
ity of the United States rested upon support of Chiang Kai-
shek. 
During mid-1947 Chiang Kai-shek requested three differ-
ent large-scale loans which were nabsolutely necessary" for 
Ch , I 1 , 112 1na s sa vation. The Truman Administration rejected 
the Chinese request because of the prevailing opinion that 
any large-scale aid to China would be largely wasted. How-
ever, to conciliate Republican critics of its China policy 
and win support for the European program, the Administration 
had to make some gesture toward China, giving assistance 
that would be "subtle enough to avoid appearance of open 
112 Am . I F ' 1 I Ch . Tsou, erica s ~JJre -..11 . 1na, p. 452; United 
States Relations~~' pp. 364-68. 
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intervention in the Chinese civil war and inexpensive enough 
113 
not to be a drain on American resources. 11 Perhaps the 
most significant concession made to pacify the Republicans 
was the announcement on July 11, 1947, of the selection of 
General Albert C. Wedemeyer for a 11 fact-finding 11 mission to 
China-. The General later reported that he agreed to go un-
der the impression that he 11 had been appointed not simply 
to give a superficially 'new look' to our China policy but 
114 to provide the basis for a fundamental change." The Gen-
eral stated in 1951 during hearings before the Committee on 
Foreign Relations and the Committee on Armed Service, that 
115 
his selection was at the "instigation of Congressman Judd." 
Wedemeyer, however, wrote in 1958 that Marshall "admitted 
that pressure in Congress (from Congressman Walter Judd, 
Senator Styles Bridges, and others) and from other sources 
accusing to the Administration of pursuing a negative pol-
116 
icy in China were compelling a reappraisal of U.S. policy." 
Wedemeyer's recollections often conflicted with those 
113 Tsou, America's Failure In China, p. 453. 
114 Albert C. Wedemeyer, Wedemeyer Reports! (New York~ 
Henry Holt & Company, 1958), p. 383. 
115
senate Committee on Armed Services and Committee on 
Foreign Relations, Military Situation in the Far East Hear-
ings, pp. 2296, 2312. 
116 Wedemeyer, Wedemeyer Reports!, p. 382. 
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of other American officials, particularly Ambassador Stuart, 
regarding his mission, regardless of charges which might be 
hurled at either side. Wedemeyer was most careful at a 
later date to leave the impression that Chiang was genuinely 
interested in seeking out and correcting existing evils 
within the Kuomintang, an impression which cannot be sup-
ported by responsible documentation. On September 2, how-
ever, the Nationalist Premier Chang Ch'un reported in an 
exclusive interview with the United Press that there would 
be "no change in either the domestic or foreign policy of 
the Chinese Government as a result of the Wedemeyer Mis-
sion.11117 A chief reason for such a reaction against Wede-
meyer may have been that he 11 failed to sweeten his criticism 
by any hint of the positive recommendations for large-scale 
118 
aid which he had by that time decided to make. A more 
fundamental reason, however, was that any 11 sweeping reform 
would have militated [against] the vested interests of the 
ruling groups and probably would have destroyed the whole 
119 foundation of its power." . In reality Wedemeyer, like so 
many other Americans, could not imagine a China without 
117 . d 1 . . h Ch' Unite States Re ations wit ina, 
anda, "The Consul General at Shanghai [John 
Secretary Marshall," September 2, 1947). 
p. 815, (Memor-
P. Davis] to 
118 Tsou, America's Failure In China, p. 455. 
119
rb;d., 455 56 
..L pp. - . 
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Chiang Kai-shek at its helm. The General rejected the alter-
native of replacing the Generalissimo, as he feared such a 
move might lead Chiang to seek a compromise with the Cornmu-
nists which might give them a dominant position in the Gov-
ernment. Wedemeyer rejected what he termed a "no assistance" 
policy and the "wait and see" policy because he feared that a 
long period of further disintegration could end in the emer-
gence of the Communists as the dominant group. 120 Thus 
Wedemeyer "placed all his hope on the ruling group's under-
121 
taking the necessary reform." 
Wedemeyer reported to President Truman on September 19, 
1947; however, his report was not made public until 1949. 
The mission and report, for the most part, came to naught in 
modifying or changing the Administration's policy. The Sec-
retary of State feared that Wedemeyer's program would expand 
American co:rnmitments to China and might even result in dir-
ect American military intervention. The chief reason given 
by Ma:rshall for his suppression of the Wedemeyer report was 
: 
Wedemeyer's recommendation of a guardianship or a trustee-
ship for Manchuria. Marshall felt that this was an imprac-
tical gesture and that nany such recommendation, if made 
120
rbid., p. 456; United States Relations with China, 
pp. 778-79. 
121 Tsou, America's Failure In China, p. 456. 
232 
public at that time, would be highly offensive to Chinese 
susceptibilities as an infringement of Chinese sovereignty, 
and r~presenting the Chinese Government as incapable of gov-
. Ch. . ,,122 erning inese territory. Without doubt the suppression 
of the Wedemeyer report was one of the most unnecessary as 
well qS one of the most unfortunate actions of the Ad.minis-
tration. Had the report been published, the resulting pub-
lie debate and reaction would have clarified many of the 
basic issues for the Administration. The report, however, 
was suppressed on the basis of an issue which was not cen-
tral to the question facing the United States, which was 
whether the United States should give large~scale, long-term 
. Ch. 123 assistance to ina. 
It has been suggested that the Administration might 
have ~uppressed the report because Wedemeyer came back from 
China "emphatically interventionist, 11 and the Administration 
was nnot disposed to abet Walter Judd by letting the report 
be published, even with official disclaimers and for the in-
124 formation of Congress." Senator Vandenberg, however, in 
writing a confidential letter to Senator Knowland, on Decem-
12 2 
· d S R 1 . . h Ch . 2 6 0 Unite tates e ations wit ina, p. . 
1 2 3 Am · 1 F " 1 I Ch . 4 6 0 61 Tsou, erica s . ai ure _n_ ina, pp. - . 
124 f · ld . P 1 " d P P 1 . . Wester ie , Forei.gn " o l£Y ..fil1_ arty o 1 tics, pp. 
260-61. 
ber 11, 1948, states: 
I never actually saw the Wedemeyer Report. 
But I listened to a complete paraphrase of it from 
General Marshall and I was satisfied that its re-
lease would have been a serious blow to Chinese-
American relations. It is my opinion that some of 
his recommendations would have gotten us into seri-
ous trouble·--even the fact of their proposal .125 
To pacify mounting Republican demands, however, the 
2.33 
Administration found it "necessary to prepare a program for 
China which would, on the one hand, ward off the rising 
pressure for large-scale military assistance and, on the 
h . 1 1 · . Am . . "126 1 ot er, strict y imit erican commitments. In ate 
October 1947 the State Department set about to formulate a 
China aid program which the China White Paper called a 
"Redefinition of American Policy. 11127 The "new" program 
called for aid over a fifteen-month period during which the 
Chinese Government would have a further opportunity to dem-
onstrate its capacity to receive aid and make effective use 
f h . 128 o t e assistance. The State Department felt '"that the 
Chinese Government's requirements for military material from 
foreign sources should be met through purchases from its own 
125Arthur H. Vandenberg, Jr. (ed.) The Private Papers of 
Senator Vandenberg (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1952), 
pp. 527-28; Tsou, America's Failure In China, p. 462. 
126Tsou, America's Failure In China, p. 462. 
127
united States Relations with China, p. 269. 
128Ibid., p. 270. 
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resources, largely freed for such use through the proposed 
program of economic aid, and that the existing United States 
military advisory groups in China would enable the United 
States to extend advice and assistance within the framework 
of these consideration. 11129 The "Redefinition of American 
Policy" program resulted in the China Aid Act of 1948, which 
was presented to Congress in February and passed on April 2, 
1948. 130 
More immediate aid for China came, however, on October 
27, 1947, when the American Government concluded an agree-
ment with China for $27,700,000, to be used at the discretion 
of the Nationalist government. This amount had been earmark-
ed by Congress during the Spring of 1946 for post United 
. 1 · f d h b · 1 · . 1 · f 131 Nations Re ie an Re a i itation re ie . Also during 
October the State Department informed the War Department 
that it agreed to the participation of the Army Advisory 
Group in the training activities of the Taiwan divisional 
training center. During the following month the first group 
f Arn . d . . d ..._ T . f t d t 132 o erican a visers arrive aL aiwan _or permanen u y. 
129Ibid., p. 271 
130
rbid. 
131
rbid., p. 367; Tsou, America's Failure In China, 
p. 463. 
132
united States Relations with China, p. 348. 
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General David G. Barr, assigned to direct the Advisory Group, 
was instructed to '"make his advice available to [the] Gener-
alissimo on an informal and confidential basis," but not to 
"accept responsibility for Chinese strategic plans and opera-
tions.11133 This was the origin of "limited assistance." 
During the following year similar installations were estab-
lished on the mainland, but only the training center at Tai-
wan produced satisfactory results. The most obvious reason 
for the limited success of the training centers was the 
failure of the Chinese to attempt to implement the program 
effectively, despite Chiang's directive that a modern train-
. b d . 134 1ng and replacement system e ma e operative. 
The major aid program of the Administration was, how-
ever, yet to be announced. During hearings on Interim Aid 
for Europe, on November 10, 1947, the Secretary of State 
commented that "only the Government and the people of China 
can solve their fundamental problems and regain for China 
its rightful role as a major stabilizing influence in the 
Far East ... but ... we can be of help ... and ... we should extend 
to the government, and its people certain economic aid and 
133
rbid., p. 324. 
134
rb1'd., 348 49 p. - . 
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assistance. 11135 The following day the Secretary reported 
that about $300,000,000 would be requested by the Adminis-
tration for China over a period of fifteen months. 136 
During hearings on Emergency Foreign Aid, on November 
14, Judd told his colleagues: "I think we have got to win 
137 in Asia ... or will ultimately lose in Europe. 11 To Judd 
China was the key to Asia, just as he considered Germany to 
be the key to Europe. 11 If China is taken by Communists, 11 
Judd asked, "how long can India, Malaysia, the East Indies, 
even the Philippines, 138 resist the pressure?" He informed 
his colleagues that Japan could not become self-supporting 
unless spe "can have access to the raw materials and the 
markets of Asia, particularly of China and Manchuria. 11139 
Judd expressed the feeling that "I cannot myself vote to put 
$20,000,000,000 into holding the line on one front and then 
140 ignore another front equally vital to our future." 
135 C S C . F . R 1 UoSo, ongress, enate, .omm1ttee on ore1gn e a-
tions, Hearings, Interim Aid For Europe, 80th Cong., 1st 
Sess., 1947, p. 7. 
136 b'd 43 I 1 ., p. . 
137 ' . House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Emergency For-
eign Aid Hearings, p. 239. 
138Ibid. 
139Ibid. 
l 40ibid. 
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Judd believed, however, that the drive to 11 hold the 
line in China" was deliberately being sabotaged. He report-
ed: "In addition to the carefully planned and executed at-
tempt to destroy the Government in China" from within China, 
there was an "equally skillfully executed plan to destroy 
the Government of China abroad; that is, to discredit it, by 
a systematic, organized propaganda campaign, in the United 
141 States and elsewhere. 11 He felt that the propaganda in 
the United States was led by about twenty or thirty writers 
and lecturers and commentators, along with other individuals 
who became Asian advisers to the State Department or "ex-
perts" on the "staff of organizations supposedly dedicated 
to enlightening the American public on Asiatic affairs or 
f , 1 . ti 142 ore1gn po icy. Some of these persons compose 11 what has 
become widely known as the 'Red cell' in the State Depart-
143 
ment, the Far Eastern Office," Judd charged. It has been 
openly reported, Judd continued, 11 that some of these 'ex-
perts' both in and out of the Government are members of the 
Communist Party, although I have no personal knowledge of 
that." 144 He felt, though, that they had consistently fol-
141Ib~d., p. 243. 
142Ibid., p. 244. 
143Ibid. 
144Ibid. 
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lowed the Communist Party line with respect to the Chinese 
Communists. He charged, without naming persons, that "one 
of them had openly boasted," of having disposed of Grew, 
Hurley, and Hornbeck, "who were the three who knew the facts 
about the Communists' wiles and who tried to carry outRoose-
145 
vel t' s policy of supporting the Central Government of China." 
Judd based his condemnation of the Truman Administration's 
China pol~cies on what he considered to have been the tradi-
tional policy of the United States. For the United States 
not to aid the Chiang Government because his Government was 
"portrayed as unworthy of support, is not only being victims 
of distorted propaganda; it is ignoring our own history and 
our own i:p.terests. 11146 Judd was always most astute in his 
effort to impress upon his audience or his colleagues that 
it was in the interest of the United States alone that he 
d h . 147 supporte C iang. 
145Ipid. 
146Ibid., p. 250. 
147 On one occasion Judd responded to the complaint that 
the Chiang Government was so bad that it did not deserve 
American help with: "No foreign country deserves a dollar of 
help. If I want to give for charity out of my own pocket, 
I'm entitled to do that, but I have no right to levy taxes 
to take money out of your pocket to take care of my charity. 
A government is not a humanitarian institution." Walter H. 
Judd, "How Can We Be So Stupid? We Help Our Enemy and Deny 
Our Friends," Vital Speeches of the ~' XVII (March l, 1951), 
298. However, to Judd, China was a responsibility of the 
United States--supposedly for security and national interest 
reasons. 
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Judd now proclaimed his new position that the tradi-
tional policy of the United States toward China was reversed 
in President Truman's December 15, 1945, address, which he 
had previously hailed as a noble gesture; Judd now asserted 
that this speech had doomed Marshall's mission before he 
started. Judd could not learn who, according to his logic, 
included the "hooker" which assured the Communists that if 
they failed to cooperate the United States would withhold 
all aid from Chiang. On Town Meeting of the Air, December 
27, 1945, Judd had applauded Truman's December 15 address. 
It was the sent.ence--"As China moves toward peace and unity 
along the lines described above, the United States would be 
prepared to assist the National Government in every reason-
able way to rehabilitate the country--" which Judd believed 
convinced the C.hinese Communists they could block American 
assistance to China. Americans who did not "understand 
Communist jargon" approved and "it sounded innocent enough" 
--but "the left wingers, 11 who did understand it, "cheered," 
Judd declared, because they realized obstructive Communist 
tactics could prevent the needed reforms from being carried 
148 
out. 
By late 1947 one can note a fundamental change in Judd's 
148House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Emergency For-
eign Aid Hearings, p. 245. 
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tactics in arguing for China aid. He began to speak more 
freely and openly about corruption within the Nationalist 
Government. The charge of "inefficiency" has been consis-
tently leveled against the Chinese Government, Judd declar-
ed, "as if that were an adequate reason for withdrawing 
. f 11 .. 149 American support roman a y. Without naming General 
150 MacArthur Judd reported: 
A great American out in the Far East said to me, 
'For the first time in the history of our relations 
with Asia, we have endangered the paramount inter-
ests of the United States by confusing them with an 
internal purification problem in China. It may 
prove to be the greatest single blunder in the 
history of the United States.' 151 
Without doubt a basic motive for the new technique in Judd's 
speaking, that is, the open manner in which he admitted 
graft and corruption within the Kuomintang group, was an 
aftermath of the Wedemeyer mission which demonstrated that 
no sweeping reforms would be undertaken by the Nationalists. 
Thus Judd, by attempting to play down the need for reform 
and emphasizing the historic interests of a free China as a 
security factor to the United States, endeavored to justify 
' 'd Ch. 152 a1 to 1na. Attempting to illustrate his point, he 
149Ib'd l • I p • 246. 
150 Tsou, America's Failure In China, p. 467. 
15 l C · F ' Aff . E F House ornrru ttee on ore1gn .airs, mergency --2£::. 
eign Aid Hearings, p. 250. 
152 Tsou, America's Failure In China, p. 467. 
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stated: ''I will admit that there are corrupt people in the 
Republican Party, and I do not think members of the Demo-
cratic Party wil;L claim that there are no corrupt persons 
or machines in that party, 11 but this "does not mean that the 
153 parties as such are corrupt." Judd pointed out that 
graft was a "century-old problem" in China and that it was 
not created by the Chiang Government--then asserted: "We 
154 haven't too good a record ourselves." 
General MacArthur echoed Judd's sentiments in a cable 
to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, dated March 3, 1948: 
I can say without the slightest hesitation that a 
free, independent, peaceful, and friendly China is 
of profound importance to the peace of the world 
and to the position of the United States .... The 
international aspect of the Chinese problem un-
fortunately has become somewhat clouded by de-
mands for internal reform. Desirable as such 
reform may be, its importance is but secondary 
to the .issue of civil strife now engulfing the 
land, and the two issues are of impossible syn-
chronization as it would be to alter the structural 
design of a house while the same was being consumed 
by f1 9me. 155 
Such support strengthened Judd, who had spent part of the 
fall of 194 7 in China., Japan, and Korea with a team of For-
153House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Emergency For-
eign Aid Hearings, p. 248. 
154Ibid. 
155Ibid., p. 256. 
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eign Affirs Cornmittee staff members, 156 and had returned to 
the United States determined to include China in any emer-
gency aid bill, as well as in the forthcoming Marshall aid 
1 . l . 157 egis ation. Judd continued to operate on the premise 
that: 11 We are not justified in doing anything for China 
unless we do enough to enable China to resist the threat to 
h . 1 ' 11158 er nationa existence. 
The Republican leaders in Congress were divided over 
this issue. The Vandenberg faction in the Senate desired 
to wait, but several House Foreign Affairs Committee members 
1 db dd d V d d d . d' . 159 e y Ju an orys eman e imme iate action. The 
Foreign Affairs Committee reported out its interim aid bill 
on December 2, 1947, which authorized $7,000,000 less than 
the President had requested. However, it added China ,to the 
list of recipient countries. The House Report stated that 
156u.s., Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, 
Hearings, United States Foreign Policy For A Post-War Re-
covery Program, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 1947, pp. 2041-42. 
Hereafter cited as House Committee on Foreign Affairs, .!lni.=. 
ted States Foreign Policy For A Post-War Recovery Program 
Hearings. 
157u.s., Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, 
Report, Emergency Foreign Aid, Report No. 1152, 80th Cong., 
1st Sess., 1947, pp. 3, 6. Hereafter cited as Committee 
on Foreign Affairs, Emergency Foreign Aid, Report No. 1152, 
1947. 
158
westerfield, Foreign Policy and Party Politics, p. 
262. 
159
rbid. 
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the objective of including China was: "to initiate the aid 
without which China cannot rally her own strength to stabi-
lize her currency, reform her administration and win her 
civil war, the first step toward resumption of economic and 
160 political progress." The report suggested $60,000,000 
f . d' ·~ Ch' 161 or 1mme 1ate a1~ to 1na. The Senate Report on interim 
aid, however, co~pletely ignored China. Vandenberg did not 
want to burden European aid with Chinese demands. H. Brad-
ford Westerfield asserts in his volume that a man who work-
ed closely with the Foreign Affairs Committee informed him 
that "Vorys privately pleaded with him (Vandenberg) that it 
was necessary in order to build up the low prestige of the 
Hou9e Foreign Affairs Committee, with Marshall Plan legisla-,. 
! 
tion in view, and that the House would be impressed if its 
committee succeeded in putting over a proposal which the ad-
ministration was resisting and which Vandenberg did not fa-
vor.11162 Tp.e resulting Conference Report tends to support 
Westerfield's charge, since the Senate yielded to the major 
160C . F . omm1ttee on ore1gn Affairs, Emergency Foreign Aid, 
Report No. 1152, 1947, p. 4. 
161Ib'd 6 l • I p • • 
162westerfield, Foreign Policy and Party Politics, p. 
263. 
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demands of the House bili. 163 
Emergency interim aid as requested by the President was 
provided in t.he resulting Foreign Aid Act of. 194 7, which was 
approved on December 17, 1947. 164 The legislation authorized 
$597,000,000 for aid to Austria, China, France, and Italy. 
The act, however, provided that any funds that might be made 
available under any other act passed thereafter relating to 
China would cause funds reserved under this act for China to 
be used for aid to the other three named countries .165 As affect-
ing China, this 1947 act was but a bare token gesture to 
pacify the Republican members of the House Foreign Affairs· 
Committee. The House Appropriations Committee, chaired by .. , .. 
John Taber, a New York Republican who lacked enthusiasm for 
spending in China, simply omitted China from appropriations. 
Styles Bridges, however, a strong supporter of the National-
ist Government and chairman of the Senate Appropriations 
Committee, succeeded in earmarking $20,000,000 for China. 
At Vandenberg's s-µggestion this was lowered on the Senate 
floor to $1~,000,000 to fit the post-UNRRA relief act passed 
the preceding spring. This amount was later accepted by 
163 C · f U.S., Congress, House, omm1ttee on Con erence, 
Conference Re9ort, The Foreign Aid Act of 1947, Report No. 
1161, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 1947, p. 8. 
164 UoS,, Statutes at Large, LXI, Part I, 934-41. 
165Ib'd 
. l • I p • 939. 
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House Conferees. Despite the meagerness of the appropria-
tion, this accomplishment of the "China bloc" indicated that 
the United States was moving toward a more comprehensive 
f Ch . . h f f 1 1 . d 166 program or 1na, 1n t e orm o arge-sca e a1 . The 
China bloc felt pride in their victory over the Administra~ 
tion; however, their successes were always susceptible to a 
setback. 
While Congress was considering interim aid, while Wede-
meyer was evaluating the China situation, and while the State 
Department was drawing up a new China aid program, events in 
China took a severe turn for the worse for the Nationalist 
forces. During the second half of 1947 the Communists took 
the offensive on a nation-wide scale. By the end of the 
year they had entrenched themselves in the large area between 
the Yellow and Yangtze Rivers--bordered on the west by the 
Han River and extending east to the Yellow Sea. They had 
also established themselves in a position whereby they could 
constantly interrupt railroad traffic between North China 
d h . 167 an Mane ur1a. The Kuomintang, meanwhile, in a further 
attempt to eliminate opposition, outlawed the Democratic 
League in September. This move only played into Communist 
166
westerfield, Foreign Policy and Party Politics, pp. 
263-64. 
167
united States Relations with China, p. 317; Tsou, 
America's Failure In China, p. 463. 
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hands, as it drove some of these liberal democratic, but 
non-Communist, opposition groups into active collaboration 
. h h 168 wit t em. The Democratic League had long been the re-
cipient of vile and unjust denunciation by the conservative 
forces in China and the so-called friends of China in the 
United States because it had opposed the totalitarian tac-
tics of the Kuomintang regime. Judd spoke on several occa-
sions against the Democratic League because it was a threat 
to Chiang's position; besides, Marhsall had worked with them 
I 
while in China. 
On December 19, 1947, Judd took the House floor to de-
' 
nounce General Feng Yu-hsiang, commonly known as the "Chris-
tian General," who was touring the United States under the 
auspices of the Coi;nmittee for a Democratic Far Eastern pol-
icy.169 Judd declared that Feng was "abusing the courtesy 
extended to him as representative of a foreign government by 
making violent and untruthful attacks upon the Republic of 
China--our first ally in the war against Japanese aggres-
168 Tsou, America's Failure In China, p. 461. 
169The Committee for a Democratic Far Eastern Policy 
was cited as Communist by Attorney General Tom Clark, letter 
to Loyalty Review Board, released April 7, 1949, UoSo, Con-
gress, House, Guide to Subversive Organizations and Publica-
tions, 87th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1962, House Doc. 398, p. 48. 
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sion. 11170 Judd described Feng, without substantiation, as 
a "member of the clique of dissidents who attempted to gain 
control of China by undermining Chiang Kai-shek, while pro-
testing loudly that Chiang is the only leader who can save 
China. 11 He continued that Feng 11 actively participated in 
the work of Communist-front organizations, like the misnamed 
171 Democratic League." Judd's charges against the Democratic 
League echoed that of the Nationalist leaders, as the Kuo-
mintang was openly unsympathetic and unfriendly to the 
172 League. Contrary to Judd's charges, which cannot be sub-
stantiated, responsible Asian experts and historians conclude 
that the League was a truly democratic group with "good in-
tentions and constructive ideas, but they lacked one thing 
most essential in Chinese politics: 173 an independent army. 11 
170u"s., Conoressional Record, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 
1947, XCIII, Part 9, 11746. 
171Ibid. 
172 Chang, The Third Force in China, p. 114. 
173Dun, J. Li, The Ageless Chinese (New York: Scribner, 
1965), p. 49Q; Carsun Chang, one of the founders of the Dem-
ocratic Leag-qe, who later fled China, asserts that the "Dem-
ocratic League, including Chang Lan and Lo Lung-Chi, who 
later joined Mao, were believers in domocracy, but through 
continued persecution by Chiang Kai-shek they were forced to 
join the communists, 11 or flee for their lives. Chang, The 
Third Force in China, p. 265. Chang further declared in re-
gard to his own convictions that: "I am more convinced than 
ever that I did the right thing ... in taking the side of Con-
stitutionalism and Democracy. Most of the members of the 
248 
In response to Judd's charges, one of his most severe 
vocal critics in the House, New York American Labor Party 
Representative Vito Marcantonio, attacked Judd with: "I 
cannot resist the temptation of stating to the gentleman 
from Minnesota that for the last week he has been attacking 
the Democratic League of China and the Christian general of 
China simply because those two ... have seen fit to attack 
Chiang Kai-shek." Judd, Marcantonio continued, had "reached 
the point that if a Biblical character jumped out of the 
Bible and attacked Chiang Kai-shek I am afraid the gentle-
man ... would attack the Bible . 11 Judd, he said, "will tell you 
that we must aid this Hitler of China to defeat the Soviet 
Union ... just as others had advanced the same line to justify 
aiding and strengthening Hitler ... and ... the world is still 
suffering from the results of that advice. 11174 Judd answered 
Democratic League who collaborated with the Communists, like 
Huang Yen-pei, Chang Lan, Lo Lung-chi, Liang Shu-min, and 
Chang Pai-chun are either Vice Presidents of the Government 
at Peking, or Ministers, or members of commissions, or mem-
bers of the Political Consultative Conference. Sometime I 
wonder to myself whether those erstwhile colleagues of mine 
of the Democratic League are contented with their present 
lot. I am sure they are not, for they are like birds whose 
wings have been clipped. It seems strange that I should be the 
only one among the founders of the Democratic League to stay 
outside the charmed circle of Peking. I remain faithful to my 
convictions, and, as a free agent, I shall continue to fight 
for a free, independent, and democratic China until the bat-
tle is won." Chang, The Third Force in China, p. 187. 
174u.s., Congressional Record, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 
1947, XCIII, Part 9, 11762. 
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Marcantonio by retorting that he had 11 0n many occasions 
criticized the Government of China and twice to Generalissi-
mo Chiang himself, once about 6 weeks ago, in an hour and 
three-quarters discussion with him. 11 Judd declared that his 
concern was not to defend Chiang; he did not need any de-
fense, as his role in "history is secure." Judd asserted 
that his concern was to save China, "if possible, as a free 
nation and on the side of the United States against the tide 
of communism, intrigue, and tyranny sweeping over much of 
175 
the world." 
Despite Judd's spirited defense of Chiang Kai-shek and 
his clarion call for immediate economic and military assis-
tance to the Nationalist forces, the following year, 1948, 
held poignant disappointment for China's congressional 
friends. The concessions which the Administration, and 
above all, Congress, were willing to make to the Nationalist 
forces did not match the military and territorial losses 
which they suffered. President Truman threw the China aid 
problem into the lap of Congress; Congress was unwilling to 
take the challenge, and its half-way policy proved no more 
successful than did the Administration's caution in refusing 
to allow the country to become engaged in all-out entangle-
ment in the China civil war which could have imperiled the 
175Ibid. 
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Administration's program of resisting communism in Europe. 
Not until mid-February, 1948, did Marshall's proposal 
for a China aid. program reach Capitol Hill, when President 
Truman recommended an authorization of $570,000,000 to pro-
vide assistance until June 30, 1949. This amount constituted 
an'increase of $270,000,000 over the figure Marshall had sug-
gested in November, 1947. In his forwarding message the 
President cited America's traditional attitude toward aid to 
China and expressed the sentiment that the continued deteri-
oration of the Chinese economy was a source of deep concern 
to the United States. President Truman related the plight 
of the United States in granting this aid to China: "We 
have hoped for conditions in China that would make possible 
the effective and constructive use of American assistance 
in reconstruction and rehabilitation. Conditions have not 
developed as we had hoped, and we can only do what is feas-
'bl d . h . ,.176 i e un er circumstances as t ey exist. The Administra-
tion'sobjective in increasing the amount suggested by Mar-
shall ip November 1947, was to provide China with additional 
American dollars whereby China could purchase civilian-type 
commodities which were not provided in the Administration's 
176u.s., Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Rela-
tions, Report, b..;ig To China, Report No. 1026, 80th Cong., 
2nd Sess., 1948, p. 2. Hereafter cited as Senate Committee 
on Foreign Relations, Aid To China, Report No. 1026, 1948. 
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China aid relief, and to allow the Nationalist regime to 
purchase abroad its own military supplies. Thereby the Uni-
ted States would not be increasing its own military commit-
ment in China--the opposite of which Judd had been laboring 
to obtain. 177 
During February, 1948, the House Foreign Affairs Commit-
tee renewed hearings entitled, "United States Foreign Policy 
178 For A Post-War Recovery Program.n Secretary Marshall 
told tp.e committee on February 20 that "in consideration of 
a program of assistance to China, it should be recognized 
that for the main part the solution of China's problems is 
largely one for the Chinese themselves. 11179 The State De-
partment held that the great difficulty facing the United 
States in determining a basis and procedure to justify a 
program of assistance for China lay in the conditions which 
existed in C,hina--military as well a,s economic. The politi-
cal, economic, and financial conditions in China, he said, 
177House Committee on Foreign Affairs, United States 
Foreign Policy For A Post-War Recovery Program Hearings, p. 
1546; Westerfield, Foreign Policy and Party Poli tics, p. 264. 
178The House Committee on Foreign Affairs started hear-
ings on United States Foreign Policy For.£ Post-War Recovery 
Program on December 17, 1947, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. Hear-
ings were renewed on January 12, 1948, and continued until 
mid-March 1948, 80th Cong., 2nd Sess. 
179Ibid., Part II, p. 1545. 
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were so uncertain that it was impossible to develop a 
"practical, effective, long-term over-all program for econ-
. ..,,180 
om1c recovery~· Marshall admitted, nevertheless, that it 
was desirable that the United States render "assistance to 
China in her present critical situation in order to help 
retard the present rapid rate of economic deterioration and 
thus provide a breathing space in which the Chinese Govern-
ment could initiate important steps toward more stable eco-
. d' . 11 181 nom1c con 1t1ons. 
The Secretary had, however, earlier questioned the 
value of what he was now advocating. Prior to President 
Truman's message to Congress on February 18, the Secretary 
had read a statement to the Committees on Foreign Affairs 
and Foreign Relations in executive session, and reported 
that there was "a great deal that directly bears on the pro-
blem which is not in the public interest of this country, 
and particularly of the Chinese Government to state for the 
182 
open record." Marshall declared that the United States 
"must be prepared to face the possibility that the present 
Chinese Government may not be successful in maintaining 
itself against the Communist forces or other opposition that 
lBOibid. 
181Ibid. 
182
united States Relations~ China, p. 380. 
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. . Ch. 11 183 may arise in ina. He pointed out that from the fore-
going statem~nt, "it can only be concluded that the present 
Government cannot reduce the Chin~se Communists to a com-
pletely negl,tgible factor in China," and to "achieve that 
objective in the immediate future it would be necessary for 
the United States to underwrite the Chinese Government's 
military effort, on a wide and probably constantly increas-
ing scc;:l.le, as well as the Chinese economy. 11184 To defeat 
the opposition Marshall concluded that the United States 
would "have to be prepared virtually to take over the Chi-
nese Government and administer its economic, military and 
goverrupental affairs. 11185 To Marshall and the administra-
tion this would constitute a course of action of such magni-
tude that it would be impossible to estimate the final cost, 
and it would involve the United States Government "in a con-
tinuing commitment from which it would practically be im-
possible to withdraw, and it would very probably involve 
grave consequences to this nation by making of China an 
f ... . . . . 1 f 1 . t 11186 .arena o internationa con ic . The Secretary could not 
therefore recommend any attempt to underwrite the Chinese 
183
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185
rbid. 
186Ibid. 
254 
economy and the Chinese Government's military efforts, be-
cause it constituted too great a burden on the United States 
d 'l't 'b'l' 187 M h 11 economy an too great a mi 1 ary respons1 1 1ty. ars a 
saw the Chinese Government as being not only weak but lack~ 
ing in "self-discipline and inspiration," and thus there 
existeq litt],.e if any "evidence that these conditions can 
b b . 11 d b f . . d 11188 e as1ca y correcte y ore1gn a1 . 
Mqrshall informed the House Committee on Foreign Af-
fairs that the Administration's proposed program of aid for 
China provided economic assistance in the amount of $570,000, 
000 for t.he period ending June 30, 1949. Of this amount, 
$510,000,000 would be used to cover minimum imports of es-
sential civilian type commodities, chiefly foodstuffs and 
raw materials, and $60,000,000 would be for key reconstruc-
tion projects. The Administration's program concentrated 
on those commodities believed to be of maximum aid to Chi-
nese civilian economy and those which would insure the 
189 greatest aid per dollar spent. 
Marshall thus gave up what Acheson, in testimony on 
187Ibid. 
188Ibid., p. 384. 
189House Committee on Foreign Affairs, United States 
Foreign Policy For£ Post-War Recovery Program Hearings, 
Part II, p. 1546. 
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June 4, 1951, 190 called the last chance for the United 
States to intervene with armed forces in China. 191 Acheson 
declared that there Marshall 11 laid before the Congress" the 
matter of mi~itary intervention in China, and the "Congress 
understood it perfectly, and the Congress had what I think 
is the sound judgment not to do that. 11192 At this time, 
however, the "actual strength" of the United States "army 
and air force was only 898,000 men with 140,000 deployed in 
the Far East. 11193 v· ' h H h 1 't b 1ew1ng eac ouse as aw o e, 1 can. e 
concluded that the House of Representatives thought one way 
in regard to ~arshall's program, and the Senate thought the 
other W?Y, the Senate taking the view which coincided with 
that of the Administration. The attitude in the House was 
due in no small part to Judd's endless speaking and the 
prestige he had built up among his colleagues. 
Without doubt Marshall realized throughout 1948 that 
his program would not be wholly effective in checking the 
190
senate Committee on Armed Services and Committee on 
Foreign Relations, Military Situation in~ Far East Hear-
ings, p. 1869. 
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192
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advance of conununism in China. 194 But, likewise, he realiz-
ed withholding all assistance and withdrawing completely 
were impossible. To Marshall it would have been against 
United States interests "to demonstrate a complete lack of 
confidence in the Chinese Government and to add to its dif-
ficul ties by abruptly rejecting its requests for assistance," 
because the "psychological effect on morale in China 11 would 
b . 195 e serious. Marshall, however, conceded that the United 
States was already conunitted by past actions and by popular 
sentiment among Americans to continue to do what we could 
do to a+leviate suffering in China and to give the Chinese 
Government and people the possibility of working out China's 
196 problems in tpeir own way. 
Judd opposed what he considered Marshall's 11 negative 11 
attitude and continued his campaign to gain total conunitment 
to China--Juqd's theme was that only if China is saved can 
Europe be secure from conununism. He had also added a new 
twist to his argument~ "If China is not to be free, then 
it would have been far better for her to be under Japan 
194
rbid., Senate Conunittee on Armed Services and Com-
mittee on Foreign Relations, Military Situation in the Far 
East Hearings, p. 1868. 
195
united States Relations with China, p. 387. 
196Ibid., p. 383. 
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rather than Russia. 11197 Equating Chinese Communism with 
Russian Communism, Judd declared that if China were not to 
remain free, then the war against Japan was not only "use-
less," but it was 11 criminal 11 -- 11 because we are left with less 
198 
security than before we resisted Japan." Thus, Judd felt 
that if the Soviet Union was to be the strongest force in 
Europe it would have been better for the United States to 
have allowed Japan to dominate Asia--rather than to have 
Russia the strongest power in Europe and Asia both. 199 Judd 
proclaimed that events in Asia as they stood then were much 
less likely to get the United States into war than events 
200 in Europe. To Judd perhaps the best single hope of pre-
venting what he considered World War III was to "keep Russia 
compelled to divide her forces, her attention, her efforts 
201 between her eqst and her west." But, Judd continued, if 
the Soviet Union could beguile the United States into look-
ing in the other direction until China fell, as he felt, 
197u.s., Congressional Record, 80th Cong., 2nd Sess., 
1948, xc~v, Part 9, A57. 
198The American Association of School Administrators., 
Official Report 74th Annual Convention (Atlantic City, New 
Jersey, 1948), p. 32 
199Ibid. 
200ibid., p. 34. 
201Ibid. 
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"all the left wingers and their dupes have tried for several 
years, and successfully, to persuade us to do," then Russia 
could concentrate all her attention and efforts on defeating 
recovery in Europe. Judd felt that under the prevailing 
circumstances of that time Russia could probably defeat the 
European program. He stressed the point that his greatest 
concern was for his own country. Thus, in the long run the 
United States needed Europe and Asia "worse than they need 
us. 11 Nearly "everyone in Asia sees that clearly," Judd con-
tinued, and they "wonder why we fail to, why a nation with 
all the aces insists on playing them so badly or even throw-
ing them away." If China and Asia go down, Judd asked, how 
much more would it cost the United States--"in money and re-
sources and men--to keep Western Europe free or even our-
selves" 202 free? To save money, "not to waste it," Judd de-
clared, the United States "must make a real effort to keep 
China independent" and 11 pro-American. 11 He felt that an 
"'intelligent and immediate program of aid to China consist-
ing of moral support, surplus munitions, American personnel 
for military training, and advice at all levels, dollars to 
balance China's international payments, help stabilize her 
currency, and loans for specified development projects could 
not cost more than a billion and a half dollars." Judd's 
202Ibid. 
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argument continued: "If that billion and a half for China 
should make the difference between success and failure of 
the proposed seventeen billion for Europe, it would seem to 
d , 11 203 be a goo investment. 
It was not until March 23, 1948, during discussions on 
the China Aid bill, that Judd really attempted to answer, 
on the House floor,what he meant by military assistance to 
China. He felt that munitions, training, and advice were 
equally essential if the Nationalist forces were to fight a 
successful war against the Chinese Communists. Thus Judd 
believed that the United States should make available to 
China an ample supply of munitions. The other kind of mili-
tary assistance China had to have, according to Judd, was 
military training and advice in planning and conducting 
operations--this Judd contended would not cost the United 
States "very much in money." Judd informed his colleagues 
that the "Chinese are traditionally not students of war-
fare," and that their "basic training is inadequate to give 
them ability to adapt imaginatively, especially the offi-
204 
cers. 11 Furthermore, Judd felt that the training which 
203
rbid., p. 35. 
204 UoS., Congressional Record, 80th Cong., 2nd Sess., 
1948, XCIV, Part 3, 3332; General Joseph .Stilwell, who spent 
nearly two decades in China betwe.en the First and Second 
World Wars, believed that the Chinese soldier when properly 
equipped and trained made the best soldier in the world. 
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American military personnel "originally gave them, in a 
sense, disqualified them for the kind of warfare they must 
now carry on." The United States "trained the Chinese to 
fight the Japanese, either for jungle warfare in Burma or 
positional warfare in east China, and accordingly had sup-
plied the Chinese with heavy machine guns, heavy artillery, 
tanks, and other war equipment, which was obsolete in fight-
ing the Communists.". Now, Judd emphasized, the Chinese 
"have to fight a totally different type of enemy, the guer-
. . 
11205 Th h h' rillas, on very different terrain. us t e C inese 
Nationalist needed "light equipment, mobility rather than 
heavy power." He further maintained that American military 
advisers should be allowed closer to the front lines so 
that they could "understand the problem and give advice on 
206 
the ground." This was a major focal point of difference 
between Marshall and Judd. Marshall opposed such American 
involvement, because he feared or perhaps realized that 
this would be the fatal step which would commit American 
forces in taking the offensive in defeating the Communists--
that such a move would lead to huge land forces being sent 
to China. 
Not only Judd, but Vorys and other members of Chiang's 
205Ibid. 
206Ibid. 
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Congressional supporters, sought increased American military 
commitment including armament, munitions, training, and ad-
vice. They desired to transform some of the Administration's 
proposed economic aid into military aid and then to have it 
',administered in a manner somewhat like the Greek-Turkish pro-
gram, which would include increased involvement of American 
officers in the supervision of smaller and smaller Chinese 
military units. The technique and demands of the China 
bloc, however, ":precluded the use of any single clear model" 
in granting economic and military aid to the Nationalist 
207 forces. Judd chose to describe the entire proposed for-
eign assistance bill of 1948, as "primarily a national de-
fense bill." He felt that no one could "rightly justify 
this bill," or title IV, the Chinese assistance title, "or 
any other part of it, on a basis primarily of humanitarian-
. h . . ,,208 ism or c ar1ty. Such measures, Judd declared, "could 
be justified in this present world situation and in the 
present strained state of America:'s finances and supplies 
only if they are essential from the standpoint of the secur-
ity of the Nation." According to Judd it "was not to divert 
attention or assistance from Europe that the aid-to-China 
207
westerfield, Foreign Policy and Party Poli tics, p. 264. 
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sections were put into this bill ... [but] .... to str;,iatt,g:tben 
and support the programs in Europe. 11 Thus Judd declared 
that "we do not believe that Asia is more important to our 
security than Europe, but we do not believe it is less im-
209 portant." Judd quoted MacArthur to reenforce his state-
ment: 
It would be utterly fallacious to underrate 
China's needs or her importance. For if we em-
bark upon a general policy to bulwark the fron-
tiers of freedom against the assaults of political 
despotism, one major frontier is no less import-
ant than another and a decisive breach of any 
will inevitably threaten to engulf us. 210 
The House Foreign Affairs Committee, of which Judd was a 
member, desired to produce a China aid bill which would 
have the European Recovery Program as its core. The House 
committee reported that its "decision to treat the whole 
problem of the restoratton of war-torn economies, to in-
elude China as well as Europe, came not only from logical 
considerations but also from the painful experience of the 
committee in receiving from the administration a long sue-
cession of 'piecemeal' programs, each with a separate time-
table of emergency, without any adequate total program, 
209Ibid. 
210Ibid. 
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· h . t ,. 211 e1t er as to scope or comm1 ments. 
The House Foreign Affairs Committee did not hold hearings 
because it had gathered testimony separately on aid to China; 
however, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee held execu-
ti ve hearings on aid to China. During the course of the hear-
ings the committee heard the views of Marshall; Willard L. 
Thorp, Assistant Secretary of State; W. Walton Butterworth, 
Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs; and their as sis-
212 
tan ts. Senator Alexander Wiley, Republican of Wisconsin 
and a member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, re-
calling the executive hearings, commented on June 4, 1951: 
"We agreed ... that we should not get our nose in the door and 
- 213 
put troops ashore and all that. 11 He continued: 11 The re-
sul t was that we agreed on a certain amount of money, and the 
House followed another policy, and the result was a compromise 
between the two Houses, as I recall it." 214 McMahon, after 
211
uoSo, Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, 
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having re-read the secret transcripts of the executive hear·-
ings, reported "without contradiction" that: "The discus-
sion ... showed a complete, unanimous agreement in the commit-
215 tee that the Chinese situation was just hopeless." The 
State Department's view was so prevalent in the Senate For-
eign Relations Committee, it has been charged, that when 
the committee reported a separate China aid bill, "the re-
port which went to the floor with the bill [foreign assis-
tance bill] was bitterly critical of Chiang Kai-shek." 216 
Committee chairman Vandenberg, chagrined at this blunder, 
ordered a more diplomatic substitute report prepared the 
following day. 217 Vandenberg, speaking for the bill on the 
Senate floor, pointed out: 
The Committee on Foreign Relations wishes 
to make it unmistakeably clear, in this, as in 
all other relief bills, that there is no impli-
cation that American aid involves any continuity 
of obligation beyond specific, current commit-
ments which Congress may see fit to make ... We do 
not--cannot--underwrite the future .... It is a 
duty to underscore this reservation in the case 
of China because we find here many imponderables 
as a result of the military, economic, and social 
pressures which have understandably undermined 
her stabilities, and prevented or postponed the 
internal reforms which even her surest friends 
215
rbid.; Westerfield, Foreign Policy and Party Poli-
tics, p. 265. 
216
westerfield, Foreign Policy and Party Politics, p. 
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217
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readily concede to be not only desirable but 
essential for the Chinese people and for the 
Nationalist government. 218 
265 
No member of the upper House questioned Vandenberg's 
point of view. A few, however, gave only moderate vocal 
opposition to the bill because they felt that it went too 
far. Wayne Morse, then an Oregon Republican, asked: "what 
assurance have the taxpayers of America that by spending 
more and more millions of dollars for food and supplies for 
relief in China they are doing anything more than again 
filling the pockets of the group which is today in charge 
of the Nationalist Government in China?" 219 
The resulting foreign aid authorization bill, on which 
Congress completed action on April 2, 1948, provided $338, 
000,000 in economic aid for China. An additional $125,000, 
000 was added to the bill for the Chinese Government to use 
as it saw necessary, which presumably meant for military 
purposes. As far as the China aid provision is concerned, 
it followed the general form of .. the text of the bill passed 
by the Senate. Aid to China was consolidated in a single 
title--Title IV--known as the Chinese Aid Act of 1948. The 
following day, April 3, 1948, President Truman signed the 
218
uoSo, Congressional Record, 80th Cong., 2nd Sess., 
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219
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Foreign Assistance Act of 1948. 220 The problem of aid for 
China, however, was not yet solved. The Assistant Secre~ 
tary of State for Economic Affairs, Willard Thorp, reported 
to the House Appropriations Committee Committee on May 18, 
that it was the Department's view that Congress intended 
by the provisions of the China Aid Act to leave expendi-
tures under the $125,000,000 grant entirely to the Chinese 
Government, without any conditions, except for possible ad-
ministrative controls determined by the President. Thorp 
pointed out that: uLegislative history indicates that the 
phrase in the act 'on such terms as the President may de-
termine' refers to procedural terms and not the screening 
221 
of requirement or supervision of use." This tended to 
indicate to the House Republicans--or to the China bloc--
that the Administration felt no special "responsibility 
for initiating, and very little for supervising, grants of 
. h. d h. . Ii 222 aid to C 1na un er t 1s section. 
The House Appropriations Committee, however, aided the 
China bloc in a last effort to pin down the Administration 
220Ibid., pp. 4035, 4063, 4080; U.SQ, Statutes at 
Large, LXII, Part I, 137-59. 
221u.s., Congress, House, Committee on Appropriations, 
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222 f' ld F . P l' d P P l' . Wester 1e , ore1gn o icy .filL. arty o 1t1cs, p. 
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on military assistance for China. The committee declared 
that the history of previous aid to China was not very fav-
orable and that this appropriation was being recommended 
with the insistence that the Administration establish and 
maintain procedures for the complete supervision of appro-
. d h . h . ff · 223 priated funds an t us insure t eir e ective use. The 
Administration compromised to the extent of promising it 
would supervise Chinese procurement under the $125,000,000 
section of Title IV if other sections of the act were not 
224 
altered--specifically the section of Greece and Turkey. 
But $60,000,000 was cut from the total amount provided for 
in the China Aid Act of 1948 by the House and Senate Appro-
. . C . 225 pr1at1ons ommittees. 
The double victory for the Administration, which sought 
to cut losses in China, was made possible by Republican 
leaders--Republican leaders especially outside of the Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee. Seduction by State Department 
officials could have been easily alleged, but regardless of 
any possible allegations, a Republican Congress was at last 
223u.s., Congress, House, Committee on Appropriations, 
Report, Foreign Aid Appropriations, 1949, Report No. 2173, 
80th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1948, pp. 7, 9. 
224
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definitely involved in a China aid policy, although at the 
time to many it would have seemed too little, too late. Had 
the Administration, nevertheless, shown greater "vigor and 
determination" in administering what Congress had provided, 
it might still have been able to minimize the paralyzing ef-
fects of rigidly partisan recrimination when Chiang's gov-
ernment abandoned the mainland late the following year. 226 
Not until November 1948 did substantial shipments start 
to reach China a.s provided for under the military section 
of the China Aid act. Admiral Oscar C. Badger, Commander 
of the Eastern Sea Frontier, testified on June 19, 1951, 
that there were various causes-- 11 a number of things rather 
than any specific thing 11 --which delayed movement of supplies 
to China. But Badger indicated that perhaps there was not 
present "the old drive" to indicate "a realization in this 
. l h . . .. 227 part1cu ar case tat 1t was important . Several days 
. later during the same hearings General David G. Barr, United 
States Army, commenting on Badger's testimony, expressed the 
belief that diplomatic channels did not delay assistance to 
China a "great deal." He reported that after the Department 
226
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of the Army was "permitted to go to work in assisting the 
Chinese and to actually sell to the Chinese the transfer of 
funds, this entire system was changed at the insistence of 
Admiral Badger; a completely new list was submitted to the 
Department of the Army by Ambassador Koo on the 29th of 
September which destroyed or nullified all the work that had 
h . . 1· .. 228 been done on t 1s previous 1st. (Barr had given the 
Chinese assistance in the preparation of their first require-
ment for $125,000,000 worth of equipment. Barr charged 
that at about the same time the first list of equipment was 
completed, Badger promised the Chinese that the equipment 
would be transported in American vessels, free of charge. 
Under this arrangement shipping costs would be diverted to 
additional supplies. Thus Barr dec'laredthat all of these 
things had to be reconsidered and had to go through the 
necessary agencies for readjustments, so that changing the 
requirements at that time operated to delay the arrival of 
h . . Ch. 229 t e equipment 1n 1na. 
During the. period between the passage of the China Aid 
Act and the arrival of American supplies in China, the Chi-
nese Communists had generally assumed the offensive in the 
civil war. They had completed their conquest of Manchuria 
228
rbid. 
229Ibid. 
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and were readying themselves for the southward march, which 
proceeded most rapidly from a military standpoint in 1949. 
Without doubt the only action that could have prevented or 
delayed a Communist take-over in China at that time would 
have been full intervention by the United States. Dean Ach-
eson, who became Secretary ~f State on January 21, 1949, 
with the inauguration of the second Truman administration, 
could sanction such a move no more than could Marshall. 
From the time he accepted the China mission assignment to 
the end of his tenure as Secretary of· State, General Mar-
shall "adhered consistently to the postulate that the Uni-
ted States should not intervene in the Chinese civil war 
230 
with her armed forces. 11 Acheson adhered to basically the 
same principle; however, perhaps in contrast to Marshall he 
underestimated the relative strength of the Chinese Commun-
ists at an early date. But Marshall's realistic evaluation 
of the Chinese situation--the relative military and politi-
cal strength of the Nationalist and the Communist forces--
led the Secretary of State to conclude- that the Chiang re-
gime could not win the civil war without American military 
intervention. The General thus saw no solution for saving 
China after his unsuccessful attempt to fulfill Sun Yat-sen' s 
2 30 Am · 1 F · 1 . Ch. 492 Tsou, erica s ai ure 111 ina, p. . 
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dictum--the establishment of a coalition government between 
the Nationalists, the Communists, and the "Third Forces. 11231 
With China thus lost, Marshall could find no substantial 
( 
reason for not moving ahead to aid Europe, to supplyAmerican 
resources and efforts where they could do the most good, where 
they would be more effective and efficiently employed. Yet 
it was this realistic evaluation of the world situation 
which served to damn Marshall in the eyes of Judd and his 
cohorts, the Asia-First element who believed that Chiang 
should be redeemed and a democ:racy established in China un-
- 232 der his tutelage. 
231
see Carsun Chang's volume, passim. cited above. 
232The year 1948, in review, was a tragic year for the 
Nationalist forces as well as for China's Congressional 
friends. The China Aid Act had provided neither enough aid 
•not:·-· the desired kind of aid. But perhaps a greater blow 
came on November 8, 1948: Thomas E. Dewey was defeated for 
the Presidency of the United States. Chinese officials and 
Republican friends of China proceeded on the assumption that 
.with Dewey's election "extraordinary measures" would be tak-
en toward giving military aid to China. In August, 1948, in 
a timely gesture intended perhaps to dramatiz_e the sincerity 
of Chiang's regime, the Nationalist Government announced a 
program which sounded like "drastic economic reforms." The 
move, however, came too late. The American public voters, 
by a rather thin margin, and without a majority of the popu-
lar vote, retained Truman's leadership for another four years 
in early November, while in late November, Chiang's highly 
demoralized Mukden garrison surrendered that well-fortified 
city to the Communist armies. This was the beginning of the 
end--the end. that was to come swiftly. 
On December 1, Madame Chiang Kai-shek, despite her ob-
vious coolness toward President Truman which had developed 
over the months, arrived in Washington to make a desperate 
personal plea to the President for immediate help. In her 
272 
Yet neither Marshall nor Acheson could, or perhaps 
would, follow a policy of total and prompt disengagement in 
China. Perhaps Marshall, like Ambassador Stuart, would have 
favored an entire withdrawal from any participation in 
China's internal affairs, to drifting along with no strong 
t t · t · one of 11 wa1· t and see. 11 233 program excep an oppor un1s 1c 
Stuart, however, favored giving "active assistance especi-
ally in the way of military advice to the Nationalist Gov-
ernment, in the expectation that the needed reform would be 
undertaken ... [ and] ... condition further aid at each stage upon 
pleas for aid, Madame Chiang asked for $3,000,000;000 over 
a period of three years, and renewed the already rejected 
request fora.military mission to China headed by a high-
ranking officer, and for a forthright declaration of the de-
termination of the United States to halt the expansion of com-
munism in Asia. (For additional information see Tsou, Amer-
ica's Failure In China, p. 492). All she accomplished was 
knowledge that the American President was unwilling to com-
mit himself to the all-out effort that would have been need-
ed to save her husband. 
The low tide of Kuomintang morale at this time was man-
ifested by a series of remarkable concessions which Chiang 
was willing to make to the United States in hopes of obtain-
ing additional economic and military assistance. The Gener-
alissimo went so far as to offer to a.ppoint United States 
officers to command Chinese units under the guise of advis-
ers, and to accept a high ranking United States officer as 
his personal military adviser. Apparently the President 
felt that a second "Stilwell affair" would develop. On Jan-
uary 8, 1949, Chinese Foreign Minister Wu handed a note to 
Ambassador Stuart expressing the desire to renew mediation 
between the Nationalists and Communists which had been given up 
in 1946, when Chiang Kai-shek considered his power invin-
cible. Wertenbaker, "The China Lobby," pp. 18-20. 
233John Leighton Stuart, Fifty Years in China (New 
York: Random House, 1954), pp. 178-79. 
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evidence of this. 11234 Marshall, however, saw in such sug-
gestion a gradual drift toward further military involvement. 
The "rule or ruin" policy of Chiang Kai-shek and his cohorts 
afforded Marshall or Acheson little if any recourse, and 
Chiang could always improvise the necessary excuse for de-
laying needed internal reforms to furnish Administration 
critics with sufficient arrununition to chide vehemently the 
President. Marshall, without an alternative, was forced to 
conciliate Republican opposition to his China policy, and 
in order to insure full authorization for his European Re-
covery Program was forced to grant China limited assistance 
after a period of partial withdrawgl. 
Thus, by "indifference if not by intention," it has 
been charged, "the administration ... utterly bungled its 
chance to show that an aid progra111 of 'GOP proportions' 
ld Ch . 11235 cou not save 1ang. The State Department's attitude 
that the only way China could be saved would be by complete 
United States intervention combined with the half-way pol-
icy of Congress, failed to produce a feeling of urgency 
within the Administration. The li.mi ted activity in both 
the Executive and Legislative branches in regard to China--
and a degree of failure in both~-gave key Republican lead-
234Ibid., p. 178. 
235
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ers, such as Judd, Vorys, Bridges, and Knowland, ample am-
munition to charge, despite the too-little too-late policy 
of their own Republican-dominated branch, that they had done 
their best to preserve China's integrity and freedom, while 
the Democratic Administration sabotaged their efforts, and 
thus gave Chiang the final push. Against charges of such 
proportions even State Department-minded Republicans such 
as Vandenberg and other members of the Foreign Relations 
Committee "were hardly likely to offer any public defense 
of their failure to implement effectively the delicate com-
promise they had effected on China to placate both Walter 
236 Judd and General Marshall." 
Despite McMahon's statement that not a single word of 
criticism from any member of the Foreign Relations Commit~ 
tee--Democrat or Republican-- was uttered in executive ses-
sion, nor a single suggestion ever made for a change of 
policy in China during the period 1947-1949, the President, 
Marshall, and Acheson were left to absorb "whatever public 
blame was America's for Chiang's eventual defeat. 11237 Per-
haps the passive acquiescence of the key Republicans on the 
Foreign Relations Committee gave the State Department a 
sense of contentment which prevented a feeling of urgency 
236
rbid. 
237
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for China. Regardless, the State Department did not "man-
age by its 'self-sufficiency' to preserve a free hand to 
frame a new policy for a new China. 11238 Thus with the 
growing mutual suspicion between the Far Eastern Division 
and the congressmen, especially Republicans, the collapse 
of all Nationalist China in 1949 nbrought a wave of parti-
san bitterness which paralyzed American policy toward 
Ch , II 239 ina. The cry of "treason" arose from Capitol Hill 
and resounded to every corner of the country--a cry which 
Judd was to echo henceforth. 
238
rbid. 
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CHAPTER V 
WALTER Ho JUDD: GRAND INQUEST OF THE DEMOCRATS' 
CHINA POLICY 
The collapse of Nationalist China in September of 1949 
brought to the American scene a wave of partisan bitterness 
which paralyzed American foreign policy toward China, until 
. d f d. lf · l the Unite States oun itse at war in Korea. During 
August, 1949, The China White Paper, an account of United 
States relations with China, with special consideration giv-
en to the period 1944-1949, was released by the United 
2 States State Department. The Secretary of State, in the 
1Bradford H. Westerfield, Fored.gn Policy and Party Poli-
tics, Pearl Harbor to Korea (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1955), p. 268. 
2walter Millis (ed.), The Forrestal Diaries (New York: 
The Viking Press, 1951). p. 534. Forrestal writes in his di-
ary that during a cabinet meeting on November 26, 1948 Gen-
eral Marshall read a paper which had originated in the State 
Department, which advocated going to the American public to 
explain the inadequacies of the Chiang Government. The paper 
declared that the Administration had two alternatives: to go 
to the public and explain the Chinese situation, or to con-
tinue to do all that was feasible to support Chiang and ac-
cept the embarrassments that would accompany the disintegra-
tion of China. With the President's approval, however, Mar-
shall rejected this recommendation on the ground that such a 
public statement would administer the final coup de grace to 
the Nationalist Government. 
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letter of transmittal to the President, blamed the National-
ist debacle on the inept leadership of the Kuomintang regime 
rather than insufficiency of American .aid. In reacting to 
the White Paper, the cry went out from Judd, from the 
entire Asian clique, that surely less than honest diplomacy 
was involved--"if Chiang had not been sold out in 1940," 
then why had he been "sold out in 1949? 113 Thus, this docu-
ment set off a new wave of unlooked-for criticism by the 
Executive Department, more severe, more intense, than any 
which had previously been directed at the Truman Administra-
tion by the Republicans. This criticism resulted in a new 
era for the China friends which was to crystallize into more 
positive demands, demands for militant assistance for Chiang 
Kai-shek, demands which evolved into a program which includ-
ed a "preventive • war" in Asia as the only alternative to 
3Edwin O. Reischauer asserts in writing about Chiang's 
demise on the mainland that: "It would be a mistake to 
attribute the Communist triumph in China primarily to what 
America either did nor did not do .... To some people it may 
seem easier and more reasonable to attribute our errors in 
Asia to inexcusably inept and sometimes disloyal individual 
Americans, rather than to insufficient knowledge and under-
standing .... But unfortunately this interpretation of our 
failure, though often put forth with vehemence, is so far 
from the truth that only our own frustration could have 
given it much credence." Edwin O. Reischauer, Wanted~ An 
Asian Policy {New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1955) pp. 12-13. 
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a Third World War. The final answer to these demands was 
to come from a Republican Administration with the Eisenhower 
victory in 1952; the answer provided was surely less than 
what Judd had envisioned. 
The China White Paper was to Judd an 11 insipid11 apology 
for a most "insidious" policy carried out by the Truman Ad-
ministration in China. It was, Judd proclaimed, a "miser-
able" attempt to cover up the treachery which grew out of 
the conspiracy of a 11 few dozen pro-leftist writers, lectur-
ers, and State Department men led by Alger Hiss," of the Far 
Eastern Division from 1939 to 1944, (Hiss was in the Far 
Eastern Division for only a short time in 1944) "when the 
policy pattern and the propaganda line which lost China to Rus- · 
sia were being established. 115 Such an attitude was easily 
4As did Judd, Frank Wilson Price feared that the China 
situation would produce World War III; 11 If China's liberals 
fail today I can see China turning back to one party dicta-
torship or swinging over to communist totalitarianism. 
Either of these dangerous possibilities would hasten the 
outbreak of World War III." Frank Wilson Price, "How Strong 
Are China's Liberals," The Christian Centu:ry, LXIV (June 18, 
1947), 766. 
5 U.S., Congressional Record, 81st Cong., 2nd Sess., 
1950, XCVI, Part 15, A3575. Alger Hiss declares in his book 
that he had "no connection with our China policy after 1944, 
a time when Chiang's pre~erninence was undisputed. My only 
functions before that time relating to China had been assist-
ing in removing discriminatory aspects of our immigration 
policy, in negotiating a treaty of friendship with China, 
and in expediting lend-lease aid to China." Alger Hiss, In 
The Court of Public Opinion (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 
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accepted by those who viewed international affairs in abso-
lute terms; for those who denied the responsibility of both 
parties involved regardless of the decision of international 
significance which came from the White House regarding uni-
lateral affairs, to cooperate to make the joint venture sue-
! 
cessful. But for a few Congressmen it was more simple to 
take the strong partisan stand and blame the Democratic Ad-
ministratton for the internal trouble which had plagued China 
for decad~s. Dean Acheson had asserted in the White Paper 
that "the only alternative open to the United States was 
full-scale intervention in behalf of a government which had 
6 lost the confidence of its own troops and its own people." 
Intervention on such a grand scale, Acheson declared, would 
have been "resented by the mass of the Chinese people, would 
have diametrically reversed our historic policy, and would 
1957), p. 7. Hiss received his original appointment to the 
State Department on September l, 1936, as an assistant to 
the Assistant Secretary of State. On January 16, 1942, he 
was promoted to Assistant to the Adviser on Political Rela-
tions. For several months in early 1944, he served as Spec-
ial Assistant to the Director, Office of Far Eastern Affairs. 
On May 1, 1944, he was promoted to the Office of Special Po-
litical Affairs, where he was involved in United Nations 
activities. Register Of The Department of State 1946, (Wash-
ington, D.Co: United States Printing Office, 1947), p. 268. 
6 Department of State, United States Relations with Chi-
.D.E., With Special Reference to the Period 1944-.1949 · (Washing-
ton, D.C.: Government Printing Office 1949), p. XV. 
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7 have been condemned by the American people. 11 But there 
were those Congressmen who could only explain the steady 
deterioration in China by finding an imaginary conspiracy 
in the United States State Department. 
With the pqblication of the China White Paper Judd 
sharpened his attack on the State Department and the Truman 
Administration in general. He saw in the White Paper "1,000 
pages ... dug out of the past to try to justify the colossal 
defeats" which the State Department had suffered in Asia 
since World War II. He viewed the Government document as a 
collection of o~ly those pieces of evidence which the State 
Department considered to be in favor of its position in 
China "coupled with unabashed special pleading for that 
position. 118 Judd contended that selection of material for 
the White Paper was made, 11 not for the purpose of arriving 
at the whole ~ruth or of laying the most substantial basis 
for policy, 11 but rather to conceal the fact that the State 
Department possessed a responsible appraisal (the Wedemeyer 
Report) of the Chinese situation and recommendations for a 
policy completely at variance with the appraisal and policy 
9 
of the State Department. A New York Times editorial, on 
7 Ibid., pp. XV-XVI. 
8
uoSo, Congressional Record, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., 
1949, XCV, Part 9, 11882. 
9New York Times, August 22, 1949, p. 20. 
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August 22, asserted apparently on the basis of the writer's 
evaluation that Judd was "a person of outstanding integrity" 
and because he "would not make charges lightly". such conten-
tions "must necessarily add to the already considerable mis-
trust with which the White Paper had been received. 1110 The 
White Paper, Judd declared, released the Wedemeyer report 
two years too late. By suppressing the report and failing 
to follow Wedemeyer's recommendation, Judd declared, the 
Administration "assumed a responsiblity for the disaster in 
11 China which it can never escape. 11 Judd accused the State 
Department of deliberately withholding "documents and facts" 
in the White Paper, omissions which he felt must be reveal-
ed.12 Thefe were sixteen documents, reports and statements 
which Judd charged should be secured by the State Department 
13 
and released. 
lOibid. 
11u.s., Conaressional Record, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., 
1949, XCV, Part 9, 11882. 
12Ibid. 
13 The documents, facts, and Judd's comments on them, 
which Judd charged the Administration withheld from publica-
tion in the China White Paper were: 
"First. '1:'he 1944 to 1949 top secret report on the Chi-
nese Communists prepared by the Military Intelligence Ser-
vice of the American Army--and reportedly suppressed by 
General Marshall. I have had a copy of its conclusions for 
almost 4 years but naturally have never disclosed them. Now, 
however, after the State Department releases scores of other 
secret documents on the subject, I have no hesitancy, in 
fact, I regard it as my duty to make the report public. 
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"Second. The document containing F. D.R. 's secret 
offer at Tehran to give Stalin 'rights' in Manchuria--just 
1 week after he made contradictory promises to Chiang at 
Cairo-:--,and an explanation why the offer was made. It is 
impossible to appreciate or evaluate the Yalta blunder ex-
cept in terms of the Cairo commitments which are convenient-
ly omitted. 
"Third. The full text of Potsdam agreements with Rus-
sia on China. 
"Fourth. F. D.R. 's famous telegram to Chinese Gener-
alissimo Chiang ~ai-shek delivered by General Stilwell about 
September 19, 1944. 
"Fifth. ~he previous message from General Stilwell to 
General Marshall in Washington soliciting the President's 
dictatorial telegram to Chiang. 
"Sixth. Chiang's answer to F. D.R. demanding General 
Stilwell's recall; 
"Seventh. F. D.R. 's message to Chiang in March 1945 
requesting him to place Communists on the Chinese delegation 
to the San Francisco Conference; 
"Eighth. The full reports, not just selected extracts, 
from American Foreign Service officers in China, especially 
in the years 1944-45, notably by Messrs. Davies, Service, 
and Ludden, wherein they showed themselves pro-Communist 
and against the Chinese Government which was our ally and 
assumed we were 9upporting, not working against, it; 
"Ninth. Directives to Ambassador Hurley and his re-
ports and recomniendations; 
"Tentl).. The Henry Wallace report to F. D.R. on China 
in 1944--allegedly written by Owen Lattimore and John Car-
ter Vincent, who accompanied Wallace on his trip. The 
white paper says this report is not in the State Department 
files. It must be produced from whereever it is and pub-
lished; 
"Eleventh. After F. D.R. 's death, the telegram from 
Washington to Ambassador Hurley in China instructing him to 
disregard the Roosevelt policy of support for the Chinese 
Government and to act toward the Chinese Communists as Henry 
Wallace had; 
"Twelfth. Some explanation why no reference is made 
in the white paper to the Lauchlin Currie, Owen Lattimore, 
and Donald Nelson missions to China, their reports and re-
commendations; 
"Thirteenth. Full directives by General Marshall or 
other officials to the American military advisory group in 
Nanking limiting the assistance and advice they might give 
to the Chinese Government forces; 
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Had the documents which J"udd cited been included in 
the White Paper its general nature would have been altered 
very little, if any. The so-called 11 deliberately omitted" 
documents were no more damaging to the Administration's pol-
icy, as Judd attempted to present them to be, than other 
material included. But to Judd, apparently for argument's 
sake, it was impossible 11 to judge the case [which] the ad-
ministration str.i ves to make for i tself'1 without the so-
11 d . . . f 'd 14 ca e missing pieces o ev1 ence. Judd's action in de-
manding that certain documents be made public was perhaps 
more of a d~vice to embarrass the Administration than to get 
at the "truth" as he termed it. For the most part, the 
documents which Judd demanded were not essential in deter-
mining or accounting for the course which the United States 
"Fourteenth. The original text of General Wedemeyer' s ... 
statement of August 1947, in order to compare it with the 
version actually released after it has been transmitted to 
Gen~ral Marshall, then at the Rio conference, and doctored 
by someone there on in the Department here; 
11 Fifte19nth. The full text of Acting President Li 
Tsung-jen's recent letter to President Truman whereof Sec-
retary Achepon had reproduced only three paragraphs, the 
motivation for which cannot be understood without the rest 
of the lett1=r. 
"Sixteenth. The explanation of why nothing from Gen-
eral MacArthur or SCAP has been included. Is it possible 
that they never were asked to present their views as to 
what they think necessary in Asia in order to keep Japan 
independent and solvent? Or were their views disregarded'?" 
Ibid. 
14Ibid. 
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pursued in Chj.na. It was the very thing which Judd demand-
ed for China which the Administration feared and would not 
allow--complete entanglement in the Chinese civil war. Judd 
viewed the situation in China as "essentially similar" to 
that which the United States faced in Greece. This was not 
a logical conclusion in regard to the two countries, and if 
Judd ever came to the conclusion that the situation in China 
was essentially different from Greece, he never admitted it. 
Judd charged that the Democratic Administration since 
F.D.R. 's death had not tried "to win the war in China, 11 but 
1 II t • d to d • t II 15 on y rie en 1 . Despite Judd's acceptance of 
Wedemeyer's recommendations for China in general, he seem-
ingly refused to accept the General's admonition that "mil-
itary force in itself will not eliminate communism,n and 
that further aid to China should be based on domestic re-
16 form. But Judd was to charge at a later date, by innuenr 
does, that even the Wedemeyer report had to be "doctored" 
17 
by the State Department or some minor governmental official. 
Regardless of Judd's charges, Wedemeyer asserts in his re-
port: "To regain and maintain the confidence of the people, 
15Ibid. 
16
united States Relations with China, p. 258. 
17
u.s., Congressional Record, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., 
1949, XCV, Part 1:1a-s-2-. 
the Central Government will have to effect irrunediately 
drastic, far-reaching political and economic reforms. 1118 
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To Judd's charge that the spread of Communist power in Chi-
na was the fault of Secretary of State Dean Acheson, Presi-
dent Truman and the late President Franklin D. Roosevelt, 
Dr. Ting'u F. Tsiang, Nationalist China's representative 
in the United States, commented that while he 11 re-
spected Mr. Judd's wisdom he did 'not share all of his 
1 . . 1 . . . ,1119 po 1t1ca an1mos1t1es. 
While condemning Acheson for the White Paper, Judd in-
serted into the Congressional Record the summary of a sec-
ret report, which he asserted had been made by the Army 
Military Intelligence Service in 1944-45, of the Chinese 
Communist movement. He declared that he had possessed the 
20 
report for nearly four years. Judd termed the report 
"secret" but did not specify how he obtained the. report or 
why the 11 classified1,1 material had been turned over to him. 
Neither Judd nor the summary of the report indicated at 
whose direction the study had been made, its purpose, its 
final disposition, or who had compiled the summary. The 
18
united States Relations with China, p. 258. 
19 New York Times, October 10, 1951, p. 4. 
20 For text of this summary report see~ UoSo, Congress-
ional Record, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., 1949, XCV, Part 15, 
A5501-03. 
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11 secret document 11 stated nothing new or startling in terms 
of objectives of the Chinese Corrununists. But apparently 
Judd did not have all the information about what he was re-
leasing, or pe sought to obtain political advantages from 
it and continued to operate on the theory that had the re-
port been followed then in his words "today's catastrophe 
. h b ' ,,21 m1g t not e upon us. Judd c;harged~ "it cannot be that 
this report was not available to our State Department, es-
pecially when General Marshall was its Secretary." How, 
Judd queried, 11 could anyone have read its conclusions and 
then followed policies in China based on suppositions 
wholly contri;idictory to those conclusions? 11 Further, Judd 
asserted, 11 0n what possible excuse can the document have 
been omitted from the white paper which is supposed to give 
our people a full and balanced picture of the situation in 
China and why we did as we did. 11 Setting aside the question 
of validity of the release, Judd found it a convenient wea-
pon in his attempt to discredit the Administration and em-
barrass Secretary Acheson. To Judd, "no fair-minded person" 
could have read this document and then tried to justify the 
Administration's China policy as Secretary Acheson had 
. 22 
sought to do in his letter transmitting the White Paper. 
21Ib1'd., A5501 p. . 
22Ibid. 
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The Secretary of State, during a press conference on 
August 24, endeavored to answer Judd and other critics of 
the White Paper. ~e declared with a note of finality, the 
New York Times related, "that there was 'not an iota of 
truth' in charges and insinuations that the State Department 
had deliberately omitted important documents from its White 
Paper on United States-Chinese relations." The Secretary 
further declared that "these charge,s and insinuations, 
which implied bad faith on the part of the State Department 
in making public the history and rationale of its policy 
with China, "are not supported by any evidence." They could 
not be supported, he asserted, "because there is not an iota 
of truth in them. 1123 He stated that the documents which Judd 
cited were not in the State Department's files, or were not 
considered important to the over-all China situation, or 
they did not give substantially different meanings or im-
pressions from extracts of other material which had been 
included in the White Paper. ·24 01 Calmly, u the Times related, 
"but with a hint of exasperation at the insistence of the 
charges, Mr. Acheson presented an analysis of sixteen alle-
25 gations of 'dishonesty' in the White Paper." 
23New York Times, August 25, 1949, p. 25. 
-- ---, 
24 C . 1 R d U. So , ongress1ona ecor , 81st Cong., 1st Sess., 1949, 
XCV, Part 11, 15091. 
25New York Times, August 25, 1949, p. 25. 
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Secretary Acheson also made available to reporters, on 
August 25, a two-volume War Department report of 412 pages 
on China and a thirteen page summary of that report, which 
Judd had previously read into the Record as a startling ex-
pose. The summary, Acheson asserted, "had heretofore not 
been seen by the State Department. 11 Acheson specifically 
answered Judd's charges regarding this summary and report. 
It was the opinion of the State Department that Judd had 
seen only the summary when he made his charges, and that 
the "summary" did not adequately cover the full report, but 
in many instances 11 drew conclusions that were the direct 
26 
opposite of those offered in the master volumes. 11 In his 
analysis of the sixteen charges made by Judd against the 
State DepartmE;:!nt White Paper, Secretary Acheson declared: 
The report of the military intelligence 
division of the War Department entitled 'The 
Chinese Communist Movement' dated July 1945, 
states the fact of which the department was 
always aware that the Chinese Communists were 
Communists. ~t also stated that some of the 
keenest observers go so far as to predict the 
ultimate ascendancy of the Chinese Communists 
in China if the present reactionary groups are 
allowed to continue in power. 
It fully confirms the view of the Depart-
ment that the conduct of the ruling clique in 
the Kuomintang [the Chinese Nat.i,onalist Gov-
ernment party] had caused the Government to 
lose its popular following. It confirms the 
view expressed in the 'White Paper' that dur-
ing the war against Japan the Government in 
26Ibid. 
Chunking was devoting more attention to strength·-
ening its internal position than to fighting the 
common enemy. 
It states that 'unity between the Chinese 
political parties is the key to a solution of 
China's problems. ' It argues in favor of agree-
ment between the Chinese National Government and 
the Soviet Union. 27 
It was not, however, until nearly two months later 
that Judd publicly replied to Acheson's news conference. 
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He then charged that if 11 those in charge of American policy 
in Asia failed to secure and study" the War Department re-
port which he had released, 11 then they were guilty of some-
thing worse. 1128 Judd thus did not charge the Administra-
tion or the Se~retary of State as such with having 11 pro-
Communist" leanings, but by snipping and innuendoes he im-
plied that they chose to listen to "pro-Communists" over 
certain military men--men who agreed with his assessment 
of the China situation. There were the Generals Stilwell, 
Marshall, and Barr, Judd declared, who said that nothing 
could be done for China. There were, however, in contrast 
to these three, MacArthur, Chennault, and Wedemeyer, who 
advocated the course that China would be saved; and there 
were eight Admirals, "Hart, Yarnell, Barbey, Leahy, Cooke, 
Kincaid, 'followed by Badger and then Radford, who said it 
27Ibid. 
28
uoSo, Congressional Record, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., 
1949, XCV, Part 11, 15091. 
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could and must be done." Thus, Judd asserted, those indi-
viduals in the War and State Department and in the Executive 
branch who said nothing could be done for China "should be 
removed from office or take themselves out of ... [the] ... 
predicament where they ... [had] to struggle with something" 
ld d . l' h' 29 they cou not succee 1n accomp 1s 1ng. 
Judd then reported that he felt "constrained" to re-
lease another document. Since his first expose he had not 
achieved the desired results, and since the State Department 
chose to ignore his demands, Judd became more reckless in 
his charges. His release on October 19, 1949, was the full 
text of a memorandum by John S. Service, a foreign service 
officer assigned to China, which had been submitted to Gen-
eral Stilwell on October 10, 1944. Service, at the time, 
was stationed at the Communist Headquarters in Yenan. The 
30 
"Service memorandum" is summarized in the White Paper, 
and the full text does not reveal any additional insight 
into Service's evaluation of the complex problem which fac-
ed the United States in China at that time. Judd, however, 
apparently believed that by inserting Service's report and 
29
walter H. Judd, "How Can We Be So Stupid? We Help 
Our Enemy and Deny Our Friends, 11 Vital Speeches of the Day, 
XVII (March·l, 1951), 298. 
30
see: United States Relations with China, p. 574. 
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31 
an address by Wedemeyer, he could win Congressional sym-
pathy for his cause by offering a comparison of the ideas 
of a man whom he considered a patriotic American with one 
whose ideas had to be less than patriotic--Service had 
charged that the Kuomintang would not allow needed reforms 
"because its war against Japan is secondary to its desire 
32 
to maintain its own undemocratic power. 11 Judd charged 
that Service illustrated "the conniving against highest 
officials of the Government of China ... carried on even dur-
33 ing the war by representatives of our Government. 11 
Judd continued to berate Service and the State Depart-
ment by inference: "After Mr. Service was transferred from 
China ... he was involved in the Amerasia case ... [a] notori-
ously pro-Commu~ist magazine .... Since then he has been 
promoted several times and is now Chairman of the Committee 
within the State Department which makes recommendations for 
11 . ..34 a promotions. Judd then made the caustic statement 
that mistakes of the Service nature would in the armed for-
31wedemeyer's address was, made at the Double Ten cele-
bration of the Chinese Republic, Roosevelt Hotel, New York, 
on October 10, 1946; U.S., Congressional Record, 81st Cong., 
1st Sess., 1949, XCV, Part 11, 15091-94. 
32 b'd I 1 ., .p. 15092. 
33
rbid., p. 15091. 
34Ibid., p. 16092. 
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ces "produce a court martial,ia but in "the State Department 
h . ..35 t ey earn promotions. By such tactics Judd apparently 
felt that the State Department would be forced to assume 
the role in China which he desired. 36 
John K. Fairbank, on October 20, 1949, took the New 
York Times to task for giving credence to Judd's charges 
without presenting the other side of the story. Fairbank 
pointed out that the "United Press report of the same day 
[October 19, 1949] quotes the department press officer, who 
pointed out that the White Paper on China had already pub-
lished the 'most forceful' parts of Mr. Service's document." 
This point was omitted from the Times news article. "Your 
report further implies," Fairbank continued, "that in the 
Amerasia case Mr. Service was one of those who 'escaped' 
indictment, a phrase which suggests that you consider the 
law to have been thwarted by. its own procedures. 11 Comment-
ing on Service's position in the State Department, Fairbank 
declared that Service is not, as Judd alleges, "chairman of 
the State Department Promotion Committee." Fairbank defend-
35
rbid. 
36 New York Times covered Judd's charges on October 19, 
1949. New York Times, October 20, 1949, p. 24. 
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3-
ed Service's reports of 1943 and 1944 1 as "farsighted" and 
"courageous"; he praised Service for his foresight of the 
"disaster" which the United States would experience if the 
country "relied entirely on the Kuomintang to maintain our 
position in China. 11 Service's warnings, Fairbank continued, 
"were distasteful to Ambassador Hurley and were disregarded, 
but the disaster in China has now occurred nevertheless." 
Fairbank in closing gives an expression of Judd's influence 
on the China policy: "It ill becomes Congressman Judd, 
whose intense partisanship for Chiang Kai-shek has been re-
garded by many as contributing to our present predicament, 
to read into the Congressional Record just before adjourn-
ment an 'exposure' of a document, the main points of which 
had already been published. 1138 
Judd was unwilling at this late date to accept the 
strength or popular support of the Chinese Communist move-
ment. In 1953, however, he could charge~ "One of the 
gravest errors ever made by our Government, under the 
never-ending hammering of Communist-inspired propaganda, 
37 f • I u • d For text o Services reports see n1te st,tes Re-
lations with China, pp. 564-76. 
38Letter to editor, "Mr. Service and the White Paper, 11 
John K. Fairbank, Cambridge, Mass., October 20, 1949; New 
York Times, November 2, 1959, p. 26. 
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was to underestimate the strength of the Chinese Cormnun-
ists. 1139 He still believed it possible "for Communist ex-
pansion in China to be stopped by a change in American pol-
icy.1140 One of the most persistent overriding fallacies of 
the Asia-First element was their refusal or their inability 
to judge and accept the might of the Chinese Communist for-
ces and the popular support which they had amassed in China. 
On August 19, 1949, Judd commented: "It appears the State 
Department prefers not to make a change 11 in its policy to-
ward China; if this be the case, "then the communization of 
Asia and World War III are inevitable. 1141 Not only with 
Judd, but with the Asia-Firsters, the inevitability of 
World War III became a most common byline--they never tired 
of repeating the phrase. 
No longer was it difficult for Judd and the Asia-First-
er element to accept the thesis that Marshall's mission of 
1946 was a deliberate move to embarrass Chiang Kai-shek, to 
undermine his prestige, and to strengthen the Communists. 
Only as part of a sinister plot could they see Marshall pub-
licly calling upon Chiang Kai-shek to take the Chinese 
39
u.s., Congressional Record, 83rd Cong., 1st Sess., 
1953, XCIX, Part 9, All80. 
40
u.So, Congressional Record, 83rd Cong., 1st Sess., 
1953,XCIX, Part 15, A5445-46. 
41Ibid., p. A5446. 
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Corrununists leaders into a coalition government. Such a pro-
posal, they proclaimed, coming officially from a country 
that was historically Chtna's friend denoted that more than 
honest and sincere diplomacy was involved. Thus, Judd de-
clared, on VJ Day the United States had "almost every ace 
and every trump in the Pacific, 11 and still "lost the game." 
In Judd's mind Marshall stood condemned: "Whoever was the 
author or architect of the policies for establishing a co-
alition with the Chinese Corrununists, General Marshall was 
f h 1 . , 1142 executor o- t e po 1c1es. The Administration's policies 
in China, Judd asserted, demonstrated how 11 irrunature 11 the 
State Department officials were in the political and ideolo-
gical fields. 43 
The legislative branch had fought a losing battle with 
the State Department, Judd stated time after time. Had the 
Administration adopted and "vigorously pursued" policies in 
Asia similar to those in Europe, then the United States 
could have prevented the "catastrophe beyond estimation" not 
only to American security but to any prospect of having a 
balance of power in the world. With Corrununists in control 
in China the world balance of power was broken, Judd felt, 
42 
· · 1 R d 81 C 2 d UaS0 1 Congress1ona ecor, st ong., n Sess., 
1950, XCVI, Part 11, 14960. 
43
uaS., Congressional Record, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., 
1949, XCV, Part 14, A3668. 
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and thus the United States could no longer exert sufficient 
influence on the Soviet Union toward cooperation rather than 
44 
conquest. Judd, however, believed that Chiang Kai-shek 
could be returned to the mainland and that China could be 
restored to Nationalist control with relative ease. If not, 
45 
he asserted, "it means inevitable war with Communist China." 
Because a third world war was inevitable if China went Com-
munist, to the Asia-First thought process, "preventive 
war" gradually became their group cry. Thus, Judd as he 
had done only a decade before, took up the mantle to warn 
the American people of the inevi tabi.li ty of war. But unlike 
his earlier venture his 1949 prophecy was to prove less ac-
curate. 
Despite the activities of the China friends in the 
United States in trying to goad the Administration to take 
a firmer position in China, the deterioration of the Nation-
alist regime prevented any beneficial American assistance. 
Chiang Kai-shek went into n retirement" on January 21, 1949. 
General Li Tsung-jen, who in 1948 had been named Vice Pres-
ident over Chiang's objections, assumed the position of 
acting President of the Republic of China. On the surface 
44Ibid. 
45
uos., Congressional Record, 81st Cong., 2nd Sess., 
1950, XCVI, Part 11, 14960. 
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it appeared that Chiang I s self-·~ernoval had disposed of the 
major obstacle to the success of a more effective American 
policy in China. A closer observation of the Chinese poli-
tical development demonstrates that this was not the case. 
The Generalissimo had, prior to the announcement of his 
so-called retirement from the presidency, transferred the 
Republic's liquid assets of gold bullion, silver bullion, 
and foreign exchange notes, from Nanking to Forrnosa. 46 
46Tang Tsou, America's Failure in China 1941-1950 
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1963), p. 497; 
New York Times, February 15, 1949, p. 7. Chiang's shipment 
of the above cited assets to Formosa was the subject of a 
heated debate between Torn Connally (D-Tex), the avid pro-
Administration China policy advocate, and William F. Know-
land (R-Calif), the extreme anti-Administration China policy 
critic, in September, 1949. The exchange of words between 
the two Senators resulted from an amendment to the mutual 
defense assistance legislation offered by Knowland to give 
$150,000,000 to the Nationalist Government. 
Connally, opposing Knowland's amendment, declared on 
September 7: 111 When it comes to.having our Government give 
something more to China, we shall consider that in the com-
mittee .... I do not think it is fair for the Senator to be 
making speeches on the floor of the Senate for popular con-
sumption, in an effort to stir up the ragged battalions of 
those who would throw $2,000,000,000 or $3,000,000,000 more 
into the rat hole in China in order to resuscitate and bring 
to life Chiang Kai-shek, who has deserted his people and has 
gone to Formosa with $138,000,000 in gold in his pocket, 
money which does not belong to him. It did belong to the 
Chinese Government, but he has absconded with it. Why do 
not they spend the $138,000,000 before they call on us for 
· another hand-out? 1 11 U o S. 0 Congressional Record, 81st Cong., 
2nd Sess., 1949, XCV, Part 10, 12640. 
Two days later, September 9, Knowland challenged Con-
nally's statement that Chiang had absconded with the $138, 
000,000. Knowland expressed his contempt for the Adminis-
tration forces by declaring: "'I am becoming a little bit 
11 fed up 11 with persons being "whispered to death" by the 
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Furthermore, Chiang had requested that after December, 1948, 
all future American shipments, as provided by the Chinese 
Assistance Act, be delivered to Formosa. Thus, even during 
his so-called retirement, Chiang controlled Formosa and the 
party machinery of the Kuomintang with an iron fist, and he 
did interfere with governmental affairs and political poli-
cies by behind-the-scene maneuvers and through his personal 
followers. Chiang also "retained actual control over the 
navy and air force and two major army groups on the mainland, 
whose active cooperation and effective employment were in-
47 dispensable for a successful defense of the Yangtze." The 
' 
Yangtze was considered a formidable barrier to the advance 
of the Communist forces, who had neither a navy nor an air 
force, and who lacked experience in amphibious warfare. 
Department of State or with information being given out from 
time to time to undermine and to pull the rug from under the 
non-Communist forces in China., because every time that is 
done, in my judgment, it means aid and encouragement to the 
Communist forces in that great country. 111 Immediately fol-
lowing Knowland' s remarks Connally reported: 11 'I want to 
apologize. I made an error in my statement at that time. 
I said that Chiang Kai-shek had taken $138,000,000 in gold~ 
I was absolutely in error. He took more than $300,000,000 
in gold to Formosa. I did not say he took it to spend for 
himself. I said it belonged to the Nationalist Government 
of China. He resigned his position in the Nationalist Gov-
ernment. He is supposed to be a private citizen, and yet 
he takes the gold that belongs to the treasury of the Na-
tionalist Government. '" Ibid., p. 127 58. 
4 7 Am · ' F '1 . Ch. 497 Tsou, er1ca s a1 ure l..!1 1na, p. . 
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With North China lost to the Nationalists and Chiang 
Kai-shek in "retirement" the United States faced the alter-
native of defending the Yangtze with American forces or 
further withdrawing from China. When due consideration is 
given to other pressing problems facing the Administration 
in the late 1940's it is clear that the Administration had 
little choice. Furthermore, there was a serious question 
whether American intervention at this time could have changed 
the course of events in China. American assumption of a 
more positive role would have required countless men, 
monies, and resources which the American public was appar-
ently unwilling to furnish. Only a minority of those Ameri-
cans interviewed in several national surveys favored strong 
. C ' t ' . Ch' 48 measures to resist ommunis expansion in ina. The 
American Chamber of Commerce of Tientsin, China, expressed 
similar feelings in March, 1949. On March 12, the Consul 
General at Tientsin forwarded to the State Department the 
text of a memorandum from the Chamber of Commerce which 
strongly opposed further aid to the Chinese Government. 
Three days later the Consul General commented: 11 Americans 
in Tientsin feel that the only result of further U.S. aid 
to a Government which has proved so ineffective that most 
48Gabriel A. Almond, The American l:_eople and Foreign 
Policy (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1950), p. 105. 
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[of] our previous aid has passed to the Communists will be 
to further strengthen the Communists .... They feel that our 
global policy of opposition to Communism should not oblige 
us to support a hopelessly inefficient and corrupt govern-
ment which has lost the support of its people .... They feel 
that the present situation must be solved by the Chinese 
and that for the time being we should adopt a hands-off pol-
. 1149 icy. 
To Judd, however, a 11 hands off" policy in China would 
eventually result in the conquest of the United States by 
the Communist forces. Judd's thesis was that there were 
four areas of the world where two ideologies--Democracy and 
Communism--were contending for the "mastery of men's minds." 
Judd still held the concept that Communism wins initially 
by force--not by propaganda. To Judd, however, the future 
of the world depended on which one of these ideologies--De-
mocracy or Communism--was victorious in each of these four 
areas. The ~irst area was Germany, which Judd viewed as 
decisive to the future of Europe. "As Germany goes so will 
50 go Europe," Judd declared. The second crucial area 
49
united States Relations with China, pp. 299-300. 
50u~ so, Congressional .Re.cord, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., 
1949, XCV, Part 9, 12293. Judd recommended nhighly" Freda 
Utley's book, The High Cost of Vengeance (Chicago: H. Reg-
nery Co., 1949), as a "sharp penetrating study." 
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were the countries of the perimeter area of Germany on the 
South and West. The third vital area was Asia. He accepted 
and expounded the "domino theoryn for Asia. If a single 
Asian country was lost to the Communist camp, Judd believed, 
then all other Asian countries would follow. 51 By 1949, 
Judd was expressing frequently the thesis that if Asia was 
not to remain "free" in the "democratic camp" then it would 
have been better to have Asia under the Japanese than under 
Russian domination. This argument resulted from his fear 
of a strong Russian influence in both Europe and Asia. Judd 
apparently rejected'nationalism, which has been a great 
force in world history, feeling that the Chinese Communists 
were committed to rnaking the Soviet Union the strongest 
force on earth. At this time Judd felt that a strong Japan 
in Asia could be used against Russia's absorbing all of 
Asia, and thus it would have been better for the United 
States to have Japan the strongest power in Asia than to al-
low Russia to be the strongest power in both Europe and 
. 52 Asia. 
11 It isn't that we don't care about Europe when we say 
you've got to pay attention to Asia," Judd argued, "it's 
51walter H. Judd, uWhich Direction in Foreign Policy," 
Midland Schools, LXIII (December 1948), 12. 
52Ibid., p. 13. 
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53 because we do care about Europe." To Judd a Russia with 
satellites all along her Asiatic frontier would have secur-
ity against the West; then she could turn attention to Eur-
ope and defeat American security there. Thus, to Judd the 
"best hope ... of preventing war with Russia" involved keep-
ing China "in the ring so that the Soviet Union has got to 
divide its forces, its energies, and its efforts between 
two widely separated fronts. 1154 In turn, the fourth and 
last crucial area in Judd's argument was the United States. 
Why the United States? Because in the United States "those 
who mold our policies will determine what happens in Europe 
and Asia--and whether we are to be free," Judd declared. 
The great mistake, Judd argued at this time, was that the 
United States ever assumed that the Soviet Union was a 
"peace-loving democracy. 1155 
Despite the fact that Judd had once accepted the good 
intentions of the Soviet Union, he could expound with appar-
ently no qualms what he believed at the time, regardless of 
having believed something else at another time. Despite 
the reality that arguments of the vast majority of politic-
ians vary with the changing international climate, Judd's 
53Ibid. 
54Ibid. 
SSibid. 
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vindictive and self-righteous indictments placed him in a 
unique political category. Judd apparently found it conven-
ient to charge that it was Acheson's "negativism," a 11 de-
featism," which allowed Mao Tse·-tung and his cohorts to pro-
claim the establishment of the People's Republic on October 
1, 1949, and to complete their conquest by the end of the 
year. Judd, like Wedemeyer, found it more comforting to 
blame the Administration for the defeat of the Chinese 
"spirit" to stay the spread of Communist forces into South 
China than to accept the possible reality that the Chinese 
peasants lacked an alternative in opposing Communism. Both 
men (as was true of the Asian clique) failed to realize or 
failed to accept what might be termed the Chinese peasants' 
alternative--Communism did offer the. Chinese peasant a hope 
for a better tomorrow, while Chiang seemed to offer nothing 
more than another forty years of despotism. John K. Fair-
bank'' s account of Communist victories in China varies widely 
from Judd's. To Fairbank .what the "nationalist troops lack-
ed was something worth fighting for as an alternative to 
Chinese Communism. 1156 Thus, Fairbank concluded: "On bal-
ance, I am afraid we must put the Communist victory in 
China down as a case of self-determination, not of outside 
56John K. Fairbank et al., Next Step in Asia (Cam-
bridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1949), p. 18. 
. ..57 
aggression. 
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With China in the hands of the Mao forces, the Secre-
tary of State, on January 12, 1950, proceeded to approach 
the Asian problem in terms of American military strategy. 
Speaking before the National Press Club, Acheson pointed 
out: 11 There is in this vast area what we might call a de-
veloping Asian consciousness, and a developing pattern ... 
based upon two factors which are pretty nearly common to 
58 
the entire experience of all Asian people." One of the 
factors was a 11 revulsion against the acceptance of misery 
and poverty as the normal condition of life. 11 The other 
was the 11 revulsion against foreign domination," and whether 
the foreign doIT\ination took the 11 form of colonialism" or 
whether it took the "form of imperialism," the Asians are 
. . h d 59 through with it, Ac eson asserte . He said that national 
independence to the Asian had 0 become the symbol both of 
freedom from foreign domination and freedom from the tyranny 
of poverty and misery." The Secretary of State then pre-
sented his interpretation of why the Nationalist regime 
57 Ibid. 
58
nean Acheson, "Relations of the Peoples of the Uni-
ted States and the Peoples of Asia: We can Only Help When 
We are Wanted, 11 Vital Speeches of the Day, XVI (February 1, 
1950), 239. 
59
rbid. 
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fell: 11What has happened in my judgment is that the almost 
inexhaustible patience of the Chinese people in their mis-
ery ended. 11 The Chinese people did not bother to "over-
throw11 their government, Acheson asserted, they simply "ig-
nored" it--the peasants "completely withdrew their support" 
, 
from the Chiang Government, and when the·ir support was with-
drawn, the "whole military establishment disintegrated." 60 
Thus, to Acheson when there was added to the "grossest in-
competence ever experienced by any military command" the 
11 total lack of support in both the armies and in the coun-
try," the Chiang regime could not continue. It was not the 
Communists that created this situation, Acheson asserted, 
but they were "shrewd and cunning to mount it, to ride this 
61 
thing into victory and power." 
; 
Judd, however, viewed the demise as resulting from 
America's great folly of putting "reform ahead of security"' 
in China. Thus, to Judd the Administration's "pre-occupa-
tion" in China was to produce economic recovery and develop-
ment, based on the thesis that 11 Communism wins by propagan-
da, that people voluntarily choose Communism--and especially 
62 in countries where people are in poverty." In contrast 
60Ibid. 
61
rbid., p. 240. 
62uos., Congressional Record, 81st Cong., 2nd Sess., 
1950, XCVI, Part 8, 10558. 
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to other occasions when it was expedient to dramatize pro-· 
paganda as a powerful weapon, Judd scoffed at Acheson em-
ploying it in explaining the Communist conquest of China. 
Here Judd left no room in his logic for degrees of the ef-
fectiveness of either propaganda or arms. He viewed all 
problems in absolute terms. Judd's argument was that Com-
munism "never ... won a country by propaganda"--Communism only 
wins by "force of arms." He could thus assert that "The 
really powerful and successful propaganda comes after, not 
63 before, the conquest." Judd apparently refused to accept 
to any degree the view that the civil war in China was "a 
war of ideas 11 coupled with a "war of armaments 11 rather than 
· 1 · ' h 1 64 a war of mi itary mig ta one. 
Acheson's willingness to use military might in Asia 
was entirely too limited to satisfy Judd or the Asia-First 
element. The Secretary of State spoke of the "defensive 
perimeter" of the United States in the Pacific as "running 
from the Aleutian Is.lands off Alaska, to Japan, to Okinawa 
63Ibid. 
64 
--rn 1952, however, during House debate on appropria-
tions for the Voice of America, Judd found it convenient to 
take the oppo!Site point of view: "But we cannot defeat 
ideas with arms," he asserted. 11 We can defeat ideas only 
with better ideas, more skillfully and successfully present-
ed." U. So, Corig;_r~_ssj.on_a~ ~ecord, 83rd Cong., 1st Sess., 
1953, XCIV, Part 7, 8894. 
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h h . 1 . ' " 65 h d south of Japan, and on tote Pi ippines. Ac eson ma e 
plain that the United States would fight if any of these 
points or any areas east of them were attacked. "So far 
as the military security of other areas in the Pacific is 
concerned," Acheson declared, "it must be clear that no 
person can guarantee these areas against military attack." 
Should an attack occur outside the "perimeter," Acheson 
continued, ""the initial reliance must be on the people at-
tacked to resist it and then upon the commitment of the en-
tire civilized world under the Charter of the United Nations 
which so far has not proved a weak reed to lean on by any 
people who are determined to protect their independence 
. 'd . ,,66 against outsi e aggression. It was folly for the United 
States, he declared, to attempt to furnish all the compon-
ents to solve the problems in China and the southern part 
of Asia. But, "if the will and if the determination exists 
and if the people are behind their government, then, only 
in such a situation could American assistance be effective, 
and only then could it lead to an accomplishment which could 
65Eric F. Goldman, The Crucial Decade: America, 1945-
1955 (New York~ Alfred A. Knopf, 1956), p. 152. 
66Acheson, "Relations of the Peoples of the United 
States and the Peoples of Asia," p. 241. 
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not otherwise be achieved," Acheson asserted. 67 
Answering his critics who pointed out logical inconsis-
tencies in American foreign aid and assistance, Acheson ex-
plained that to demand exactly the same relationship toward 
every country was not a "helpful way of discussing foreign 
policy," and it was "a very false trend." TheUnitedStates, 
he declared, must act in regard to a "foreign nation strict~ 
ly in regard to American interests or those wider interests 
which affect American interest." 68 Thus, "if it is to Amer-
ican interests or those wider interests which affect it, to 
do one thing in one country and another thing in another 
country," then this was the policy which the United States 
should follow. Acheson saw in his critics the failure to 
realize that the problems which faced China were quite dif~ 
ferent from the problems which plagued Greece. Thus he 
charged the Asia-Firsters were attempting to nbounce" one 
problem off of "another problem11 without facing the issue 
bl d . 1 . 1· . 69 or pro em irect y or in area istic manner. This 
67
rbid., pp. 241-42. It was generally agreed by mili-
tary men with knowledge of South Korea that the area would 
not be tenable if there were any real effort by Russia to 
take it. General Marshall expressed such sentiment during 
late 1948; U.S., Congressional Record, 81st Cong., 2nd 
Sess., 1950, XCVI, Part 1, 651. 
68
rbid., p. 244. 
69Ibid. 
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speech, Judd later declared, invited a Conununist attack on 
70 South Korea. 
On June 24, 1950, approximately six months after Ache-
son chided the Asia-Firsters and Judd about their unrealis-
tic attitude on American aid and assistance, the massive at-
71 tack on South Korea by North Koreans was launched. Three 
days later--June 27--President Truman announced that he had 
ordered United States air and naval .forces in East Asia to 
assist the South Koreans; furthermore, he instructed the 
Seventh Fleet to prevent any attack on Formosa. The follow-
ing day, in compliance with President Truman's request, the 
Nationalist Government ordered its forces to cease attacks 
on the Chinese mainland. The President had instructed the 
Seventh Fleet to see "that this is done"--an order later 
dubbed as the !ileashingu of Chiang Kai-shek. 72 The United 
Nations Security Council approved the appointment of General 
Douglas MacArthur as United Nations Commander in Korea on 
July 7, after having endorsed the President's action on June 
27. Whatever Congressional bipartisanship had characterized 
70u.s., Congressional Record, 81st Cong., 2nd Sess., 
1950, XCVI, Part 8, 10558. 
71 Eastern Standard Time. Early in the morning June 25, 
Korean time. 
72
congressional Quarterly Service, China and U.S. Far 
East Policy 1945-1966 (Washington, D. c.~ Congressional 
Quarterly Inc., 1967), p. 53. 
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the early months of the Korean conflict quickly disintegrated 
after the Red Chinese were discovered aiding the North Kor-
eans in October, 1950. The Korean conflict, however, was 
not the only factor in the ever widening split between the 
Executive and Legislative branches, or among the legislators. 
Earlier in the year Joseph R. McCarthy, a Wisconsin Republi-
can, set off the most devastating "witch hunt" the country 
had ever experienced, which only further complicated the 
execution of a rational·Asian policy. 
McCarthy was but one symptom of a greater condition 
which blanketed the country. In 1950, during Vandenberg's 
last illness, attempts at bipartisanship ground to an abrupt 
halt as the nation came under the grip of "a strange, un-
American malaise, compounded of personal insecurity, econom-
d . . f .. 73 ic doubts, an anti-Communist ears. A growing number of 
Americans sought simple answers to the complicated problems 
facing the nation--these Americans likewise, chose to follow 
the leaders who provided the simplest solution. Out of the 
resulting anxiety Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., saw arising a 
'
0New Isolationism00 which was later referred to by some his-
torians and journalists as "neo-isolationism." Schlesinger 
felt that the "New Isolationism01 was real and that it was 
73 Jack Anderson and Ronald W. May, McCarthy, The Man, 
the Senator, the "Ism" (Boston~ Beacon Press, 1952), p. 381. 
311 
bent upon what promised to be a fundamental attack on the 
foreign policy to which the United States and the free world 
. d 74 were comrn1tte . President Truman hinted at what Schlesin-
ger was saying when he wrote: "There were some [Americans 
by late 1950] who wanted to pull all our troops out of Korea, 
75 
turn out back on Europe, and build up a 'Fortress America.'" 
Schlesinger declared that "a new isolationist formula-
tion was bound to come--a new triangulation by which the old 
emotions would try to make terms with the new realities and 
76 issues in the form of up-to-date doctrine and program." 
Some observers saw 1n a December, 1950, speech of Herbert 
Hoover the "setting off11 of one phase of the discussion 
which evolved into the "New Isolationism. 11 Hoover had as-
serted in his address that the United States should withdraw 
to the defense of the American Continent: "The foundation 
of our national policies must be to preserve for the world 
77 
this Western Hemisphere Gibraltar of Western civilization." 
74Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., "The New Isolationism," 
Atlantic, CLXXXIX (May, 1952), 35. 
75 Harry S. Truman, Years of Trial and Hope~ Memoirs, 
vol. II (Garden City~ Doubleday and Co., 1956), p. 414. 
76 hl . Sc es1nger, "The New Isolationism," p. 36. 
77 b h 1 . 0 Norman A. Grae ner, Te New Iso at1on1sm: A Studv 
in Politics and Foreign Policy Since 1950 (New York~ Ron-
ald Press Co., 1956), p. 26. nsuch politically divergent 
figures as former President Hoover, and the late Senator 
Brien McMahon, Democratic Chairman of the Joint Congression-
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Hoover further declared that the United States did not need 
Europe for its defense. General MacArthur set off another 
phase of discussion with his speeches following his recall 
in 1951, demanding in April, 1951, 11 a cut in the size of 
projected military forces, a reduction in the military bud-
get, and a more aggressive war in Asia,u and added 11 subse-
quently that our reduced forces should be committed to the 
78 protection of the Suez Canal." The "supreme emotional 
link" of the "New Isolationism" with the "Old Isolationism," 
Schlesinger declared, was its dislike of allies and its 
desire for unilateral action by the United States. 1179 
The new isolationism wanted "o-ther nations to establish 
their own strength first in order to prove themselves wor-
thy of American aid," excepting only 11 Chiang Kai-shek or 
Franco." The "vital dangers to American freedom and survi-
val," according to this group, were not external; they were 
internal, and of the internal dangers two were of decisive 
importance: the dangers of excessive government spending, 
al Committee on Atomic Energy, both claimed that the defense 
budget could be reduced by billions, while our security was 
bring improved, by developing our atomic capability and air 
power to the full at the expense of 'conventional' land 
forces." New York Times Magazine, "Dissection of the 'For-
tress America' Idea," August 17, 1952, p. 7. 
78 hl . Sc es1nger, "The New Isolationism," p. 36. 
79Ib1' d., 36 37 pp. - . 
313 
80 
and the danger of Communist penetration within the country. 
Government spending, in the new isolationist view, was the 
· "overriding issue of national survival," and likewise, 
McCarthyism was an "indispensable part of the new isolation-
ism, because without it the new isolationism would be "al-
81 
most indistinguishable from a policy of appeasement." 
Thus the new isolationists or the neo-isolationists 
wrote Europe off in their program by giving "lip service" 
but employing a "mental reservation 11 in supporting programs 
of some commitment in Europe, for they had the apparent in-
. d 1 82 tent of eventual with rawa . The group, however, "had to 
implement its more aggressive program toward the Far East 
(it has been said that a neo-isolationist was one who wanted 
to fight in China) without challenging its domestic program 
of reduced expenditures. 1183 China, the neo-isolationists 
contended, had to be made safe for the United States through 
support of Chiang Kai-shek and the Nationalist cause. The 
safety of the United States, however, had to be achieved at 
"minimum cost and without [direct] American responsibility 
80
;rbid • / p • 37 • 
81Ibid., p. 38. 
82 b'd I l . I p. 37; Graebner, The New Isolationism, pp. 
25-26. 
83 Graebner, The New Isolationism, p. 27. 
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or involvement. 1184 In China America's traditional policy 
of the Open Door had been subverted by Communist victory, 
and thus America must once again regain the right to "ven-
ture forth'" without, however, the additional costs of mak-
. . f f h Am . 85 1ng Asia sa e or sue er1can ventures. 
Expectations for China presented the new isolationism 
with its chief challenge. The new isolationists accepted 
the hypothesis which Judd had been expressing for years 
that Chiang Kai-shek was preferable to anyone else in main-
taining America's safety in Asia; thus Chiang had to be re-
turned to power; and Communism as a direct threat to Ameri-
can democracy and safety must be driven from the Asiatic 
scene. But to execute such a venture required a price, 
"and this price might be so high that it would destory the 
domestic program of reduced expenditures and perhaps Ameri-
can security everywhere"--thus, the existence of Red Chinese 
power h~d to be explained away or denied. The defeat of 
Chiang Kai-shek, if against the United States' interest, 
then could not have been beyond America's power to prevent. 
84Ibid. For examples of articles which express this 
point of view, and read into the Record by Judd see: Con-
stantine Brown's articles, UoSo, Congressional Record, 83rd 
Cong., 1st Sess., 1953, XCIX, Pa:tt 12, A4930, and Edgar 
Ansel Mowrer's article, U.Sog Congressional Record, 82nd 
Cong., 2nd Sess., 1952, XCVIII, Part 8, A934. 
85 Graebner, The New Isolationism, p. 27. 
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Therefore, it was concluded that since the United States 
did not prevent the demise of the Nationalists on the main-
land, the real "threat 11 to the country's security through-
. 1· h 86 out Asia must ie at ome. 
It was thus Senator Joseph McCarthy, Republican of 
Wisconsin, who 11 supplied the rhetoric" which bound the 
Asia-First orientation of the new isolationism to the cher-
ished goal of limited expenditures. 87 The Senator's need 
for a campaign issue, and the resulting sensational charges, 
provided the new isolationism its needed nationale. By 
raising the charge of untold Communist subversion within 
the country, McCarthy produced the argument which would 
provide the reason for European withdrawal, concomitant with 
aggressiveness in Asia without burdening military commit-
ments. Since the United States did not accomplish the ob-
jective of subduing, or did not sufficiently aid in stay-
ing, the Communist takeover in China, it meant but one 
thing--that the United States State Department was full of 
Communists. The Asia-First or nee-isolationist did not ac-
cept the possible tenet that "Asia had unleased a new ener-
gy,1188 in the form of socialism against Western imperialism. 
86
rbid. 
87Ibid. 
88
rbid., p. 29. 
316 
Judd moved in rapidly to share the limelight of the 
early period of McCarthyism; however, he later regretted 
the uniformity he had attempted to present between McCarthy 
and himself. McCarthy made his first defamatory attack on 
February 11, 1950, charging that there were fifty-seven 
Communists working in the State Department. Then came the 
charge, on February 20, that the State Department contained 
not only fifty-seven Communists, but some eighty-one employ-
ees whose loyalties were "questionable" and who were being 
protected by their superiors. Only after the Senate had 
voted unanimously for an investigation by the Foreign Rela-
tions Committee was McCarthy forced to cite names. He ac-
cused Ambassador-at-Large Philip C. Jessup, who had headed 
the China White Paper compilation, as having "an unusual 
affinity for Communist causes, 1189 Other alleged 11 security 
risks 11 included Owen J. Lattimore of Johns Hopkins Univer-
sity, former personal adviser to Chiang Kai-shek and direct-
or of the Institute of Pacific Relations, and John S. Ser-
vice, a veteran foreign service diplomat; both men had ad-
vised the State Department in formulation of East Asian 
1 . . 90 po 1c1es. 
89China and UoSo Far East Policy 1945-1966, p. 49. 
90
rbid. See pp. 48-55 for a chronological account of 
McCarthy's activities in the early 1950'~ and Anderson and 
May, McCarthy, The Man, the Senator, the 11 Ism," passim. 
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In contrast to McCarthy, who was forced to name names 
or face the possibility of contempt charges by the Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee, Judd took the more cautious 
approach when striking out against the Administration and 
State Department. Judd could assert, without the reprisal 
which McCarthy was experiencing, that had the responsible 
people in charge of the China foreign policy listened to 
"those w'j:lo were willing to study thoroughly the Chinese 
Communists and their doctrines instead of reading the pro-
paganda of the Fairbanks, Lattimores, Edgar Snows, and the 
Far Eastern Division of the State Department,u then Chiang 
Kai-shek would not have fallen, and they could also see 
that the 61 Communists are in the process of making China a 
McCarthy later charged that Lattimore was Russia's "top 
espionage agent in America.n On April 6, 1950, Lattimore 
11 confronted McCarthy before the Senate Foreign Relations 
Subcommittee. To McCarthy's charge that Lattimore was the 
architect of the country's policy of abandoning China to 
the Communists, Lattimore said~ 'I wish I had more in-
fluence. If I had, I think the Communists would not now 
control China.' Lattimore called McCarthy a 'base and 
contemptible liar' and said he was 'either a fool or an 
enemy of his country. ' He dared the Senator to a.ccuse him 
off the Senat.e floor of being a Communist or Soviet spy. 
McCarthy answered that he would not repeat his charges 
without Congressional immunity unless the Government gave 
him Lattimore's loyalty files. Two weeks earlier, the 
Senator had said he would quit when the day came that he 
was afraid to repeat outside the Senate any charges he had 
made in the chambero 11 China and Uo§.• Far East Policy 1945-
1966, pp. 45,50. 
318 
colony of the Kremlin. 1191 Judd boasted on April 14, that 
he gave McCarthy "much" of the material used by McCarthy in 
his initial charges. He added, however, he did nqt think 
that McCarthy was handling the case very well. He cited 
McCarthy as "a fighting marine who just waded in instead of 
reconnoitering.n Judd declared that McCarthy was trying 
to conviGt the State Department 11 0n evidence the department 
has and he does not." Judd said he argued vainly for two 
hours to persuade McCarthy "not to make certain charges," 
because he was trying to convict the Administration on their 
own evidence. "Do you think the government is going to pro-
duce the evidence from its files? 18 Judd asked. inof course 
92 
not!" Judd asserted that the information he gave to 
McCarthy came 11 from individual FBI and State Department 
men. 11 The Department of Justice cannot be depend.ed on to 
"dig into the dangers cited by McCarthy," he added. The 
Republicans in Congress are supporting McCarthy's "objec-
tiven and admire his n1 courage 11 , Judd concluded. 93 He fur-
ther asserted that he had helped line up Louis Budenz, for-
mer editor of the Daily Worker, as McCarthy's chief witness. 
91u.s., Congressional Record, 81st Cong., 2nd Sess., 
1950, XCVI, Part 14, A2488. 
92Minneapolis Star, April 15, 1950. 
93Ibid. 
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"The country owes a great deal of gratitude, 11 Judd continued, 
"to another former Communist, Whittaker Chambers, who pro-
bably ruined his career by becoming chief witness to help 
convict Alger Hiss," former State Department official, of 
. 94 perJury. 
Only five days later Judd modified the story of his 
relationship to McCarthy. On April 19 he reported that the 
information he had turned over to the Wisconsin Senator was 
not sufficient to prove the charges that there were Commun-
ists in the State Department. He further departed from his 
original story by stating: 11 When McCarthy had made his 
charges and haq been challenged, he contacted me and I gave 
him what material I had from the previous investigation ... " 
(Judd was referring to an investigation conducted by the 
House Foreign Relations Corrunittee of the 80th Congress.) 
He continued that he "deplored" McCarthy's "blanket charges" 
and that McCarthy had, "in effect, issued a verdict before 
witnesses have been on the stand. 18 He added that he told 
McCarthy it was incomplete information which he possessed 
and that it should be investigated further before any direct 
charges are made. 11 Rather than look for Communists," Judd 
said, Congress should 11 investigate" key State Department 
94Ibid. 
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officials "on the basis of their record in foreign affairs." 95 
Earlier Judd
1
had commented in typical McCarthy fashion that 
11 Whether the Hisses, the Jessups, the Lattimores and the 
Achesons are or have been members of the Communist party, 
I don't know or care ... but look at their record of failure. 11 
But to Judd, whether it was 11 stupidity" or "disloyalty," 
these individuals should be disqualified from continuing in 
ff . 96 o ice. At the same time Judd indicated that the "Com-
munism charges should be exploited by Republicans in this 
year's elections. 11 In the past, he asserted, "Republicans 
have been guilty of failing to expose the errors of the 
Democratic national administration. 1197 Despite Judd's sug-
gestion that the Republicans should 11 expose" the Democrats, 
the Democrats retained control of both Houses in the Con-
gressional election of 1950 (the Senate, however, by only a 
majority of two). The year 1951, however, produced the most 
vicious a}tacks on the Administration as the demand for an 
expanded Asian war grew. 
During February, 1951, Judd, speaking to the Executive 
Club of C~icago, informed the club members that he was now 
95M. 1· 1nnea120 1s Star, April 19, 1950. 
96M. 1" 1nnea120 1s Star, April 15, 1950. 
97 Ibid. 
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"trying to prevent World War III. 1198 As he had spoken in 
the period 1939-1941, he spoke again in 1951: "while we 
try to prevent war [World War III] we must be prepared to 
win it if it comes. 11 He spoke as if he doubted whether 
there was time to make adequate preparations. Judd declared 
that the United States was n less secure 11 in 1951 than it had 
been when the nation had been founded. To Judd's mind the 
basic assumptions on which the policies were made which led 
to the difficulties facing the country in 1951 were the 
"abandonment" by Truman (and Roosevelt, during the latter 
period of his Administration) of the basic assumption or 
concept or policy which had been the United States' for al-
most a hundred years, which was designed to give the United 
States 11 security 11 on the West. 99 
Judd, ignoring the widely accepted economic interpre-
tation of the Open Door, chose to describe the Open Door 
policy as a pragmatic move by the United States--a policy 
not nbased on sentimental feeling for the Chinese," but on 
the thesis that the best "guarantee" of American security 
in the Pacific was to have an independent, friendly China. 
The Open Door, Judd asserted, was considered in this light 
by every Administration down to recent years. What Judd was 
98Judd, "How Can We Be So Stupid?" p. 293. 
99Ibid., p. 294. 
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saying was a classic example of the unique type of thinking 
advanced by the entire Asian clique and by neo-isolationists: 
"It did not matter" what type of government the Chinese peo-
ple wanted--this was beside the point. Whether the govern-
ment of China was democratic or not was none of America's 
business. What was America's business was whether the lead-
ers of China remained friendly to the United States and were 
willing to do w~at America wanted them to do. For China to 
have a "good go"fernment" was "desirable but wholly second-
ary," Judd proclaimed. Nor did it have to be an "honest 
government" or a,n "efficient government." The only important 
thing, the "key" Judd maintained, "what that the manpower 
and the resources of the bases of China be under Chinese 
friendly to the United States, and not under the control of 
potential enemies of the United States. 11100 It is interest-
ing to note here, in light of Judd's stand on China and 
America's dominant role there over the years, a comment 
which he made in 1945: 11 It is unfair to the British and to 
our allie 9 not to make clear that we Americans will never 
pledge our men and resources to maintain any empire or to 
prevent other people from doing the same sort of thing we 
lOOibid. 
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ourselves did, in 1776."lOl 
Judd condemned the Democratic Administration of Roose-
102 
velt and Truman for what he considered the abandonment of 
11 sound policy," and being '"led by some Pied Piper into con-
cern about whether the Chinese had liberal government and 
democratic government," and for wanting "to impose the 'Four 
103 Freedoms' ... on the whole world. 11 Thus to Judd the Demo-
cratic Administrations "abandoned sound policies and went 
off following a will-o'-the-wisp." This "new assumption" of 
the Democrats, Judd charged, developed from the idea that 
the independence and friendliness of Europe was more essen-
101walter H. Judd, inWhat Is the Truth about China? The 
Great Moral Decision of Chiang Kai-shek and the Chinese Peo-
ple," Vital Speeches of the Day, XI (June 1, 1945), 495. 
Chang Hsin-hsi, writing about Judd's remarks, said such an 
attitude was "how the Chiang Kai-sheks, Syngman Rhees, Bao 
Dais and Ngo Dinh Diems came into power and helped to make 
Communism popular. u He .continued: "Dr. Judd was a Chris-
tian missionary in China and a medical doctor! If one ex-
tends this view of China to the rest of the world, we can 
see why Commu~ism has grown so rapidly since the end of the 
Second World War. It has been helped by a series of govern-
ments that are sponsored and financed by the United States, 
whose interests they serve; and by serving the United States 
they serve themselves and oppress the people of whom they 
eventually make themselves the enemies. Is it any wonder 
that they rise to overthrow their governments and go over to 
the Communists? Mao Tse-tung used to say that Chiang Kai-
shek was his friend." Chang Hsin-hai, America fil1Q China: A 
New Approach To Asia (New York~ Simon and Schuster, 1965 ), p. 103. 
102 . . 1 . f D y· b For an interesting eva uation o r. Sun at-sen y 
Judd see: Judd, "How Can We Be So Stupid?" p. 294. 
l0 3Ibid. 
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. 1 Am . . t th th . d d f A · l04 t1a to er1can secur1 y - an e 1n epen ence o s1a. 
At this time Judd's hypothesis was that the Soviet Union, in 
her desire to control Europe, and because of failures in 
Greece and Germany, would try to capture Europe by a "flank-
ing movement'0 through Asia. Such a movement, he felt, ·would 
take the Soviet Union through China, Southeast Asia, to Af-
rica, and then on into Europe proper. Judd, in contrast to 
the "die-hard" group of neo-isolationists, advocated support 
for Europe-- 11 selective support 11 which would foster security 
for the United States. If we did not help Europe, Judd as-
serted, it would fall into the Soviet Union's lap 11 like a 
. l .. 105 
ripe p um. Aid to Europe, however, must carry the stip-
ulation that the recipient view as an enemy anyone and ev-
eryone whom the United States viewed as an enemy. When 
Great Britain was first considering giving recognition to 
Red China, Judd declared that it would be very difficult for 
Congress to support aid programs for Britain in the future 
as it had in the past, if she gave "official recognition" 
(to Red China) and thereby enormous assistance to the Commu-
nist puppet regime in China, an avowed enemy of the West 
and a partner of the Kremlin." 106 
l04Ibid. 
l05Ibid. 
106 C . l U o S", · ongress1ona 
1950, XCVI, Part 1, 14. 
Record, 81st Cong., 2nd Sess., 
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Judd asserted that he did not expect a conflict in 
Europe, if the United States got 11 realistic" and got uback 
on a sound track,n meaning to abolish Communism throughout 
Asia. To Judd, the Democratic Administration, in its "pre-
occupation to save Europe, ui followed the "faulty" assumption 
that the way to save Europe was to put forth effort in Eur-
ope alone, and in so doing, neglected to give adequate at-
tention to basic concepts which he asserted were "stronger 
deterrents to Russian attack upon Europe than any possible 
strength" the United States could build up in Europe in the 
conceivable future. The greatest deterrent to the Soviet 
Union, to Judd, was what the United States could do to Rus-
sian factories and cities and lines of communications in 
Russia. In essence, Judd believed that the United States 
could "knock out" Russia before the Communists could retal-
iate against American movement. Apparently, at this late 
date of 1951, Judd did not completely ignore Soviet air and 
atomic power, but he felt that it was not important in Rus-
sia's supposed desire to conquer Europe. Why? Russia's 
use of air or atomic power would destroy Western Europe's 
industries--a vital factor in Russian expansion. It appear-
ed that he rejected the possibility that the Soviet Union 
would strike first with air and atomic power to "knock out" 
American supply and air and ground forces throughout Europe 
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107 before using land forces in the conquest. 
Judd expressed the belief that Russia could move to the 
English Channel just as fast as ground forces could walk. 
Thus in Judd's logic, the real deterrent whereby the United 
States could strike at Soviet bases was to build up in cer-
tain areas-- 11 somewhat protected 0' from Russian land forces--
American military strength from which the United States 
could "pound away"' at Russia's "productive capacity," while 
Russian ground forces were moving to conquer Europe. He 
cited deterrents to Russian ground forces, behind which the 
United States should build up military strengthg England, 
by the channel; Spain, by'the Pyrenees Mountains; and parti-
cularly North Africa, where the Mediterranean was a 10 must 11 
108 to protect f.rnerican bases from Russian ground forces. 
Judd had moved far away from his former position, held in 
1945, that "You cannot beat a people just by air attack ... 
'h b d t u,109 It as never een one ye. Thus, in 1951, Judd believ-
ed possible, in fighting Russia, that which he felt unwork-
able in 1945 and which was "a bitter pill for our military 
pride to swallow, ,u .. when it was discovered that air power 
107 How Can We Be So Stupid?"' p. 295. 
lOBibid. 
109Judd, "What Is the Truth about China?"' 498. 
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alone would not defeat the Japanese in China. 110 
Another factor which Judd considered a greater deter-
rent to a Russian attack upon western Europe was the keeping 
of resistance forces alive and active in Asia, thus forcing 
the Soviets to divide their attention, their strength, their 
energy between widely separated fronts. 111 Judd never pre-
sented an over-all plan for his so-called total victory in 
Asia; however, he did have simple devices and tactics which 
he constantly threw out to the general listening public or 
to his Cong.ressional cohorts. On one occasion he advocated 
the smuggling into Red China, behind the Communists' lines 
of 11 selected groups" to establish a '1Department of Dirty 
Tricks, 11 which he argued would prevent the consolidation of 
China in Communist hands. This, he felt, would cause the 
Red Chinese to fail in their ngreat promises," and thus help 
break the Communist movement throughout the Orient. If this 
was done, Judd contended, Stalin would 18 think a long, long 
' b f . bl " E 81 112 dd · time e ore starti.ng trou. e 1.n urope. Ju consis-
tently maintained that he did not favor the use of American 
land forces in aiding Chiang Kai-shek in retaking the main-
land--Judd' s "total victory 0u ~ould be achieved, he assured 
llO Judd, "How Can We Be So Stupid?" p. 295. 
111Ibid. 
112Ibid., p. 299. 
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the nation, without asking Americans to die in a fight for 
Chiang Kai-shek.'0113 
The real key to Judd and the entire Asia-First element 
in liberating Asia from Communism, however, is found in the 
phrase "unleashing of Chiang. '0 What was Washington waiting 
for? Judd asked over and over~ "Red China is the enemy of 
the United States! 0114 The Nationalist forces are the 
strongest allies the United States has in Asia, 11 and which, 
for no discoverable good reason, 11 the United States is keep-
ing "imprisoned on Formosa." Such action by the United 
States only gives the "'Chinese Reds full opportunity to con-
centrate their strength against our forces in Korea. 11 Thus, 
Judd proclaimed, it is "not only madness" but "it is murder" 
to leave the Seventh Fleet stationed in the Formosa Straits. 
11 How long, Mr. Acheson, How long?!@, will you continue to 
nsacrifice American boys?n, Judd cried. 115 Judd, who de-
clared that he fought the sending of American land forces to 
116 Korea, who opposed the use of the atomic bomb in 
113u o So , Congressional Record, 82nd Cong., 1st Sess., 
1951, XCVII, Part 11, A476. 
114Ibi.d., Al2. 
llSibid. 
116 Judd, '°How Can We Be So Stupid'?'" p. 299; U o So, Con-
gressional Record, 82nd Cong., 1st Sess., XCVII, Part 11, 
7760. Whether Judd supported or opposed the use of "ground 
troops'' in Korea was the source of considerable debate. On 
329 
February 2, 1951, Judd, speaking before the Executive Club 
in Chicago, said: "I fought against sending ground troops 
into Korea." He went on to explain that the Communists were 
the strongest in ground troops and the United States was 
weakest--thus the United States should use air power. Judd, 
"How Can We Be So Stupid?"' p. 299. In 1962, however, when 
Donald Fraser declared in a campaign speech that Judd had 
opposed the use of ground troops in Korea, he was accused 
of "compounding a misrepresentation." See Minneapolis §tar, 
October 4, 1962. Judd said he had not only urged use of 
troops in Korea after the 1950 North Korean invasion, but 
also "begged our government not to withdraw our forces from 
Korea a year previous to the invasion." 11 Instead of oppos-
ing the use of Uo So forces in Korea, I urged that we make 
our full strength available to the UN repeatedly during 
those first dark days," Judd replied. He cited speeches on 
the floor of the House of Representatives and on the radio 
at the time of the Korean invasion as evidence of his stand. 
Fraser replied: "On June 29, 1950, Judd was quoted in the 
Minneapolis Tribune as saying 'United States combat troops 
shoqld not be used in South Korea. '"' Judd was further 
quoted in the Tribune "as saying that one reason he opposed 
use of American combat troops in Korea is that such action 
would furnish propaganda for the Communists because 'You 
can't have whites fighting Asiatics. '"' Minneapolis Tribune, 
October 3, 1962. A Minneapolis Republican official entered 
the conflict and said that the following sentence nshould 
have been sufficient to show [Fraser] how wrong he would be 
if he made his groundless charges: 'Orders by President 
Truman for aid to South Korea--including American planes 
and warships--followed advice given secretly Monday to the 
State Department by Judd. ''0 Ramberg, the Minneapolis Repub-
lican, said Fraser quoted a part of the story that described 
Judd advising that Uo So combat forces not be used '0at that 
time. 11 Minneapolis Star, October 4, 1962. This incident 
is but one example of individuals attempting to pin Jli.dd 
down on exactly what he had said and what he believed. 
The argument used by Ramberg appears groundless because it 
proves nothing. Judd was in the habit of speaking in broad 
general terms, and nearly any conclusion can be drawn from 
many of his speeches. Perhaps this was deliberate on Judd's 
part, that is, if the "prophet"' was to play the role. The 
Minneapolis Tribune quoted Judd on September 19, 1959, on a 
labor reform bill: 11 He said he was glad the name of Sen. 
John Kennedy (Do O Mass.) is on the bill because 'We g,et 
credit for the bill, but if things go wrong we can share 
the blame with him. ' 11 Minneapolis Tribun~, September 19, 
1959. In speaking to a mixed political group, Judd could 
assert: "Here.,s one Republican who wants to·give Democratic 
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117 Korea, could nevertheless ask: 11 If it is right for Amer-
ican boys to be fighting Chinese Reds in Korea, why is it 
wrong to let or to help Chinese anti-Corrununists fight them 
on their own soil? 1111~~,,gudd, without doubt, accepted the real-
ity that the Korean venture was sponsored by the United 
Nations, but he refused to accept the reality that over~ 
throwing the Chinese Corrununist regime and turning back Chi-
nese Corrununists in Korea were not one and the same. Thus 
the Democratic Administration, apparently to his logic, had 
not made up its mind whether it wanted to 18 Win" in Korea or 
not. If the United States wanted to win then everything 
119 possible should be done to weaken the enemy. Judd's 
solution was simple--all the world needed was "hard-headed 
d Ii • h O • • d 120 octors, wit positive i eas. Judd often asked, if we 
do not do everything possible to aid Chiang "then why should 
former President Harry Truman 'credit for tying up the Com-
munists for three years in Korea. ,n (From speech given to 
Massachusetts Federation of Women's Clubs Convention,) 
Minneapolis Star, May 20, 1954. At this time Judd's main 
theme was that Truman was "soft on Corrununism, •n and that he 
preferred to consult those with n'prQ-corrununist 1' sentiment. 
117 · 1 d 81 C UoSo, Congressiona Recor I st ong., 2nd Sess., 
1950, XCVI, Part 8, 10558. 
llSUoSo, Conqressional Record, 82nd Cong., 1st Sess., 
1951, XCVII, Part 11, A476. 
119Ibid. 
120Judd, ,n{lOW Can We Be So Stupid? 1u p. 300. 
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our Government ask Americans to die in fighting" the Chi-
nese Communists in Korea. "How long, 11 Judd never tired of 
crying out on the House floor, "can this two-faced murder-
ous policy be continued'? 11121 
In like manner, but with a more belligerent tone, Or-
land K. Armstrong, Republican from Missouri, could assert 
that the Chinese Communist regime possessed the "weakest" 
governmental framework in the world. Armstrong, one of the 
most vocal advocates of "unleashing" Chiang Kai-shek, and 
of the so-called "preventive. war" theory, accused Congress 
of overlooking one major responsibility in dealing with the 
Korean conflict--that of declaring war. He charged the 
122 
majority leaders "to assume their duty in this respect. 18 
Armstrong, like Judd, believed that the "preventive war 11 
would be of short duration and a resounding victory for the 
United States~ ".I say to you, and I measure my words again, 
Communist China could be quickly defeated and the war in 
123 
the Far East ended." Armstrong, as did Judd, proclaimed 
121
u,s,, Congressional Record, 82nd Cong., 1st Sess., 
1951, XCVII, Part 11, A476. 
122
u.s., Congressional Record, 82nd Cong., 1st Sess., 
1951, XCVII, Part 12, A2162. 
123
u,S,, Congressional Record, 82nd Cong., 1st Sess., 
1951, XCVII, Part 4, 4813. A conversation on the House 
floor between Judd and Armstrong fully illustrates the 
"preventive war 11 advocates' thought process~ Judd~ "Is 
this what the gentleman is saying? You are not recommend-
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with absolute certainty that the Soviet Union would not in·-· 
tervene "at the present time." That, he asserted, "is the 
almost unanimous opinion of all the military men we talked 
ing that we tie ourselves exclusively to Chiang Kai-shek or 
the Nationalist Government. Rather it is your concern that 
we get effective help to all the forces opposing our mortal 
enemy in China. We ought not deny ourselves the benefit of 
the leaders who has [sic] the largest following and the most 
forces under his control. But at the same time, does not 
the gentleman agree, that we should with imagination and 
vigor support every single group or force on the mainland 
of China whiqh is making trouble in the rear of the Commun-
ists, seeking to make them fail in their aggressive plans, 
discrediting them and their whole movement in Asia, and 
diverting some of their strength from Korea, where they are 
killing Americans. 
1 Armstrong: "'The gentleman is exactly correct. Let me 
summarize the advantages of this ;plan~ It does not require 
the use of American ground troops on the mainland of China. 
It would permit the people of free China to regain their 
homes and liberties. It would save.countless lives that 
will otherwiqe be lost in this stalemate war in Korea. It 
would reverse the tide of the Communist aggression and put 
us on the offensive and the Kremlin on the defensive. I 
say to you in this closing wora, that since there is no sub-
stitute for victory, we cannot stop to negotiate with these 
Red Chinese aggressors. We have to go ahead to victory. 
In China we find a people who are ready for revolution 
against Commqnist aggression. If we win back China, it 
would give u~ the first victory over communism since 1945. 
The courage and strength of free men in the world are on 
I 
trial today. I be9 that we move quickly to give these free 
men the lead~rship they need. 
Judd: "Sqme people are saying that if we do the things 
you have urg~d it will lead to all-out war with Communist 
China. Is it not rather a fact that this is the best hope 
we have of preventing all-out war with China; because if 
they win in qhina, they would be able to fight in the Phil-
ippines and fight in Japan and fight in Indo-China, and 
then we would be in trouble? Whatever the risks of the pro-
posals which the gentleman has presented, the risks of any 
other alternative are infinitely greater." UoS0 0 Congress-
ional Record, 82nd Cong., 1st Sess., 1951, XCVII, Part 4, 
4814. 
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to." Red China's defeat would be simple and rapid without 
committing American ground forces, involving only "a naval 
blackade by the United States ... J::?lockading the Chinese 
coast, ... bombing the Chinese mi.litary bases and supply lines, 
d f h . 1. f 11124 an •.. use o t e Nat1ona 1st orces .... With this ac-
complished in "short order 11 the Soviet Union would suffer 
her first great loss--which would be the beginning of the 
end for Communism throughout the world, the entire Asia-
First element believed. 
On May 3, 1951, when the China clique was discussing 
their scheme for unleashing Chiang and pulling off one of 
the most simple victories in the history of the world, John 
McCormack could restrain himself no longer. McCormack had -
been relatively quiet on the China issue since he had with-
drawn his support some two year prior. He now asked Arm-
strong if it was not correct that the Nationalists had held 
the island of Hainan until several months ago. Armstrong 
admitted that this was correct. McCormack then asked him~ 
"How many Communists captured the island? 88 When Armstrong 
could not answer the question McCormack reported that it had 
been captured by not "more than twenty or twenty-five thou~ 
sand. 11 Armstrong retorted: nr believe that Nationalist 
troops were ready to abandon it and move to Formosa." 
124Ibid. 
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McCormack replied: "No:, they had 130,000 troops there, the 
Nationalists." Judd then entered the discussion 11 
It had been decided in about December of 1949 
by the Nationalist forces in Formosa that they would 
withdraw from Hainan, but before they could withdraw 
the first Communist attack came across the little 
gap of water between the mainland and Hatna, and 
the generalissimo, so I am advised reliably, did not 
want to pull immediately under the pressure but with-
draw gradually. His men stood off all attacks in the 
process of evacuating. When the twelfth attack came 
it was accompanied by the infiltration and defection 
of one Nationalist regiment in Hainan. It was the125 break-up of that regiment which brought the end. 
McCormack then demanded: "I want to know how many Nation-
alist troops there were there. 11 "I think the gentleman has 
correctly stated, about 130,000, 11 Judd replied. Then McCor-
mack asked: "How many Communists were in the attacking 
force?" Judd expressed doubt that there were any "reliable" 
figures: he told McCormack that he questioned whether he 
could substantiate the number 25,000, after McCormack had 
cited it. McCormack, apparently satisfied that he had made 
his point, replied: "That may be so, but the number of Com-
munists was considerably less than the number of National-
ists; and the Communists won because the Nationalists had some-
how lost the will to fight. 11 Judd typically reverted to 1946-4 7 
and called out the ghost of the Marshall mission to explain why the 
125Ibid., 4815. The entire "verbal battle" is found 
on this page in the Record. 
Nationalists had lost the will to fight in 1951~ 
And why should not they after our repeated 
announcements that they were finisheq: Origin-
ally the Nationalist troops had plenty of will 
to fight, but we insisted they cease fire in-
stead. Marshall's criticism when he went over 
there was because they had too much will to 
fight. He helped destroy their will to fight, 
although I do not suggest he realized what he 
was doing. If you will help the Nationalists 
a little again, especially with moral support, 
you will find they will come back almost over-
night. 126 
McCormack said no more, apparently content that if his 
33.5 
point was well taken the folly of unleashing Chiang would 
be exposed. 
In the face of all arguments hurled at him Judd remain-
ed undaunted in his conviction that Chiang Kai-shek was the 
best that could be offered to insure a friendly China, and 
that his sole concern was for the "security" of the United 
States. Judd apparently found no contradiction in maintain-
ing at the same time that the Soviet Union would not go to 
war in China while the United States aided Chiang and the 
Nationalist forces to liberate, what he termed, the freedom-
loving and freedom-seeking Chinese masses of the mainland, 
and that !'the Spviet Union and its satellites are at war 
with the United States and with the whole free world. 11127 
126Ibid. 
127u.s., Congressional Record, 82nd Cong., 1st Se~s., 
1951, XCVII, Part 3, 3684. 
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He could continue to declare that 11 It is too late for us to 
strike first" as the "other side has already struck." He 
felt confident in scoffing at those whom he said did not 
want to "start a war or strike first. 11 Likewise, in his 
confidence, he could assert that the only question which 
the United States faced, and had faced for years, was "how11 
and "where" and "when" should the United States strike back 
. ff . 128 in order to be most e ~ctive. That is the only deci-
sion which the United States has--"unless we are to surren-
der piecemeal. 11 Thus Judd could state without hesitation 
that the "urgent question" is not whether there is to be a 
bigger war later on, but how the country can win the present 
war. Total victory in Korea, liberation of mainland China 
from the Communists, and restoration of Manchuria to the 
Nationalists was to Judd, the 11 best 11 way--the "onlyn way--
to prevent the "bigger" war. 129 
As the Korean conflict continued, 18 unleashing Chiang 11 
became a potent issue among the Asia-Firsters and the con-
gressional China chique. The Asia-Firsters found their hero 
in General MacArthur who, they said, stood for their whole 
. . 130 position. James V. Forrestal relates in his diary that 
128Ibid. 
129Ibid. 
130 Goldman, The Crucial Decade, p. 154. 
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throughout World War II the General contended that the Pac·-
131 ific was being "starved" in the interests of Europe. The 
Asia-Firsters recalled that as early as 1944 MacArthur had 
declared "that the history of the world will be written in 
132 
the Pacific for the next ten thousand years." MacArthur 
at this time saw Europe as "a dying system," which was 
"worn out and run down," and destined to become "an economic 
and industrial hegemony of Soviet Russia, 11 while the 11 lands 
touching the Pacific with their billions of inhabitants will 
determine the course of history" for centuries to come. 133 
The Pacific area, MacArthur was most confident, would in 
the post-war era become and remain an "industrial and eco-
nomic sphere of world development." Perhaps MacArthur's 
strongest criticism against the Democratic Administration 
during World War II was that they,were guilty of "treason 
!, 
and sabotage" by not adequately attending to the Pacific--
134 preferring to hammer away at Germany. In 1948 MacArthur 
expressed the opinion that it would be 10 utterly fallacious 
to underrate either China's needs or her importance.n He 
continued: 11 I can say without the slightest hesitation 
131M.ll' l lS, Ih§ Forrestal Diaries, p. 17. 
132Ib'd l • I P• 18. 
133Ibid. Forrestal notes that MacArthur asserted that 
"The North African operation was absolutely useless,u p. 17. 
134 b'd 18 I l . I p. . 
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that a free, independent, peaceful and friendly China is of 
profound importance to the peace of the world and to the 
135 position of the United States. Furthermore, MacArthur 
saw no "substitute for victory" in Asia. 
Ironically Judd supported American participation in the 
Korean conflict for a different reason than that for which 
the United States had struggled. The Korean conflict which the 
North Koreans started--and which was taken up by the United 
States, the United Nations, and the Chinese Communists--was 
a war of specific objectives and within geographical limits. 
The objectives as set forth by the United Nations were to 
repel and discourage aggression in Korea, not to aboldsh 
communism from Asia; and to work toward the establishment 
of an independent and unified Korea. North Korea's mili-
tary aggression was a direct challenge not only to the Uni-
ted Nation.s but to the whole concept of a democratic world 
order. This was the "political challenge'8 which the Truman 
Administration was willing to meet, even though to meet it 
the United States was forced to 11 re-enter an unsound mili-
136 tary position at great cost" to the country. Edwin 0. 
Reischauer viewed the Korean conflict, to a large extent, 
135
u.So, Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, 
Hearings, United States Foreign Policy For A Post-War Re-
covery Program, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 1947, p. 2041. 
136Reischauer, Wanted: An Asian Policy:, p. 38. 
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as a waste of resources: "We entered the fighting not be-
cause of South Korea's military importance to us but rather 
despite the strategic liability of our position there. 11137 
The United States, Reischauer continues, entered Korea "not 
at all because of local military consideration, but purely 
because of global political strategy." By such an under-
taking, the United States simply "sought to check open ag-
gression 1n Korea solely because we believed that if aggres-
sion had gone unchallenged in Korea, our whole long-range 
138 
program for peace and security would have been undermined." 
Reischauer's words, however, would have been totally unten-
able to Judd, the Asia-Firsters and the new isolationists. 
Judd demanded total victory in Korea and Asia. In 
reality Judd, contrary to his statements, supported a much 
bigger war to extinguish Communism forever. Judd, as did 
many Americans, suffered from a sense of urgency which 
arose from an exasperation with Communism--a fear of it 
which had continued to smolder since 1917, the year of the 
Revolution in Russia. His fear of Communism led him to as-
sume that only conflict between the United States and the 
Soviet Union could end the ideological contest, with Commu-
nism abolished from the face of the earth;. there can never 
137
rbid., pp. 36-37. 
138Ibid., p. 37. 
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again be security or relaxation for us, or any people, un-
til the tyrannical [Russian] government is overthrown." 139 
In their self-righteousness and fear, the Asia clique failed 
to grasp that for nearly half a century the Communist strug-
gle had continued by means short of war--limited war, pro-
paganda, civil strife, and that the struggle would continue 
in some form until the fallacious tenets and methods of 
communism can no longer appeal to extensive sections of 
humanity. The Asia clique and the entire community who 
supported the conspiracy theory, and who advanced the.pre-
ventive war theory, would not accept the tenet that whether 
the struggle of ideology should be peaceful or violent, 
narrow or broad, rested not only on the actions of Commur 
nists themselves, but also with the opposition to commu-
nism. Thus the Democratic Administration, realizing this 
tenet, and willing to resist communism in open conflict 
only when it chose the road to war, as in Korea and earlier 
in Greece, took a pragmatic position, and gave aid only when 
the populace were willing to help themselves. For this ap-
proach Truman and Acheson were damned by Judd and by the 
139F . 1 . f h h u • or a rationa presentation o watt e preventive 
war" advocates wanted see editorial from the Christian 
Science Monitor, "Small War or Big?n in UoSou Congressional 
Record, 82nd Cong., 1st Sess., 1951, XCVII, Part 12, A2156, 
as read into the Record by Senator Clyde R. Hoey, Democrat 
of North Carolina. 
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Asia-Firsters, and were accused of being soft on co1mnunism. 
Secretary of State Acheson told the nation repeatedly 
that neither the Nationalist forces nor the independent 
guerillas opeFating in the China hinterland were "strong 
enough or active enough to threaten the existence 11 of the 
Communist regime on the mainland. The Asia clique agreed 
with the Secretary to a point: By themselves they were 
not, but with enough American assistance, with effective 
military aiq to Formosa, they could threaten that regime. 
Effective military aid to Formosa, according to Judd, in-
eluded "some top-flight American military spark plugs, like 
General Wedemeyer, Admiral Cooke, Admiral Badger, with ade-
quate American staffs to train and advise the Chinese armed 
forces at all levels--and in strategy, tactics, and opera-
t . 11140 ions. Also, Judd stated, along with these advisers 
there should be 11 a relatively small amount" of munitions, 
140 . 1 d 81 U.S., Congressiona Recor, st Cong., 2nd Sess., 
1950, XCVI, Part 15, A3575. On June 11, 1951, General Wede-
meyer discussed a factor which had plagued him in working 
with the Chinese military~ 11 l had difficulty in indoctrin-
ating my Chinese generals and other commanders with the 
idea that they had to stockpile munitions and food behind 
a projected advance. Frequently they would make an attack, 
and it would peter out because they didn't have, they 
couldn't give, the succeeding impulse to their attack. They 
just didn't have the logistical support behind it. I had 
great difficulty with that when I was there. 11 U.S., Con-
gress, Senate Committee on Armed Service and Committee on 
Foreign Relations, Hearings, Military Situation in the Far 
East, 82nd Cong., 1st Sess., 1951, p. 2329. 
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light arms, equipment, and supplies carefully planned for 
the particular type of operation needed. He further added 
spare parts and fuel for the Chinese Air Force and Navy, 
and a few hundred World War II planes, along with perhaps 
some 50,000 more Wd.rld War I type rifles and ammunition. 
Judd, however, excluded American combat troops in describ-
ing what he considered effective military aid to Chiang on 
Formosa. Judd, when quizzed on previous aid to Chiang, em-
ployed the patent answer that when military aid was voted 
by Congress in April, 1948, "the administration systematic-
ally sabotaged it by delays, overcharges, and unbalanced 
h . 11141 s 1pments. 
Despite popular protest President Truman was willing 
to take what appeared to him to be a more justifiable course 
in the direction of limiting war and refusing to allow the 
fomentation of additional hostilities. The dismissal of 
MacArthur on April 11, 1951, set off an onslaught of protest 
against the President, with numerous demands for impeachment~42 
141Ibid. 
142 Senator Joseph R. McCarthy said the dismissal was 
"perhaps the greatest victory the Communists have ever won." 
Senator William E. Jenner, the Republican arch-isolationist 
from Indiana, said "Our only choice is to impeach President 
Truman"; and Senator William F. Knowland, dubbed by the pro-
Truman press the "Senator from Formosa," warned of a Far 
Eastern 'Munich'; a few Republicans, including Senators 
Henry Cabot Lodge and Leverett Saltonstall of Massachusetts, 
and Wayne Morse, of Oregon, and most Democrats, backed the 
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Judd's reaction was that only a "miracle 11 ·would prevent the 
deterioration of the whole East Asian situation, "with coun-
try after country going down like nine pins." Judd could 
declare, apparently with a clear conscience, that it was 
the "pygmies" of history, President Truman and Secretary of 
State Acheson, who had to dispose of the "giant MacArthur," 
because he had "been so consistently right about Asia and 
143 they so consistently wrong. 11 Judd found in the Mac-
Arthur dismissal the possible opening of the way "for the 
President. China and the U.So Far East Policy 1945-1966, 
p. 56. 
143
uos., Congressional Record, 82nd Cong., 1st Sess., 
1951, XCVII, Part 3, 3685. An interesting paradox can be 
deduced from Judd's comment on Philip Jessup: "A citizen 
has the right to join whatever he wishes, but other citi-
zens have an equal right to draw conclusions about him by 
observing what he chooses to join and the causes he sup-
ports." What Judd said in regard to Jessup might be equal-
ly applied to General George Marshall by Judd. Judd further 
commented that "Senator McCarthy is not the one who dis-
credited Dr. Philip Jessup ... He merely reported what Jes-
sup had done to discredit himself." Judd, however, found 
great comfort in believing and shouting that the Democratic 
Administration--Truman, Acheson, and Marshall--had humiliat-
ed a national hero--Douglas MacArthur. If one takes the 
position that MacArthur was guilty of military insubordina-
tion, then MacArthur indeed humiliated himself. Judd, 
during the campaign of 1952, stressed General Eisenhower's 
history of strictly obeying civil authority and the military 
chain of command. See: U.So, Congressional Record, 81st 
Cong., 2nd Sess., 1950, XCVI, Part 4, 4715. Debate in Con-
gress and articles read into the Record followed, with few 
exceptions, partisan lines in the MacArthur dismissal. See 
U.S., Congressional Record, 82nd Cong., 1st Sess., 1951, 
XCVII, Part 12, A2148-2204, for arguments for and against 
Truman's position. 
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Corrununists to chip away and destroy the faith of the Japan-
ese in us and the United Nations. 11 Thus a settlement in 
Korea would not end the war; it would just move the war from 
Korea to Japan. Then, Judd continued, if the United States 
or the Democratic Administration abandoned Formosa "in a 
futile effort to buy the Reds off, we do not end the strug-
gle; we simply shift it from Formosa to the Philippines. 11 
Judd asked if the United States lets uthe Philippines and 
Japan go," in order to avoid a war with Communist China or 
Russia, what is the security of the United States? The con-
flict is simply moved to Alaska and Hawaii, Judd reasoned. 
Then if the Democratic Administration sells out Alaska and 
Hawaii in order to get peace, the United States does not 
avoid World War III. All that is accomplished, Judd assert-
ed, is that "we just make certain that more of it will be 
144 fought in the Northwestern States of our own country. 81 
144u.s., Congressional Record, 82nd Cong., 1st Sess., 
1951, XCVII, Part 3, 3685. Judd, surruning up the MacArthur 
recall, declared that "it was one-man Government that final-
ly functioned. One man in the White House, in a sudden de-
cision ... decided to dismiss a general who had served his 
country well and to announce that decision to the press. A 
false issue is now being trumped up. It is an argument be-
ing advanced by the President that MacArthur wants to bring 
on a large-scale war and that Mr. Truman wants peace .... Gen-
eral MacArthur is sincerely convinced that the proposals he 
has championed means peace .... Many observers--not in the 
Military Establishment---,believe an appeasement policy by the 
President and the Department of State will bring a third 
world war with all its horrible consequences." UoSo, Con-
gressional Record, 82nd Cong., 1st Sess., 1951, XCVII, Part 
34-5 
This made sense not only to Judd but the entire Asian cliqueo 
Thus indeed theirs was a holy mission--·the waging of a pre-
ventive war. 
The Asia clique, who advocated the American bombing of 
Chinese cities, which contained great numbers of people not 
in sympathy with the Communists, would provide ample room 
for these very same people in the Chinese cities, and else-
where in Asia, to question whether the United States was in-
deed the real aggressor. The Asia clique members and Judd 
apparently never thought of this factor. Judd and his as-
sociates spoke and acted as if they alone had all the per-
tinent facts at their disposal, and they alone were in the 
position to render the infallible judgment on the future of 
Asia. In their hearts they knew they were right, and this 
they found sufficient as the basis of their operations. To 
Judd the United States was nothing less than the 11 sanctuary 
of the universe, 11 and only he and those of like-mindedness 
had the moral courage or character to direct the United 
States in leading the world. With the monopoly on morality, 
they could sit in judgment of the Truman Administration 
with its State Department influenced by pro-Communists. 
They could echo Nebraska Republican Hugh Butler's reaction 
of Acheson~ "I watch his smart-aleck manner and his British 
12, A2137. 
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clothes and that New Dealism, ever-lasting New Dealism in 
everything he says and does, and I want to shout, Get Out, 
Get Out. You stand for everything that has been wrong with 
145 
the United States for years.'' Judd, with apparent honest 
145Goldman, The Crucial Decade, p. 125. On July 18, 
1951, Judd read into the Recorq an article by David Lawrence 
which was perhaps one of the most absurd charges hurled at 
the Democratic Administration. Lawrence declared that what 
the Secretary of State said was important "because for all 
practical purposes, he is President of the United States.'" 
To Lawrence, Acheson was 1'virtually commander in chief of 
the Army, Navy, and Air Force," and he alone defined "their 
scope of action,'' and President Truman did only what Acheson 
"tells him to do." Thus Lawrence declared: "No man in the 
office of Secretary of State heretofore has had the oppor-
tunity to wield such power, first, because no President ever 
delegated as much authority to him and, second, because no 
comparable issues fell to a Secretary of State to decide." 
u.s., Coug_ressional Record, 82nd Cong., 1st Sess., 1951, 
XCVII, Part 14, A4785. Lawrence apparently had forgotten 
that President Truman fired Byrnes in 1947 for continuing 
to make statements which had not been cleared through the 
Executive Office. One of the most caustic anti-'I'ruman-Ach-
eson columnists, who turned out column after column, and 
espoused the clarion call of the Asia-Firsters and the new 
isolationist sentiment to the nation, was Edgar Ansel Mow-
rer. Judd consistently read his columns into the Congres-
sional B.§..c;:ord during the period of the Great Debate. On 
January 23, 1951, Judd read into the Record one of Mowrer's 
columns in which he declared that America's Ii road'' to fol-
low in Asia was '11 both clear and straight~"' ""We should con-
tinue the war in Korea, if necessary by ourselves, until 
the Chinese get sick of being slaughtered. We should refuse 
to discuss the future of Formosa as long as aggression con-
tinues anywhere in Asia. [regarding its legal status] We 
should rearm our friends on the island to make them proof 
against any sort of attack. We should not discourage them 
from taking the offensive against Red China whenever they 
feel capable. We should further bolster Viet Nam in Indo-
china. Finally, we should announce that under no circum-
stances will we accept an aggressor government as a member 
of the UN--preventing its entrance by our veto, if necessary." 
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conviction, could assert: "We fought for an opposite pol-
icy. We were ignored. There is not one drop of the blood 
of the American boys in Korea on the hands of any Republi-
can. We had no responsibility at any stage of the whole 
debacle. We were opposing as far back as the decision which 
brought the Communists into Manchuria, and without Commu-
nists in Manchuria there never could have been a Korean at-
t k 11146 ac . Judd had for some time found it most convenient 
to forget that he had argued as late as 1947 that the Uni-
ted States could work successfully with the Soviet Union. 
Despite Judd's contentions that the Democrats alone were 
responsible for allowing Russia to register gains in East 
Asia, "it seems probablE;! that the Russians would have ... in-
vaded Korea regardless of what had been said at Yalta. 1114 7 The 
Mowrer's concluding statement captured the entire sentiment 
of this self-professed "moralist" element. He declared that 
should the above cited rnsteps, as is likely, provoke new 
shrieks from New Delhi, Ottawa, and London, we should gently 
but firmly tell Messr. Nehru, Pearson, and Bevin to go 
roll." U.S., Congressional Record, 82nd Cong., 1st Sess., 
1951, XCVII, Part 11, A473. 
146u.s., Congressional Record, 82nd Cong., 1st Sess., 
1951, XCVII, Part 6, 7594. Judd described the fall of Man-
churia to the Chinese Communists as amounting to a "Pearl 
Harbor" and presented the "gravest danger•• to the United 
States security. New York Times, November 4, 1948, p. 17. 
147 . h w d Reise auer, ante ~ An Asian Polley, p. 18. 
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Asian clique, however, held fast to the thesis that the Dem·-
ocrats had sold not only Chiang Kai-shek, but all of Asia, 
11 down the river." 
A Republican victory in 1952 was therefore absolutely 
necessary if the United States was to survive as a free 
world entity. A Republican victory in 1952 held the total 
solution for all the frustrations held by Judd and the en-
tire communi t.y of self-styled vu Asian experts. ua 
CHAPTER VI 
WALTER Ho JUDD: A REPUBLICAN PRESIDENT AND 
A REPUBLICAN CONGRESS 
For the new Republican Administration Asia was the 
first logical place to act, in keeping with the party's 
charges against the Democrats in the presidential campaign 
of 1952. The supposed "unintelligent" and "near-treason" 
statecraft of the Truman-Marshall-Acheson Administration 
had allowed the "unchristian" and "bloodthirsty" horde of 
Communist aggressors in Asia, whose "only god was force," 
to run rampant. The American people, Judd could declare, 
had called upon the Republicans to redeem America's lost 
prestige and save the United States from the clutches of 
international communism. This involved not only action 
abroad but action in Washington as well--"cleaning the 
traitors out of the State Deparment." The new President 
understood what was wrong with the world and could make 
all necessary corrections. 
On January 20, 1953, Dwight David Eisenhower became 
the thirty-fourth President of the United States. This was 
the day that Judd had looked forward to; this was the day 
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when the Executive leadership would stay America's aimless 
course and redirect Americq. toward the nation's "historic 
perspective." In his inaugural address, President Eisen-
hower promised a continued quest for peace without appease-
ment, and 11 to give testimony" that 11 the future shall belong 
to the free. 111 To "rechart 11 the course of American foreign 
policy and launch its world program of "liberation", the 
Eisenhower Administration made two decisions to prompt the 
end of the Korean conflict. First, it nunleashed" Chiang 
Kai-shek from his I' imprisonment•u on Formosa. Then, the Ad-
ministration decided if its efforts to win an armistice 
failed, it would blockade the mainland coastline, bomb Chi-
nese bases and supply sources in Manchuria and China, and 
possibly employ tactical atomic weapons. John Foster Dulles, 
the new Secretary of State, conveyed this strategy to Nehru, 
India I s Prime Minister·, on the assumption that Nehru would 
relay the plan on to the Chinese Communist government. In 
late July, 1953, the Korean Armistice was signed. 2 
1
nwight D. Eisenhower, "World.Freedom and Peaceg The 
Responsibilities of Leadership, 11 Vital Sgeeches of the Day, 
XIX (February 1, 1953), 252. 
2Robert J, Donovan, Eisenhower: The, Inside Sto~ (New 
York: Harper & Brothers, Publishers, 1956), p. 118. Judd 
and his China Lobby friends apparently disregarded Stalin's 
death in March 1953 as a possible factor in bringing the 
Korean War to an end. 
To the mind of Judd, Dulles, Asia-Firsters, and new 
isolationists, it was the new Administration's threat to un-
leash American air power against Communist China, along with 
the "unleashing" of Chiang Kai-shek, that induced the end of 
fighting. The Asia-Firsters refused to accept any other in-
terpretation.3 The Korean Armistice, as undesirable as it 
was to the Asia-Firsters, however, only reinforced their 
faith in the utility of advanced warning coupled with the 
threat of heavy punishment. Judd declared over and over 
that the United States could "win the fight against commu--
nism only by standing firm in its commitments." The Commu-
nists are encouraged, Judd would assert, by "any evidence 
of weakness, hesitation or vacillation," and this only in-
creases trouble. "The Communists pull us to the brink to 
see how we behave," he said. Every time America stands 
firm, nno one pulls us over the brink.n But, he would con-
tinue~ "I'm scared of them when they smile, because then 
we're inclined to think there has been a change in their 
policy. 114 Indeed, the sound of the word 11 liberation, 11 
especially when used in conjunction with Asia, greatly 
pleased the ears of the Asia-Firsters. 
3John W. Spanier, American Foreign Policy Since World 
War II (rev. ed.; New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1962), 
pp. 104-06. 
4Minneapolis Tribune, October 17, 1962. 
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On taking office, however, the Eisenhower Administra-
tion made a few lame gestures against the Yalta agreement, 
but then the dynamic Eisenhower-Dulles policy seemingly for-
got about "liberation." Indeed, the new President was soon 
to stay the hand of the "hard-liners," to forsake "rolling 
back the iron curtain," for a policy of "peaceful co-exis-
tence," little different from containment--surely it was a 
policy less dynamic than that envisioned by Judd and those 
who saw in a Republican victory in 1952 the employment of 
"force and strength" as a panacea for all problems facing 
the world. 
Without doubt Judd's strategy in promoting a Republican 
victory in 1952 included placing in the White House a mili-
tary man who clearly understood npower." A military man 
would further assure the "commies" that the Republicans 
"really meant business." Who better represents '' strength" 
than the professional soldier? ustrength was the best way 
to meet the Communist threat,'' and a man who clearly under-
stood "strength" and the "Communist threatn would take "im-
mediate11 and 11 corrective1' measures in Asia. 5 General Mac-
Arthur, the "giant of the East," had not been fully exoner-
ated by the joint Senate Armed Services and Foreign Rela-
5New York Times, November 3, 1952, p. 31. 
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t . . tt h . . h . d. · 1 6 ions corrmn ee earings into is isrnissa . The removal 
of General MacArthur was "within the constitutional powers 
of the President," it was concluded by some com.mi ttee mem-, 
bers, despite "shock to the national pride'1 regarding the 
circumstances of his dismissal. 7 Furthermore, despite feel-
ings that there was no serious disagreement between Mac-
Arthur's strategy in Korea and that of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff, the Joint Chiefs did generally agree with General 
Omar N. Bradley, the Chairman, that MacArthur erred in ad-
. . f h . Ch' S 11 vocating extension o t e war in ina. Nor were a com-
6 On August 17, 1951, the Senate Armed Services and the 
Foreign Relations Joint Committee to investigate General 
MacArthur's dismissal voted 20-3 not to make any formal 
report on the investigation of MacArthur's dismissal. Chair-
man Richard B. Russell, Democrat of Georgia, said a report 
might renew ''bitter discussion of methods for waging war" 
and "would not help" Korean truce negotiations. Eight of 
the twelve Republicans on the committee released "conclu-
sions" on the investigation. They were all, with the ex-
ception of Smith and Flanders, associated with new isola-
tionism~ Styles Bridges, New Hampshire; Alexander Wiley, 
I 
Wisconsin; H. Alexander Smith, New Jersey; Bourke B. Hick-
enlooper, Iowa; William F. Knowland, California; Harry P. 
Cain, Washington; Owen Brewster, Maine; Ralph E. Flanders, 
Vermont. U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Ser-
vices and the Committee on Foreign Relations, Hearings, 
Conduct An Inquiry Into The Military Situation In The Far 
East And The Facts Surrounding The Relief Of General Of The 
Army Douglas MacArthur From His Assignment In That Area, 
82nd Cong., 1st Sess., 1951, p. 3605. 
7Ibid., p. 3601. 
8
rbid., p. 3602. 
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mittee members convinced that Chiang's loss of China could 
be contributed solely to the fact that ''he did not receive 
sufficient support, both moral and material, 
9 
ted States." 
from the Uni-
Thus the plausible course for Judd might have been to 
look to the deposed MacArthur as a presidential candidate. 
There is, however, no evidence that Judd seriously for any 
extended period of time viewed MacArthur as that ideal can-
didate. Judd realized that the General had made military 
and civilian enemies. Judd's only hope for a more aggress-
ive Asian policy rested with placing a Republican in the 
White House on January 20, 1953, with a Republican Cong-
10 
ress. 'Thus he sought a II sure winner" who would take the 
country by storm and receive an overwhelming mandate from 
the people. Therefore, he looked to the European Theatre 
for a military man whose record appeared without blemish. 
Eisenhower, quite contrary to MacArthur, had kept relatively 
clear of political commitments and issue,s, and the public 
had little knowledge of his political views. But his past 
9
rbid., p. 3603; Congressional Quarterly, China and 
U,So Far East Policy 1945-1960 (Washington, D,Co: Congress-
ional Quarterly Inc., 1967), p. 59. 
lOBy mid-1951, many Republicans and news reporters were 
convinced that General MacArthur did not want the American 
presidency; however, he gave a contrary impression to many 
delegates to the Republican Convention of 1952. See the 
New York Times, June 15, 1951, p. 4. 
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role as a military man made him nothing less than a great 
patriotic American who could appeal to the entire political 
spectrum from populace to elite without regard for geograph-
ical location. 
Thus the ideal candidate to Judd·'s mind was General 
Dwight David Eisenhower--a national hero, a military man, 
and one who had assured Judd that there 11 is not East or 
West: There is East and West." 11 Judd asserts that he and 
Christian Herter organized the 11 so-called Eisenhower group" 
in Congress and that the two of them called on the General 
at Versailles, F'rance, in May, 1951, to urge him to seek the 
Republican nomination for President in 1952. 12 Judd be-
lieved that this was the first such "direct request 1' Eisen-
hower received. In fact, Virgil Pinkley, a newspaper cor-
respondent in the North African theatre of World War II, in 
1943, had made the earlier serious suggestion that Eisen-
hower might become 13 a presidential candidate some day. 
Similar suggestions increased with the passing of time. 
11
uoSa, Congressional Record, 82nd Cong., 2nd Sess., 
1952, XCVIII, Part 10, A3542. 
12 
' 1· T 'b O b 2 1955 ' h ' Minneapo is ri une, cto. er , . Eisen ower s 
memoirs do not bear this out. See: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 
The White House Years: Mandate For Change 1953-1956 (Garden 
City, New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1963), pp. 3-25. 
13Eisenhower, Mandate for Change, p. 4. 
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During November, 1951, Judd again sought out the Supreme 
Commander of NATO to determine exactly the General's posi-
tion. Eisenhower related to Judd that "No man who loves 
his country can refuse the bona fide request of his politi-
cal party to be its candidate for President of the United 
States." But the General continued by asserting that he 
did seek the presidency, nor would he "be maneuvered into 
14 
appearing to seek it." 
Thus Judd considered this "his cue" to see that Eisen-
hower received the "bona fide request" from the Republican 
party. Furthermore, Judd asserts, the Minnesota write-in 
vote of January, 1952, convinced Eisenhower that "he ought 
. h. . . ti 15 to reexamine 1s position. During the first half of 
1952, prior to the General's retirement, Judd spoke on be-
half of the candidacy of Eis.enhower in meetings and broad-
casts from 11 New Hampshire to the State of Washington.u 16 
Judd's theme during the early months of 1952 was that the 
"paramount issue confronting all America today, as it was 
in 1861, is preservation of our heritage of freedom." Amer-
ican freedom he told his audiences, was threatened on two 
14Minneapolis Tribune, October 2, 1955. 
15Ibid. 
16u.s., Congressional Record, 82nd Cong., 2nd Sess., 
1952, XCVIII, Part 10, A3541. 
357 
fronts; first "by ruthless armed communism pursuing skill-
fully its unchanging goal of world conquest;" and secondly, 
American freedom was being challenged by "the never-ending 
expansion of the Federal Government and its power over the 
. . . . ,117 H d . life of every American citizen. e supporte Eisen-
hewer's nomination, he asserted, because he would more as-
suredly win the general election than any other candidate 
whom the Republicans might offer. 
Even though Senator Robert A. Taft, at an early date, 
was collecting more delegates to the national convention, 
Judd would declare that Taft's capacity to win electoral 
votes in November was much less than Eisenhower's. Judd's 
argument when confronted by an undecided Republican or a 
Taft supporter, was that most of Taft's delegates came from 
states which regularly voted Democratic in November. In the 
states which voted Republican in 1948, Eisenhower led two 
18 
to one in delegates over Taft. It is ,u foolish" for "us, 11 
Judd would tell his audience, 1nnot to nominate our strongest 
vote getter--because it is essential that we get also a Re-
publican House and Senate--and the strongest possible tick-
17 Ibid., pp. A3441-42. 
18 UoSo, Congressional Record, 82nd Cong., 2nd Sess., 
1952, XCVII, Part 11, A3940. 
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ke1i is necessary to achieve that. 1119 Eisenhower, Judd as-
serted, was the man for President who was best able to or-
ganize and carry out the resistance movement against those 
who would destroy American freedom both 11 inside 11 and "out-
side" American borders. 20 
When the Republican delegates convened on July 7, 1952, 
the T.aft forces appeared to have control; however, the Eis-
enhower forces fought bitterly for their "sure winner." 
Eisenhower received the nomination on the first ballot. The 
keynote address delivered by General MacArthur declared 
that the Truman Administration 11 gave over to Soviet control 
the industrial resources of Manchuria" and ''condemned" the 
populace of China to "Communist tyranny. 11 He contended 
that when the Chinese Communists entered the Korean War, 
Democratic leaders lacked the necessary 11 courage to fight 
to a military decision, even though victory was then readi-
ly within our grasp--a victory which ... mightwell have saved 
continental Asia from Red Domination." He further asserted 
that the Democratic Administration had hobbled the Korean 
War to a 11 stalemated strugglen and sentenced Korea to 11 pro-
19 UoSo, Congressional Record, 82nd Cong., 2nd Sess., 
1952, XCVII, Part 10, A3543. 
20Ibid., p. A3542. 
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gressive obliteration." 21 
MacArthur's speech was quite typical of the entire Re-
publican campaign; the Democrats had failed to cope with 
the challenges facing the United States; the Democrats had 
coddled, protected, and allowed 11 pro-Communists and fellow-
travelers,n to operate unmolested in the Government. 22 The 
Korean Armistice negotiations, in MacArthur's opinion, only 
served to give the Communists time for military reinforce-
ment. Judd had hammered away on this theme since the nego-
tiations started on July 10, 1951. Eisenhower, assuming a 
more aggressive and vocal position, echoed this same senti-
ment in early October, 1952, when he cri ti.cized the Demo-
21 U.S., Congression~l Record, 82nd Cong., 2nd Sess., 
1952, XCVII, Part 11, A4541. 
2
~en the Republican National Convention convened on 
July 7, 1952, Eisenhower had already obtained a release from 
his NATO duties and trans.fe.rred to the retired list. Eis-
enhower no more than mentions.that MacArthur gave the key-
note address in his memoir. The Republican platform o:f 
1952 charged the Democratic Party with fostering socialism 
and bureaucracy, and with weakening local self-government. 
It charged corr~ption and even treason in high places. Ad-
ministration policies had led to loss of American prestige, 
and even worse, had contributed to making enemies among 
those who once were friends. To the sharply worded attacks 
was added a less well-defined proposed program. The posi-
tive section of the Republican platform advocated less gov-
ernment at the national level and greater local autonomy; 
less federal control of business; a tougher anti-Communist 
line in national and international affairs, and reduction 
of governmental spending and taxation. Richard C. Bain, 
Convention Decision And Voting Records (Washington, D.C.~ 
The Brooklings Institution, 1960), p. 284. 
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cratic Administration for allowing United Nations forces to 
accept the 11 trap11 of negotiations in Korea at a time when 
the Communist forces were retreating. The negotiation lull 
allowed the enemy time to reinforce their position, the Re-
publican candidate contended. 23 The Republican candidate 
continued to make similar charges which filled the self-
styled Asian experts with uncontrollable jubilation. 
Judd, fully recognized as an 11 Asian expert, 11 not only 
among the.Republicans, but also among many Democrats in 
Washington, consulted periodically with the Republican 
presidential candidate and his general staff. He flew not 
infrequently to the Republican strategy meetings in Denver 
d h . . . 24 11 . . an ot er maJor cities, as we as covering an exhaustive 
25 
campaign circuit in behalf of the General. Judd's faith-
23
congressional Quarterly, China and U.§.. Far East Pol-
icy, p. 62. 
24 New York Times, July 29, 195~, p. 1. 
25 
' h 1952 . h R bl' h d h' h During t e campaign t e epu icans a a ig -
ly organized group known as the "Truth Squad." Members of 
the "Squad" followed national Democratic leaders and "cor-
rected" the II lies" spread by opposition speakers. Includ-
ed in the "Truth Squad" at one time or another were a num-
ber of Senators and Representatives such as: Frank Carlson, 
Kansas; Francis Case, South Dakota; Homer Ferguson, Michi-
gan; Bourke B. Hickenlooper, Iowa; Eugene D. Millikin, Col-
orado; AndrewW. Schoeppel, Kansas; Ralph Flanders, Vermont; 
George D. Aiken, Vermont; Edward Thye, Minnesota; Hugh 
Scott, Jr., Pennsylvania; Clifford R. Hope, Kansas; Walter 
H. Judd, Minnesota; Claude Blakewell, Missouri. New York 
Times, November 3, 1952. p. 31. 
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ful followers in the fifth district of Minnesota carried 
out a highly successful campaign in his behalf, to free him 
for his greater role in getting Eisenhower elected. Perhaps 
Judd's major contact with the constituents of his own dis-
trict remained the pulpit, which he filled Sunday after Sun-
26 day. 
Whether Judd exerted any direct influence during the 
campaign on the General-turned-politician, or on his speech 
writers, Judd's major themes regarding Asia and communism 
began to appear i;nore regularly in the campaign speeches 
delivered by the Republican candidate as the election date 
drew nearer. Without doubt, in part, this change can be 
attributed to the 11 breakfast meeting" between Eisenhower 
and Taft on September 12, 1952. Taft presented the Repub-
lican candidate with a long statement in which he set forth 
his own understanding of Eisenhower's philosophy on a num-
ber of issues. Eisenhower's rnfull agreement" with the 
11 manifesto"' may account for his more aggressive campaigning 
and more severe indictment of the Democrats. At this date, 
however, Eisenhower clearly recognized Judd's standing 
among all factions of the Republican Party. Party faction-
alism was keen among the Republicans; however, Eisenhower 
clearly demonstrated that he was not going to allow anyone's 
26Minneapolis Tribune, October 23, 1952. 
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personal demands or feelings to obstruct a Republican vic-
tory in 1952. 27 
Eisenhower assumed the position that "if there must be 
war" in Asia, 18 let it be Asians against Asians," with Arner-
ican "support on the side of freedom." Either the General 
had never qgreed with the Truman policies with which he had 
been involved, or in the interest of party unity or party 
victory, he agreed to make the most of past failures in 
28 foreign policy and secure total new isolationist support. 
President Truman answered Eisenhower by declaring that the 
Soviet Union would have taken Europe had Americans failed 
11 . 29 to meet the cha enge 1n Korea. Furthermore, the Presi-
dent declared, fifty percent more South Koreans than Arneri-
cans were fighting in the conflict. The President accused 
Eisenhower of giving American mothers nfalse hope" in an 
30 
"effort to pick up a few votes.u Soon thereafter candi-
date Eisenhower pledged to a Detroit audience that 11 I shall 
27c · 1 Q 1 Ch' d ongress1ona uarter y, 1na, ~ UaSo Far East 
Policy, p. 27. 
28 Norman A. Graebner, The New Isolationism: A Studv 
in Politics and Foreign Policy Since 1950 (New York~ The 
Ronald Press Company, 1956), p. 99. 
29 Judd and other Republicans were later to assume the 
same position; however, in 1952, the Democrats had to be 
defeated. 
30
congressional Quarterly, China and Uo§... Far East 
Policy, p. 63. 
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go to Korea" in an effort to bring the war to an end. 
Perhaps few Presidents have won the presidency as easi-
ly as did Dwight D. Eisenhower. Victory, however, for the 
Republicans in 1952, seemed imminent from the moment of 
General Eisenhower's nomination on July 11, 1952. The Demo-
crats, as the party in power for twenty years, could not es-
cape condemnation for the nation's '' severe" problems--" the 
Democrats alone were responsible for the sorry state of the 
31 
world." Simple and rapidly executed answers were demanded 
by the American populace and Judd alike. Few Americans, if 
any, felt that the "magic" of an F.D.R. or the pluck of a 
"Give 'em hell Harry" could save the Democrats in 1952. In 
contrast to the Democrats, the Republicans beheld in their 
candidate not only a popular hero, but a candidate who offer-
ed great hope for remedies of the nation's ills, particularly 
those relating to Asia collectively--starting with Korea. 
The November returns, however, revealed a reluctance among 
the American people to accept the Republican Party with com-
parable enthusiasm. 
The Republicans won control of Congress by only a maj-
ority of eight in the House and one in the Senate. Thus, 
unless the foreign policy issues which constituted the core 
of the 1952 campaign could be exploited further, the victor-
31Minneapolis Tribune, October 27, 1952. 
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ious Republican Party would suffer defeat at the next con-
gressional election. Eisenhower took office without a de-
pendable majority in Congress, and to make matters more dif-
ficult for the President, the balance of Republican power in 
Congress was still lodged with the Old Guard which had fav-
ored Taft for the nomination. Taft himself was for several 
32 
months the majority leader in the Senate. This, in part, 
accounts for much of the struggle which the President was 
to experience with his own party in Congress during the 
first two years of his Administration. Republican leaders, 
the voting pattern revealed, could not ignore the role of 
the new isolationism in their new-found victory. The Pres-
ident's employment of new isolationism principles in 1952 
tied the old isolationist vote to the Republican Party. It 
was in these sections where Eisenhower received his most 
solid support. Yet, it was Eisenhower's acceptance of the 
Truman-Acheson premises, of collective security, liberal 
reciprocal trade agreements, the resumption of international 
diplomacy, and vigorous bipartisanship in policy formula-
tion, that appealed to the overwhelming internationalist 
suburban and urban middle class. Thus, to the slight Repub-
lican congressional majority, foreign policy questions alone 
"gave promise of future Republican victories when Eisen-
32 " h Donovan, Eisen ower: The Inside Story, p. 84. 
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hower's personality would not be involved. 1133 
Eisenhower from the very beginning of his Administra-
tion gave ample evidence that he possessed a deep concern 
for the strength and welfare of the Republican Party organi-
zation. The new .President's relationship with his own Re-
publican Congress, however, scarcely resembled the honeymoon 
one might expect upon ending a twenty years' absence. Eis-
enhower's allegiance to his party was so strong that Taft 
confounded the predictions that he would head the Senate 
opposition to the President's leadership and actually became 
one of the Administration's staunchest defenders. 34 The 
Taft leadership in the Senate, however, was not to last for 
long, as cancer rapidly sapped his life. Before Taft left 
the Senate on June 10, 1953, he named William F. Knowland 
of California as leader in his absence. Taft felt that his 
absence from the Senate and Knowland's majority leadership 
35 
would be only temporary; however, both proved permanent. 
It was Robert Taft who had "engineered" the renewed 
attack on the Truman-Acheson policies. Taft believed that 
future Republican victories would not result solely by '1 effic-
iency, honesty, and frugality in government.'' Taft recom-
33 Graebner, The New Isolationism, pp. 112-20. 
34Ibid. 
35Taft resigned as majority leader on June 10, 1953, 
and died of cancer on July 31. 
·"'41-·- .. 
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mended that his Republican brethren constantly publicize 
the contrasts between the Eisenhower Administration and the 
dm . . . 36 Truman A 1n1strat1on. Judd was fully receptive to this 
concept, and cooperated fully to bring additional discredit 
to the Democrats. Thus foreign policy to the "Taft Republi-
can" had by 1953 become the "pawn in a conservative revolu-
tion." Judd went along in that he was willing to employ 
every device or lever to accomplish his objectives in Asia. 
Campaign strategy for future victories was based on the gen-
eral concept that the President "held the affection and 
trust of the American people and that whatever was done to 
perpetuate past national antagonisms, nothing dared deflate 
the President's stature." President Eisenhower's initial 
concept of tpe Executive Office rendered this congressional 
objective "totally feasible." His original "broad toler-
ance toward cong·ressional action permitted Republican lead-
ers a wide r~mge in which to establish the assumptions on 
which American foreign policy would be founded without des-
troying the illusion that the President was, in fact, chart-
ing the nation's course. 1137 
The President did engender an air of friendliness and 
respect in his relations with Congress. Eventually, how-
36Robert A. Taft, 11What the G.OoP. Must Do to Win in 
1954, 11 ~ (April 21, 1953), 44. 
37Graebner, 11:l&. ~ I§olationism, pp. 120-21. 
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ever, as Congress attempted to assert greater influence, 
the limit to what Presidential amenities could accomplish 
was reached, and the gap between the President and the new 
isolationist Republicans began to widen ominously. Judd, 
although often diametrically opposed to some of the basic 
concepts of the new isolationists, was willing to cooperate 
with them because of their high regard for Asia. The Pres-
ident was forced to react against many of his own as he 
became more aware of what he considered dangerous pressures 
on the White House in the form of congressional encroach-
ments as Congress attempted to assume the initiative in 
1 . f . ff . 38 formu ating or~ign a airs. 
A major threat to Presidential power and prerogative 
took the form of the so-called Bricker Amendment, actively 
sponsored by John W. Bricker, Republican of Ohio. The amend-
ment would have had the effect of limiting the President's 
power to make executive agreements and treaties and thus of 
. . 1 h . f . 1 . 39 augmenting congressiona aut ority over oreign re ations. 
The proposal stemmed from resentment over such executive 
agreements as Yalt~ and, as Bricker had said, from a fear 
that "American sovereignty and the American Constitution ... 
are threatened by treaty law. 11 Behind the proposed Bricker 
38 Donovan, Eisenhower: The Inside Story, pp. 37, 85. 
39Ibid. 
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Amendment was the accumulated fear that unless the Constitu-
tion was amended formally, the federal nature of the Ameri-
can Government itself would be permanently altered, due to 
its position in the United Nations, toward a more central-
ized form at the expense of the states. Although a showdown 
on the Bricker Amendment did not come until February 26, 
1954, Eisenhower was dogged with it from the time he assumed 
ff . 40 o ice. 
In the evolving pattern of isolationism under the Eis-
41 
enhower leadership Asia continued to receive 11 top billing. 11 
This concept resulted logically from the acceptance of the 
view that the Truman Administration had established the 
pattern for Chiang Kai-shek's demise, and that President 
Truman refused to "win" the Korean War against the advice 
of General MacArthur. Judd and other supporters of Chiang 
Kai-shek openly declared that Eisenhower's election was a 
mandate that the Administration abrogate the Truman policy 
toward China and give all possible assistance to the Nation-
42 
alists. Indeed, Judd declared in early 1953, the Eisen-
hower and Republican victory was a mandate of the people 
44. 
40Ibid., p. 232. 
41 Graebner, The New Isolationism, p. 121. 
42Ibid., p. 124; New York Times, February l, 1953, p. 
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demanding "correction" of an "ineffective foreign policy, 
a war in Korea that the preceding Administration did not 
want to win, corruptions, entrenched bureaucracy and infla-
. ,,43 tion. 
With popular mandate in hand, on December 2, 1952, 
Eisenhower ventured forth for Korea. After a three day 
tour of battlefronts and consulting with military officials, 
I 
the General concluded in a press conference that he had "no 
panaceas, no tricks, for ending the fighting." He, however, 
expressed a concern which had long plagued the Democratic, 
Administration--the "working out a. plan" which would produce 
a "positive and definite victory without possibly running a 
grave risk of enlarging the war. 1144 
In his inaugural address the new President promised a 
45 
continued que$t for peace without appeasement. Two weeks 
later, on February 2, 1953, in his State of the Union Add-
ress, the President declared that his Administration would 
apply "America's influence in world affairs with such forti-
tude and such foresight that it will deter aggression and 
43New York Times, February 1, 1953, p. 44. 
44c ' 1 Q t 1 Ch' d US F E t ongressiona uar er y, ina .§11._ _._. ~ ~
Policy, p. 63. 
45E. h isen ower, "World Freedom and Peace, 11 pp. 252-54. 
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46 
eventually secure peace. n .Am.erica:n foreign policy, the 
President continued, 11 must be the product of genuine, con-
tinuous cooperation between the executive and legislative 
branches of this Government ... [and] ... must be developed and 
directed in the spirit of true bipartisanship. 047 
The President's announcement on the future of the 
Seventh Fleet, however, was not so stated as to strike a 
happy chord with the Democrats~ "I am ... issuing instruc-
tions that the Seventh Fleet no longer be employed to shield 
Communist China." President Truman's June, 1950, assignment 
of the Seventh Fleet "had meant, in effect that the United 
States Navy was required to serve as a defensive arm of 
Communist China," the new Chief Executive asserted. The 
President said the order did not imply aggressive intent 
against Red China on the part of the United States, "but we 
certainly have no obligation to protect a nation fighting 
us in Korea ... 4s On the Republican side of Congress the deci-
sion was hailed with "immoderate joy" because it 8'would 
unleash Chiang Kai-shek to attack the Chinese mainland, i, 
declared an avowed Asia-Firster columnist. The picture was 
46 · UoSo, Congress, House, The State of the Union~ Add-
.£§.§.§. of the President of the United States, 83rd Cong., 
1st Sess., 1953, House Doc. 75, p. 1. 
4 7 Ibid., p. 2. 
48Ibid. , p. 4. 
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one of a tiger let out of his cage.". The President's state-
ment was hailed by the Asia-Firsters as the first step in 
"liberating" the mainland of China. "It isn't necessary to 
cross all the bridges at once," Judd related, "it is suffi-
cient to the movement that we have crossed the first bridge." 
Thus, to Judd and the Asia-Firsters, the "days of intellect-
ual retreat of paralyzed tension, of spiritual prostration 
before the Communist conspiracy are over, and all else will 
f 11 . d . ..49 o ow in ue time. Judd declared that President Eisen-
hewer's action was but "the first break in the stalemate 
f h f dm . . . "50 program o t e ormer a inistration. 
To liberate the mainland the Asia-Firsters needed one 
of "their own" to map the future course which the Eisen-
hower Administration would pursue in East Asia. Judd, how-
ever, turned down an offer for a high position in the State 
Department of the new Administration. He believed that he 
would better serve the Eisenhower Administration and foreign 
policy as a senior member of the House Foreign Affairs Com-
mittee. Because of the narrow Republican margin in the 
House, Judd declared, he should remain in the House. In the 
House he could work for reform legislation, serve as a key 
49u.s., Congressional Record, 83rd Cong., 1st Sess., 
1953, XCIX, Part 10, All81. This is from an article by John 
Chamberlain which Judd read into the Record. 
50u.s., Congressional Record, 83rd Cong., 1st Sess., 
1953, XCIX, Part 9, All35. 
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liason man between the House and Capitol Hill with respect 
to foreign policy legislation, and continue to advise the 
• 0 ff . 51 President on foreign a airs. 
The man destined to become Eisenhower's Secretary of 
State, John Foster Dulles, had moved closer in his thinking 
on Asian affairs to those basic concepts held by Judd, dur-
ing the years 1950-52, when he served as special consultant 
to the State Department. Eisenhower met Dulles for the first 
time in Paris in 1952, following Dulles' resignation from 
the State Department. The Truman Administration had, in 
1950, appointed Dulle.s as a special consutant to the Secre-
tary of State, in hopes of creating a semblance of biparti-
sanship in the execution of foreign affairs. The growing 
gulf, however, which separated Acheson and Dulles regarding 
a feasible course to follow in Asia was indeed too great to 
bridge. Thus in early 1952 Dulles resigned. 
With Dulles' reputation in the area of foreign affairs, 
dating back to the Wilson Administration, it appeared ob-
vious that he wo~ld serve as chief diplomatic officer of an 
Eisenhower Administration. The future Secretary of State, 
however, when discussing his ideas on foreign policy with 
the future President found differences of opinion. Dulles 
was skeptical about Eisenhower's views on Asia. He felt 
51Minneapolis Tribune, December 17, 1952. 
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that there was a tendency to subordinate American interest 
52 in Asia to American interests in Europe. Dulles had al-
ready discussed his idea with Admiral Arthur W. Radford, 
then Pacific naval corrunander, and the two individuals agreed 
that American strategy in Asia and in Europe should be found-
ed on the theory that potential aggressors must be warned 
that if they broke the peace the United States would not 
necessarily move against them at the point of aggression, 
but might hit back where and when it was deemed most advan-
tageous. Finally, as a result of the Korean War,, which then 
dominated political thought, Dulles and Radford advocated 
that, if possible, United States troops would never again be 
d h . . 1 d 53 ' . . . employe on t e Asian main an, a position which the Presi-
dent fully supported. 
Eisenhower, by eventually appointing Dulles and Radford 
to key posts, apparently had accepted their premise to a 
large degree. However, the President was continually on the 
alert lest such concepts give theappearance that the United 
States was "abandoning Europe and relying for our defense 
solely upon retc;3.liatory striking air power and Herbert 
Hoover's 'fortress America' concept.'' 54 
52 C. L. Sulzberger, What's Wrong with U.S. Foreign Pol-
icy (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1959), p. 41. 
53
rbid. 
54
rbid. 
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Dulles, as well as Judd, openly opposed the idea of 
those who felt that the United States could isolate itself; 
and by 1953 the secretary seemed to hold that democracy and 
communism could not continue to exist side by side indefin-
itely. Dulles' previously published judgment on Red China, 
however, worried many Republican stalwarts,, particularly 
Republican members of the China bloc. Dulles had argued in 
1950 for the admission of Communist China to the United Na-
tions: "I have now come to believe that the United Nations 
will best serve the cause of peace if its Assembly is repre-
sentative of what the world actually is, and not merely re-
presentati ve of the parts which we like ... we ought to be 
willing that all the nations should be members without at-
tempting to appraise closely those which are 'good' and 
55 
those which are 'bad. ' 11 
However, upon receiving the nomination for Secretary of 
State, Dulles gave 11 private 11 and 0'official II assurance to 
members of the China bloc that he no longer favored Peiping's 
. h , . 56 
entry into t .e United Nations. Dulles' critics felt that 
55 John Foster Dulles, War Or Peace (2nd ed.; New York: 
The Macmillan Company, 1957), p. 190. 
56 Sulzberger, What's Wrong with UoSo Foreign Policy, p. 
198; Dulles in the special preface to the 1957 edition of 
War Or Peace gives a very weak and unconvincing argument 
why he changed his mind on recognition of Red China. 
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this shift only reinforced their initial opinion: that in-
deed Dulles was a 11 man capable both of changing his mind 
with dazzling speed and of employing skillful legal tactics 
to obscure the fact that he has in reality shifted his posi-
tion.1157 Therefore, pro-Chiang Senators subjected Dulles to 
severe vocal criticism. Judd, however, did not join them. 58 
In analyzing why Dulles shifted position in regard to Red 
China, one can conclude with Judd, that '"Mr. Dulles changed 
when he learned from experience the hard fact that recogni-
59 
tion did increase the prestige and power of a government;" 
or one can conclude that Dulles learned between 1950 and 
1952, the strength and influence of the China bloc in Con-
60 gress. Dulles, to assure his questioners further of the 
sincerity of his new-found conviction, promised that he 
would give favorc;ible consideration to any candidate they 
might recommend as assistant secretary in charge of Far 
. 61 Eastern Affairs. 
57 Sulzberger, What's Wrong with U . .§.o Foreign Policy, p. 40. 
58
rbid., see pp. 185-210. 
59 C , 1 d UoS., onaress1ona Recor, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., 
1961, CVII, Part 7, 9921. 
60Robert P. Newman, Recogniti_on of Communist China? A 
Study in Argument (New York~ The Macmillan Company, 1961 ), 
p. 46. 
61 Sulzberger, What's Wroqg with UoS. Foreign Policy, 
p. 198. 
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During his first week as Secretary of State Dulles in-
terviewed Walter S. Robertson, whom Judd recommended (des-
pite Taft's protest, for Robertson had been present at Yal-
62 
ta) as Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern affairs. 
Robertson had served in various capacities in Asia during 
the previous Administration. In 1945-1946 he held the posi-
tion of Minister and Counselor for Economic Affairs at the 
United States Embassy in Chungking. He had opposed a coa:-
lition government for China throughout the Truman Administra-
tion. Upon returning to the United States he allied himself 
63 
with Judd, Knowland, and Wedemeyer. Robertson had long 
contended that Mao Tse-tung was but a passing phenomenon 
and that Chiang remained China's 11 real 11 symbol. This great-
ly satisfied Judd. As Assistant Secretary Robertson could 
assert to a New York Times columnist that "Mao has no more 
real influence than the first taxi driver who goes by out-
'd 1164 Sl e. Robertson pursued with Judd's constant approval, 
a vigorous policy of trade embargo, travel restrictions, and 
similar measures, designed as much as possible to isolate 
62 John R. Beal, John Foster Dulles~ A Biography (New 
York: Harper & Brothers, Publishers, 1957), p. 9. 
63 Graebner, The New Isolationism, p. 15.5. 
64 Sulzberger, What's Wron__g with U.§.. Foreign Policy, 
p. 198. 
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Communist China from the non-Communist world. 65 Judd loudly 
applauded Admiral Arthur W. Radford's appointment as chair-
man of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Radford made no secret of 
his feeling that if it required a·· fifty year war to destroy 
Red China, then it should be carried out. 66 Dulles, Robert-
son and Radford were but a few of--the pro-Chiang men who 
constituted a strong voice in the top echelons of the Eisen-
hower Administration demanding relentless opposition to Red 
Ch . 67 ina. 
Judd's technique to 11 broaden 11 American foreign policy 
into a "global 11 policy was incorporated into political and 
economic measures against Red China. On this premise he 
proceeded to instruct and advise the President. First, the 
Administration must fully "recognize" that the Communists' 
65Roger Hilsman, To Move A Nation: The Politics of 
Foreign Policy in the Administration of John F. Kennedy 
(Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1967), 
p. 299. 
66In 1960 Radford had urged Nixon, if elected, to ap-
point Judd as Secretary of State. Minneapolis Tribune, Nov-
ember 21, 1960. When Joe McCarthy was asked to name his 
candidate for Secretary of·State, since he believed the Re-
public was lost as long as Dean Acheson remained in office, 
he responded: Congressman Walter H. Judd of Minnesota. 
McCarthy made this suggestion at the time when he was ques-
tioned about the MacArthur removal. Minneapolis Tribune, 
April 19, 1951. ._McCarthy and Judd were co"'."workers in the 
1948 campaign for.former Governor Harold E. Stassen of Min-
nesota. Judd placed Stassen's name in nomination at the 
convention that year. 
67 Graebner, The New Isolationism, p. 155. 
378 
inunediate goal in Asia was to undermine the weak, and it was 
America's responsibility to protect the weak. With a Repub-
lican Administration, however, Judd could assert that world 
war was not the inunediate danger fac.ing the country. Amer-
ica would demonstrate its strength, no one would pull the 
United States over the "brink." Secondly, the United States 
had to "oppose" admission of Red China to the United Nations. 
Keeping Conununist China out of·the United Nations was a 
"diplomatic" victory which the United States had to win, des-
pite the position of America's European allies, along with 
other military and economic victories, if democracy were to 
win over conununism. Non-recognition of Red China was a pol-
icy most vital to the future security of the United States. 
Likewise, to perpetuate American security, the United States 
"must find ways to help the enslaved peoples become free," 
Judd asserted, and the United State:s. "must not build up 
their enslavers.n 68 The continuing flow of refugees from 
Conununist China, Judd felt, was an excellent force around 
which the United States could build "to recreate a free Chi-
69 
na and an Asia that will stand against Conununist aggression." 
In addition, Judd felt that the.United States should 
68 
· 1· T 'b A 'l 22 1954 Minneapo .is ri une, · pri ··· , . 
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do everything possible to help pro.duce the circumstances 
which would encourage a successful revolution within the 
Soviet Union. Judd held that·the purpose of the cold war 
was to prevent further Russian expansion and the further 
development of its power until the inte.rnal forces and pres-
sures within Russia became so great .that a revolution was 
set off. 70 It's "bound to crack;II Judd asserted. For this 
reason Judd supported economic aid to Tito and Franco, not 
because they were democrats or believed 11 in the kind of 
world we do," he asserted, but because Tito was making trou-
ble for Russia, America's enemy, and in doing that Tito was 
saving the United States "considerable trouble. 11 Likewise, 
he supported Franco because he was not a "threat" to the 
United States, and to the extent that Tito and Franco could 
tie up Russian strength, they were "on the side of the 
71 United States. 11 Judd sincerely believed that it was pos-
sible for the United States, by extending moral encourage-
ment, to destroy the Soviet Union from within; but, not un-
til the "people of the free world repeatedly, effectively, 
and convincingly make clear to the Russian people that we 
want them to join us in an honorable peace and with full 
70Minneapolis Star, June 29, 1950. 
71walter H. Judd, 11 How Can We Be So Stupid? We Help 
Our Enemy And Deny Our Friends," Vital Speeches of the Day, 
XVII {March 1, 1951), 295. 
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cooperation, good will and brotherhood. 11 Not until the 
United States made this clear to the Rus.sian people could 
the United States expect the Russian people to rise up and 
"overthrow the tyranny and despotism under which they suf-
72 fer, 11 Judd declared. 
Greater encouragement and·assistance, Judd asserted, 
must come from the Administration to challenge the free 
Chinese on Formosa, because survival of·. the "whole free 
world is at stake in Asia." 7 3 To Judd, one 11 of the -. gravest 
errors ever made by our Government, under the never-ending 
hammering of Communist-'inspited propag·anda, was to under-
estimate the strength of the Chinese Communists. 11 But now, 
in 1953, the Government gave signs of making the mistake of 
overestimating the strength of the Communist regime. Amer-
ica's "best hope in the Pacific is to exploit and increase 
its weaknesses ... [to] encourage and help the free Chinese to 
h h • f. • h • 'I 7 4 overt row t .e1r oppressors rom wit 1n.· Judd's fifth 
point was 11 greater assistance 11 to the free Chinese on For-
mosa and elsewhere "to enable them to smuggle agents and 
supplies to the mainland" to wage guerrilla warfare. Sixth, 
72 U.S., Congressional Record, 82nd Cong., 1st Sess., 
1951, XCVII, Part 2, 2893. 
73Minneapolis Tribune, April 22, 1954. 
74u.s.~ Congressional Record, 83rd Cong., 1st Sess., 
1953, XCIX, Part 9, All80. 
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and very important, the United States must manifest n faith'' 
in the oppressed people behind'theTron Curtain rather than 
75 in "cynical deals with their oppressors." Thus, Judd 
sincerely felt that with the President getting advice from 
"loyal Americans,". the country would return to its "historic 
perspective." 
Despite Republican assertions that the Eisenhower Ad-
ministration kicked out the "Communists and fellow travelers 
and security risks, not by the hundreds but by the thous-
76 
ands,. 11 Judd came to feel that even the Republican Adminis-
tration failed to rid the State and·Defense Departments of 
Communists and "pro-Communist" influence. He felt that the 
"pro-Communists" were not all subversive, nor members of 
the Communist Party. But, to Judd, high officials in the 
departments were subject to "pro-Communistu influence. In 
essence, Judd seemed to argue that anyone who differed from 
his own conclusion was 11 soft on communism. n This was the 
only way that Judd could explain his opponents' conclusions. 
Judd, however, refused to charge openly that a !!pattern of 
appeasement" existed in the over-all policy of the Eisen-
75
walter H. Judd,"Congressman Looks Inside the State 
Department: Excerpts from Testimony Before Senate Subcom-
mittee on Internal Security," Uo.§.. News and World Report, 
XL (June 15, 1956), 96. 
76Minneapolis Tribune, April 22, 1954. 
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hower Administration. He would, however, charge that ap-
peasement existed at the "lower echelons" and officials with 
"pro-Communist" views influenced top level decisions. 77 Judd 
could assert, nevertheless, that the State Department was 
"a good deal better than it was, but ... it has a long way to 
go, 11 before it is free from 11 pro-Communist influence. Judd 
saw the so-called upro-Communists" as "clever" souls who 
wrote position papers, which came up to their superiors and 
became policy papers. Then, to Judd, the policy papers as 
influenced by the "questionable ones" go on to the action 
agencies, such as the State Department, the Pentagon, and 
the National Security Council. In this way the 11 pro-Corrunu-
nists influenced all major decisions made in the Executive 
Departments. I don't see how they could come to the conclu-
$ion they do if that were not the case, 11 Judd declared. 78 
Judd's simple "black and white" solutions were not al-
ways warmly received by the new Administration. Judd and 
the Asia-Firsters and associates, without being named, re-
ceived a public rebuke from the new Administration regard-
ing their preventive war theory. Dulles, on January 27, 
1953, after meeting with the Senate Foreign Relations Com-
mittee and the House Foreign Affairs Committee, of which 
77Minneapolis Tribune, June 1, 1956. 
78Ibid. 
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Judd served as chairman, dispelled the preventive war the·-
ory. 11 A few people, 11 the Secretary declared, "have suggest-
ed that a war with Soviet Russia was inevitable, and that 
we'd better have it soon rather than later because they 
said time is running against us. 11 The President is "absolu-
tely opposed,n Dulles continued, "to any such policy and so, 
of course, am I and all my associates in the State Depart-
ment and the foreign service." The Eisenhower Administra-
tion "shall never choose a war as the instrument" of its 
79 policy, the Secretary concluded. 
The courses of action in Asia as advocated by Dulles 
naturally flowed from the collapse of the Truman Adrninistra-
tion 's policy in Asia--the only alternative to a policy that 
had failed was its logical opposite. 80 John Foster Dulles 
believed, as did the Asia-Firsters and new isolationists, 
that it was possible to limit the use of atomic weapons to 
tactical purposes. The result of such tactical employment 
would be the destruction of airfields, supply installations, 
ports, and lines of communication--this would cause the en-
79John Foster Dulles, "Enlightened Self-Interest: En-
circlement A Deadly Threat To United States, 11 Vital Speeches 
of the Day, XIX (February 15, 1953), 266. 
BOTang Tsou, America's Failure In China 1941-1950 
(Chicago~ The University of Chicago Press, 1963), p. 490. 
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81 
emy to surrender. There were, however, those in the Eis-
enhower Administration who.felt that suc-h operations of 
atomic weapons would inevitably include the destruction of 
cities. The new President himself concluded that "there is 
really no definite dividing line between the tactical use 
82 
of atomic weapons and the miscalled strategic use of them. 11 
Even though the Eisenhower Administration hinted at taking 
the Korean War into China it appears quite obvious that the 
President did not have the stomach for expanding the war at 
this time, that is, if he could obtain an armistice without 
it. 
The resulting Korean Armistice, a weaker settlement 
than that which the President had demanded and worked for, 
as signed on July 26, 1953, was surely less than that ex-
pected by Judd and the Asian clique. It was indeed a grave 
disappointment for the Asia-Firsters and the China Lobby. 
They felt that ending the war without 11 victory 11 was bad 
enough, but in so doing it hi;id 11 undermined the prestige of 
the United Nations and of the United States." To members 
of the lobby the armistice demonstrated American "unreadi-
ness to pay the price" of the policy which they demanded. 
81Thomas R. Phillips [Brigadier General (Ret.) ], "Our 
Point of No Return, 11 The Reporter, XII (February 24, 1955), 
18. 
82Ibid. 
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The agreement provided for prisoner exchange; freezing of 
existing military fronts as the demarcation line; and the 
establishment of a demilitarized zone four kilometers wide 
separating the Communist and United Nations forces. Troop 
and equipment rotation was permitted on a limited scale, 
but logistic conditions were to remain static. A Military 
Armistice Commission of ten members, five representing each 
side, was charged with enforcing the agreement. After pris-
oner exchange a political conference would meet to discuss 
83 
the future status of Korea and related problems. 
Despite the grave disappointment which Judd surely felt 
over the Korean Armistice, he was obliged to make at least 
a token effort to defend the President he had worked so hard 
to elect. It was Eisenhower's withdrawal of the Seventh 
Fleet from the Formosa Straits which 11 brought the fighting 
84 
to a close, 11 Judd would assert. Judd, however, just prior 
to the signing of the armistice argued that the peace talks 
were a II ruse" to buy 11 time 11 and an nopportuni ty for the Com-
munists to rebuild their shattered strength." Any armis-
tice, Judd declared, "which did not reunite Korea, disarm 
the North Koreans, and require withdrawal of Chinese Com-
83
congressional Quarterly, China and Uo.§.o Far East 
Policy, p. 65. 
84Minneapolis Tribune, April 18, 1955. 
386 
munist forces, could not give Korea security or bring 
peace. 11 Lesser accomplishments in Korea, Judd asserted, 
would strengthen the Communist position in Asia and weaken 
85 
that of Korea, the United States, and the entire free world. 
Later Judd was to assert that the "Korean War" could not be 
called a "failure," even though it did not do 11 what many of 
us wanted," because without that "operation all Korea would 
86 have been gone, long ago.n 
Judd's denunciation of President Eisenhower's action 
in Korea is clearly illustrated by the number and charges 
of syndicated columnist articles which he read into the 
Congressional Record. Contrary to the fact that Eisenhower 
campaigned on the promise of making a personal visit to 
Korea and of bringing the Korean conflict to a close, the 
Asia-Firsters were in essence critical of all talk of end-
ing the war, and rather shocked that the new President 
would consider anything short of total victory over the 
Communists in Asia. Without doubt Eisenhower was never 
thoroughly convinced that the Korean War was not the wrong 
war, at the wrong time, at the wrong place. His handling 
and ending the war apparently sprang from his lack of con-
85Minneapolis Star, July 1, 1953. 
86
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viction that there had to be a nshowdown" with Communist 
China and Russia. If Korea was the right war, at the right 
place, at the right time, then he settled for 11 too little. 11 
Eisenhower had tasted well the f'l.ltility and frustrations of 
I 
war prior to his elevation to the presidency~ This, combi-
ned with the Korean settlement and the reaction thereto, 
helped to stop him from seriously considering intervention 
in Indochina at a later date. 
Edgar Mowrer, a conservative syndicated columnist of 
the Asia-Firster faction, who mouthed. the sentiments of 
Judd and was yet unwilling to cite or condemn the Eisenhower 
Administration by name, assert.ea in regard to the armistice 
settlement~ nThose in high places who ~ave meekly yielded 
to defeatists at home and abroad will hp-veto accept full 
responsibility for their decisions. 11 '.l;'hus, ifthe·arrnistice 
turned out badly, Mowrer continued, 11 they will have no valid 
87 
excuse. 11 Constantine Brown, in true Asia-First form, as-
serted that the signing of an armistice in Korea nis the 
last sop the present administration is willing to offer 
our Western allies." He voiced the explanation~ ""Adminis-
tration leaders explain that, in the face of the determined 
stand of Great Britain and France to sign a truce, it would 
87
uoSo, Congressional Record, 83rd Cong., 1st. Sess., 
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have been difficult for this Government to do otherwise 
without the London and Paris governments getting in trouble 
with their own people. 1188 It is interesting to note, how-
ever, that the same Administration which Judd had asserted 
so often during the campaign would appease the Reds no long-
er, now according to Brown, would be guilty of not one more 
"concession." 
Brown futher assured his loyal followers that the 
European powers were convinced that ij1 our declaration that 
Korea must be unified in accordance with the Western concept 
of free elections is not just another official statement to 
appease President Syngman Rhee. 11 European powers have been 
fully convinced, he continued, that the United States Gov-
ernment intends to carry out this pledge, 11 regardless of 
what opposition may develop at the political conference to 
be held 90 days after the signature of the armistice. 11 
Brown spoke with conviction as he declared that the Admin-
istration would not "hesitate to accept the challenge of 
the Reds in Asia even if we have to meet the enemy without 
the support of Great Britain, the Commonwealth, and France.n 
In such an event, Brown continued: "General Eisenhower 
knows ... th.is country has at this moment the power to anni-
hilate them with comparatively fewer losses than an appease-
88Ibid., p. A4929. 
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ment policy would cost. 11 He failed to explain himself on 
this point, but the preventive war theory was still present 
in the minds of the Asia-Firsters as the only alternative 
to world peace. Brown concluded his remarks with the as-
surance that the Eisenhower Administration did not •ushudder 
at the prospect of a challenge from the Reds, whom they re-
89 gard as Colossi with clay feet. 11 
In contrast, Walter Lippmann found the Korean armistice 
90 
a reasonable and honorable arrangement. Columnists who 
expounded the China bloc line, however, could echo the Know-
land dictum that the armistice was at best arslightly dis-
honorable. 11 The armistice did, however, serve to intensify 
the determination of the China clique and the new isolation-
ists against the admittance of Red China to the United Na-
tions. 
It was the growing suspicion among many Congressmen 
that .America's participation in the United Nations had tied 
the President's hands in obtaining a Hftbetter" settlement 
from the .Korean negotiations. 91 Although Judd appears to 
have remained totally silent in 1953 and 1954 on the so-
89Ibid., p. A4930. 
90u.s. 0 Congressional Record, 83rd Cong., 1st Sess., 
1953, XCIX, Part 12, A4793. Read into the Record by Clyde 
R. Hoey, Democrat of North Carolina. 
91Donald C. Blaisdell, American Democracy Under Pres-
~ (New York: The Ronald Press Company, 1957), p. 22. 
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called Bricker Amendment debate, he was willing to work 
with the strong supporters of the proposed amendment to 
gain his own objectives in the field of foreign affairs. 
Many of the sub-agencies which the new isolationists feared 
were the very ones which Judd had supported for years. 
Nearly a decade before Judd had toured the country seeking 
to place the Government on record as favoring a new inter-
national organization for the maintenance of peace. 92 What 
America must do, Judd declared in 1944, 11 when the war is 
over is join with the world in hoisting a standard of free-
dom and honesty that 85 per cent of the world's people will 
93 follow." The United States, however, under a Republican 
Administration would make no renunciations in Asia out of 
regard for the "timidity" of European allies, Judd would 
declare. He would readily admit that the United States had 
a need for these allies, but not more than they needed the 
United States; perhaps indeed the need was a great deal 
less on the part of the United States. 94 
Contrary to the belief held by many of America's al-
lies, not only Asia-Firsters but a vast majority of the 
92Minneapolis Star-Journal, October 26, 1945. 
93Minneapolis Star-Journal, March 31, 1944. 
94u.s., Congressional Record, 83rd Cong., 1st Sess., 
1953, XCIX, Part 11, A3551. 
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American population saw Red China emerging from the Korean 
War as a new and potent force in the world balance of power, 
waiting for the proper moment to throw herself against For-
mosa and Southeast Asia. With the Korean deadlock broken, 
the Eisenhower Administration attempted to move ahead on 
other fronts, notably expenditures. Substantial cutbacks 
were achieved, as promised in the Republican platform of 
1952, in conventional war appropriations. Although the 
Eisenhower Administration refused to formulate actual pol-
icy on the basis demanded by the new isolationists and the 
China bloc, the "new look" or ••new direction 1e of defense 
concentrated on "instant" and 11 massive 11 retaliation, pre-
sumably, with nuclear weapons, against aggression of the 
Communist forces, a policy which would eliminate the need 
of a la:rge standing military force. Since "Korean type" 
wars were not included in the .Administration's military 
program, reserve forces, rather than standing forces, would 
serve the country's needs and at the same time save tax 
payers money. To both the Asia-Firsters and the new isola-
tionists, the United States required nothing more than air-
atomic-sea power to achieve total victory in East Asia over 
h h . C . 95 t e C inese ommunists. 
John Foster Dulles announced and vaguely outlined the 
95 Graebner, The New Isolationism, p. 124. 
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Administration's economy program to obtain "more security" 
for "less money," to the Council on Foreign Relations in 
New York, on January 12, 1954. The Secretary of State in-
formed the Council that henceforth the United States would 
"depend primarily upon a great capacity to retaliate, in-
stantly, by means and at places of our choosing." This 
reliance upon strategic air power was expected to appeal to 
the American public for several reasons. Indeed "massive 
retaliation" sounded more dynamic than the time-worn Truman 
term of "containment," and it made possible a reduction of 
over-all military expenditures. Massive retaliation reject-
ed the concept of limited war, or "half war," and "reassert-
ed the old American doctrine of either abstaining or fight-
96 ing an all-out-war." Judd's response to Dulles' state-
ment was that the American people truly appreciate "the 
forthright and unequivocal way in which Secretary of State 
Dulles has amplified and spelled out in sharp detail the 
strong, positive, and sound foreign policy President Eisen-
hower and his new administration are developing to meet the 
d , .. 97 urgent nee s of our time. 
Indeed, the doctrine delighted all factions on the 
96 
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right of the political spectrum. This policy of massive re-
taliation reflected Dulles' and Asia-Firsters' own strong 
conviction that the only effective way of stopping further 
aggression was to give the enemy an advanced warning that 
if he committed such aggression, he would be subject to 
such overwhelming retaliatory blows that his possible gains 
would be far outweighed by the punishment he would receive~8 
The Dulles doctrine supposedly provided for a clear line 
drawn around the entire Sino-Soviet bloc. Thus the Russians 
and Chinese could cross this line only at the risk of total 
war with the United States. The fear of total destruction 
by the American Strategic Air Command was expected to deter 
the Russians and Chinese from committing any new '"Koreas." 
Unlike the Truman Administration, the Eisenhower Administra-
tion proposed to fight no more local ground wars. 
The doctrine, whether or not it accomplished its inten-
ded purpose, is still subject to heated debate. The In.do-
china war provided ample opportunity for demonstrating the 
doctrine of the Administration which held "the mandate for 
change." The President, however, refused to accept full 
responsibility for making the theory operative in Vietnam, 
because Democratic leaders would not give him the "blank 
gg ' Am ' F . P 1° S 0 W ld W II Spanier, erican oreign o icy ince or ~ _, 
p. 104. 
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check 11 which the Administration desired. By mid-1954, after 
the fall of Dienbienphu, the Eisenhower Administration made 
no additional overt gesture to stay the course of this Asian 
problem, except establish and increase in size the United 
States Military Assistance Advisory Group which took over 
the training of South Vietnamese troops as the French forces 
left. The doctrine of massive retaliation, however, pro-
duced a domestic battle which resulted in corrections, clar-
ification~, counterassertions, and restatements, resulting in 
further confounded confusion which virtually nullified the 
. . 1 d 1 . 99 or1g1na ec arat1on. 
Judd held the view that the United States should be 
prepared to carry out massive retaliation against Red China 
if necessary, and proceeded to advise the Eisenhower Admin-
istration to that end. The United States should be prepared 
to act, he asserted, regardless of the position of American 
allies, although the threat of massive retaliation in itself 
would be sufficient to deter Communist aggression in Asia. 
But if the threat failed, Judd would assert in answering 
questions, the "country would face an awful decision--wheth-
er to let those countries go ... or to go in with our men in 
99Bernard Brodie,·. 11 Unlimited Weapons And Limited War, 11 
The Reporter, XI (November 18, 1954), 20. Dienbienphu fell 
on May 7, 1954. This was the first time in the Indochina 
War that a French stronghold had been conquered by direct 
attack. 
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a Korean-type war, or an all-out retaliation." His own in-
1 . t . h 1 d 11 • t th K t II l O O c ina ion e wou say, was agains e orea- ype war. 
Thus, after the fall of Dienbienphu, Judd announced that 
all the gains the United States had made on the European 
continent were in jeopardy by American losses to the Commu-
. . A . 101 
nists in sia. 
As chairman of the Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on 
Asia and the Pacific, Judd made a 30,000 mile trip through 
Asia in late 1953. Upon his return he announced that he 
would make a full and detailed report of his trip to the 
President, and that he was recommending to Secretary Dulles 
that the United States sign a new defensive pact with friend-
ly Asiatic nations t0 assure them that they were "full part-
ners" in America's fight against communism. 11102 Dulles, 
despite his refusal to sign the Geneva Declaration of July 
21, 1954, which without a doubt would have been condemned 
by the China bloc as making concessions to the Communists, 
did bring about the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Trea-
ty, commonly known as the Manila Pact. Signatories of the 
treaty of September 8, 1954, included Great Britain, France, 
Pakistan, the Philippines, New Zealand, Thailand, Australia, 
lOOM. 1· St inneapo is~' April 12, 1954. 
lOl y k T' J 18 1954 3 New --2.L_ imes, une , , p .. 
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and the United States. The treaty area included, in addi-
tion to the signatory nations, the areas of South Vietnam, 
Laos, and Cambodia. The creation of SEATO, which took only 
three days to negotiate, was followed by the Pacific Chart-
er. Here, the Western nations, in a document inspired by 
the Atlantic Charter, affirmed their wiilingness to help 
the Asiatic nations retain full independence. 103 
Judd reacted ~to these formal agreements by expressing 
his approval of the direction of the Eisenhower Administra-
tion in the field of foreign relations. He described the 
Administration's direction as "good," and reported that he 
was "more encouraged for real unity and strength among the 
free nations of the world than at any time since the end of 
the war." This has come about, Judd declared, "because of 
a basic change in this nation I s foreign relation I s approach." 
The Republicans, Judd continued, regard "the world as one 
strategic unit, instead of making everything secondary to 
the North Atlantic countries." The Republicans, Judd would 
tell his audiences, recognized Corrununist gains anywhere as 
dangerous as in Europe--"something Dean Acheson ... wouldn't 
. ..104 
recognize. 
Although Judd hailed SEATO as a "triumph," it beca!Tle 
103Eisenhower, Mandate For Change, p. 374. 
104Minneapolis Star, October 16, 1954. 
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a reality only after part of Indochina was lost, the Eur-
opean Defense Corrununity was drafted, and the gulf between 
the United States and Britain widened. Judd's "NATO" for 
Asia left much to be desired when compared with its European 
counterpart. NATO came into being because the nations most 
concerned were convinced that defense and prosperity for 
Europe was a corrunon venture. At Manila there was no such 
corrunon belief. The nations involved in SEATO, it appears, 
could not readily identify the "corrunon" enemy. The Ameri-
can delegation finally had to add a paragraph stating its 
own "understanding" that the treaty had to do with stopping 
. . .. 10s 
aggression by Corrunun1sts. 
Perhaps this weak treaty came about only after threats 
of American withdrawal from the United Nations if Red China 
were admitted. The United States prevented the seating of 
Red Chinese delegates, not by the veto, which the Asia-
Firsters advocated, if necessary, but by political-economic 
lOSSEATO, unlike NATO alliance, which it resembled, 
did not possess a unified corrunand or joint force. The prin-
cipal force behind the alliance was American sea and air 
power. An armed attack on any of the SEATO members was not 
considered "an attack against ... all," as set forth in NATO. 
E.ach of the eight nations merely agreed that an attack on 
any of the nations involved would "endanger its own peace 
and safety." The trouble evolving from the treaty was that 
there was produced an illusion that America had a "NATO" in 
Asia which it did not. Sulzberger, What's Wrong~ Uo~o 
Foreign Policy, p. 145. 
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. d . fl 106 persuasion an in uence. Most other governments appar-
ently concluded that the central issue of "Formosa vs. 
Peking" was too important to be disposed of through voting 
technicalities on a report of the credentials committee of 
h . d . 107 t e Unite Nations. Judd's own talk of the United States 
withdrawing from the United Nations, without doubt, was but 
his own device to exert pressure on the Administration to 
provide more aid and protection for Asia. Throughout 1954 
Judd urged on and demanded from the Administration greater 
encouragement and assistance "to the Free Chinese on For-
mosa" because the survival of the 11 whole free world" was 
k . A . 108 at sta e in sia. Judd's reputation and his objectives 
were circulated widely enough to warrant condemnation "as a 
war monger" from a Russian delegate to the United Nations~09 
The House Foreign Affairs Committee, of which Judd 
served as chairman during 1953 and 1954, had to withstand 
tremendous pressure from those who demanded that the United 
States withdraw from the United Nations if Communist China 
106More than a few of the sixty United Nations coun-
tries recognized or supported recognition of Red China. 
The Chinese Communists, however, refused recognition to 
several Western countries. 
107New York Times, July 10, 1954, p. 6. 
108Minneapolis ~' March 27, 1954. 
109New York Times, July 10, 1954, p. 6. 
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were admitted. Judd was willing, along with Kit Clardy, 
Michigan Republican, to sponsor a resolution demanding 
American withdrawal if Red China were seated. 110 He declar-
ed that personally he would "rather suspend the Uo No than 
make it a league of gangsters, murderers, thugs, kidnapers 
111 
and completely lawless people. 11 He, however, ''opposed 
any action that would tip off what this country intends to 
do if Red China was admitted. 11 Judd could sponsor such a 
resolution because he sincerely felt that the "Chinese Reds 
would not win a United Nations seat. 11112 Judd's assurance 
came from the Presidents pledge that he would impress upon 
foreign governments the feeling of Congress and would cau-
tion them that if they forced the issue in the United Na-
tions that he would not be able to answer for the reaction 
in 113 the United States. 
Opposition to admittance of Red China to the United 
Nations had crystallized prior to Judd's resolution, which 
never got out of committee. The main pressure group in-
fluencing Congress and the Administration, in behalf of 
"free" China, was the Committee of One Million (Against the 
llOibid. 
111 
· 1 · s J 1 10 1954 Minneapo is tar, u y , . 
112Ibid.; New York Times, July 10, 1954, p. 6. 
113Eisenhower, Mandate For Change, p. 215. 
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Admission of Communist China to the United Nations.) The 
committee came into existence only weeks after the Korean 
Armistice was signed. The conception of the committee, 
originally the Committee For One Million originated with 
Nicholas de Rochefort, a Russian-born university lecturer. 
Judd, when contacted about the committee, immediately em-
braced the idea and set to work to make the organization a 
reality. rhe Committee For One Million succeeded during 
the first ten months of its existence in enlisting more 
than a million signatures on petitions to President Eisen-
hower to oppose Communist China's admission to the United 
Nations. With this objective accomplished, the committee 
suspended its activities; however, the following year it 
was reactivated as the Committee of One Million. Since 
that time it hqs not only opposed admission of Communist 
China to the United Nations but also has opposed extending 
diplomatic reaognition and all other moves which might build 
. f h pk' . 114 the power or prestige o t e e ing regime. Judd active-
ly labored for the committee as it continued as,a very 
powerful and influential pressure group. Likewise, he 
continued to occupy a key position in policy making. The 
objective of the Committee of One Million in influencing the 
114A. To Steele, The American People And China (New 
York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1966), pp. 120-21. 
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Administration and Congress sought to have each individual 
commit himself in black and white to a "hard" position on 
Red China. 115 
The activities of the China bloc to bind the President 
occasioned considerable strain between the President and 
members of his own Republican majority in Congress. Eisen-
hower often spoke of the endless battle of "congressional 
encroachment" on the Executive branch of the Government as 
members of his own party attempted to assert the initiative 
in foreign affairs. Not infrequently did members of the 
China bloc or new isolationists attempt to subjugate the 
President to their own will by threats of withholding funds, 
or attaching riders, or amendments, to the President's do-
mestic or foreign programs and commitments. On numerous 
occasions Judd compelled the President to take notice of 
the power and prestige which he had amassed in the House. 
On one occasion Judd sought to prevent the President from 
115The letterhead of the Committee of One Million for 
several years carried the names of five senators: Thomas 
J. Dodd, Democr~t of Connecticut; Peter H. Dominick, Repub-
lican of Colorado; Paul H. Douglas, Democrat of Illinois; 
Bourke B. Hickenlooper, Republican of Iowa; William Prox-
mire, Democrat of Wisconsin; and other well-known person-
ages as Charles Edison, Walter H. Judd, and Congressman 
Thomas E. Morgan, Democrat of Pennsylvania. There were 
prominent liberals who lent their names to the committee's 
goal during the interim period following the Korean Armis-
tice. They, however, soon found themselves increasingly 
uncomfortable with the origanization's policies, and many 
eventually withdrew. 
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obligating any mutual~security funds until the European 
governments ratified the treaty which would set up a Euro-
pean Defense Community, including West Germany. The Pres-
ident called, Judd'and informed him of his disgust at this 
Republican action. 11 It was an insult," tl:le President told 
Judd, "for a Republican President to face such a restric-
tive policy when the Congress had not forced it on his 
Democratic predecessor." Judd defended his stand, the 
116 
President related, but "he agreed to work for a compromise." 
Judd, nevertheless, was willing to employ every tactic at 
his command to force his own China case upon the Administra-
. 117 
tion. 
The President refused to go all the way with Judd and 
the China bloc in reestablishing Chiang Kai-shek on the 
mainland. He, however, assured Judd and his allies that 
the United States would be ever mindful of Chiang's welfare 
and that Formosa would never fall to the Red Chinese while 
he was President of the United States. On December 2, 
1954, the Eisenhower Administration concluded a defense 
agreementwiththe government controlling Formosa, designa-
116Eisenhower, Mandate For Change, p. 215. 
117For interesting observations on Judd see: "The 
Ladejinsky Case" under "The Reporter Notes, 11 The Reporter, 
XII (January 13, 1955), 4; Minneapolis Tribune, October 6, 
1955. Judd was one of Ladejinsky's strongest supporters. 
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ting it "the Republic of China. 11 This, without doubt, Judd 
found most reassuring as the United Nations Charter pro-
vides, by name, that "the Republic of China" shall be one 
of the five permanent members of the Security Council. The 
treaty provided for the defense of Formosa, the Pescadores 
Islands, and other such "territories as may be determined 
by mutual agreement. 11 The treaty as such did not cover all 
Nationalist-held islands off the coast of China. It, how-
ever, required the United States and Nationalist China to 
maintain and develop "jointly by self-help and mutual aid" 
their individual and collective capacity to resist armed 
attack and Communist subversion directed against them 
"from without. 11118 The new treaty provided no tangible 
benefits which the Nationalist Chinese did not already 
have on Formosa, by action of the Truman Administration. 
Both political parties in the United States were fully com-
mitted to defend Bormosa. The treaty, therefore, did pro-
vide a new justification to keep the Seventh Fleet patrol-
ling the China Seas, to execute the same function which 
Truman had ordered in 1950. 
By late 1954, without doubt, Judd, Knowland, the Asia-
Firsters, and the new isolationists, realized as well as 
llSC . 1 Q 1 Ch" d US F E ongress1ona uarter y, 1na .fill__._. ar ast 
Policy, p. 73. 
404 
did Chiang Kai-shek and members of the Eisenhower Executive 
family, that Chiang Kai-shek was not going anywhere without 
Presidential consent. The President's experience with con-
gressional leaders of the new isolationist and China bloc 
varieties, and the failure of some of his programs in Con-
gress at the hands of a Republican majority, apparently con-
vinced the President that he must exert stronger leadership. 
Apparently it was here that Eisenhower learned that in the 
democratic process the relationship between the Executive 
and Congress depends often upon an uneasy coalition of fac-
tions, always capable of inflicting great harm on the Admin-
istration. The President curried the favor of the new isola-
tionist coalition,, but they remained rebellious at the Pres-
ident's leadership in foreign affairs. The persistent de-
termination of the new isolationist coalition to seize and 
maintain the initiative in formulating foreign policy, thus 
subjugating the President to their will, remained strong 
throughout the two years that the Republicans controlled 
Congress. Th~ President could afford to give Chiang Kai-
shek a protective treaty, but conquering the mainland con-
stituted too high a price for returning the "rebellious" 
ones to the Republican fold. 
Without doubt the Chinese Nationalists wanted the 
treaty as long-term insurance not only against Communist in-
405 
vasion, but also against recognition of Red China. 119 The 
treaty reassured Chiang Kai-shek on the defense of Formosa, 
but he was in no position to force the United States to 
codify its policy in treaty form. However, Judd, Knowland, 
and the entire China bloc coalition wanted the same assur-
ance, and they had the political power to compel it. 120 The 
treaty did commit the United States, when approved by the 
Senate, formally to recognize Formosa and the Pescadores 
Islands as a part of the Republic of China, a recognition 
which the United States had successfully avoided for nearly 
ten years. This was welcome assurance to Judd and the en-
tire China bloc that the United States fully recognized 
Chiang Kai-shek's claim to Formosa. 121 
119 Harlan Cleveland, "Troubled Waters: The Formosa 
Strait," The Reporter, XII (January 13, 1955), 9. 
120Ibid., p. 10; Minneapolis Tribune, February 4, 1953. 
The United States navy was ·absolutely essential for any 
real offensive against the Chinese mainland. Major General 
William C. Chase, chief of the United States military assis-
tance advisory group on Formosa, reported that Chiang's 
forces could not be ready for any attack before early 1954 
even if the new Administration gave top priority to the 
Nationalists' needs on Formosa. Even then the United States 
navy would be needed for preparatory bombardment and to 
supply Chiang's troops. 
121The disposition of Formosa had served as a point of 
disagreement between the Taft Republicans, the old isola-
tionists, and the Asia-Firsters at an earlier day. Taft, 
contrary to the main stream of Republican thought on For-
mosa, on January 11, 1950, expressed his opinion that if at 
the peace conference with Japan it was decided that Formosa 
11 should be set up as an independent republic" then the Urii-
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The Mutual Defense Treaty with Chiang's government, as 
approved by the Senate on February 9, 1955, literally by-
passed the United Nations in providing defense for Formosa. 
The new isolationists had no regrets in regard to the Uni-
ted Nations; however, Judd felt that the backing of Ameri-
can friends in the United Nations, added to America's own 
well-known determination not to let Formosa be taken over, 
should deter any invasion if any advanced warning could 
deter it and defeat it if the Red Chinese were so irrational 
as to ignore the collective warning. The treaty as written 
was a blue print for going it alone on the part of the Uni-
ted States in Asia. But the Eisenhower Administration amply 
demonstrated that it wanted a neutralized Formosa, not an 
Asia-Firster "liberation" adventure on the mainland. 
The treaty, however, presented a possible block for 
aid from American allies through the United Nations if war 
had developed in the Straits of Formosa. The treaty did 
hobble American freedom in Asia; however, the Secretary of 
State felt that its value outwe,ighed the restrictions plac-
ed on the United States. But the question was still asked: 
ted States had "the means to force the Nationalists' sur-
render of Formosa. 11 Robert A. Taft, 11 'Hang On' To Formosa: 
Hold Until Peace Treaty With Japan Is Signed," Vital 
Speeches of the Day, XVI (February 1, 1950), 237. Taft, 
however, before his death chose to think and speak of For-
mosa as Chiang's private property. By 1954 the Republican 
Party was in full accord on the future of Formosa. 
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Why was such a treaty negotiated? Critics of the treaty 
charged that the Eisenhower Administration needed "a treaty 
with the fire-eating wing of the Republican Party. 11122 And 
it was a concession to the new isolationists and Asia-First-
ers, perhaps the best that could be offered short of "lib-
eration." 
The Eisenhower Administration demonstrated, less than 
two weeks previous to negotiat~ng the Mutual Defense Treaty, 
that it did not intend, any more than had the Truman Admin-
istration, to be drawn into a war with Red China, despite 
the demands of Judd, Knowland, and the entire China bloc. 
On November 22, 1954, a Red Chinese military tribunal sen-
tenced eleven United States airmen and two American Army 
employees to long prison terms as spies. These men had been 
captured in two groups when their planes were shot down dur-
ing the Korean conflict. The State Department sent a strong 
protest and the Defense Department cabled that the charges 
were "utterly false. 11 The President reacted by declaring 
that the United States would do everything "humanly possible 
within means" to obtain their release. Knowland, the Senate 
majority leader, however, urged a United States blockade of 
122
c1eveland, "Troubled Waters: The Formosa Straits," 
p. 10. 
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Red China until the Americans were released. 123 Perhaps 
Knowland was only recalling the Administration's threat of 
the previous year. The Asia-Firsters still regarded Eisen-
hewer's "strong talk" of a blockade as contributing to the 
end of fighting in Korea. 
Secretary of State Dulles, however, on November 29, 
1954, informed a Chicago audience that a United States 
blockade of Communist China would be an act of war and that 
imprisonment of the thirteen Americans was "a challenge to 
us ... to find ways, consistent with peace, to sustain inter-
national rights and justice." He further declared that the 
United States was obligated to settle disputes within the 
framework of the United Nations "in such a manner that in-
ternational peace is not endangered. 11 On December 1, 1954, 
however, the Secretary of State reported that a blockade 
was 11 certainly a possibility" if all peaceful efforts to 
obtain the release of the Americans failed. 124 
Despite Dulles' "possiblity" of employing a blockade 
against Red China and the great threat of massive retalia-
tion, the Red Chinese seized in August of 1954 the small 
offshore island of Ichiang, some 210 miles north of Formosa. 
123c . 1 ongress1ona Quarterly, China and UaQ.o Far East 
Policy, pp. 70-71. 
124Ibid., p. 71. 
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The Chinese Communists appeared prepared to invade the 
nearby Tachen Islands, more important than lchiang and lo,-
cated some 200 miles north of Formosa. Military strategists 
viewed this move as posing an imminent threat to the Nation-
alist stronghold on Formosa. Communist China had repeatedly 
declared its intention of taking Formosa and adjoining ter-
ritories. The activities of January 18, 1955, prompted the 
President to petition Congress on January 24, 1955, for ex-
plicit authority to use American armed forces to protect 
Formosa, the adjoining Pescadores Islands, and "related 
positions and territories. 11 It was essential to United 
States security, the President asserted, for Formosa to 
"remain in friendly hands." While "authority for some of 
the actions which might be required" was clearly his as 
Commander in Chief, the President declared, Congress should 
"make clear the unified and serious intentions" of the 
nation "to fight if necessary. 11 Congressional approval of 
the proposed resolution, Eisenhower said, would "clarify 
present policy" and help prevent the Communist forces from 
"misjudging American firm purpose and national unity. 11125 
Both the President and his Secretary of State, however, 
125u.s., Congressional Record, 84th Cong., 1st Sess., 
1955, CI, Part 1, 660; Congressional Quarterly, Congress 
and the Nation, 1945-1964; A Review of Government And Pol-
itics in the Postwar Years (Washington, Do C.: Congression-
al Quarterly Inc., 1965), p. 114, 
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failed to clarify exactly their intentions regarding Que-
moy, Matsu and other offshore islands, located little more 
than one hundred miles from Formosa. The Red Chinese had, 
in September, 1954, opened up heavy artillery fire on Que-
moy. The President did warn that the United States must 
"be alert to any concentration or employment of Chinese 
Communist forces obviously undertaken to facilitate attack 
upon Formosa, and be prepared to take appropriate military 
action. 11126 The message, however, only implied that the 
President with his newly acquired congressional support 
would commit American forces to repulse an invasion of 
Quemoy, wh~ch was still under Chinese Communist bombardment. 
The President, nevertheless, apparently wished to convey to 
Peking that he had full support of Congress to take any 
action that he deemed necessary. Surely Judd greeted the 
President's request with some reservation as it did not in-
elude the "liberation" of the mainland from the Communists 
which he and the China bloc desired. Judd, however, sup-
ported the measure as "a belated effort to prevent war, not 
k . .,127 to ma e it. Judd did not judge it necessary for the 
President to come to Congress for this authority, but he 
126Ibid. 
127 
. 1 d 84 h U.S., Conqress1ona Recor, t Cong., 1st Sess., 
1st Sess., 1955. 
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thought it wise that he did so, because it made the Ameri-
can position "stronger before those who threaten war and 
before the world." The appearance of the 11united front" 
which the President requested, Judd felt, was more likely 
h b . . b 128 to prevent wart an to ring it a out. 
The President's proposal met with 'near overwhelming 
Republican support. A few Democrats, however, viewed the 
offshore islands--excluding Formosa--as.clearly belonging 
to mainland China, and the question of-their disposition as 
falling outside of legitimate United States security in-
terests. These Democrats feared that Chiang Kai-shek, in 
an effort to regain the mainland, would use this "fatal 
ambiguity" over the offshore islands to maneuver the United 
States into a war with the mainland Communists. 
Perhaps Judd and the China bloc secretly held hope 
that the activities would lead to the "liberation" which 
they long desired. Despite their misgivings the Democratic 
129 
leaders in Congress complied with the President's request. 
h 1 · 1 · 1 · 130 h · d h ·a Te resu ting egis ation aut orize t.e Presi ent to 
employ the armed forces of the United States for protecting 
128
rrbid. I P•. 672 • 
129
rbid., pp. 641, 818, 821, 920, 991, 993; Congress-
ional Quarterly, Congress and the Nation, p. 114. 
13069 Stat. 7. 
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the security of Formosa, the Pescadores, and related posi-
tions and territories of that area. The ambiguity of the 
resolution cannot be denied, and perhaps secretly some Re-
publicans supported it for the very reason some Democrats 
feared it--indeed, the President had received a pre-dated 
blank check from the newly elected Democratic Congress. 
Perhaps the Democrats' most distressing default as 
active agents of bipartisanship was their failure to obtain 
a clarification of what they were called upon to authorize. 
Throughout the congressional debate there was an underlying 
confusion whether the new policy constituted retrenchment 
or advance on United States commitments to the Nationalist 
Chinese, whether it was an ultimatum.to.the Chinese Reds or 
a partial withdrawal leading ultimately to the neutraliza-
tion of Formosa under a United Nations trusteeship. The in-
dividual most responsible for the swift action on the Admin-
istration's request was Senator Walter George, Democrat of 
Georgia, the new Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee. 
Assistant Secretary of .state for Far Eastern Affairs 
Walter S. Robertson, a Judd nominee, had flown to Georgia, 
prior to the convening of Congress, to confer with George 
on the Formosa Mutual Defense Treaty. George in defending 
the resolution before the Senate could emphasize the assur-
ance which he recieved from the President: the President 
413 
alone would make the decisions going beyond the iITLmediate 
defense of Formosa and the Pescadores. 11 It means that no 
admiral here and no line officer off the coast of China, in 
the Formosa Straits, or elsewhere will start [a war], 11 
George said. Such Presidential assurance, was needed to win 
several Democrats to support the resolution. There was 
much anxiety among several Democrats as to whether Admiral 
Arthur Radford, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, or 
the President would decide when American security in Asia 
. . d 131 
was 1n Jeopar y. 
To Judd and the China bloc, however, America's security 
was in jeopardy as long as Red China remained a reality. 
Judd accepted the resolution with less enthusiasm than might 
be expected: 11 the most encouraging thing I see in the whole 
picture is the awareness of the nature of the Communist 
menace which the members of Congress are demonstrating over-
whelmingly.11132 Judd did, however, assert that he was 
greatly encouraged about the chances of peace in Asia be-
cause the Eisenhower Administration was 11 alert to the key 
role played by Asia in the fight against communism, 11 and 
131Douglas Cater, 11 Foreign Policy: Default of the Demo-
crats, 11 The Reporter, XII (March 10, 1955), 23; UoS,, Cong-
ressional Record, 84th Cong., 1st Sess., 1955, CI, Part l, 
819. 
132
uos., Congressional Record, 84th Cong., 1st Sess., 
1955, CI, Part 8, 10468. 
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because the United States had a global policy for the first 
t . 11133 1me. Even though the Eisenhower Administration was 
not willing to 11 break Red China," which Judd asserted was 
the "only lasting solution to the Conununist problem in 
Southeast Asia, 11134 he was willing to declare that it "is 
clear" that the Eisenhower Administration "realizes the 
nature of conununism and will not again take words as sub-
stitutes for deeds.n 135 
Judd was always most reluctant to criticize openly the 
Eisenhower Administration, Still, Judd's speaking implied 
that even a Republican Administration did not fully under-
stand the conununist adversary. Perhaps recalling his days 
with the Price Conunittee, Judd felt that the American popu-
lace was not active enough in their own defense, when he 
declared that "the generals try to build strength and unity 
while soft-headed civilians try to woo their enemies with 
136 
appeasement. 11 Surely, Judd realized that Eisenhower's 
foreign policy constituted in no greater sense a "global 
foreign policy11 than had the Truman foreign policy, that 
133 . 1 · M,1:nneai20 1s Star, February 19, 1955. 
134 . 1 · M1nneai20 1s 1,,ribune, April 22, 1954. 
135 . 1 · M1nnea120 1s Star, February 19, 1955. 
136Minnea12olis Tribune, October 29, 1952. 
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"liberation" was nothing more than masked containment. 
Evaluating the Eisenhower years, Judd could declare that Eis-
enhower' s policy of "containing communism" was II sound in con-
cept" and was founded largely under bipartisan agreements. 
But to Judd the American people did not give the needed II solid 
support" for the policy executed by the Eisenhower Administra-
tion, nor for the policies of the Republican Congress of 1953-
1954, as formulated by the China bloc. 138 Judd, however, rather 
than indict the Eisenhower Administration, or question the 
"soundness" of his own policies, could castigate the American 
people for the "national sickness" in believing that Russia 
could be diverted from its plan of world conquest by conces-
sions.139 In short, neither the President nor the American 
people clearly understood America's invincibility. 
Judd, apparently, continued to believe in the policy of 
"liberation" through stern political and military action. 
The voice of America, however, was the more moderate voice 
of President Eisenhower--and Judd did not like it. The cold 
war was to continue, but the President was determined that 
it was not to go Dr. Judd's way. 
137For a critical evaluation of the Eisenhower fo~eign 
policy see Brodie's article, "Unlimited Weapons and Limited 
War," 16-21. 
138Minneapolis Star, January 11, 1961. 
139Minneapolis Tribune, October 7, 1961. 
CHAPTER VII 
EPILOGUE 
A review of Judd's Congressional career will ~eveal 
that accomplishments were slight if judged on the basis of 
legislation proposed. Perhaps his most significant role in 
Congress can be found on the House floor or behind the scenes 
in his vigorous oratorical ability and his persistent activ-
ities to obtain passage of legislation which he deemed im-
portant to the security of the country. Judd was a crusader 
rather than an innovator. His real contributions can perhaps 
be judged through his ability to dramatize issues anq to lead 
those Congressmen who looked to him for advice and counsel 
as a great expert on all Asian matters. It was this ability 
to dramattze issues that was to establish Judd as a spokesman 
for the Republican Party, particularly on questions relating 
to the Pacific area. He soon emerged as one of the most 
prominent figures in the "China bloc, 11 a group of pro_-Chiang 
critics· of the Truman Administration foreign policy after 
World War II. More perhaps than any other man, Judd helped 
to build up a tremendous following for Chiang in the United 
416 
1 States. 
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This same talent accounts for the rapid su~ge in Judd's 
popularity as a public speaker. He became one of the most 
widely-known Congressmen outside his own district and one of the 
most sought after speakers not only at partisan fuhctions, 
but for gatherings as diversified as national and state edu-
cation, dental, and medical groups, commencement exercises, 
1 . 
The Washington Post, on November 29, 1964, noted how 
death, retirement, and loss of interest took their toll of 
the original stalwarts of the China Lobby: "'Of the people 
most prominently identified with the 'China Lobby,' Senators 
McCarran and McCarthy, as well as Senator Styles Bridges 
{R.-N.H.) are dead. Senators William F. Knowland (R.-Calif.) 
and William E. Jenner (R.-Ind.) are obscurely out of office. 
Of the military members, General Claire Ch.ennaul t and Patrick 
J. Hurley are dead; General Albert C. Wedemeyer and Admiral 
Arthur W. Radford are retired, Of the civilian officials, 
Ambassador William C. Bullitt, Pennsylvania Governor George 
A. Earle and Walter Robertson, Secretary of State for Far 
Eastern Affaira are long retired. Of the private citizens, 
Alfred Kohlberg, the importer of Chinese lace handkerchiefs 
who headed the American China Policy Association, is dead; 
Henry R. Luce, Publisher.of Time, Inc., now takes a less ac-
tive role in his organization; hts wife, Clare Boothe Luce, 
recently did a public turnabout on United States~China pol-
icy;, William Loeb; publisher of the Manchester (N" Ho) Union-
Leader, has lost voice in his own state, and author Freda 
Utley, the frequent congressional witness, is now introducing 
herself at Washington cocktail parties. . . 
"'The one member of the 'China Lobby' still active, 
former Representative Walter H. Judd (R.-Minn.), a one-time 
missionary doctor in China, now speaks for the 'Committee of 
One Million,' a group which one American official guardedly 
called 'a term rather than a reality."' A. T. Steele, The 
American People And China (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Com-
pany, 1966), p. 239. 
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college and university seminars, or for the National Conven-
tion of the DAR. 
Judd's platform style and subject matter seldom failed 
to arouse pungent reaction from both critic and admirer. 
Perhaps Judd's "supreme moment" in his public speaking career 
came on July 25, 1960, when he delivered the Republican Na-
tional Convention keynote address in Chicago. A reporter for 
the Minneapolis Star commented: "His poise, his rhetoric, 
his familiarity with his subject, his pauses, his natural 
gestures shoved him to oratorical heights which may not be 
surpassed at this convention or any other for a long, long 
time. 112 ;In contrast, and with less charity for Judd as a 
person than for his oratorical ability, Theodore White re-
ported: "The keynote address was made by Congressman Walter 
H. Judd: since Rockefeller, who loves people, had not wished 
to make it, the Republican National Committee had chosen 
Judd, who is a master at arousing hate; and Judd made the 
rafters roar and the benches shake" as he skillfully utiliz-
ed the "old fashioned Minnesota Populist knack of heating 
3 the political blood," to lift his Republican brethren to 
share with him the delight of the sounds of stern, harsh, 
2Minneapolis Star, .July .26, 1960. 
3Theodore H. White, The Making of the President, 1960 
(New York: Atheneum Publishers, 1961), p. 206. 
419 
demanding words. 
Judd's style and personality do not promote objectivitr 
from either friend or critic. His repetitious ninety minute 
speeches seem always to mesmerize his followers, who appar-
ently want only to be told, and then told again, never tir-
ing of being told, that the United States and the Republi-
cans are good and that the Communists and the Democrats are 
not. Judd has mastered the technique of rousing passions 
where thought might better serve. Whether familiar with 
subject matter or not--a source of considerable debate--Judd 
is always ready to express himself freely, in seemingly 
well-rehearsed and frequently stated phrases which are often 
meaningless cliches, delivered with gatling-gun speed. 
There is, however, a sincere, earnest, positive, but still 
defensive and self-righteous air about every sentence he 
utters in public--perhaps these are traits of the "martyr 
complex." He eagerly and vocally offers to 11 sacrifice" him-
self for the cause of the moment. When confronted with the 
possibility that he might lose in the new Fifth District of 
Minne~polis in 1962, Judd replied in usual form: "I've been 
fighting for losing causes all my life. I won't back down 
just because of that. 114 Judd apparently took great pride 
in asserting that he never "asked for a vote" in his politi-
4Minneapolis Star, April 7, 1962. 
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cal career. After losing the election in 1962 to Donald M. 
Fraser, Judd attacked his victorious opponent in odious 
terms. This prompted from Fraser an assessment of Judd's 
attacks which may be the most apt description of Judd's ap-
proach to individuals or groups who differed with him poli-
tically: "[Judd's] inability to accept or comprehend that 
individuals might prefer a point different from his own, no 
matter how sincerely held, is almost unbelievable. 115 With 
the passage of time Judd appears to have taken as a personal 
affront any opposition to his policies. By the early 
1960's, many constituents of the Fifth District began to see 
in Judd the "apotheosis of narrow thinking, the dividing 
line between rationalism and extremism. 116 
Judd's partisanship was notorious. Excess has always 
characterized his busy schedule, whether as a super-charged 
Republican campaigner, regardless of the tint of his Repub-
lican brethren, or in his almost evangelistic determination 
to assist China. Just as Judd's evangelistic heritage led 
him to the foreign mission field, this same dri~e propelled 
him throughout his congressional career. As an over-confi-
dent moralist Judd was for the most part unable to bend, to 
see how right or wrong might appear from the opponent's 
5 Minneaoolis Tribune, December 22, 1962. 
6Minneaoolis Tribune, March 10, 1966. 
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position. His criterion was one of absolute right and 
wrong. Thus, Judd as a political moralizer possessed an 
advantage over many of his opponents who argued policies on 
more rational grounds; he could simply draw a line that ex-
cluded some possibilities as immoral. 
There are those critics who view Judd as one of the 
most adroit of chameleonic politicians; there are those 
supporters who see in him a great man of boundless know-
ledge, whose integrity is above reproach; and then there 
are those persons who view him as an honest b1..1.t misguided 
soul. A whole host of political labels have been associated 
or attached to Judd, varying from the "left" of a "new 
:liberal II to his own descr~ption of himself as a "progressive 
conservative," or to the 11 reactionary right. 11 Judd has of-
ten spoken of himself as "really a Jeffersonian Democrat at 
heart, 11 and asserts that the only way he can "fight for the 
Jeffersonian principles is through the Republican Party. 117 
A close observation of Judd's speaking and voting in the 
House will readily reveal evidence for the development of 
those varied political labels. 
His congressional career, however, if viewed with re-
straint, reveals why he retained a semblance of respectibil-
ity among nearly all political factions. Serving as a pro-
7Minneapolis Tribune, August 25, 1960. 
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minent representative of a bipartisan foreign policy, he 
remained a severe critic of the China policy of the Demo-
crats. Yet he found himself not always satisfied with many 
Republican maneuvers in Asia. Judd apparently felt that 
some of the sting could be removed by heaping additional 
blame on the Democratic Party. On one occasion Representa-
tive Wayne Hays, a Democrat of Ohio, admonished Judd for 
one of his speeches by asking why similar programs, if 
suggested by a Democrat, became "a Democratic give-away" 
and if suggested by a Republican became "statemanship. 118 
Judd made no reply. 
Always eager to accept the challenge to defend those 
things he held dear, Judd would readily lend his name and 
voice, on his terms alone, to those groups who like himself 
felt that the United States was on the verge of, if not al-
ready irrevocably committed to, an error or irremediable 
proportions. It was the responsibility of the "enlightened 
few" to carry forth the historic perspective of the national 
interest. Judd was first and foremost an American patriot 
who viewed his country as the only hope for the redemption 
of mankind. Seemingly, Judd held that the sole solution 
for the great perplexing international problems rested with 
the force of Christianity as dictated by the United States. 
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Only when America redeemed the wor·ld would universal fellow-
ship and service abide with resulting peace and harmony. 
Despite the lofty origin of his motivation, however, his 
ethical convictions often turned out to serve his own more 
earthbound interest--but he always denied by his actions 
and words that there were any weaknessess on his own part. 
Judd, often lacking in a sense of relativity, adapted his 
arguments to the times very neatly. The guideline for his 
speaking and voting in the House perhaps can best be summed 
up in his own words: "a Congressman should be guided, in 
his voting, less by what the voters of his disLrict want 
9 him to do than by what he thinks he ought to do." 
9
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